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Abstract 
 
De-radicalisation has become increasingly prevalent in the UK’s counter-terrorism 
policy as a strategy for tackling the threat of religiously inspired violence/extremism. 
Recently, British citizens fighting in Middle Eastern conflicts have rekindled the 
preoccupation of policymakers with the radicalisation of British Muslims.  In fact the 
work of PREVENT post 2011 has primarily been recalibrated towards a greater focus 
on de-radicalisation interventions, which is delivered by the police through the 
Channel programme. Channel is perceived by policy-makers to be a more 
streamlined and effective way of dealing with radicalised/extremist individuals than 
the wide remit of PREVENT initiatives between 2006 and 2010. Indeed since 
becoming placed on a statutory footing in 2015, PREVENT requires public 
institutions, like schools and universities, to identify ‘vulnerable’ individuals’ at risk of 
radicalisation. And yet despite the greater attention on de-radicalisation, very little 
continues to be known about what makes violent individuals leave terrorism behind. 
De-radicalisation in PREVENT is characterised by the absence of credible research, 
little or no empirical evidence for policy development, confusion surrounding its 
conceptual framework, and conflicting policy logics.  
 
The following thesis is based on a case-study examination of de-radicalisation with 
27 PREVENT practitioners. Through qualitative semi-structured interviews, my 
investigation seeks to address the problems that arise from the concept and practice 
of de-radicalisation in PREVENT by ascertaining (a) an ontological understanding of 
de-radicalisation and (b) the practice of de-radicalisation. The findings of the 
fieldwork data revealed the existence of multiple conceptions of de-radicalisation and 
a number of conceptual features unique to the UK context. Despite yielding a more 
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fruitful conceptual and empirical understanding of de-radicalisation, the data in itself 
nevertheless could not fully explicate the relationship between several critical themes 
comprehensively within an analytically generative framework. 
 
With the inductive method falling short, I draw on Michel Foucault’s concept of the 
‘technologies of the self’. Comprising of discursive, disciplinary, and confessional 
technologies, it is argued that the technologies of the self allows us to reframe the 
concept beyond the narrow confines of counter-terrorism policy and place it within 
wider governmental relations. Situated within neo-liberal governmentality, the 
technologies of the self encourage individuals to work on themselves and regulate 
their behaviour through a wide range of discursive, practical, and technical 
interventions. Seen in this way, de-radicalisation is therefore less about the 
mitigation of violence and more about the making of a particular political and ethical 
subjectivity. 
 
Ultimately, the technology of the self eschews the conceptual problems inherent in 
the PREVENT conception of de-radicalisation, the limitations evident in the literature, 
whilst amplifying the salient findings of my fieldwork data. It provides a more robust 
concept and theory that successfully captures and explains de-radicalisation in the 
UK context. This thesis thus makes an original contribution to knowledge by (1) 
being the first study to gather primary data on de-radicalisation in the UK; (2) offering 
an alternative concept of de-radicalisation; and (3) contributing to theories on the 
governmentality of radicalisation policies, focusing on the micro-politics of identity in 
neoliberal governance. 
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Introduction 
 
What we are fighting, in Islamist extremism, is an ideology. It is an extreme doctrine. 
And like any extreme doctrine, it is subversive. At its furthest end it seeks to destroy 
nation-states to invent its own barbaric realm. And it often backs violence to achieve 
this aim – mostly violence against fellow Muslims – who don’t subscribe to its sick 
worldview. But you don’t have to support violence to subscribe to certain intolerant 
ideas which create a climate in which extremists can flourish. Ideas which are hostile 
to basic liberal values such as democracy, freedom and sexual equality…  
                                
                                 (Prime Minister David Cameron ‘Extremism’ Speech, July 2015) 
 
We need to now be less precious about the private space. This is not about us 
invading private thoughts, but acknowledging that it is in these private spaces where 
this [extremism] first germinates. The purpose of private-space intervention is to 
engage, explore, explain, educate or eradicate. Hate and extremism is not 
acceptable in our society, and if people cannot be educated, then hate and harmful 
extremism must be eradicated through all lawful means.  
 
                                                 (Scotland Yard Commander, Mak Chishty May 2015) 
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 Le Problematique: what is De-radicalisation? 
 
Following the terrorist attacks on London in 2005, a key question has occupied 
British policymakers and public discourse: why do some young British Muslims 
legitimise, and in some cases, adopt violence against the state? How do young 
British Muslim become radicalised? Governments and policymakers in Europe 
invested a lot of financial, political, and emotional capital into the discursive 
production of radicalisation in order to answer the question, as well into a policy 
designed to ‘prevent’ radicalisation. The UK government responded to the 
challenges of violent radicalisation through its counter-terrorism Strategy 
(CONTEST) (HO 2006; 2009; 2011). In its efforts to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of 
British Muslims in the struggle against violent radicalisation, the strategy focused on 
preventing the long-term causes of radicalisation through the PREVENT strand of 
CONTEST. CONTEST was launched in 2003 and became public in late 2006 (HC 
2010, 7). CONTEST comprises of four ‘P’s’ (HO 2011): (1) ‘Prevent’: preventing 
people from being drawn into extremism; (2) ‘Pursue’:  pursuing those who become 
involved in planning; (3) ‘Protect’: protecting critical national infrastructure to reduce 
vulnerabilities and populations; (4) ‘Prepare’: preparing to manage the 
consequences of attack. 
However, since 2011 PREVENT has readjusted the focus of counter-terrorism 
initiatives towards something called ‘de-radicalisation’ (HO 2011, 56).  Indeed ‘de-
radicalisation’ has become somewhat of a buzzword amongst policymakers. In 
September 2014, UK Prime Minister David Cameron announced that British jihadists 
returning from Iraq and Syria would be forced to attend de-radicalisation 
programmes to ‘reverse their warped brainwashing’ (Whitehead 2014). In the 
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aftermath of the Paris attacks in January 2015, Cameron also championed the 
development of de-radicalisation in his discussion with Barak Obama at the White 
House. They discussed moving towards tackling hard-line ideologies, with American 
and British officials devising plans that ‘will focus on ways of working with Muslim 
communities to challenge extremist thought and designing deradicalisation 
programmes’ (Morris 2015). Elite policy-makers have thus conceived de-
radicalisation as a vital instrument of counterterrorism in the fight against violent 
radicalisation.   
Meanwhile, since receiving Royal Assent in February 2015, the Counter-Terrorism 
and Security Bill has enshrined de-radicalisation in statutory law, thereby ensuring it 
now plays a pivotal role in the management of public spaces and the regulation of 
public conduct. The Act made Channel– the UK’s voluntary de-radicalisation 
programme for people ‘at risk’ of radicalisation – a legal requirement for public 
bodies so that it is delivered consistently across the country (CTSA 2015). Schools, 
universities, NHS trusts, nurseries and local councils are compelled to identity 
‘vulnerable’ and ‘at-risk’ individuals and report them to Channel. In time this 
inevitably will lead to greater investment of resources, whether financial capital or 
man power. Making de-radicalisation a legal requirement has not only expanded its 
operation and reach nationally, but has also further ensconced it institutionally into 
structures of governance in the UK.  
As an instrument of counter-terrorism, de-radicalisation is supposed to provide the 
police and policymakers with a more selective, targeted, and structured approach to 
tackling the threat of terrorism. It is also supposed to do away with the blanket and 
problematic approach characterising PREVENT initiatives between 2006 and 2010 
(See chapter 6, section 1). However, in contrast to counter-part programmes in the 
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Middle East (M.E.) and Southeast Asia (S.E.A)1, de-radicalisation in the UK is 
distinguished by several key features: (1) it is aimed at ‘vulnerable’ youths who have 
not committed a crime but are deemed ‘extremist’; (2) interventions primarily take 
place outside of prisons; (3) interventions require the involvement of civil society and 
public institutions in identifying radicalisation; (4) it targets youngsters; and (5) it 
focuses on the primacy of ‘Weltanschauung’ or worldview in behaviour explanations 
of radicalisation, consequently valorising counter-ideological approaches in 
interventions.  
And yet despite the growing prevalence of de-radicalisation in UK counter-terrorism 
policy, little continue to be known about these programmes and about what de-
radicalisation as a concept actually means. Questions about de-radicalisation have 
also remained underexplored: is it possible to reverse years of cultural, religious, 
educational, and political conditioning? Can somebody’s ‘worldview change’ change 
through debate and discussion? Is it possible to dissuade people from supporting or 
adopting violence? Does changing a person’s behaviour depend on changing their 
views? How do we prevent people from committing terrorism? Is de-radicalisation 
really a norm free tool of governance, a means to ‘protect the vulnerable’, secure a 
healthy identity for individuals, and a way to ensure that youngster are diverted from 
radicalisation?  As an area of academic study therefore, de-radicalisation remains 
unchartered terrain.  
Notwithstanding the absence of knowledge on de-radicalisation and its novelty as a 
counter-terrorism initiative in the UK, the PREVENT strategy presents a number of 
challenging problems.  First, there appears to be confusion regarding the underlying 
                                                          
1
 Those programmes are primarily (1) based in prisons; (2) target convicted criminals, militants, and 
terrorists; and (3) aimed at collective groups (Bjorgo & Horgan 2009; ICSR 2010). 
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purpose of de-radicalisation. On the one hand de-radicalisation generally posits as a 
rehabilitative model targeted at individuals who have already crossed the line and 
pose a threat. It is thus underscored by the notion that ‘we are going to make you 
good and/or better’. On the other hand de-radicalisation sits within PREVENT, 
whose underlying logic is ‘prevention is better than cure’ and suggests that ‘we are 
here to stop you from becoming bad’. The logic of ‘cure’, to use the medical 
vocabulary of this policy domain, has been intertwined with that of ‘prevention’; one 
is an act of reversal, the other pre-emptive.   
A second problem is the wide ambit of concern governing de-radicalisation 
interventions. For example, the PREVENT strategy exhibits a preoccupation with a 
future orientated temporality; something could happen in the future, which in 
conjunction with the immanency of the threat justifies corrective interventions in the 
present. This logic operates outside of juridical spaces: since those deemed 
‘extremist’ and ‘radical’ have not committed a crime, have not even breached the 
law, the future oriented logic underpinning de-radicalisation shifts attention way to 
from the juridical realm and towards another sphere altogether; and it is in this space 
of the non-juridical, one geared towards shepherding the ‘Weltanschauung’ of British 
Muslim youngsters, that the terrain of PREVENT strategy and de-radicalisation 
intervention takes place.  In other words, it targets individuals who have not even 
committed a crime but who merely harbour certain ideas deemed as ‘extremist’. 
As a result, the third problem relates to the disjuncture between what policymakers 
say de-radicalisation is about on the one hand, e.g. ‘preventing radicalisation’, and 
what it seems to be doing on the other, e.g. policing thought crimes. It effectively 
moves the objective of policy-makers towards other concerns beyond only reducing 
the potentiality of violence: particular ideas, behaviours, and practices in the 
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temporality of the present become problematic. Religious, political, and dissenting 
ideas and behaviour of religious and racial others therefore acquire greater 
significance, becoming objects of apprehension and existential concern, some of 
which has been reflected in public debates on multiculturalism, identity, and 
immigration, amongst other issues, in a way that transcends the narrow scope of 
counterterrorism.   
Finally, the most surprisingly problem presented by de-radicalisation in the UK is the 
fact that there is not a single conceptual, theoretical, and empirical study on de-
radicalisation in the UK (corroborated in chapter 2). The scant literature on de-
radicalisation brings to light the fact that de-radicalisation as a policy rests not only 
on insubstantial evidence but underscores how little we continue to know about the 
precise details of the process of de-radicalisation, the profile of individuals 
undergoing interventions, and the success rate of de-radicalisation interventions. 
Even though de-radicalisation has become a centralised programme sanctioned by 
statutory law, there remains a marked absence of robust conceptual framework 
underpinning de-radicalisation interventions, not to mention an evidence-based 
approach to policy development.  
 
 
The Challenges of Investigating De-radicalisation  
 
When it comes to de-radicalisation we have seen the deep disjuncture that exists 
between the popular uses of the term, the way the concept is formulated, the actual 
programme on the ground, the process of de-radicalisation itself, and then what we 
know of it in the literature. Linked to this is the striking absence of an attempt to 
analyse and codify the rules, operations, concepts, and theories of de-radicalisation. 
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In other words, the emergence of de-radicalisation occurred without an invested 
concern for ontology. As a concept tied to policy objectives, de-radicalisation was 
conceived as a policy strategy (fight terrorism, reverse radicalism, and reduce the 
risk of re-offending), before it was conceived as a concept. As a researcher 
endeavouring to study the phenomenon of de-radicalisation amidst such a 
fragmented and immature picture, where does one begin? How do we study it? And 
what are policies of de-radicalisation supposed to look like? It transpired very early 
on in the research process that if I was going to do any justice to my inquiry into de-
radicalisation, some heavy-lifting would be required.  
This thorny state of affairs was further exacerbated by the contested, ideological, 
and politicised discourse on radicalisation-a new and recent knowledge domain with 
its own considerable research and conceptual issues. And yet it became quickly 
evident that no study of de-radicalisation could be undertaken without 
comprehending and dissecting the discursive formation of radicalisation that 
preceded it. For de-radicalisation shares, prima facie, similar conceptual features 
with radicalisation; etymologically, the ‘de’ that prefixes the term ‘radicalisation’ 
connotes the relationship between both concepts. More importantly, the conceptual 
features associated with de-radicalisation- the importance of ideology, the causal 
relationship between thought and action, the significance of identity, and the fact it is 
conceived as a linear process affecting individuals- bear the ontological fingerprints 
of radicalisation. It is therefore ‘radicalisation’ that is dominant in ‘de-radicalisation’ 
because it constitutes the reference point upon which it acquires it signification, since 
de-radicalisation cannot exist outside an understanding of radicalisation. The 
suturing role played by radicalisation conceptually in counter-terrorism and de-
radicalisation then begged a whole range of other questions: Why radicalisation and 
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not terrorism? What is radicalisation? Why did it not exist before? Why is 
radicalisation a new security challenge? What is the relationship between 
radicalisation and de-radicalisation?  
 
Another challenge confronting the researcher of de-radicalisation is that it sits within 
the PREVENT strategy, which is regarded as a controversial government policy. 
Amongst a whole panoply of other issues associated with PREVENT, it was officially 
acknowledged by parliamentarians, practitioners, academics and civil society 
organisations to have been a muddled policy that focused its activities on intelligence 
gathering and counter-subversion rather than countering violent radicalisation; 
wastefully expended public money on irrelevant community projects, and fostered 
divisions within Muslim communities, promoted envy between Muslim communities 
and other communities, and severing the trust between government and Muslim 
communities. This emotionally laden policy area presses itself upon any attempt to 
conduct a robust, independent, and interest-free investigation. Not to mention the 
difficultly of securing fieldwork interviews with practitioners and stakeholders in a 
low-trust policy domain that is characterised by as much mistrust and suspicion that 
exists in Prevent.   
 
That de-radicalisation is a PREVENT initiative also makes research challenging 
given that it is a dynamic and constantly evolving strategy. In a space of six years, 
for example, we have seen three iterations of PREVENT, all of which have been 
accompanied by substantial changes in its approach, where the flow of resources 
go, changing terminology, and the altering profile of practitioners who are ‘in’- vis-à-
vis those who are ‘out’. We often forget that PREVENT belongs to an important and 
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bustling policy area that has to be responsive to political events and the influx of the 
latest research, both of which have demonstrably been integrated into the PREVENT 
documents more than once during its lifespan since 2006. This rapidly shifting policy 
domain, accompanied by a lexicographic field resembling the game of musical-
chairs, and supported by a hyper research area moulded by contributions from 
various disciplines on a one time basis,  presented an external form of pressure to 
perpetually remain on top of developments in relation to de-radicalisation.  
 
The last problem PREVENT threw at me was that de-radicalisation is administered 
by the Police. Although Channel is public facing, it is nonetheless a highly 
confidential programme that precludes access to interventions, the name of mentors, 
and the profile of individuals undergoing de-radicalisation. Conducting ethno-graphic 
fieldwork to observe de-radicalisation in real-time, interview radicalised subject to 
ascertain the phenomenological experience of being ‘de-radicalised’, or interviewing 
mentors to acquire the ‘ins and outs’ of de-radicalisation was consequently not a 
feasible option for me.        
  
So, provoked as I was by the questions highlighted in the previous section and 
motivated to resolve the barriers mentioned above, my research examines the 
ontological framework of de-radicalisation using the case study method. It does this 
by conducting qualitative interviews with experts and practitioners of de-
radicalisation and PREVENT. The rationale behind this approach was that primary 
data would ground my investigation and therefore enable me to deal with substance 
over mere conjecture, and new data over canned material. Speaking to experts with 
years of experience and intimate knowledge of the field behind them would also 
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enhance the credibility of my findings. Furthermore, speaking to a wide range of 
experts hailing from a plethora of diverse organisations, positions, interests, political 
affiliations, at different levels of the policy-making process would allow me to tease 
out multiple interpretations in a way that goes against the conventional grain in this 
area, dominated as it is by binary perspectives (e.g. ‘moderates’ vs ‘extremists’). 
This would augment the usefulness, validity, and purchase of my research data. My 
focus on ontology therefore is an attempt to say something substantial about de-
radicalisation, in a way that is neglected in the literature and marginalised by 
policymakers. 
 
I also decided to investigate de-radicalisation with an open mind to embracing 
various perspectives. What had started off as a data driven and conceptual study of 
de-radicalisation with a focus on policy and with a firm grounding in methodology 
within the disciplines of politics and international relations broadly, also quickly 
morphed into a theoretical thesis that drew inspiration from the disciplines of 
philosophy, history, sociology, anthropology, and Islamic Studies. Although being 
immersed in the literature of several disciplines proved to be an immensely enriching 
experience, it was in reality borne out of sheer necessity. It was the only way that I 
could overcome many of the intellectual cul-de-sacs characterising the field of 
counter-terrorism and the study of radicalisation and de-radicalisation. The 
conceptual tools of traditional international relations and political theory in some 
instances were not particularly helpful. For example, both disciples have little ability 
to examine ‘religion’, besides being seen as a form of ideology, like false 
consciousness, or dated value system within modernisation theory. Hence I dipped 
into sociology, anthropology, Islamic studies, and philosophy in order to understand 
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the role of religion within the wider discussion surrounding radicalisation. As a result, 
the following book is replete with multi-disciplinary references and is driven by a 
heterodox spirit.  
 
At this juncture is it vital to say something about my use of this strange term 
‘ontology’.  In the case of de-radicalisation, I use the word in two ways. In the first 
instance, I use it in the sense of getting to the bottom of what gives something its 
thingness. What is this thing that we are talking about? What, also, makes the thing 
we are talking about, namely de-radicalisation, de-radicalisation? What has to be 
present for de-radicalisation to be de-radicalisation? What does it comprise of? What 
is it that I am studying?   Ontology is the most fundamental question because it starts 
with the basics. Before we can talk about solutions to tackling radicalisation (why) 
and the process we go about doing this (how), we need to know what it is that we 
are proposing as the solution.  My concern for ontology means I am interested in the 
conceptual framework of de-radicalisation. 
 
The second use of ‘ontology’ aligns with the use of post-structuralist ontology 
inspired by the likes of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Judith Butler. We can 
make sense of post-structuralist ontologies in contradistinction to both Realist and 
Constructivist conception of ontology. Material ontology states what counts for 
something is its material existence. Interests are pre-given and fixed. According to 
this concept, de-radicalisation exists in the real world with fixed properties that are 
universally true from which we can generate universal laws about its nature, which 
accurately coincide with the term and concept we designate for it.  In contrast, the 
Constructivist position, which takes its cue from idealist thinking, posits that reality is 
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constructed primarily by ideas. It is this immaterial conception of reality that led 
International Relations Constructivist theorist Alexander Wendt (1999) to claim that 
the world is made up of ideas ‘all the way down’. This position is primarily an 
ideational and linguistic one that would claim that the reality of de-radicalisation is 
constructed through language, culture, and identity. 
 
For post-structuralism however, the material is not eviscerated. The material world 
does exist but only acquires intelligibility and meaning through discourse.  Discourse 
here is not just language but a framework of significations that shapes and 
constrains the way that people think and behave. The meaning of something only 
occurs in relation to a whole range of references, say the way that a hammer only 
makes sense in relation to nails, wood, carpenter, houses, and other things too 
otherwise it would be rendered an incomprehensible and useless metal object.  Also, 
the way the hammer is discursively framed determines whether I see it as equipment 
used in carpentry or a weapon deployed to hit an aggressor with.  With respect to 
de-radicalisation post-structuralist ontology would agree that de-radicalisation exists 
in the real world but that the way it is framed, understood, and disseminated is 
mediated through discourse and representation. Hence I attempt to ascertain a 
better picture of de-radicalisation in the UK context by finding out how it has been 
discursively framed and whether a coherent portrait of it emerges that would allow us 
to describe how it operates in the real world.  
  
This discursive framing however does not occur in a vacuum but is shaped by history 
and politics, coalescing in a certain form for a particular purpose. Specifically, it is in 
this sense that Foucauldian ontology is considered radical because it contends that 
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reality as we know it is the result of social practices and struggles over truth and 
objectivity- what he calls ‘truth-games’- effectively exposing the constitutive role of 
power in shaping reality. This forms the philosophical background underpinning my 
argument in this book. Chapter 4 elaborates in greater detail Foucault’s ontology and 
how it informs the theoretical structures of chapters 5, 6, and 7 of this thesis to 
analyse my fieldwork data.  As a result of employing a post-structuralist ontology, a 
crucial output of this book will therefore be a more contextualised understanding of 
de-radicalisation.  
 
Indeed one of the glaring failures of the literature on de-radicalisation is the 
ahistorical approach to understanding programmes, as well an overall neglect of the 
social-political context that allows such a phenomenon to emerge. Much of the 
discussion does not move beyond the domain of counter-terrorism. And yet the 
multifaceted challenges surrounding de-radicalisation contradict this narrow debate. 
The study of terrorism must involve analysing the discourses that give the term 
meaning in conjunction with the social and political institutions that produce and 
disseminate them, as well as the wider context that make such discourse possible, 
not least endow them with traction. Inspired by post-structuralist ontology, I argue 
that what de-radicalisation is and what it means cannot be separated from the 
historical and political context in which de-radicalisation is being discussed. In fact 
the idea and practice of de-radicalisation impinges on multiple policy areas and 
issues, attested, as you will see, in chapter 1. 
Notably however my ontological investigation primarily focuses on the concept and 
understanding of de-radicalisation. The data elucidates how practitioners, who are 
involved with, work in, or are familiar with the way de-radicalisation operates in 
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Prevent, view and understand de-radicalisation. Recapitulating my argument in 
previous paragraphs, de-radicalisation does exist in the real world. It just exists 
meaningfully in the world in different ways, shaped by how it is framed discursively, 
and how it relates to the historical and political context in which it is discussed.   
However, my investigation will attempt to provide a concept and theory for making 
sense of the practices of de-radicalisation. The coordinated activities directed 
towards tackling the risk (distinct from threat) of radicalisation and extremism in the 
UK, pushed by government, and affecting all society is an evolving and constantly 
transforming practice. The alternative concept I propose to conceptualise de-
radicalisation in chapter 4 can be applied to describe the practice of de-radicalisation 
in the UK. This is because the concept and theory I outline employs a Foucauldian 
Interpretive Analytics, which presents an analytically strong framework for studying 
the human world; it encompasses the interconnected relationship between discourse 
(knowledge/power), disciplinary institutions (bodies), and subjectification (the identity 
of subjects). That these also sit within a theory of government makes such an 
analytical framework relevant and applicable to the concrete reality of our present 
day context. This investigation will therefore offer a more accurate and deeper way 
of describing the concept and practice of de-radicalisation in the UK.   
Accordingly, this book is based upon PhD fieldwork conducted for eighteen months 
between December 2011 and May 2013, in which 27 Prevent and de-radicalisation 
practitioners were interviewed. The following also tries to answer a number of 
questions that arise from the above problematique of de-radicalisation:  
 What is de-radicalisation? 
 What is the purpose of de-radicalisation interventions?  
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 Why are policymakers concerned with what young Muslims are thinking? 
 What does the hitherto non-juridical location of intervention says about the 
policy?  
 How can de-radicalisation interventions be justified in the absence of 
empirical evidence about the process of de-radicalisation?  
 Why has no substantial academic work on the subject been undertaken?  
 
Notwithstanding such objectives, it must also be explicitly mentioned that it is not the 
purpose of this research to investigate how de-radicalisation occurs in a positivist 
way and neither does it attempt to offer an explanation of the best way to de-
radicalise radicalised subjects. This investigation is not, in other words, concerned 
with the question of process or with any normative proposal for how interventions 
should be done or improved.  Those questions fall outside the scope of the thesis. 
 
Why De-radicalisation is Important 
 
By gathering primary data and thinking rigorously through de-radicalisation 
conceptually, this thesis attempts to arrive at a more meaningful analytical 
framework that moves beyond the sensational headlines, the politicised discourse, 
and the contentious claims made by commentators on the topic. Invoking the post-
structuralist normative spirit, this thesis seeks to disrupt the dominant binaries 
characterising the discourse and implementation of de-radicalisation, e.g.  Islamism 
vs. British values, vulnerable vs. radical, integrated vs. violent, moderate vs. 
extremism, cognitive vs. behaviour, etc. The dominant securitisation topos and with 
its positivist episteme that determines the way we think about de-radicalisation has 
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marginalised other crucial ways of examining it. It has relegated and closed off a 
world of nuance, layers, and multiplicity. The following book is interested in opening 
up alternative spaces of thought and analysis, one that will prove significant to 
policymakers, academics, everyday citizens, not least citizens of the Muslim religion.   
 
Consequently, given the priority invested in tackling radicalisation and terrorism in 
the UK, the findings of this investigation will be of great relevance to policymakers.2 
Now that the Channel programme is expanding, de-radicalisation is likely to play a 
greater role in counter-terrorism and in the management of public spaces against 
extremism. This has not hitherto been helped by the existing limitations of the 
PREVENT conception of de-radicalisation, which is currently mired in confusion. 
Moreover, the question of de-radicalisation touches upon some of the biggest, if not 
most pressing concerns of our age: security, identity, and religion. Yet without such 
an understanding on de-radicalisation, we are left with inadequate analysis that 
creates the condition for ill-informed policy decisions. 
 
This research is also pertinent academically. De-radicalisation offers an account of 
human behaviour.3 For example, as a concept, de-radicalisation is premised on the 
notion that behavioural transformation can occur through thought reform and that 
agency resides in ‘cognitive change’. De-radicalisation claims to be able to make 
                                                          
2
 One of the most influential think-tanks working in this field- the Quilliam Foundation- has 
acknowledged in a recent paper ‘In and Out of Extremism’ the conceptual challenges raised in one of 
my article’s on de-radicalisation (Quilliam 2015, 25), which proves the relevance of de-radicalisation 
to policymakers. Elsewhere the paper also states: ‘Analysing behaviour around deradicalisation is 
also extremely relevant for policy makers. It can indicate why people choose to adopt a particular 
ideology, or why they participate in high-risk activism. It also shows why people choose to 
deradicalise and break away from a particular ideology or organisation’ (14). 
3
 This point is illustrated in Quilliam’s recent paper: ‘By analysing extremists’ journeys in and out of 
extremism we are able to examine the emotional and cognitive behaviour which often underlines their 
commitment to a group or cause. All of this knowledge can be built into persuasive and realistic 
counter-extremism strategies which can prevent radicalisation and offer strategic support to those 
who have deradicalised’ (Quilliam 2015, 14).  
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radicalised subject renounce violence, as well as have individuals re-integrated back 
into the ‘mainstream’.  Intellectually, it connotes the relationship between theory and 
action in terms of human behaviour, as well as the relationship between the 
individual and society. But as will become evident later, research on de-radicalisation 
has been ideologically driven, lacks methodological integrity, credible data, and 
depends on an over reliance on anecdotal evidence, and limited research design. 
The need for robust, independent, and fine-grained analysis has never been so 
pressing.  
 
This research also provides very much needed insight for Muslims to understand a 
programme primarily targeting them. The production of discourses on radicalisation 
post 2004, the implementation of PREVENT since 2006, and the growing 
prominence of de-radicalisation has the Muslim population in sight. Amidst the flurry 
of media headlines, public debate, and implementation of policy initiatives, the 
agency and voice of Muslim subjects has been supressed. More significantly, the 
Muslim population in the UK occupies a position in the social imaginary of the 
majority that can be described as the ‘infidel within’ (Ansari, 2004). The Muslim 
population of Britain are perceived, through the prism of an undifferentiated and 
conflated category of radicalisation, by policymakers, political elites, and the popular 
media to represent a political, social, and cultural problem to the nation-state. Put in 
other terms, elite policymakers are thus responding to the issues provoked by ‘the 
Muslim Question’. 
 
In light of this top-down political pressure and wider cultural scrutiny on Muslims in 
Britain, de-radicalisation thus poses significant questions about identity, religion, 
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citizenship, and power- all of which profoundly impacts the lives of Muslims and 
every British citizen today, as well as in the future. It is crucial therefore that 
counterterrorism policy is expounded and that sound research is produced, 
disseminated, and shared for the purposes of public awareness. The future of the 
Muslim minority in European societies is poised between assimilation on the one 
hand and marginalisation on the other. This thesis should thus be seen as a humble 
yet necessary intervention in the debate about that future. 
 
 
A Journey through the Thesis 
 
The first chapter analyses the way Muslim identity was constructed as a problem 
over three decades in the UK. In particular, it discusses three critical themes that 
came together into a common localisation in the concept of ‘radicalisation’: security, 
identity, and religion. Indeed the intersectionality of these themes together 
constitutes, what has been called, the ‘new security challenge’.  The aforementioned 
themes are then subsequently situated within the culturalisation of politics, in order to 
say something about the wider politics of de-radicalisation. Although chapter 1 reads 
like a literature review, it tries instead to identify the chief discursive and historical 
developments that allowed the idea and practice of de-radicalisation to emerge in UK 
counterterrorism at a particular period in history. 
 
Chapter 2 examines the literature on de-radicalisation. This chapter is particularly 
interested in finding out what the term and concept means, what the process itself 
entails, and the evidence of de-radicalisation programmes. The aim is to find out the 
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lacuna in the literature, as well as to situate my investigation. This provides the 
background for the rest of the thesis, as well as enables me to place my research 
within the wider field. It will allow me to amplify the originality of my contribution to 
the research on de-radicalisation. 
Chapter 3 attempts to answer the question of my investigation using fieldwork data.  
My aim is to find out what 27 practitioners working in the field of PREVENT and de-
radicalisation think and believe de-radicalisation is. It tries to take the PREVENT 
conception of de-radicalisation as a point of departure, and examine de-
radicalisation ontologically in a more meaningful way than articulated in the literature 
and by policymakers. This chapter sets out my methodology, presents the data, and 
then analyses it. The new conceptual features that emerge from the data are 
examined and its implication for conceptual and policy development is assessed. I 
also evaluate the significance of my data  as well as reflect on the research process 
itself. This chapter makes the case for the importance of my data in deepening our 
understanding of de-radicalisation and the fact that it represents the first case-study 
of de-radicalisation in the UK. It also empirically grounds the move towards an 
alternative framework of de-radicalisation.  
Chapter 4 presents an alternative conception and theory of de-radicalisation. 
Drawing on the works of Foucault, I propose that de-radicalisation be understood 
through the concept of the ‘technologies of the self’, which is defined as that:  
 
....which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a 
certain number of operations on their bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and the 
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way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of 
happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality. 
                                                                                                     (Foucault 1988a, 18)  
 
Here the technologies of the self is explained and how it was modified in light of the 
empirical data gathered from my fieldwork. Other key concepts are addressed, like 
the ‘fourfold’ (the four step guide to ethical self formation), the self, and what is 
meant by ‘technologies’, as well as agency. The three technologies that constitute 
the technology of the self are: discursive (chapter 5), disciplinary (chapter 6), and 
confessional (chapter 7). The technology of the self is then situated within the theory 
of governmentality. The last section deals with the way that government shapes the 
subjectivity of citizens: deploying concepts like the ‘paradigm’, ‘central sphere’, ‘the 
political’, neo-‘liberalism’ and ‘normalisation’, I try to explain how the regulatory norm 
operates conceptually. Overall, this chapter lays the conceptual and theoretical 
background for understanding de-radicalisation as the technologies of the self.        
Chapter 5 examines the role of discursive technology.  Discursive technology is 
about the codification of knowledge through the claims of science and the formation 
of ‘regimes of truth’ that guide the way we think, talk, and understand something. 
This chapter highlights how ‘radicalisation’ as a discourse and concept constructed 
the problematisation of the Muslim population. It examines the use of narratives, the 
legitimisation of discourse by ‘experts’, the search for ‘root-causes’, and the 
politicised nature characterising the will to knowledge on ‘radicalisation’. More 
importantly, ‘radicalisation’ etches the discursive parameters that define the 
conceptualisation of de-radicalisation in the UK. It is through discursive technology 
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that the problematisation of Muslim identity was achieved for the purposes of 
corrective intervention. 
Chapter 6 focuses on the Prevent strategy and the Channel programme through 
disciplinary technology Disciplinary technology describes the way that knowledge 
systems, like radicalisation, are actualised and implemented in material domains, 
through social institutions, programmes of intervention, and by managerial experts. 
Disciplinary technologies seek behaviour modification and conformity amongst the 
population through the process of discipline and normalisation rather than through 
punishment. This chapter examines the PREVENT strategy and the Channel 
programme. It analyses what interviewees thought of the implementation of 
PREVENT, its effectiveness in tackling radicalisation, and the impact it had on 
PREVENT practitioners and Muslim communities. In terms of de-radicalisation, this 
chapter also shows how individuals who are deemed ‘vulnerable’ and ‘at risk’ of 
radicalisation are identified, the criterion used to judge individuals bound for 
interventions, and the normative framework guiding de-radicalisation. Through 
PREVENT, individuals, problematic populations, and the wider population are 
disciplined according to a norm. 
Chapter 7 assesses the role of confessional technology. This chapter is significant 
because it explores the pastoral logic governing de-radicalisation interventions and 
the process of subjectification. Confessional technology is rooted in the idea that 
concern with the welfare and wellbeing of individuals in our culture represents a 
secularised version of the Christian penance. The confessional today, re-enacted 
through intervention programmes and embodied in the role of the expert, is about 
‘salvation in this life’. This chapter argues that the pastoral logic was evident in two 
ways: firstly through the extraction of knowledge from community organisations and 
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think-tanks working on counter-radicalisation; and secondly by the transformation of 
individual Muslim subjectivity through programmes of intervention. The last two 
sections highlight the confessional dimensions of interventions: mentoring, the 
techniques of psychotherapy, the role of dialectic dialogue, and the notion of 
‘redemption’, all of which culminate with the erasure of surfeit Muslim-ness and a 
transformed identity for the radicalised subject.  
In the conclusion I summarise the salient issues and arguments made in this thesis. I 
contextualise the significance of conceptualising de-radicalisation as a technologies 
of the self, explicitly demonstrating the contribution my research has made to the 
study of de-radicalisation in the field of counter-terrorism, radicalisation studies, and 
political theory. I argue that this thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge in 
three ways: empirically, conceptually, and theoretically.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Setting the Scene: Radicalisation as the ‘New Security Challenge’ 
 
 
It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not 
be primarily ideological or economical. The great divisions among humankind and 
the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most 
powerful actors in world affairs, but the principle conflicts of global politics will occur 
between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of Civilization will 
dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of 
the future. 
(Huntington 1993, 22) 
 
A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language 
and language seed to repeat it to us inexorably.        
                                                                               (Wittgenstein 1958, 45, Para 115) 
 
This passage quotes a ‘certain Chinese encyclopaedia’ in which it is written that 
‘animals are divided into (a) belonging to the emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) 
suckling pigs, (e) Sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present 
classification, (i)frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, 
(l) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off 
look like flies’. In the wonderment of this taxonomy, the thing we apprehend in one 
great leap, the thing that, by means of the fable, is demonstrated as the exotic charm 
of another system of thought, is the limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of 
thinking that. 
                                                                                                                  (Foucault 2002, xvi) 
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Why has one of the proposed solutions by policymakers to some of the biggest 
security challenges of our age- the problem of transnational violence, the integration 
of problematic minority into the nation, and the ubiquitous yet ambiguous spectre of 
‘extremism’- been conceived in terms of ‘support’ interventions aimed at youngsters 
who have not committed a crime, but who express ‘extremist’ views? If Islamist 
inspired terrorism represents a security threat, even an existentialist threat to Britain, 
why has analysis of radicalisation primarily focused on identity issues and theological 
interpretation and not about politics, foreign policy, social-economics matters, and 
notions of justice? Why has the radicalisation of Muslims in Britain been conceived in 
terms of a problem of culture and individuals? Such questions occasion a more 
detailed discussion of the areas that have not only shaped the idea and practice of 
de-radicalisation in the UK but which also represent the main issues and challenges 
confronting the nation-state, international and domestic politics, and society in the 
last three decades.  
 
In the quote above, Foucault invites us to consider the wider discursive structures- 
what he calls ‘episteme’- that shape what is being said and done in a particular 
epoch rather than merely attributing it to the zeitgeist produced by authors or 
thinkers, or individuals in general.  Taking my cue from Foucault’s ‘episteme’, the 
premise of the following chapter rests on the idea that the way things are ordered 
and made intelligible is structured by a paradigm that governs mainstream thinking 
and practices. Following this logic, I claim that our understanding of de-radicalisation, 
in the UK context at least, emanates from the discourses on radicalisation. In other 
words, it is our conception of radicalisation which will allow us to arrive at a clearer 
understanding of how de-radicalisation came to acquire certain characteristics. 
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Consequently, this chapter aims to (1) provide a discursive account of the major 
ideas and debates that lead to our current understanding of radicalisation; and (b) 
situate de-radicalisation genealogically within the historical and political context in 
which it emerges. 
 
The next section highlights the new security paradigm that has impacted security 
thinking since 7/7. Section 1.2 discusses the integration agenda and the 
problematisation of identity. Section 1.3 attempts to situate the debate on religion 
and its role in the public sphere sociologically and historically within the 
secularisation thesis. The last section discusses the politics of de-radicalisation, 
positioning de-radicalisation within the framework of the culturalisation of politics. 
This chapter is about the construction of problematic Muslim identity and 
accompanying discursive developments that allowed the idea and practice of de-
radicalisation to emerge. 
 
1.1 The New Security Paradigm: Pre-emptive Risk and Radicalisation 
  
The first major theme that is crucial to understanding the ‘new security challenge’ 
confronting Britain since 2005 is the concept and practice of ‘security’. How did the 
domestic radicalisation of British Muslims, alongside the ubiquitous spectre of 
‘extremism’, come to occupy such a menacing presence in security thinking and in 
the national imaginary?  What, in simple terms, constitutes a severe security threat? 
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The concept of security is ‘paradoxical and complex’ (Jarvis and Holland 2015, 2).  It 
denotes a desirable goal that actors such as states, communities and individuals 
want to achieve. At the same time ‘security’ makes us less safe and is capable of 
terrible acts- destruction, violence, incursions into civil liberties, and huge opportunity 
costs (2-3).  For Jarvis and Holland the complexity of security is borne out by the fact 
that it is not immediately obvious to whom or what we are referring when we think 
about, discuss, or seek to achieve security’ (3). Conventionally, the concept of 
security is concerned with how states interact with one another. By the 1990’s the 
logic of deterrence and ‘mutually assured destruction’ that governed security thinking 
during the Cold War period gave way to ‘new wars’, ‘Responsibility to Protect’, and 
humanitarian intervention. The referent object of security therefore expanded to 
include non-state actors, like individuals and communities, and wider issues besides 
national security, like the environment food, and poverty (Booth 1991).  
An important starting point for identifying the establishment of a new security 
paradigm was the 9-11 attacks on the Twin Towers in 2001. The American 
administration responded with the ‘Global War on Terror’ (GWT). Analogous to its 
counterpart nomenclature that preceded it (i.e. the ‘Cold War’), which structured the 
mainstream security dynamics of inter-state politics for decades, the GWT has 
become the international policy narrative describing and legitimising the security 
practices of nation-states post 2001. The GWT narrative essentially conceives the 
world as its stage and postulates the existence of a ubiquitous, evil and omnipotent 
enemy. In the words of Roselle, Miskimmon, and O’Loughlin, the GWT ‘sets out 
states as protecting individuals from non-state actors known as terrorists in a battle 
for security’ (2014, 76).  
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Under the pretext of conducting the GWT, the US and Britain have gone to war in 
Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), and have consistently intervened in Somalia, 
Yemen, and Pakistan through the use of drone attacks; it has also legitimised the 
expansion of greater surveillance techniques, the securitisation of boarder control, 
the rolling out of new technologies for the regulation of the population, extraordinary 
rendition flights, expansive and penetrating domestic counter-terrorism policies, the 
suspension of habeas corpus, and has been associated with the controversial 
images of the Guantanamo Bay concentration camp, as well as torture centres like 
Abu Graib in Iraq. Besides legitimising the globalisation of violence and the 
expansion of the machinery of War globally (Reid 2006), the GWT effectively 
rendered all domains (education, health, charity, etc.)- even the banal and the 
mundane, such as carrying toiletries with you whilst passing through an airport- has 
become subjugated to the politics and logic of securitisation. 
 
Key to understanding the political reality of unrestricted conflict, the flouting of 
domestic law, the expanding power of nation state sovereignty, and the extensive 
infrastructure accompanying the ‘War on Terror’, is the idiom of the ‘state of 
exception’. The works on the ‘state of exception’ (Schmitt 1985; Agamben 2005; 
Butler 2006; Husymans 2008) asks questions about the limits of law, when 
exceptional practices are justified, and the general problem of limits (Huysmans 
2008, 167).  Limited by space to address this debate, we refer here only to the 
progenitor of the idiom of the exception- Carl Schmitt. In Political Theology, Schmitt 
defined the sovereign as ‘he who decides on the exception,’ (Schmitt 1985, 5). For 
Schmitt the state of the exception determines the authority and place of sovereignty, 
compelling the ‘decision’ to appear in its absolute purity. Politics for Schmitt is 
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predicated on the decision of the sovereign against the norm or rule. Given that 
unpredictability of the emergency scenario, it is futile for legal positivism, or the norm 
to establish what can be done beforehand. Schmitt also believed that the exception 
was more important than the norm, for the exception defines the norms (15). 
Notably, Schmitt emphasised that the exception is by definition exceptional and 
cannot be transferred into a permanent state. For Benoist (2013), Reid (2006), and 
Agamben (2005) however, the ‘War on Terror’ made the exception a permanent 
state of affairs. 
 
The politics of ‘state of the exception’ is justified on the grounds of averting a crisis, 
catastrophe, and an exceptional circumstance. Such a logic was encapsulated in 
Donald Rumsfeld’s famous ‘unknown unknowns’ speech (Rumsfeld 2002), as well as 
Tony Blair’s proclamation in the aftermath of the London bombings that the ‘rules of 
the game had changed’ (Blair 2005).  Importantly, the ‘state of the exception’ helped 
established the condition for a particular form of governance centred on pre-emptive 
policies. For Massumi (2007), ‘preemption is not prevention’: ‘Prevention operates in 
an objectively knowable world in which uncertainty is a function of a lack of 
information, and in which events run a predictable, linear course from cause to effect’ 
(ibid). He continues: ‘Prevention has no proper object, no operational sphere of its 
own, and no proprietary logic. It is derivative. It is a means toward a given end.’ In 
other words, prevention presumes the objective existence of something before 
intervention and only makes sense within the domains of different policy domains 
(economics, health, etc.).  
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Pre-emption however operates according to a different logic. Whilst prevention and 
pre-emption strategies are both concerned with risk, it is the ‘uncertainty’ of the 
future which distinguishes them apart.  ‘Risk’ is used to indicate the possibility of 
danger or harm and is constituted by three major properties: probability, uncertainty 
and futurity (Mythen and Walklate 2006, 381). Massumi (2005) argues that the 
uncertainty of the future shifts the rationale for decision-making from what is known, 
quantified and understood to the realm of the imagination, catastrophe, and the 
worst case scenarios. This risk-governed rationale differs therefore from the logic of 
other political decision-making such as prevention or rational calculation in the way it 
acts on the basis of uncertainty and probability. It does not matter whether the 
spectre of the catastrophe actually occurs, but it is instead sufficient for the 
potentiality to exist in order to justify pre-emptive action.  This is how ‘uncertainty’ 
becomes tied up with ‘futurity’.  According to Massumi therefore, the emerging aim of 
security governance is to police the future by anticipation so as to bring about a 
‘future perfect’ liberated from the ominous spectre of always-imminent catastrophe 
(2005, 6). The conceptual lens through which the idea of security is understood has 
thus been temporalized, with an imagined fear of the future providing justification for 
sovereign action under the pretext of security, thereby rendering the present as the 
site of intervention.  
 
It is this pre-emptive logic that has provided the intellectual and ‘scientific’ 
justification for policies of community intervention and counter–terrorism. The 
discourse on ‘new terrorism’ is a case in point.  ‘New Terrorism’ is associated with 
academics like Walter Laqueur (1999), Quintan Wiktorowicz (2005), and Peter 
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Neumann (2009).4 The concept of ‘new terrorism’ argued that Al-Qaeda inspired 
terrorism witnessed in the attacks of 9-11, Madrid, and the London bombings were 
qualitatively different to previous patterns of violence in four main ways (ESRC 2007; 
Jackson et al. 2011, 165).). First, unlike old terrorism like the IRA or ETA which 
focused its operations within territorial boundaries, new terrorism was transnational 
and operated across borders. Second, organisationally new terrorism was horizontal 
in structure and based on loose networks, whereas old terrorism was hierarchical. 
Third, in terms of personnel new terrorism comprised of amateurs, whilst old terrorist 
were more professional. Lastly, new terrorism was driven by ideology based on 
religious fanaticism divorced from political goals, whereas again old terrorism, 
epitomised by groups like the Red Brigade and Baader Meinhoff, is presented as 
being motivated by clear political objective.  
 
The discourse on ‘new terrorism’ was influential in shifting the conceptual boundaries 
of what constituted an existential threat, as well as being linked to the legitimisation 
of counter-terrorism policy. Basia Spalek (2011) traced the impact of the ‘new 
terrorism’ discourse on many fronts: Muslims distrusting the government, increased 
counter-terrorism powers, creation of suspect communities, human rights abuse, 
Muslims being viewed as fifth column, and the problematisation of Muslim identities 
(194-195). Similarly, Heath-Kelly (2013) also attributes the emphasis in the 
PREVENT strategy’s focus on religious ideas and vulnerability to the ‘new terrorism’ 
literature (399). Meanwhile, the London attacks in 2005 were explained in terms of 
the ‘new security challenge’ posed by ‘new terrorism’, now embodied by home-grown 
                                                          
4 A number of scholars (Jackson, Jarvis; Gunning, Smyth 2011; Spalek 2011, Lambert 2011) are 
critical of the categorisations of ‘old’ and ‘new terrorism’. They argue that there are similarities 
between what was called old terrorism and new terrorism and believe that the validity of New 
Terrorism is hampered by its link to counter-terrorism policy. 
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terrorism (ESRC 2007). This led to the preoccupation in Britain with ‘preventing root-
causes’ of terrorism, which was crouched in the concept ‘radicalisation’. It was due to 
the success of discourses like ‘new terrorism’, governed by the political imperative to 
manage the risk of existential threat emanating from it, that lay the groundwork for 
the emergence of radicalisation and preventive approaches to countering terrorism.   
 
A melange of discourses aspiring to investigate and codify the ‘truth’ of radicalisation 
emerged post 2005, bringing a vast tapestry of knowledge domains, experts, 
institutions, and organisations into common localisation. Indeed one of the 
distinguishing features of the way that knowledge developed during this period, in 
conjunction with multiple other discourses, was the dominance of the natural 
sciences over the social science in the theories, language, tools, and methods 
deployed to construct a predictive and explanatory model of radicalisation. There 
was, for example, a preoccupation with ‘root-causes’, ‘process’, and the use of 
various ‘models’ said to explain and predict radicalisation (Moskalenko & McCauley 
2008; 2010, Sageman 2008, Wiktorowicz 2005, Haqq Baker 2011). Despite their 
differences in emphasis and degree, all models nevertheless posited a causal 
relationship between thought and action within a linear process, which Muslims 
undergo on route to violent radicalisation. The production of discourse on 
radicalisation reached its zenith in 2010 (Richards 2011; Sedgwick 2010; Kundnani 
2012), culminating in a body of knowledge with its own theories, models, experts, 
and concepts.  
The by-product of the discourses on radicalisation was the creation of the 
‘radicalisation’ process. The notion of radical had a plethora of meanings and 
contexts before 2005, such as progressive, left-wing, and outside the box thinking 
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(IRR 2012, 1) but became associated after this period with the religion of Islam, 
Islamist ideology, the ‘identity-crisis’ of second and third generation Muslim 
diasporas (Roy 2002; Sageman 2008, Wiktorowicz 2005), and the causal 
relationship between these factors and violence (Githens-Mazer 2010a, 10). In fact 
‘radical’, ‘radicalism’, and ‘radicalisation’, went from being a state of mind and/or 
activity to becoming a state of being and a problem of the soul, or something internal 
to the radical. 
 Another effect of radicalisation discourses was that the ‘radical’ existed in a type of 
transcendental and eternal way, prefiguring their historical, social, and political 
context. The production of the radical rendered him a threat and danger irrespective 
of the existence of an actual threat/danger. The existence of the radical, through 
discursive production, enabled the possibility and potentiality of radicalisation and 
the perpetual perception of an immediate and imminent threat, divorced from the 
reality of attacks occurring by radicals (Heath-Kelly 2013, 407-408). Indeed 
radicalisation had been conceived within a particular framework and process- one 
which took at its starting point the paradigmatic law abiding citizen, and placed at the 
polar end of the spectrum the paradigmatic violent Muslim radical. The potentiality 
for violence by implication therefore resided within every British Citizen of Muslim 
faith.  
Similarly to Wittgenstein’s quote at the beginning of this chapter about the ‘picture’ 
captivating Western thinking, the accounts of radicalisation have been built upon the 
threat of ‘ideology’. The dominant conceptions of radicalisation, which is embedded 
in PREVENT, posits that ideology leads to violence and that it is thus ideology that 
constitutes the main security threat. It is a formulation that holds that ideas and 
beliefs not only explain behaviour but can also predict it. And it is based on a 
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foundationalism that dichotomises the mind and body and reduces identity and 
religion to a list of propositions and statements. More importantly, it is a result of 
downloading the Islamist ideology, to use a software metaphor, that the perceived 
Muslim potentiality for violence is activated. This is why, like Wittgenstein’s picture, 
security thinking became captivated by ideology. 
 
A corollary of the conceptualisation of radicalisation were a number of salient 
features that were deployed in the PREVENT strategy and which later constituted 
the assumptions of the conceptual framework of de-radicalisation. These were: 
 Radicalisation is a ‘process’ experienced by Individuals: despite the 
acknowledged academic complexity, policy-makers conceived radicalisation 
as a ‘process’ and a type of ‘conveyor belt’ which constructed individuals as 
starting off as ‘integrated’ and non-radical, and due to mainly ideological 
influences, in response to an identity crisis, end up on a trajectory that results 
in violence. Despite the affirmed role of groups and movements in influencing 
radicalisation, it is nevertheless a ‘process’ that affects and ends with the 
individual.  
 
 Radicalisation is synonymous with violence: radicalisation almost always 
means or implies violence. The line of radicalisation is placed between 
political activism and violence, rather than between apathy and political 
mobilisation. This consequently means that political mobilisation is viewed 
within a security lens and therefore potentially criminalises democratic 
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legitimate activism. It also implies violence being committed by its own 
citizens.  
 
 Radicalisation is associated with Islam and Muslims: a particular 
conceptualisation of radicalisation took ascendency in popular use, one in 
which associated Islam and religion as a causal variable in the radicalisation 
process. Githens-Mazer critiques the dominant pejorative use of radicalisation 
in academia, the media, and amongst policy-makers that radicalisation is 
about the ‘implicit correlation between the “dangers of radical Islam” and 
violence’ (2010, 10).  
 
 Radicalisation is about the direct causal relationship between ideas and 
violence: the concept and process of radicalisation presumed a direct 
relationship between ideas- particularly religious, theological, and political- 
and action (political mobilisation and especially committing acts violence). 
Consequently, given the influence afforded to ideas as a prime mover in the 
radicalisation process (since ideas lead directly to action), PREVENT prized 
count-ideology as a strategy and has led to an inordinate focus on what 
individuals are thinking rather than doing.  
 
 Radicalisation minimises the role of politics: the concept of radicalisation 
excludes ascribing causative role or any significance to political actions taken 
by governments/State either domestically or internationally. Structural reasons 
like foreign policy, repression, war, etc. are acknowledged in some accounts 
(discussed as grievances real or ‘perceived’) but are mostly marginalised in 
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favour of psychological and theological explanations claimed to be the ‘root-
causes’ of the radicalisation process. Analysis is primarily focused on the 
‘identity crisis’ and ‘vulnerability’ of individuals and not wider structures. 
 
However, ‘radicalisation’ was beset by a number of problems: epistemologically, 
methodologically, conceptually, and empirically. The concept suffered from a 
diversity of understandings (Sedgwick 2010, Awan, Hoskins, and O’Loughlin 2012; 
Githens-Mazer 2010; 2012), espoused a linear narrative that explains radicalisation 
but not terrorism (Richards 2011, Kundnani 2012), stigmatises and criminalises 
Muslims (Githens-Mazer 2010; 2012, Lambert 2011, Kundnani 2009; Baker-Beall, 
Heath-Kelly and Jarvis 2015), and has proven practically inoperable (Heath-Kelly 
2013; Githens-Mazer 2012). The instability of the radicalisation concept has led 
some to question its utility and purpose. For example, Richards (2011, 144) posed 
the poignant question: ‘If it is terrorism that we are concerned with, then where is the 
additional benefit of investigating radicalization as a process, over and above 
becoming a terrorist as a process?’ For Akil Awan, Andrew Hoskins and Ben 
O’Loughlin (2012, 3), radicalisation was the ‘symptom and cause of the state of 
hypersecurity’, in which it emerged as a ‘tangible and intangible threat’ feeding into 
the construction of discourses surrounding terrorism. Githens-Mazer also asks 
whether radicalisation is a made up ‘securitising’ label designed to ‘other’ Muslims 
and maintain a non-Muslim hegemonic status quo (2012, 10). And Heath-Kelly 
suggested that caution should be exercised with respects to the accuracy of the 
radicalisation concept to explain the actual process of radicalisation in the real world 
(2013, 397). Ultimately, the concept of radicalisation remains unstable and provokes 
the following question: why did policymakers invest so much in the concept?  
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A credible explanation is found in the social construction of risk. Ulrich Beck (2008) 
argues that risk is a feature of modernity, a ‘side effect’ of the advances made in 
modernity. These risks, defined as a systematic way of dealing with hazards and 
insecurities, which can be transformed into catastrophe, are seen as an objective 
reality of modernity, an externality impacting global societies. In response to the 
global risk thesis espoused by Beck, Awan, Hoskins, O’Loughlin rightly alert us to 
the pertinence of asking ‘how and why some processes or threats become 
understood as risk and some do not’ (Awan, Hoskins, and O’Loughlin 2012, 9). In 
the case of radicalisation, Gutkowski (2011) asks us to differentiate between the risk 
posed and threat posed by radical Islamism. Thus what is under consideration in the 
discourse production of radicalisation is not the threat of an imminent attack but 
several stages removed: the risk of radicalisation spreading among a population 
(347). It is explicitly risk and not threat that has preoccupied policy-makers. 
Hence we turn here to Mary Douglass (1992). Douglass argues that risk is a modern 
approach to the way in which traditional communities and societies addressed 
threats to their cohesion and values. According to Douglass, risk is seen as a 
socially constructed phenomenon that reflects the norms and cultural values of a 
particular tribe, group, or society. Risk, in other words, is a cultural artefact. The role 
of socially constructed risk in the discourses of radicalisation is also noted by other 
scholars in the field. For example, Githens-Mazer (2012) emphasises the substantial 
gap between the reality of the security threat and perception of that threat. He 
reminds us that the actual threat of violence from Muslim communities in Europe is 
statistically negligible. There is ‘probabilistically higher dangers involved in driving 
too fast, drinking too much, not looking both ways when crossing the street, or falling 
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asleep with a cigarette in our hand’ (10). For Heath-Kelly (2013) radicalisation is 
viewed more in terms of ‘performativity’, in that it produces the effects it names’ 
(2013, 395). She argues that knowledge on radicalisation produces a possible 
counterfactual to terrorism by inventing a narrative about transitions to militancy, one 
that allows security mechanisms to perform interventions into the supposed 
production of terrorism (397). In other words, radicalisation is produced as a 
discourse in order to justify governmental interventions. 
Summarising: the way security has been understood and practiced evolved in the 
years leading to and after 9-11. I argued that the ‘GWT’ and events like 7/7 created 
the conditions for the emergence of new security paradigm called ‘radicalisation’. 
Central to the development of radicalisation has been the entrenchment of pre-
emptive logic in structures of governance and the implementation of policies. Such a 
logic has been aided by the rationale of the ‘state of the exception’, the severity of 
which is reinforced by the social construction of risk.  The risk of Islamist radicalism 
has, at its heart, the narrative that Islamist ideology, coupled with the precariousness 
of Muslim identity (more below), can trigger the path toward violence. Security 
thinking has, in other words, been captivated by the risk posed by Islamist ideology. 
It is this contextual background that not merely impinges on other domains (e.g. 
identity and religion) but which creates the conditions of possibility for de-
radicalisation to become a practice and idea of counter-terrorism 
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1.2 The Integration Agenda and the Politics of Belonging: the ‘death of 
multiculturalism’ and problematic Muslim identity 
 
 
The second cluster of issues this thesis is concerned with is political, social, and 
categorical identity. Here political multiculturalism must be distinguished from social, 
as well as normative multiculturalism. The social multiculturalism denotes the fact 
that Britain today is a multicultural society (which is not the matter being discussed in 
public debate), whereas normative multiculturalism signifies the ideal of celebrating 
and promoting diversity and plurality. By contrast, Political multiculturalism refers to 
government strategies to manage difference (Modood 2005; Parekh 2006).Beginning 
with political identity: political multiculturalism in Britain developed in an ad hoc way. 
The arrival of migrants to the UK was a consequence of labour migration, the arrival 
of families to join migrant workers, as well as the arrival of political asylums. The 
initial model of integration, formulated by the Home Secretary Roy Jenkins in 1966, 
was based on the gradual socialisation of racial and ethnic groups from the 
Commonwealth countries into wider society.  Integration was defined by Jenkins as 
‘not a process of flattening out uniformity but of cultural diversity, couple with equal 
opportunity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance’ (Rex 1996, 236-7). Initially the 
integration of immigrants into Britain merely focused on providing immigrants with 
the language and employment skills in order to bolster their economic opportunities. 
The move towards political multiculturalism was developed through local 
government, particularly in the 1980’s by promoting the celebration of diversity in 
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schools and festivals, what Ali Alibihai-Brown called ‘sari, somosa, and steelband’ 
(2000,17), whilst nationally it was responsive to political and social events in the 
country. 
 
However, a number of critical events over three decades have led many to question 
the viability of multiculturalism: the Brixton Riots (1981), the Rushdie Affair (1988), 
the Northern Riots (2001), Danish cartoons (2006), and the Charlie Hebdo attacks 
(2015). In particular, the Rushdie Affair revealed the beginning of the disorientation 
with multiculturalism and produced new fault lines.  It led to the surprising 
lamentation by Roy Jenkins that ‘we might have been more cautious about allowing 
the creation in the 1950’s of a substantial Muslim community here’ (Parekh 2000, 
301).  This episode created a polarisation between the liberal elites and many British 
Muslims, in which the ‘cultural difference’ of Muslims became the subject of 
questions (Rai 2006; McRoy 2006; Brighton 2007, 7). 
 
The Northern Riots were also particularly important because it brought to light the 
failure of multiculturalism as a model for managing multi-ethnic/religious communities 
in Britain. It also introduced, in the publication of the Cantle Report, the concept of 
‘community cohesion’ and the notion that communities were living ‘parallel lives’ into 
the political lexicon (Cantle 2001, 9; Thomas 2007). The Cantle report identified the 
Asian communities for not being adequately integrated, recommending that a 
‘greater sense of citizenship’, ‘common elements of nationhood’, and the use of the 
‘English language’ would need to be forged by the ‘non-white community’ (10-13). 
These events culminated in arguments calling for the ‘death of multiculturalism’ 
articulated by political and media elites (Alibhai-Brown 2000).  
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Whilst the viability of political multiculturalism was questioned during these events, it 
was not until the attacks on London in 2005 that political multiculturalism became 
securitised. Multiculturalism was identified as one of the causes of radicalisation 
amongst British Muslims. It was blamed for creating segregated communities, 
undermining a cohesive national identity, and promoting a type of relativism with 
respect to values (Mirza, Senthilkumaran, and Ja’far 2007). The integration agenda, 
which confusingly encompasses concerns about immigration, the emergence of neo-
nationalism, and the management of diversity (Sedgwick 2010; Coolsaet 2010), 
became integrated into the security agenda (the threat of Islamist ideology and 
home-grown terrorism) in the media, the discourse on radicalisation, and the 
PREVENT policy. Indeed David Cameron’s speech at Munich 2011 marked the 
success of this logic, further entrenching multiculturalism and political identity as a 
source of the security challenge (Cameron 2011).  
 
In the democratic age, multiculturalism poses obstacles to coexistence because it 
concerns the divisive issue of the political identity of the state. Charles Taylor (2011) 
brings to light the paradox of liberal democracy: that despite being considered as the 
philosophy of inclusion (rule of the people, by the people, for the people), it also 
excludes certain citizens, minorities, and identities in its pursuit of a high degree of 
cohesion.  Taylor shows how in the modern period the new collective agency of ‘the 
people’ was created and how popular sovereignty needs to have a personality (124-
125). In order to remain viable, states seek to create a feeling of common belonging. 
The modern state has a political identity, defined as the generally accepted answer 
to the ‘what/whom for?’ question (128): ‘To form a state, in the democratic era, a 
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society is forced to undertake the difficult and never to be completed task of defining 
its collective identity’ (131). Political identity is crucial for the cohesiveness and 
integrity of the nation state. 
 
There is thus a sort of dialectic between state and nation. It is not just that nations 
strive to become states; it is also that modern states, in order to survive, strive to 
create a national community. Indeed accounts by historians like Anderson (1982), 
Hobsbawm (1983), and Ernst Geller (1983) reveal the constructed nature of the 
nation, the development of the nation-state in line with the growth of capitalism, 
homogenisation of language, and the printing press. In the twentieth century, 
nationalism, an extension and feature of the nation state, has proved to be the most 
popular ideology, and most successful heir to religion (in terms of a unifying grand 
narrative) (Eagleton 2014). This is why, explains Taylor, that democratic states need 
a healthy degree of patriotism, a strong identification with the polity, and a 
willingness to give oneself for its sake. This explains why nation-states have focused 
on cultivating citizenship over a host of other poles of identity, like the family, class, 
gender, and religion. This may be promoted either through a direct assimilationist 
model like French republicanism, or fostered in more indirect ways, like British 
multiculturalism, which renders other modes, such as religion, outside the operation 
of public life (Taylor 2011, 90). It is in this way, that the task of defining political 
identity, a necessary feature of the nation-state, creates exclusions in democratic 
societies. 
 
If we are to make sense of the cacophony of voices denouncing multiculturalism as a 
source of social and political tensions, then we must consider the ideas of political 
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liberalism. John Gray (2000) identifies two faces of liberalism-‘universalist’ and 
‘modus vivendi’.5 This is also referred to by Bhiku Parekh as ‘proceduralist’ and ‘civic 
assiminalionist’ (2006, 199)   For Gray, ‘universalist’ liberalism is inhospitable to 
difference, insists on the uniform application of the rules defining rights and is 
suspicious of collective goals; whereas the second mode of liberalism is a project 
that seeks peaceful coexistence between different regimes and ways of life. British 
multiculturalism primarily belongs to the second liberal regime. However, the 
Muslims presence in the UK, as a result of ‘modus vivendi’ liberalism, is seen as 
hindering national and community unity. It is thus the task of ‘universalist’ liberalism 
to curb Muslim difference in order to ensure a common political identity is possible.  
Indeed political elites in the UK have gestured a preference for ‘universalist’ 
liberalism, encapsulated by David Cameron’s ‘muscular liberalism’6 and underlined 
by the promotion of ‘British values’ in public institutions and counter-terrorism policy. 
Part of the problem according to Charles Taylor is that ‘universalist’ liberalism cannot 
accommodate ‘what the members of distinct societies really aspire to, which is 
survival’ (Taylor 1994, 61). However, in the case of ‘liberal multiculturalism, tension 
arises when particular demands are met at the expense of a unified nation and when 
separate communities develop little attachment to the nation.  A second source of 
tension arises when a disconnection occurs between the identity of nation (based on 
common ethnicity, language, and history) and the legal and political dimensions of 
citizenship.  
                                                          
5
  
6
 In his speech Prime Minister Cameron introduced the phrase of ‘muscular liberalism’: ‘Frankly, we 
need a lot less of the passive tolerance of recent years and a much more active, muscular 
liberalism….’ (Cameron 2011) 
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It is with the second tension that the narrative about the failure of Muslims to 
integrate in the UK takes place.  In contrast to the ‘death of multiculturalism’, this 
narrative confusingly conflates questions about immigration on the one hand with 
concerns about religion, ethnicity, and culture (all reductively merged), on the other 
hand. A stereotype developed post 9-11 in Europe that equated the ‘immigrant’ with 
Muslim, further entrenching the image of that Muslim as different and foreign 
outsider (Roy 2002). The second sub-narrative moved the focus beyond the 
limitations of citizenship and towards a different boundary of difference: culture. 
According to this argument, despite being citizens, Muslims are perceived as being 
culturally different and therefore cannot be accepted as part of the nation until their 
beliefs and practices are reformed.  
 
This logic is reflected in the language of public discourse and PREVENT policy, 
exemplified by the array of perpetually shifting signifiers attributed to Muslims- 
between the binary ‘moderate’ and ‘extremist’ and ‘vulnerable’ and at-risk’, to 
‘fundamentalist’, ‘violent radical’, and violent ‘extremist’, all of which are synonyms 
for surfeit Muslim difference. Such signifiers are also connected to the association of 
British Muslim communities with a wide range of social ills perceived by many to be 
disrupting community and national cohesion: the repression of women, the practice 
of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM)7, homophobia, sex trafficking (Roberts and 
Hurst, the Mirror 2015)8, extremism in faith schools9, proliferating birth rates, and a 
                                                          
7
 PM David Cameron explicitly mentions the practice of FGM in relation to young British Muslim girls in 
his Extremism Speech in Birmingham 2015 (Cameron, 2015).  
8
 The Rochdale sex trafficking gang was a group of men who preyed on under-age teenage girls 
in Rochdale between 2005 and 2013. Twelve men were originally charged. Of the nine men 
convicted, eight were of British Pakistani origin and one was an Afghan asylum-seeker.  
9
 There were allegations concerning Birmingham schools arising from the ‘Trojan Horse’ letter sent to 
Birmingham City Council in November 2013. Operation ‘Trojan Horse’ refers to an organised attempt 
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drain on welfare resources, etc. The meaning produced is that Muslims are 
disrupting the cohesiveness of the British nation.  
 
As mentioned above, the narrative about the failure of Muslims to ‘integrate’ had its 
origins in the Rushdie Affair. This episode in the history of British multiculturalism 
was a catalyst for the move away from the category of ‘Black’ to the category of 
‘Muslim’ (Rai 2006; McRoy 2006; Brighton 2007). In fact throughout most of the post-
war era, Muslims in Europe were defined primarily defined by race and ethnicity. The 
ascendancy and predominance of the ‘Muslim’ category in describing diverse 
immigrant and diaspora populations in Europe can be attributed to (1) European 
Integration in the 1990’s, which had to define itself against Islam in the making of a 
common European identity (Casanova 2012); (2) domestic efforts by the Labour 
government to promote and encourage the creation of a single body of Muslim 
representation in the 1990’s (Ansari 2004; Rai 2006; McRoy 2006) (3) the political 
and media response to 9-11 compressed Muslims into a monolithic category of the 
‘Muslim community’, despite the vast ethnic and racial diversity, class disparity, and 
socio-cultural differences amongst Muslims; and (4) globalisation played a pivotal 
part in creating new spaces, lifestyles, and transnational networks for a global 
community of Muslims (‘Ummah’).  
 
Although a complex topic to be addressed properly here, a couple of points on 
globalisation must nevertheless be made. The significance of globalisation stems 
from the challenges it poses to the nation-state in areas relating to the control of 
information, people, capital, goods, and the distribution of power. In terms of shaping 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
by a number of associated individuals to introduce an Islamist or Salafist ethos into several schools 
in Birmingham (Clarke 2014). 
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Muslim categorical identity, globalisation allows ethnic diaspora’s in Europe to 
maintain strong social, cultural, and political relations with their countries of origin 
(Roy 2002; Rai 2006; McRoy 2006). It is also crucially able to make and unmake 
social and political realities, so that what happens in Palestine impacts London and 
where the political dynamics of Bangladesh influences the power struggles unfolding 
in Tower Hamlets (DEMOS 2006, 55). The narrative here argues that minorities have 
managed to hold on to older identities, as well as creating other newer identity 
synthesis, without developing affiliation and allegiance to the British mainstream 
political identity. Over the last thirty years a dominant perception emerged that 
minorities were increasingly identifying with a global Muslim identity. Paradoxically, 
however, many diasporic communities have adopted the ‘Muslim’ category, despite 
the top-down construction of the category and attempt to racialize Muslims by 
political and media elites. The result, according to Sayyid and Tyrer is that Muslim 
identity is problematised: 
 
In turn, Muslims are frequently represented as an awkward presence, interrupting 
the closure of the nation because of an assumed lack of shared symbolic grounds 
between Muslims and the ‘host’ nation. The solution offered with increasing 
regularity takes the form of attempts to tame or erase the difference that is seen as 
tearing the nation apart.  
 
                                                                                                                (2012, 354) 
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Nevertheless, the dominant narrative about Muslim populations being problematic 
due to problems of identity made its way into accounts of radicalisation. For 
example, Olivier Roy (2002) treats Islamism as a cultural, social, and political 
phenomenon in which individuals seek to reconstruct a lost identity in a hostile and 
confusing world. The adoption of a globalised transnational Islam by second and 
third generation Muslims is accompanied by the abandonment of the traditional 
culture of their parents. Oliver Roy explains this phenomenon in terms of ‘de-
culturalisation’ (117-147). The cultural displacement experienced by the Muslim 
diaspora in Europe has thus been construed in terms of ‘identity crisis’; in other 
words, many young Muslims do not feel like they belong to Europe or their countries 
of origin. This leads them to appropriating ‘purer’ forms of religiosity which does 
away with cultural and national markers. This process is exacerbated by the ‘de-
territorialisation’ of Islam (18), which became reconfigured through globalisation, and 
resulted in the formation of alternative identities, with loyalties beyond the state. 
 
Furthermore, social movement theories also emphasise the importance of identity, 
meaning, and belonging in accounts of radicalisation, particularly articulated by Marc 
Sageman and Quinton Wiktorowicz. Their works have been influential, inspiring the 
radicalisation model used by the Intelligence Division at the New York Police 
Department and the FBI, as well as being directly linked to extensive surveillance of 
Muslim populations in America by the NYPD with the assistance of the CIA 
(Kundnani 2012). Wiktorowicz, who sits on the US Nation Security Council, was also 
largely responsible for drafting the counter-terrorism strategy for Obama’s 
administrations in 2011 to prevent violent extremism, which was inspired by the 
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experience of PREVENT in the UK.10 Both Sageman and Wiktorowicz formulated a 
model that combines psychological, theological, and factors in the analysis of 
radicalisation, known as the ‘bunch of guys’ theory. The theory is predicated on the 
notion that radicalisation is a phenomenon that happens amongst networks of 
friends.  
 
Specifically, Sageman identifies four stages to this process: (1) moral outrage (2) 
enabling Interpretation (3) personal Experience and (4) mobilising Network. The first 
stage of moral outrage is in response to a perceived injustice; the second relates to 
the framing of political events within a narrative, e.g. there is a war against Islam 
(2008, 75-81); the third relates to personal experiences of discrimination, which is 
understood as a manifestation of the grievances afflicting Muslims globally (83); and 
finally the existence of a group of people who share their experience and grievance 
and who ‘can help them cross the line from venting their anger to becoming 
terrorists’ (84). According to this model, radicalisation begins with the individual who 
tries to understand the world through a particular narrative that pits them in identity 
camps, which is then internalised and reinforced by a social group. Crucial to stages 
(1) and (2) is identification with Islam and the Muslim ‘Ummah’ and the feeling of 
despair and outrage with regards to Muslim suffering in a plethora of conflicts 
globally, whilst (3) problematises the identity further, which is then recalibrated at 
stage (4). In order for stages (1) and (2) to occur there must be what Benedict 
Anderson (1983) calls ‘imagined communities’, or the emotional, imaginative, and 
intellectual investment of individuals into a collectively that is constructed. In other 
                                                          
10
 In August 2011, the White House revealed its strategy for countering radicalisation, entitled 
‘Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism’. Wiktorowicz has been described as the 
‘chief architect’ of this strategy (Vidino and Hughes 2015, 18).  
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words, it is the affiliation of British Muslims with other Muslims globally problematizes 
Muslim identity for UK political and social elites.  
 
Meanwhile, the narrative of problematic Muslim identity became embedded in 
PREVENT.  This was poignantly demonstrated by the fact that the delivery of the 
PREVENT strategy until 2011 was delegated to the Department for Communities 
and Local Government (DCLG). It was unreservedly clear, and what later proved 
problematic, that British counter-terrorism was being executed through a Department 
of government responsible for delivering the Community Cohesion agenda. This, if 
anything, was testament to the fact that the logic of security and identity had 
intermeshed in the eyes of policymakers. But, as I have argued here, the intertwining 
of the integration and security agendas had its roots in the problematisation of 
identity in Britain as far back as the 1980’s.  
Such arguments are made by security scholars like Shane Brighton and Heath-Kelly. 
Shane Brighton (2007) situates PREVENT within the historical development of 
domestic multiculturalism. Amidst the backdrop of the loss of a cohesive British 
identity, precipitated by the decline of empire, religious affiliation, and the shifting 
socio-cultural changes of the past decades, events like the Rushdie Affair and 
Northern riots were framed as ‘crisis’ by political elites (12-13). Brighton thus argues 
convincingly that PREVENT signified the reworking of political multiculturalism in the 
UK. Heath-Kelly (2013) also makes the connection between British Muslim 
communities being produced as the problematic ‘Other’ during events like the 
Rushdie Affair and the Northern Riots in 2001 and narratives linking Muslim 
communities to violent disorder, and its persistence as a discourse in PREVENT 
(Heath-Kelly 2013, 409). The fact that PREVENT anchors the problem of 
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radicalisation in the identity crisis of British Muslim and promotes ‘British values’ as a 
panacea further reinforces the argument that the problematisation of Muslims was 
shaped by discourse surrounding multiculturalism and integration.   
I have argued in this section that the problem of the integration agenda has been 
articulated in terms of a failure of multiculturalism on the one hand and the inability of 
Muslim to ‘integrate’ on the other. It has also implicitly explained the move towards 
the category of ‘Muslim’ as an attempt by government to racialise and problematise 
Muslim identity in order to manage and curtail perceived excess, which is 
represented as threatening liberal democratic values, as well as disrupting the unity 
of the nation. This constructed narrative of problematic Muslim identity made its way 
in the conceptualisation of radicalisation and the implementation of PREVENT. 
Hence it is the attempt by government to reverse Muslim surfeit difference that paves 
the way for the emergence of de-radicalisation.  
1.3 The Religious Other as Radical Alterity and the De-Privatisation of 
Religion: the ‘Muslim Question’ within the context of the Secular in Europe  
 
 
The final set of issues impacting our understanding of what became problematic to 
policymakers relates to the role of religion in modern public life.11 The dominant 
theory that explains modernity and religion in the West has been the secularisation 
                                                          
11
 The category ‘religion’ is complex, for it either emphasises or excludes certain aspects of religion. 
Two broad approaches see religion as (1) functional and (2) Substantive. The functionalist 
perspective examines religion in terms of society’s needs, whereas the substantive perspective is 
concerned with the content of religion. There are also various interpretations on the role of religion 
(Marxists and Feminist) in human life, as well as existence of studies trying to determine the 
relationship between religion and society (religion as a conservative force, revolutionary, or 
progressive), the existence of a plethora of religious organisations and its relationship to the state and 
society, and the changing nature of religion in modernity (the emphasis on ‘faith’ and the individual), 
the impact of globalisation and religion as catalyst of globalisation (transnational groups and 
diaspora’s), and the emergence of ‘new age’ religions. (Haralambos & Holborn 2008, 394-457)      
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thesis. This scholarship is complex and cannot be rehearsed here.12 However, 
noteworthy is the fact that the secularisation thesis is both descriptive and normative 
(Asad 2003, 181). Descriptively, it states that as societies industrialise and 
modernise, religious belief declines. In terms of normativity it states that in order for 
‘society to be modern it has to be secular and for it to be secular it has to relegate 
religion to non-political spaces’ (182). To avoid confusion, I draw on Casanova’s 
(1994) tripartite distinction of this thesis: (1) increasing structural differentiation of 
social spaces resulting in the separation of religion from politics, economy, science 
and so forth; (2) the privatisation of religion within its own sphere; and (3) the 
declining social significance of religious beliefs, commitments and institutions.  
 
Casanova holds that (1) and (3) hold true whereas the same cannot be said of (2). 
We are witnessing what Casanova calls the ‘de-privatisation’ of religion the re-
emergence of religion in the public space. Whilst Casanova considers the ‘de-
privatisation’ of religion a global phenomenon, visible with the rise of Pentecostalism 
in South American, Evangelical Christianity in America, and Christianity in China, 
many commentators view the presence of Islam and Muslims in Europe as disrupting 
the narrative about secularisation and the decline of religion.  
 
The role of the secular in European consciousness and history must be stressed. 
According to Casanova, the ‘secular’ nature of the modern European state and the 
‘secular’ character of European democracy serve as one of the foundational myths of 
                                                          
12
 The debate on the secularisation theory is complicated by different uses of definitions, concepts, 
empirical evidence, type (‘weak secularism’ like the UK vs. ‘strong’ secular states like France) and 
contexts (the theory does not apply in the same way to the Unites States, for example, which was 
established as a secular state, unlike European states, but which predominantly remains socially 
religious, in contrast to Europe where religious belief has declined). For more see Bruce (2002; 2011) 
Taylor (2007; 2011); Casanova (1994; 2006; 2008); and Talal Asad (2003).   
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contemporary European identity (Casanova 2008, 109). For Charles Taylor, the 
Modern West’s normative order was established from the seventeenth century 
onwards as it moved away from ‘cosmic-religious’ order to a new ‘bottom up view of 
society’, which stresses (1) the rights and liberties of its members, (2) the equality 
among them, and (3) the principle that rule is based on consent (Taylor 2011, 318). 
What Taylor therefore describes as the ‘modern moral order’ (intermeshed with 
Enlightenment ideals, particularly liberal ideas and values), political identity, 
democracy, and the modern nation state is associated with European history of 
secularisation.  
 
To reiterate, modernity, at one point synonymous with the West, was associated with 
the decline of religion and being modern entailed moving beyond religion. Indeed for 
Asad secularism is not merely about the confinement of religious belief and practice 
to a private space where its threat to political stability and the ‘liberties of free-
thinking citizens’ is mitigated, but rather builds a particular conception of the world 
and the problems generated by that world’ (2003, 191-192).  In a sense, Asad teases 
out the analogy between secularism, the nation-state, and nationalism and the way 
religion operates, indirectly and paradoxically showing the ‘religious’ nature of the 
secular in Europe (191-195).    
 
 
The presence of Muslims in European societies amidst wider security challenges 
since 9-11, continual immigration, and rampant globalisation has been interpreted by 
European societies as not only a social challenge but as a threat to its secular 
shibboleths, not least paradoxically its Christian heritage. This is provoked by the 
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growing visibility of religious symbols like the veil, the growing presence of Muslims 
in urban cities, and the political mobilisation of Muslims over issues regarding free 
speech and foreign policy.  This tension between secular critique on the one hand 
and the protection of the sacred on the other has acquired an almost ritualised re-
occurrence in public discourse in response to crisis events like Rushdie (1988), the 
Danish Cartoons (2006), and Charlie Hebdo (2015). Also, this perception has been 
exacerbated by Muslim mobilisation in response, inter alia, to the Afghanistan War, 
the Iraq War, Gaza protests (2009), the Palestinian issue, amongst others. The 
overall perception and feeling is of an expansive and encroaching Muslim presence. 
In terms of a sociological and political reality rather than as faith, Muslim identity 
poses problems for Secular, Christian, and Liberal Europe. Parekh argues that there 
is now a widespread perception that: 
 
…. Muslims are collectivist intolerant, authoritarian, illiberal and theocratic and that 
they use their faith as a self-conscious public statement, not quietly held personal 
faith but a matter of identity which they must jealously guard and loudly proclaim, not 
only to remind them of who they are but also to announce to others what they stand 
for. 
                                                                                                              (2006, 180-81)  
 
In addition, Islam represents the Other of Western secular modernity (Casanova 
2008, 108; 2012). For Roy (2009), the hostility to Islam in France is rooted in the 
belief that Islam cannot be integrated into secular and liberal society. This notion has 
its basis that religion is rooted in a particular culture and must therefore be curbed 
and contained. There is a message being produced in discourses, the media, and 
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the social imaginaries of Europe that Islam is anti-modern, fundamentalist, 
backward, and barbaric. This discourse on Islam has been built upon three elements 
(Casanova 2008 109; 2012; Oliver Roy 2009, 42):  
 
(1) A theological-political distinction between ‘civilised’ and ‘barbaric’ religions, that 
is, between religions that are compatible with enlightenment principles and liberal 
democratic politics and religions that are grounded in traditions that resist the 
progressive claims of the Enlightenment philosophy of history, liberalism, and 
secularism;  
 
(2) A nativist, anti-immigrant posture that postulated the unassailability of foreign 
immigrants because of their illiberal and uncivilised social customs and habits, 
supposedly grounded in their traditional religion; and  
 
(3) Transnational attachments and loyalties to either a foreign religious authority (i.e. 
the papacy) or to a transnational religious community (i.e. the umma) that appears 
incompatible with republican citizen principles and the exclusive claims of modern 
nationalism.  
 
 
The responses to the challenge of Islam in the public sphere have differed 
depending on the place and context. Examples include banning the veil in schools in 
France, banning minarets in Switzerland, the growth of right wing parties in many 
European countries, the rise of Gilt Wilders in the Netherlands, the emergence of 
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PEGIDA in Germany13, the rise and fall of the English Defence League (EDL) in the 
UK, the rising popularity of UKIP, and the promotion of ‘British values’ in public 
institutions, amongst many others. In addition, the problematisation of Muslims has 
been instrumentalised politically. This is exemplified by the way that politicians stoke 
the flames of anti-Muslim prejudice in order to win votes and appeal to a growing 
constituency of anxious voters14; the way that the liberal elite invoke the 
fundamentalist threat in order to stop the transmission of illiberal, fundamentalist, 
and patriarchal customs to younger generations (Casanova 2012); the manner in 
which the media regularly conflate issues and spins stories in order to sell papers; 
the way that anti-Muslim prejudice has galvanised various groups of the far right, 
evidenced by the activities of the EDL, the works of right-wing think-tanks15, the Oslo 
attacks by Andres Breivik in 2011, and the political success seen with UKIP in 
Britain.16 More importantly, the anxiety directed towards Muslims has been primarily 
driven by the mainstream and not just by the fringe, encapsulated by Barons Warsi’s 
speech on Islamophobia, in which Islamophobia had passed the ‘dinner-table test’ 
(Batty 2011). In sort the spectre of Islam within Europe has provoked various 
reactions and is being employed as a pretext for the fulfilment of heterogeneous 
political, social, and cultural objectives.  
 
                                                          
13
 PEGIDA stands for ‘Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident’ is a German anti-
Islam political organisation founded in Dresden in October 2014 (BBC 2015). 
14
 In the build up to the 2015 General Election in the UK, Nigel Farage, Leader of UKIP, in an 
interview with Trevor Philips, equated the fear of immigration with some British Muslims who were 
described as a ‘fifth column' (Mason, the Guardian 2015). In addition, Afzal Amin, a Conservative 
candidate in North Dudley, was suspended after being caught by the Mail on Sunday trying to arrange 
with the EDL a fake demonstration outside the mosque UKIP, which would then be called off after his 
intervention (Watt and Mathew, The Guardian 2015).  
15
 Spin Watch Reports examines the work and funding of two right-wing think tanks in the UK- the 
Centre for Social Cohesion (now Henry Jackson Society) and the Policy Exchange. The report 
reveals their links to global transnational counter-jihadi movements and shows that the arguments 
advanced by these think-tanks are a reversion to counter-subversion strategies of the Cold-War era 
(Mills, Griffin, Miller 2011).  
16
 UKIP received almost 4 Million votes and 12.6% of the share of the vote in the elections of 2015 
(BBC Election 2015) 
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What makes intolerant liberalism justifiable is the notion of teleological liberal 
secularist assumptions built into notion of modernity that one set of norms is 
enlightened and progressive and the other is dark and backwards. A European 
narrative of progress is uncomfortable with looking in the mirror and seeing its past 
return. In one sense the vocal and visible Muslim presence is perceived as a 
throwback to the Middle Ages in Europe: 
 
At a more diffuse level, the Islamic revival signals a cultural anxiety in the West. The 
West sees in Islam the distorted mirror of its own past. It marks the rebirth of the God 
they had killed so that Man (sic) could live. The Islamic resurgence mark the revenge 
of God; it signals the return of faith, the return of all that puts into question the idea of 
the progressive liberation of humanity.  
                                                                                                         (Sayyid 2015, 4) 
  
Part of the anxiety in Europe comes from the implicit fact that being modern is no 
longer associated with being Western. There is a global trend towards what Taylor 
(2011) and Casanova (2008) refer to as ‘multiple modernity’s’, that is, that every 
society, cultural, and tradition seeks to negotiate a modernity in its own image and in 
a way compatible with its way of life, instead of the previously held assumption that 
all societies have to follow the trajectory of the West on route to modernisation. Even 
a champion of the Enlightenment and secular modernity like Jürgen Habermas now 
speaks of a ‘post-secular age’ in which secular reason must learn to become ‘aware 
of what is missing’ in secularity and which the reason of faith, oxymoronically, 
provides space for. For Habermas, secularisation now ‘functions less as a filter 
separating out the contents of traditions than as a transformer which redirects the 
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flow of tradition’ (Habermas et al 2010, 18). In other words, the de-privatisation of 
religion in Europe is seen to have derailed its conception of modernity.  This 
argument draws on current global trends in which Western modernity is challenged 
by globalisation, the rise of new powers in Asia, and the diversity of European 
society. The notion of multiple modernities effectively decentres the West as the 
bastion of universal values and severs the link between the West and modernity.  
 
With this in mind, it is important to turn to the connection between the role of the 
secular, the perceived threat of Islam, and counter-terrorism in Britain. Using 
PREVENT as a case study, Stacy Gutkowski (2011) shows how political and cultural 
secularity has contributed to perceptions of risk. Secular ideas consequently helped 
make the following problematic suppositions seem plausible (358): 
 
• Religious identity (rather than evidence of extremism) was a useful and 
unproblematic way to identify a diverse Muslim population, bringing it under 
surveillance; 
 
• Religious narratives, doctrine and law are static entities that can be 
instrumentalised for security purposes; and 
 
• There is a ‘slippery slope’ between mainstream Islamic ideas and radical 
extremism, particularly for young men.  
                                                                                                                                      
Gutkowski also crucially highlights the position of religion in relation to secularism 
and liberalism, supported by assumptions like the natural separation of politics and 
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religion, and that religion is a kind of personal ‘idiosyncrasy’ with an ‘irrational’ hold  
over people (349). Concomitantly important in defining religion as risky is the 
perception of religion by the political liberal tradition, the historical experience of 
British colonialism with non-violent and violent religions, and the increasing non-
religiosity among the white mainstream from the 1960s onwards (Ibid). She therefore 
argues that a by-product of this secular orientation, is something she calls the 
‘ambivalence of the secular’, which has ‘exaggerated the extent to which radical 
ideas have taken hold among Muslims’ and that ‘moderate Islam could be co-opted 
into managing the spread of radical ideas’ (35).  It is thus the secular liberal context 
of Europe that has determined what is seen as ‘risk’ and which has shaped the 
representation of the radicalisation threat in security discourses and counter-
terrorism policy in the UK. 
The construction of problematic Muslim communities and the threat posed by the 
spectre of Islam has shaped the production of discourses on radicalisation. 
Specifically, it has resulted in the privileging of theology and identity as causal 
factors in accounts of radicalisation; the focus of PREVENT on Islamist ideology and 
‘extremism’ and the religious rehabilitative models deployed in de-radicalisation 
interventions (PSJ 2012; Bjorgo and Horgan 2009; Ashour 2009). Such examples 
point to the primacy of beliefs and ideas in the conceptualisation and understanding 
of human behaviour.17 The by-product of this thinking is that individuals are defined 
in solely religious terms, the conflation of religion and personal identity into a 
categorical identity, and that 3 million Muslims constitute a single subjectivity.  
                                                          
17
 The notion of beliefs as a doctrine or set of rational precepts was also a feature of Enlightenment 
conception. Thinkers of the Enlightenment attacked religious doctrine, covertly assuming that religious 
behaviour is a result of religious beliefs, and will cease when the belief is refuted. Roger Scruton 
shows instead the various ways religions exist for people: as a social fact, as myth, as cult, religion as 
an aid to survival, and religion as sublimated violence (Scruton 2006, 121-128). 
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Consequently, this discursive development inscribes causal power onto Islam and 
Muslim subjectivity and links it with propensity to violence, as well as identifying it as 
the source of problematic identities, not to mention troublesome practices 
incompatible with life in modern Britain. As a result, the solution to ‘radicalisation’ 
and ‘integration’ become an issue that needs to be addressed in theological and 
psychological terms. Indeed the preoccupation with theological reflections in Muslim 
political activity is itself an integral component of de-radicalisation intervention. Since 
the security and integration threat is understand and analysed in terms of identity 
and religion, then the logical solution for government and civil society is to intervene 
in the religious life of Muslims. Hence we see the call, in some quarters, for a ‘reform 
of Islam’ as well as the promotion of ‘moderate Muslims’ in PREVENT, evidenced 
below in a recent speech by Prime Minister David Cameron in July 2015.  
 
Now the third plank of our strategy is to embolden different voices within the Muslim 
community. Just as we do not engage with extremist groups and individuals, we’re 
now going to actively encourage the reforming and moderate Muslim voices. This is 
a significant shift in government approach – and an important one.  
 
                                                                                                         (Cameron 2015) 
 
The history and experience of Christianity in the British context provides a normative 
blueprint for the type of Islam that would be accepted in the UK. Both Casanova 
(Casanova 2006, 23) and Taylor (2007; 2011) show how Protestant Christianity is 
implicated in the development of secular modernity. For Taylor, Western 
Enlightenment produced a type of religious sensibility compatible with secular 
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modernity, characterised by the disenchanted of the world, a self-immanent order, 
and a staunchly buffered identity (2011, 285-286). Similarly, for policymakers the 
remoulding of Islam to suit British political, social, and cultural spaces would ideally 
take the shape of Anglican Christianity- private, non-political, and institutionalised. 
Such a strategy is also tied up with concepts of citizenship. And it would also entail, 
clear from the emphasis on ‘shared values’ in PREVENT, compatibility with liberal 
values of equality, human rights, and democracy. The British experience of the 
secular and religion not only prescribes a normative template for the indigenising of 
Islam in Britain, but also becomes adopted as a strategy in British counter-terrorism 
policy.   
 
In summation, in this section I have argued that constructions of Islam as a foreign 
entity, transnational in scope, politically ambitious, and possessing a fanatical hold 
on its adherents have been shaped by the European experience of religion, the 
secular, and modernity. The de-privatisation of religion as a result of immigration and 
globalisation in recent times has challenged European societies with respect to the 
place of religion in public and social life. These both explain the fashion in which the 
threat of Islam has been imagined, as well as the attempt by elites to remake and 
domesticate Islam in an image palatable to European realities. Doing so enables us 
to make sense of the role of religion in theories of radicalisation, its place in the 
PREVENT strategy, and its association with de-radicalisation. 
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1.4 The Culturalisation of Politics and the Self-Other Nexus  
 
One approach to contextualising the backdrop to the themes mentioned above of 
security, identity, and religion in the formulation of ‘radicalisation’ as the ‘new security 
challenge’, is the ‘culturalisation of politics’ (Brown 2006, 17). Events of the past 
three decades have put culture as the primary lens through which politics is analysed 
(Huntington 1993). The ‘culturalisation of politics’ consigns politics, history, political 
economy, class, gender, international relations, colonialism, the state, and many 
more to mere footnotes in the analysis of phenomenon, placing in its stead ‘culture’ 
as the primary explanation for motivations, actions, and events. Whilst liberal 
democracies ascribes culture to the fundamentalist Other, it excludes itself from 
culturalisation. Only Western liberal democracies have politics and history, whereas 
the Other is dispossessed of them.  
According to Brown (2006), this non reciprocity is based on three elements: first, 
Liberalism’s claims to universality through secularism, the rule of law, equality, moral 
autonomy, and individual liberty. Second, Liberalism unit of analysis (the individual 
and its primary objective of maximising individual freedom) is the antithesis of the 
coherence and continuity claimed by groups and so naturally positions the individual 
in tension with culture. Third, Liberalism privatises and individuates culture, as it 
does with religion, exemplified in the basic premise of liberal secularism that ‘neither 
culture nor religion are permitted to govern publicly; both are tolerated on the 
condition that they are privately and individually enjoyed’ (21). Culture must be 
contained by liberalism so as to make no political claim (22).  
The offshoot of culturalisation is de-politicisation.  Brown identities two different 
dimensions assumed by de-politicisation in Western Liberal democracies: De-
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politicisation involves ‘construing inequality, subordination, marginalization, and 
social conflict, which all require political analysis and political solutions, as personal 
and individual’ (15). Second, de-politicisation presents such domains as problems 
that are natural, religious or cultural (Ibid). In short, significant issues that demand 
political solutions are replaced with therapeutic or behavioural solutions, as well as 
making religious, ethnic, and cultural difference an inherent site of conflict (Ibid). 
Brown highlights several causes for de-politicisation: long-standing tendencies in 
liberalism itself, individualism, and the diffusion of market rationality across the 
political and social spheres precipitated by the ascendency of neo-liberalism (17). In 
this light, de-radicalisation is a by-product of the ‘culturalisation of politics’.  
After all, de-radicalisation is seen as a solution framed at the individual level 
explained in terms of ‘cognitive’ and ‘behavioural’ variables, implemented to 
eradicate ‘radicalisation’- itself said to be caused by ‘culture’. In addition, the 
narrative of radicalisation depicts Muslims as a security threat because of the 
problems with their identity, the misinterpretation of religious doctrine, which are also 
the reasons that they pose a social threat. It also attributes blame to political 
multiculturalism for rendering Britain conducive for the incubation of radicalisation. 
Indeed Kundnani (2012) writes that the radicalisation discourse deliberately removed 
politics, foreign policy, and notions of injustice out of purview; whilst scholars like 
Jonathan Githens-Mazer (2012), Lee Jarvis, Baker-Beall, and Heath Kelly (2015), 
have critically noted that the discourse on radicalisation ignores decades of 
scholarship linking the importance of political, social, economic, meso, and macro 
issues to political violence.  It is little wonder that political analysis evades 
radicalisation discourses, not to mention the glaring absence of politics in 
discussions surrounding de-radicalisation. 
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Through culture, essentialism takes up residence in our understandings and 
explanations of the Muslim Other.  Everything becomes a matter of religious and 
theological causation: crime, social ills, political violence, terrorism, and much more, 
occur as a result of religion. Muslims are presented as exceptional and Islam as 
backward and distant from the progress of modernity embodied in Enlightenment 
values such as tolerance, democracy, free speech, equality, and individualism (Said 
2003, Casanova 2008; 2010; Asad et al. 2009). Moreover, the foreign, religious, 
radical, and cultural Other is denied the capacity to be authors of their own narrative, 
are disposed of any agency, and exist statically and menacingly in the shadows of 
the imaginations of the Western nation state.  
The same phenomenon of culturalisation was at play in European representations of 
the Middle East at the height of colonialism, what Edward Said famously called 
‘Orientalism’ (2003 [1978]). One of Said’s claims was the notion that Western 
Orientalism constructed a particular understanding of the Orient for the purposes of 
political control and hegemony (3-6). The remarkable feature of contemporary 
Orientalist representations of Muslims in Europe is the ease with which it is made, in 
large part made possible by 9-11. Whilst my argument in chapter 5 on discursive 
technology echoes Said’s argument about the political objectives governing the will 
to knowledge,  it is the second feature of Said’s claims that also opens avenues for 
further insights on the ‘culturalisation of politics’; namely, the claim that such 
constructions were done for the purposes of Self construction. That is to say the 
West (as a cultural and ideological construction and not as a geographical place) 
came into existence through the representation of the foreign Other.18  
                                                          
18
 Sayyid (2015, 32-35) identifies two versions of orientalism- ‘weak’ and ‘strong’. Weak orientalism 
sees the orientalist enterprise was subverted by its complicity with western imperialism. It remains 
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In the case of Europe, European identity was built in opposition to Islam and through 
the exclusion of Muslims. For example, Talal Asad (2003) shows how European 
identity was formed through the deliberate exclusion of Muslims in its cultural and 
historical narratives (166). This is exemplified by the absence of Bosnia from the 
idea of Europe, the beginning of European civilisation as a homogenous space and 
time dated to the Battle of Vienna against the Ottomans, and severing the link 
between the World of Islam and its inheritance of Hellenistic culture (166-169). 
Today, the West (primarily Euro-America) is defining itself once again against 
Islam.19  
There are many benefits conferred to Western Liberal democracies, like the UK, by 
the construction of the backwards fundamentalist Other of Islam: politically, 
governmentally, socially, and culturally. Politically, it has an internal and external 
function. Internally, it galvanises the population and permits the construction of a 
political identity, the ‘we’ that is integral to the nation state.20 Externally, it enables it 
to execute hegemonic projects (a la War on Terror) in the Middle East with greater 
legitimacy. Domestically it enables the government to fix the content of the label 
‘Muslim’, which in Britain was placed into crisis by the emergence of Muslim 
subjectivity in the wake of Rushdie, thereby disrupting the racial categories 
governing bio-political management of the population (Tyler and Sayyid 2012, 357). 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
about a discourse of knowledge/power instigated by conditions of European global expansion. 
However, strong orientalism is concerned with how orientalism constructs the Orient and in the 
process creates the Orient, not just distorting the ‘real’ Orient. It is a means of establishing and 
reinforcing the identity of the West. 
 
19
 Said (2003, 300-301) argued that Orientalism produces accounts about Islam and the Orient 
organised around four themes: (1) There is an absolute and systemic difference between the West 
and the Orient (2) the representation of the Orient are based on textual exegesis rather than modern 
Oriental realities (3) the Orient is unchanging, uniform, and incapable of describing itself and (4) The 
Orient is to be feared or mastered.  
20
 See analysis on Carl Schmitt’s concept of the Political in Chapter 4, Section 4.3  
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In other words, the presence of unracialised Muslims augments the domestic 
disciplining capacity of government (see chapter 4). 
 
Thirdly, the presence of Muslims allows European society to transfer its tensions and 
social ills on to the Muslim Other. British society becomes understood as a place 
which stands against a whole range of social ills embodied in the Muslim 
Other.Notably, this rationale of deflecting social tension to a scapegoat is found in the works 
of French anthropologist Rene Girard (2013). In ‘Sacred Violence’, he formulates the notion 
of ‘mimetic rivalry’ amongst the same group of people, who become rivals in the struggle for 
status, power, and resources. Only the sacrifice of an internal or external other can ensure 
the dissipation of conflict and tension and thus the scapegoat acts as a mechanism to deflect 
inherent violence in every society. In this way, the Muslim Other serves as a scapegoat 
mechanism for the purification of the West. This partly explains why the Other is 
often spoken in terms of the language of purification, moral disease, and 
medicalisation. This phenomenon was also corroborated in the works of British 
anthropologist Mary Douglass (2002). She found that the understanding of danger and 
threats to a community was couched in the language of purification, dirt and hygiene, and 
disease.   
 
Culturally, it allows Europe to realign itself with universal values. For Brown (2006) 
the culturalisation of politics occurs in response to a ‘legitimacy deficit’ and the 
‘diminished capacity to embody universal representation’ (83/84).  For Sayyid (2015), 
the ‘War on Terror’ in Europe is a desperate attempt by the West to re-establish 
Eurocentrism (Europe as the bearer of universalism). Meanwhile Julien Reid (2006, 
62) argues that the ‘War on Terror’ is underwritten by a liberal conception of 
humanity in a way that not only exceeds and challenges state sovereignty, but one 
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which ‘redraws the boundary between a biopolitical account of human being and it’s 
enemy’. Hence the reason that anti-Muslim prejudice has become a prominent 
feature in European societies and why its manifestations will persist unabated as 
long as it continues to serve the above functions effectively.   
 
Equally significant is the changing practice of citizenship. The idea of neutral and 
norm free citizenship has been challenged by feminist thinking (Moufee 1993, 78-
82). Feminists critiqued both the liberal and republican models shared assumptions 
of separation between public and private spheres, articulated in the platitude- ‘the 
personal is the political’ (Heywood 2007, 234). Such dichotomies were contested on 
the grounds that they were socially constructed and that discarding the abstraction 
characterising notions of citizenship reveals the reality of citizenship situated in the 
real world in which life is organised according to differences of class, gender, race, 
culture, and religion.  
However, more significant than the circumspect notion of neutral citizenship today is 
the issue of changing citizenship. I wrote earlier that the reconfiguration of citizenship 
was propelled by the integration of the pre-emptive risk logic into structures of 
governance in the UK, concomitant with the challenges posed by minority difference 
to the nation in conditions of plurality and globalisation. For example, the new ethics 
of citizenship has witnessed the revoking of citizenship for British nationals believed 
to be involved in terrorism (Provision 1, CTSA 2015), as well as the move away from 
rights to duties and obligations. This is amplified in chapter 6, which elucidates the 
powerful way non-juridical categories such as ‘British values’ and ‘extremism’ were 
remaking communities, not least inculcating a type of citizenry geared towards a 
proactive monitoring of risk in society, the de-legitimisation of ‘radical’, ‘extremist’, 
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and dissenting ideas from public spaces, and the purging of difference, which is 
associated with Muslim idea and practices. Practices of citizenship are developing in 
ways previously conceived in terms of services to be provided by government (Rose 
1999, 166).  In the drive for inclusive citizenship, the new face of citizenship today in 
the UK paradoxically creates new exclusions.   
Moreover, nation-states are not merely civil political entities that demand the civil 
allegiance to institutions of the state but are also ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson 
1983) that call for a cultural identification with the nation. The fact that the PREVENT 
policy is driving ‘British values’ and ‘extremism’ in public institutions nationally has 
the effect of excluding Muslims from the political and cultural identity of the nation. 
This is corroborated by the fact they have been viewed as ‘suspect communities’ 
(Hillyard 1993; Hickman et.al 2011), are seen through the prism of security and are 
perceived to be an alien and disloyal fifth column.  
Importantly, Asad (2003, 173) asks the pertinent question: what is the possibility of 
representing Muslim minorities in secular European states? By exploring the paradox 
of enjoying equal rights as citizens but being excluded as ‘minorities’ Asad shows 
that it is difficult if not impossible to represent Muslims in liberal democracies. The 
concept of ‘minority’ is not merely a quantitative concept but one which has roots in a 
Christian post reformation context in which it was the state’s business to secure 
religious uniformity, if not exclude dissent (Ibid). Asad therefore remains sceptical in 
the end that the exclusion of Muslim from the political, social, and cultural 
representation of Europe can be reversed without the introduction of a new model of 
representation, something akin to a pre-modern multiplicity of overlapping bonds and 
identities (174). This idea regarding the exclusion of Muslims is reiterated by Stuart 
Croft (2012) who argues that Muslims have come to be seen as the ‘Other’ outside 
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the contemporary conceptions of Britishness. Hence Muslims cannot be incorporated 
into the ‘imagined community’. 
In terms of future prospects then (of which de-radicalisation is seen as but one 
solution) the position of British Muslims has to be re-thought outside the scope of 
juridical concepts of law, sovereignty, and citizenship. There is, to be precise, no 
single subjectivity or homogenous group called ‘Muslim’, sociologically, 
economically, and theologically, and so there can never be one ‘solution’. Also 
redundant is the move towards ‘reforming Islam’ in order to prevent violence 
undertaken in the name of Islam or even the ever elusive ‘extremism’; such calls 
presume that Muslims constitute a single subjectivity, mistakenly reduce religion to 
propositional beliefs21, and assume that reform has not already been a feature of 
Islamic history.22  
 
In fact the emergence of Al-Qaeda inspired violence, as John Gray (2007) and Faisil 
Devji (2008) have rightly shown, owes more to European secular modernity and to 
groups like the Jacobins then traditional Islam. Given the failure to represent the 
Muslim in the nation-state, the prevalent illiteracy of history and religion 
characterising mainstream discourse,  not to mention the function of citizenship as a 
carrier of harsh exclusion, it is pertinent instead to re-frame the problem of Muslims 
in terms of the power characteristics of majority-minority relations within the nation-
state.  It is also crucially important to find new analytical tools to understand the 
                                                          
21 Understanding Islam in terms of the Western and Christian notion of ‘belief’ distances us from the 
subtleties that drive it. Asad shows that in Islam it is faith rather than belief that is a more accurate 
concept but one which the Quran itself has stated is an unknowable entity and unidentifiable amongst 
people. In contrast, the ‘Christian tradition allows that thoughts can commit the sin of blasphemy and 
should therefore be subject to discipline: thoughts are subject to confession’ (Asad et al. 2006, 40).  
 
22
 ‘….the Islamic tradition in the very recent past has undergone an unprecedented process of 
pluralization and fragmentation of religious authority, comparable to that initiated by the Protestant 
Reformation and operative ever since within Protestant Christianity’ (Casanova 2006, 29). 
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challenges of security, identity, and religion than currently deployed by theories of 
radicalisation, liberal discourse, and utterances made by policymakers about ‘de-
radicalisation’. 
 
This section examined the wider politics of de-radicalisation. In particular, it singled 
out the dominant recourse to ‘culture’ by policymakers and public discourse. The 
‘culturalisation of politics’ reduces major problems and issues confronting our politics 
to either a problem of ‘culture’ on the one hand and/or an individuation of the 
problem on the other. In the context of the ‘new security challenge’, it has the effect 
of ‘naturalising’ radicalisation as a problem of identity and religion, instead of macro 
(politics and Society) and meso factors (organisation, social groups). The tropes of 
culturalisation reside in the tendencies of liberalism, as well as being the discourse of 
choice for dominant powers. Whilst one manifestation of culturalisation is the 
objectification of culture for the purposes of domination, we also alluded to the other 
more critical dimension of this discursive strategy and technique: the formation of the 
self through the construction of an ‘Other’. In light of the fact, therefore, that Islam 
serves as the antithesis and antagonistic quilting point for the formation of the self, a 
call was made to re-examine our conceptual vocabulary in order to make sense of 
the new realities shaping the Muslim experience in Britain.  
 
1.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter examined the discursive conditions that allowed de-radicalisation to 
emerge. It also showed the ontological components of the problems said to be 
confronting Britain (security, identity, and religion), commonly understood in terms of 
‘radicalisation’, ‘extremism’, and the ‘Muslim Question’. The first section traces the 
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changing security paradigm. This was articulated in terms of the ‘politics of 
exception’, the social construction of risk, and the adoption of pre-emptive 
anticipatory logic in policy-making. These produce the radicalisation discourse and 
legitimise PREVENT. In particular, ‘radicalisation’ becomes associated as a process 
affecting individual Muslims and their trajectory towards violence through an ideology 
comprising of theological-political elements. Section 1.2 addresses the two-fold 
dimension of the identity debate: the failure of political multiculturalism on one hand 
and the failure of Muslims to ‘integrate’ on the other. The overall message is that a 
more robust political identity is required to assimilate problematic Muslim 
communities, whilst Muslim identity must be tinkered with in order to ensure 
compatibility between the nation and Muslims. Section 1.3 tries to make sense of the 
role of religion in the discourses on problematic Muslim communities and its re-
emergence in the public sphere. Here religion is situated sociologically within the 
experience of secularisation and modernity in Europe. Doing so fruitfully 
contextualises current debates and policy strategies that seek to ‘reform’ Islam, 
counter ‘extremism’, counter ideology, and promote ‘moderate’ Muslims- all of which 
is associated with de-radicalisation. The last section attempts to analyse the 
problematisation of security, identity, and religion through the main paradigm 
shaping the way we think, understand, and analyse contemporary challenges: 
Culturalisation. The concept and practice of de-radicalisation is presented as the by-
product of the culturalisation of politics par excellence because it targets the 
individual by addressing the ideas and beliefs they hold through therapeutic and 
behavioural remedies. Absent from this ‘solution’ are wider discussions and 
strategies to address politics, society, and power. The argument was made that the 
process of problematisation by policymaking elites in Britain was intertwined with 
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identity construction.  Analysing the stranglehold of top-down identity models for 
Muslims through concepts of nationhood, citizenship, identity politics, and 
liberalism’s favoured default category of ‘culture’, fails to encapsulate the reality of 
power relations characterising discourses relating to Muslims in Britain. 
Another way of viewing all the above is to see Muslim difference as being framed in 
terms of surfeit difference (too religious, too political, and too foreign). It is in this way 
that the discourse on ‘Radicalisation’ entails both the Radicalised Other (individual 
Muslims) and the Orientalised Other (referred to singularly as the ‘British Muslim 
Community’).  De-radicalisation in PREVENT is thus tasked with the responsibility of 
mitigating Muslim excess through the transformation of Muslim subjectivity in 
conformity to norms which the national majority consider desirable. Herein lays the 
politics of de-radicalisation. It also constitutes the backdrop to the following 
investigation into the concept and practice of de-radicalisation in the UK. The next 
chapter examines the literature on de-radicalisation so that we can ascertain both 
the ontological framework of de-radicalisation- championed by policymakers as a 
solution to the problem of ‘radicalisation’ engulfing British Muslim communities- and 
the position of my thesis within the wider field. 
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CHAPTER 2 
De-radicalisation: a Literature Review  
 
De-radicalisation is situated under the second objective- ‘supporting vulnerable 
people’- of the PREVENT strand in CONTEST:   
 
This area of Prevent is based on the premise that people being drawn into 
radicalisation and recruitment can be identified and then provided with support. The 
purpose of that support is to dissuade them from engaging in and supporting 
terrorist-related activity. This support is sometimes described as ‘de-radicalisation’, a 
term which is sometimes used to refer to cognitive or behavioural change: in the 
context of our own programmes we use it to refer to both. We seek to remove people 
from the influence of and from contact with terrorist groups and sympathisers, and to 
challenge any support they have for them.                                                                                                                              
 
                                                                                            (HO 2011, 56, section 9.4) 
 
The above definition is taken from an updated PREVENT document at the time of 
writing (June 2015), whereas the initial document of 2011 also compared de-
radicalisation to crime prevention work. Notably, the analogy of de-radicalisation to 
‘crime prevention’ is included in the summary section on page 55 in the updated 
version. The important point here is the opacity of this definition of de-radicalisation. 
To reiterate, de-radicalisation is defined as a ‘support’ programme aiming to 
‘dissuade’ radicals from supporting or adopting violence and involves ‘cognitive or 
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behavioural change’. The definition offered by the Home Office does very little to 
explain the ontological framework of de-radicalisation. This confusing definition 
provokes consternation given that fact that governments in Europe are interested in 
knowing what factors get violent individuals to abandon violent radicalisation. The 
following chapter endeavours to find out the state of research on de-radicalisation in 
order to begin answering the question about ontology: what is de-radicalisation? 
Overall, the purpose of this review is twofold; it aims to highlight what is known about 
de-radicalisation in the literature and to situate my investigation within the wider field.  
The first section provides an inventory on the state of the field of studies on de-
radicalisation. The section after surveys the various de-radicalisation programmes 
operating in different parts of the world. Sections 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 examine the 
definition, concept, and process of de-radicalisation respectively. The last section 
sums up the chapter and the key findings of this review.  
 
 
 
2.1 A ‘State of the Nation’ Overview  
 
De-radicalisation is a new area of study and little research has been done on it. The 
nascent state of this research area is summarised below. 
 
The literature on (de-) radicalisation is young. In the attached bibliography the 
majority of the 175 titles are from the last decade, especially from the last six years. 
Only eleven titles are from the 1990s, four from the 1980s, none is from the 1970s 
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and only one from the 1960s. Most of the literature focuses on Islamist radicalization. 
The majority of studies describe radicalisation processes with studies of de-
radicalisation being fewer and of more recent origin. The literature selected here is, 
however, more illustrative than representative for the dynamic and fast growing field 
of (de-) radicalisation studies. Part of the literature is “grey”, that is, it consists of 
reports that are not distributed in the form of academic monographs or published in 
social science journals, though many of them are available online. 
                                                                                                          
                                                                                          (Schmid & Price 2011, 338) 
 
 
An important aspect mentioned above is the fact that most of the literature is ‘grey’. 
The majority of the literature on de-radicalisation can be classified as reports 
available online but which are not published in journals or academic monographs. In 
fact much of the reports online are produced by think-tanks (Demant et al. 2008; 
Rabasa et al. 2010; Disley et al. 2011; the ISD 2010; and the ICSR 2010). The UK 
literature on de-radicalisation has mainly been confined to think-tank reports (ICSR 
2010; ISD 2010; ISD 2011), which provide a best-practice description of prison 
programmes. Other think-tank reports that provide comprehensive reviews are non-
UK based, e.g. the RAND Corporation (Rabasa et al. 2010) which is an American 
think-tank and the Centre for International Migration and Ethnic Studies (Demant et 
al. 2008) based in the Netherlands. The only real attempts academically at 
conceptualising de-radicalisation have been made by John Horgan (Horgan 2008; 
2009; 2009a; Bjorgo and Horgan 2009) and Omar Ashour (Ashour 2009).  Notably, 
Ashour’s (2009) ‘The De-Radicalization of Jihadists’ is the only detailed and focused 
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case study of de-radicalisation in the field, whilst ‘Leaving Terrorism Behind’ (Bjorgo 
& Horgan 2009), is the first attempt in the field to provide a comparative study on the 
processes and programmes of disengagement and de-radicalisation. 
 
It is important to state here the absence of a detailed study of de-radicalisation in the 
UK context. For example, Ashour’s and Horgan’s studies of de-radicalisation and 
disengagement are either primarily concerned with (a) prisons and (b) terrorists 
and/or convicted militants. The significance of this observation can be understood in 
relation to the fact that in the UK de-radicalisation intervention is primarily (a) outside 
prisons23 and instead target at civil society and (b) ‘extremist’, especially it seems 
non-violent terrorist, and not necessarily terrorist or convicted criminals; and (c) 
youngsters. Moreover, there is no independent and rigorous assessment of 
‘Channel’, the flagship police-run de-radicalisation programme in the UK in the 
literature. Instead there is only rudimentary information on Channel (Kundnani 2012; 
ACPO report 2010, HO 2011; HMG 2015) and no reliable data, let alone evaluation 
of any form on it. The only case study of de-radicalisation interventions that could be 
                                                          
23
In the UK, Prison de-radicalisation is managed by the National Offender Management (NOMS). 
Since 2007 NOMS has been trying to develop interventions targeting the drives of radicalisation (HO 
2011, 88; Spalek, Al-Awa, and Lambert 2008, 45-46). According to the Prison Service Journal, there 
are two intervention programmes- Healthy Identity and Al Furqan (PSJ 2012, 31). The Healthy Identity 
Interventions delivers one-to-one (or two facilitators to one offender) over a number of sessions and 
are responsive to the individual’s needs, risks, type and level of engagement and are suitable for all 
types of extremist offenders (regardless of cause) (NOMS 2013). Al Furqan (meaning to distinguish 
between truth and falsehood) is specifically suitable for Islamist offenders where ideology has become 
wedded with extremist interpretations of the Islamic faith. It is intended to challenge misinterpretations 
of Islamic texts (PSJ 2012, 32). However, the Journal concluded that the ‘development and delivery of 
a co-ordinated, multi-faceted approach to preventing terrorist offending is still in its relative infancy’ 
(PS J 2012, 36). Furthermore, PREVENT 2011 stated that ‘progress has been slower’ due to the lack 
of ‘proven methodology’ and the lack of template to develop interventions from (HO 2011, 89), 
although national implementation was planned for 2012. One of the future goals of PREVENT 2011 
was ‘significantly scaling up’ de-radicalisation interventions in prisons. According to the NOMS 
summary on Healthy Identity interventions in 2013, interventions ‘available to all convicted extremist 
offenders in both custody and community who are assessed as suitable’, with interventions being 
monitored and re-evaluated (NOMS 2013, 2). However, an article in January 2014 reported that 
“Three quarters of all prisoners convicted of terror offences reject rehabilitation and not a single senior 
terror convict has engaged with the de-radicalisation programme “(Gover 2014). In short, given the 
lack of documentation and access to data it is difficult to assess how interventions in prison are faring. 
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found in the literature in the UK context is either on the Strategy to Reach, Empower, 
and Educate (STREET) (Lambert 2011; ISD 2012; Baker 2011) or Active Change 
Foundation (ACF) (Rabasa et al. 2012, 133-136), which represent the two flagship 
organisations delivering interventions. Perhaps the most relevant reading of de-
radicalisation to the UK context is advanced by Lasse Lindekilde (2015). His analysis 
of de-radicalisation focuses on individual interventions in Denmark after their revised 
counter-radicalisation policy of 2011, which was influenced by the separation of 
community cohesion projects from counter-radicalisation efforts in the UK (229). 
Despite the similarities prima facie of the PREVENT strategy in both countries, the 
fact remains: there is not a single conceptual, theoretical, and empirical study on de-
radicalisation in the UK.  
 
It is worthwhile referring to the findings of a comprehensive review on the literature 
on de-radicalisation commissioned by the OSCT, titled, ‘Individual disengagement 
from Al-Qaeda influenced terrorist groups’ (Disley et al. 2011). The report was 
produced to inform policy and practice in preventing terrorism. The report begins by 
stating that:  
 
Very little academic research has been completed into the factors leading individuals 
to desist and disengage from Al-Qaeda-influenced terrorist groups, or indeed into 
intervention designed to draw individuals away from such terrorism. 
                                                                                                                      (2011, 1)  
 
However, the review identifies seven main flaws in the literature (78-80): 
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 Limited amount of robust research focusing on Al-Qaeda influenced 
terrorism; their review found only five empirical studies, with three only using 
primary data (Demant et al. 2008; Garfinkel 2007; Horgan 2009b) in each 
study interviews included Al-Qaeda extremist, as well as others.     
 
 Limited amount of research interest in leaving groups; report states that 
desistance and disengagement is a new area and that most of the research 
has focused on radicalisation. Concerns about safety and access acts as 
barriers to further research in the field.  
 
 Limited empirical basis; the report states that three studies mentioned 
above are well designed in that they sought to gather information about the 
experience and motivation of leavers but that caution must be exercised with 
respect to transferability of findings from these studies given that so few 
leavers have spoken to researchers. 
 
 Causality cannot be inferred; that the limited studies only provide 
information on those who have left and thus the problem with the ‘control’ 
selection of the limited research conducted on leavers of terrorism means 
that it is therefore difficult to infer causality. 
 
 Reliance on personal accounts; personal accounts of why someone has 
left the group can be unreliable- the individual might not be telling the truth, 
may not be able to articulate clearly the reasons he’s left the group, or may 
not know the reasons with much certainty-coupled with the limited numbers of 
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those actually being involved let alone leaving, that personal accounts cannot 
be self-validated with confidence.  
 
 Lack of robust evaluation of interventions, including no counter-factual; 
No evaluations of interventions to facilitate exit from terrorist groups were 
identified. Instead the reports can be considered programmes reviews with 
unverified information about intervention. Another important weakness to note 
is the absence of the counter-factual in these ‘reviews’: what would happen if 
those individuals did not participate in the intervention? Moreover the report 
stated that there was no evidence of any reported longitudinal studies that 
looks at the long-term effects of interventions.    
 
 
 Lack of peer reviewed literature: although some of the reviews, reports, 
and studies found in the literature are written by credible academics or policy 
officials, this literature, unlike that produced in Journals, is not peer-reviewed, 
which in conjunction with the absence of empirical data, means that findings 
should be treated carefully. 
 
Given the weaknesses in the quality of the literature on de-radicalisation and 
disengagement the report finds little or no evidence for policy development:  
 
The available evidence provides a limited basis for policy development. There are 
too few studies that look at leaving terrorist groups and a very limited number that 
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look at leaving Al Qa’ida-influenced groups. The studies that have interviewed 
individuals who have left terrorist groups are useful starting points, but they provide 
an insufficient basis for isolating the factors that caused, or were strongly associated 
with, an individual’s decision to leave.  
                                                                                                 (Disley et al. 2011, VI) 
 
Indeed the lack of empirical data emerging from reports on programmes is 
acknowledged in PREVENT 2011:  
 
‘There is little empirical evidence underpinning intervention work in this area here in 
the UK and internationally.’ 
                                                                                                                (HO 2011, 61) 
 
In summation, this section provided a schematic overview of the state of the 
literature on de-radicalisation. The first major point is that as an area of study, de-
radicalisation is very new, with the bulk of the literature being produced after 2006. 
Secondly, the vast majority of the literature is ‘grey’. This means that very little of the 
available literature has been subjected to academic scrutiny or even peer review. 
The vast majority of the literature is available online are in fact primarily think-tank 
reports and reviews of de-radicalisation programmes. Another issue is that there is a 
marked absence of primary and empirical data. Besides the rudimentary mention in 
a few policy documents, we have no body of work on de-radicalisation programmes 
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in the UK. As a result of the fragmented state of the knowledge on de-radicalisation 
and the absence of primary data, no causal inferences can be inferred with regards 
to the process of de-radicalisation and no basis for policy development can be 
established. 
2.2 De-radicalisation Programmes 
 
De-radicalisation programmes emerged in many countries in the Middle East (M.E.) 
and Southeast Asia (S.E.A), and Europe in the late 1990’s with the overarching 
objective of getting individuals and groups to move away from terrorism (Bjorgo & 
Horgan 2009, Ashour 2009). Many countries began responding to terrorism in 
innovative ways out of recognition that traditional coercive methods of counter-
terrorism do not work on its own. Other factors included the counter-productiveness 
of repressive measures, the need for a more systematic way of managing risk, and 
the need to reduce recruitment (Bjorgo & Horgan 2009, 1). In fact de-radicalisation 
programmes were implemented before 9-11 in places like Egypt and Algeria (Ashour 
2009; 2012, 124).24 However, such programmes were more associated with attempts 
at reconciliation and doctrinal revision of prison inmates convicted of terrorism than 
de-radicalisation.  It was only after the growing number of terrorist attacks globally 
after 9-11 that the development and concern for de-radicalisation in the M.E. and 
S.E.A. began to take shape.  
Table 1 in the Appendix illustrates a variety of de-radicalisation programmes and the 
reports conducted on them. These programmes or interventions have been targeted 
at all types of violent groups; from the left-wing guerrilla Revolutionary Armed Forces 
                                                          
24
 In Egypt al- Gama’a al-Islamiyaa, AKA Islamic Group (IG) declared a unilateral ceasefire in July 
1997 that resulted in comprehensive de-radicalisation of the organisation by 2002. In Algeria a 
unilateral ceasefire declared by the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) in October 1997.   
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of Colombia (FARC) in Colombia, to right-wing extremists in Europe, and to Takfiri-
Jihadi militants in the M.E. and S.E.A. These programmes have been guided by 
different strategies and vary in type- from individual to collective de-radicalisation, 
and state or/and NGO run programmes. The delivery of these programmes has been 
implemented and expressed through a number of diverse activities that include 
counselling, dialogue, counter-ideology, state repressions, family involvement, and 
aftercare (Barret & Bokhari 2009, 173-4). Interventions are also predominantly prison 
based programmes, whereas European programmes mainly target individuals 
outside of prison environments.  
Most the de-radicalisation programmes in the M.E. and S.E.A. employed theological 
discussions as well as counter-ideological dialogue with militant inmates as an 
essential component of ‘rehabilitation’. Notably, these theological dialogues are 
predicated on the idea that militant extremist follow an incorrect understanding of 
Islam and a crucial dimension therefore of de-radicalisation intervention has been 
religious doctrinal revision.  De-radicalisation in Egypt was the first and arguably the 
most successful programme in the 1990’s, which was distinguished by the 
pioneering work on theological doctrinal revision. This involved dynamic interaction 
between inmates, charismatic leaders, and discussions with Al-Azhar imams. The 
comprehensive de-radicalisation of the IG in 2007 was accompanied by the 
publication of twenty five volumes of doctrinal revisions. Similarly, the de-
radicalisation of al-Jihad in 2007-8 resulted in the publication of two books by former 
Al-Qaeda ideologue and Emir (leader) of al-Jihad Dr. Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (Ashour 
2012, 124).25  
                                                          
25
 The two books are (1) Document for Guiding Jihad (Ashour 2012, 136) (2) Rationalising  Jihadist 
Action in Egypt and the World (Al-Anani 2009, 3)  
92 
 
Another example of this approach was seen in Yemen through the ‘Committee for 
Dialogue’. It was one of the first de-radicalisation programmes to be based on 
religious dialogue with militants in 2002 in order to get detainees to accept legitimacy 
of the regime and to prevent attacks within Yemen (Boucek, Beg, Horgan 2009, 
189). This approach was seen as a success (Yemen claims 98% of graduates have 
remained non-violent) and has influenced programmes in Indonesia, Singapore, and 
Malaysia (Abuza 2009, 191-211). In Singapore, for example, the Yemeni model was 
loosely replicated with the creation of Religious Rehabilitation Group, which 
undertook over 800 individual counselling sessions between 2003 and 2007 (198).  
Equally significant, the material based components are also a major if not 
substantive part of de-radicalisation programmes. This approach indicates that 
ideological and theological dialogues are not sufficient factors in influencing militant 
detainees to renounce the use of violence. These programmes offer economic and 
social support to families of detainees, providing job training to detainees released 
from programmes, as well as involving the support of families and friends in 
rehabilitation efforts.  For example, the programme in Saudi Arabia has received 
acclaim for taking a comprehensive approach and using family members in the 
intervention process, providing job training, as well as finding apartments for 
detainees (Boucek, Beg, Horgan 2009, 212-223).  
In contrast to counterpart programmes in the M.E. and S.E.A, European 
programmes are broadly voluntary-based and target non-violent extremist. Examples 
include programmes such as ‘Exit’ in Sweden and Norway (these programmes 
emphasise non-ideological factors in explanations of pathways towards far-right 
extremism), which targets far-right extremism, not to mention the ‘Violence 
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Prevention Network’ in Germany, which expanded its previous remit to include 
religiously radicalised individuals (ISD 2012, 12). In Amsterdam a programme called 
‘Information House’ targeted radicalised Muslims but due to concerns about privacy 
had to be closed in December 2009 (Rabasa, et al. 2010). In the UK interventions 
include STREET, which was run by a community and grass roots group based in 
Brixton, South London26 and the ACF, which is a grass-root organisation based in 
East London. Overall, de-radicalisation in the European context primarily targets 
individuals in civil society rather than in prisons, albeit some prison programmes 
exists (ICSR 2010). 
 
 
 
 
Importantly, since de-radicalisation programmes include both material and counter-
ideological components, it is difficult to evaluate what factors are the most important 
in enabling the de-radicalisation of individuals to occur. In addition given the limited 
data available it is also difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of these programmes. 
At the moment, current evaluation methods focus on something called ‘recidivism 
rates’, i.e. the number of “ex” Jihadist who re-engage (Chowdhury & Hearne 2008, 
16), but due to the lack of information and the unreliability of this measure, there 
have been calls, by the likes of Horgan, to find more effective ways of evaluating the 
success of programmes (Horgan 209b; Horgan & Bruddock 2010).  Despite the 
highly publicized claims for success associated with some interventions 
                                                          
26
 STREET stopped receiving money with the suspension of PREVENT by the Coalition government 
in 2010. They are no longer provide counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation interventions for 
government.  
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programmes, John Horgan and Kurt Braddock (2010, 285-6) concluded that there 
are major barriers to even the most tentative of evaluations: 
 
 There are no explicit criteria for success associated with any initiative;  
 
 There is little data associated with any of these initiatives that can be reliably 
corroborated independently;  
 
 There has been no systematic effort to study any aspect of these programs, 
even individually, let alone collectively. 
 
In summation, it is clear that de-radicalisation programmes differ significantly in aim, 
implementation, and targets of intervention. The most salient distinction between de-
radicalisation in Europe and elsewhere is the fact that policymakers target non-
violent youngsters with little or no connections with wider networks but who are 
believed to harbour ‘extremist’ views. In contrast, de-radicalisation in the M.E. and 
S.E.A targeted convicted militants in prison. The absence of empirical data and in in-
depth study of de-radicalisation means that academics and policymakers cannot 
draw causal inferences regarding successes of interventions. More significant, there 
is no robust way of evaluating the success of de-radicalisation interventions, even if 
some have tried to employ the notion of ‘recidivism’ from crime prevention. Instead, 
some of the reports identify ‘best practice’. Overall de-radicalisation programmes are 
diverse, what we know of them is limited, and evaluation of interventions is non-
existent. 
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2.3 The definition of De-radicalisation  
 
There are eight different definitions of de-radicalisation that can be discerned from 
the literature (shown as table 1 in the Appendix), which could be categorised into the 
following: official (policy driven); academic; and definitions formulated by think-tanks. 
Moreover, the confusion surrounding the meaning of de-radicalisation is 
compounded in the literature with the use of other terms which are used in the same 
context as de-radicalisation and yet contain subtle differences in meaning and 
subsequently pose different policy ramifications. For example terms like 
‘rehabilitation’, ‘desists’, ‘de-legitimisation’, ‘socialisation’, ‘de-programming’, and 
‘dialogue’ are used to refer to de-radicalisation programmes. It is also employed 
interchangeably in the discourse with other terms like “disengagement” and “counter-
radicalisation” (Horgan 2008).  
There are two official definitions of de-radicalisation. The first official definition that 
was formulated at a policy level was in 2008 at the United Nations by the UN 
Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism leading to Terrorism, which defined 
de-radicalisation as: 
 Programmes that are generally directed against individuals who have become 
radical with the aim of re-integrating them into society or dissuading them from 
violence.  
 
                                        (UN Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force 2008, 5)   
 
A second definition to consider and one which is relevant to discussions about the 
conceptual framework of de-radicalisation is the one used by the UK Home Office, 
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which was quoted at the beginning of this chapter.   The reference to ‘support’ in this 
definition relates to supporting ‘vulnerable’ individuals. These two policy orientated 
definitions are different; the UN definition refers to de-radicalisation as programmes, 
whereas the PREVENT strategy conceives it as ‘support’. Another obvious 
difference is that the PREVENT strategy deploys the terms ‘cognitive’ and 
‘behavioural change’, which is terminology adopted from debates about de-
radicalisation in the literature, particularly associated with the works of John Horgan 
(2008; 2009), whereas the UN definition states the intended objectives of de-
radicalisation programmes, i.e. reintegrate back into mainstream society and/or 
dissuading militants from the use of violence. These explicit objectives are missing in 
the UK’s Home Office’s definition. Although both definitions are ambiguous, in many 
respects the UK Home Office’s conception of de-radicalisation indicates greater 
confusion, evidenced not only by the ambiguity of ‘cognitive and behavioural change’ 
but also the confusing analogies it draws with ‘crime prevention’. 
Meanwhile, there are three definitions of de-radicalisation made by academics, John 
Horgan (2008; 2009), Omar Ashour (2009), and Demant et al. (2008). John Horgan 
is the most vociferous critic of the term and concept.  He defines de-radicalisation as:  
[T]he social and psychological process whereby an individual’s commitment to, and 
involvement in, violent radicalization is reduced to the extent that they are no longer 
at risk of involvement and engagement in violent activity. De-radicalization may also 
refer to any initiative that tries to achieve a reduction of risk of re-offending through 
addressing the specific and relevant disengagement issues. 
 
                                                                                               (Horgan 2009, 153) 
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In contrast to Horgan, Omar Ashour situates de-radicalisation as a process within 
Islamist movements (defined in relation moderation and radicalisation of Islamic 
movements) instead of emphasising the individual and things like ‘risk’: 
 A process of relative change within Islamist movements, one in which a radical 
group reverses its ideology and de-legitimises the use of violence to achieve political 
goals.  
                                                                                                        (Ashour 2009, 5-6)  
This definition represents the clearest attempt by a scholar to define de-radicalisation 
with some detail.  Unlike the previous definitions, Ashour locates de-radicalisation 
within the particular context of Islamist movements and political Islam with wider 
political and social environments. Another difference between this definition and the 
two policy orientated definitions above is that it conceives of de-radicalisation as (a) 
Collective phenomenon and (b) specifically involves ideological revision.   
Another academic contribution is made by Demant et al. (2008). They define de-
radicalisation as ‘the opposite of radicalisation’ and as the process of ‘becoming less 
radical’, where ‘becoming less radical’ applies to behaviour and beliefs (2008, 13).  
Moreover they define what ‘belief change’ involves: 
 
 …..increase in the confidence in the system, a desire to be a part of society, and the 
rejection of non-democratic means. 
                                                                                                                              (13)   
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Their distinction between behaviour and belief echoes the definition used by the UK 
Home Office. However their elaboration on what ‘belief’ change would entail is 
unique from the definitions above, which avoid defining what belief or “cognitive 
change” entails besides renouncing violence.  It is notable that the no mention of 
changing attitudes toward violence features in their definition.  
Finally, examples of definitions employed by think-tanks are offered mainly by 
Rabasa et al. (2010) for RAND, the International Crisis Group (ICG) (2007), and the 
Quilliam Foundation (2009). The ICG report defined de-radicalisation as a prison 
based effort to “persuade terrorists and their supporters to abandon the use of 
violence” (2007, 5). Also, according to the report the term covers anything from 
‘inmate counselling to development aid for Islamic schools’ (Ibid). This definition is 
similar to others above with the difference that it specifies de-radicalisation as being 
‘prison-based’ programmes as well as highlighting the different associations the 
terms connotes. In contrast, Rabasa et al. (2010) define de-radicalisation as  
 
A process of abandoning an extremist worldview and concluding that it is not 
acceptable to use violence to effect social change. As part of the process there is 
recognition that social, political, and economic transformation will occur slowly and in 
a pluralistic environment.  
                                                                                                                         (1-2)  
This definition sets out what ‘worldview’ change entails. In contrast to previous 
definitions, this definition uses words like ‘extremist worldview’ without defining what 
extremism is, as well as being the most demanding of all the definitions seen above.  
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With this definition, necessary and sufficient conditions for de-radicalisation would 
require individuals to abandon extremist worldview on social, political, and economic 
issues. In other words, Rabasa et al. view of de-radicalisation entail substantial belief 
change. 
The third example of a think-tank definition is provided by the Quilliam Foundation 
(QF). This definition was taken from an interview between a researcher and a 
member of the QF. The QF defines de-radicalisation as a process through which the 
ideology behind extremism is ‘questioned and refuted and replaced in favour of a 
more traditional, pluralistic understanding of Islam’ (Johnson 2009, appendix). This is 
a completely different understanding of de-radicalisation. No mention is made of 
violence, behavioural change, or prisons, and solely focuses on (a) ideology and (b) 
adopting plural interpretations of Islam.  
Notably, there is some reluctance regarding the use of the term ‘de-radicalisation’ by 
policymakers. In the UK de-radicalisation interventions existed at a local and ad hoc 
way in the 1990’s, not to mention on the ground work during the first two iterations of 
PREVENT in 2006 and 2009. However, it was not until 2011 that the term de-
radicalisation was expanded in PREVENT. This raises the question: why was the 
term de-radicalisation not used before to describe on the ground interventions? Why 
wait until 2011?  
 
Whilst no definitive answer exists, there is certainly an indication that there was 
some reluctance with regards to the definition of the term de-radicalisation, which is 
evident with the confusing definition of de-radicalisation in PREVENT.  It is also 
significant that the OSCT at the Home Office commissioned a review in 2011 on 
‘disengagement’ and not de-radicalisation. Another reason, which will become more 
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transparent in chapter 5, is the fact that unlike discourses on radicalisation, there 
was no institutional investment in the study of de-radicalisation. In any case the term 
de-radicalisation is certainly contested. In a literature review conducted for the 
International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, Alex Schmid highlighted the fact that 
governments prefer to use terms like ‘rehabilitation’ and ‘reintegration’. 
 
The term ‘de-radicalisation’ is generally avoided by governments when it comes to 
winning back the ‘hearts and minds’ of those who became violent radicals or 
terrorists. The Global Counterterrorism Forum (a new multilateral forum consisting of 
30 member states spearheaded by the US and Turkey) used, in its recent Rome 
Memorandum, the terminology of ‘Good Practices for Rehabilitation and 
Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders’ as did the Roundtable Expert Meeting 
and Conference on Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders, 
co-organised by ICCT – The Hague and UNICRI, in their paper Core Principles & 
Good Practices.   
 
                                                                                                        (Schmid 2013, 49) 
 
Finally, the eight definitions reviewed above illustrate the lack of agreement in the 
literature with regards to the meaning of de-radicalisation. The various definitions of 
de-radicalisation convey that the term ‘meant different things to different people’ 
(ICG 2007, 3). Another salient feature is that de-radicalisation as a term is being 
conflated with numerous other terms in the literature. Of the eight definitions, the 
PREVENT conception of de-radicalisation is the most confusing, whilst the definition 
of de-radicalisation offered by Western think-tanks emphasise an expansive view of 
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de-radicalisation in which radical individuals have to embrace Western values as a 
necessary prerequisite for successful de-radicalisation. This was contrasted with 
Ashour’s definition which places de-radicalisation within the history and politics of 
Islamist movements at the collective level, whereas all the other definitions seem to 
place de-radicalisation as an intervention designed for individuals. Horgan defines it 
in two ways revolving around the desire to ‘reduce risk’. In addition, Quilliam’s 
definition of de-radicalisation was not an official definition but one found in a written 
interview between a researcher and a Quilliam analyst. It was used because it 
showed another understanding of de-radicalisation relating to the hermeneutics of 
the Islamic tradition, which is a theologically focused definition. It is interesting that at 
the global and UN level member state governments show a reluctance to use the 
term ‘de-radicalisation’ and prefer the term ‘rehabilitation’ and ‘re-integration’. In 
short, the term is ill-defined and confusing. 
 
2.4 The Concept of De-radicalisation 
2.4.1 Older Conceptions of De-radicalisation  
 
There are four journal articles on de-radicalisation written before the 1990’s.  The 
earliest is dated to the 1960’s, two written in the 70’s, and the fourth in the 1980’s. 
The most influential piece of work belongs to Robert Tucker on ‘The Deradicalization 
of Marxist Movements,’ (1967). The second and third articles, in terms of chronology, 
are ‘Deradicalisation of the Japanese Communist Party’ and ‘Deradicalisation and 
the French communist Party’, by Hong Kim (1976) and Sue Charlton (1979) 
respectively. The last article is ‘A Theory of Political Socialisation: Institutional 
Support and Deradicalisation’ by Donald Searing (1986). 
102 
 
Robert Tucker defined de-radicalisation as: 
 
Deradicalization signifies a subtle change in the movement's relation to the social 
milieu. Essentially, it settles down and adjusts itself to existence within the very order 
that it officially desires to overthrow and transform. This is not to say that the 
movement turns into a conservative social force opposed to social change. Rather, it 
becomes "reformist" in the sense that it accepts the established system and its 
institutionalized procedures as the frame- work for further efforts in the direction of 
social change.  
                                                                                                      (Tucker 1967, 348) 
 
Based on Tucker’s definition of de-radicalisation, the phrase ‘coming to terms with 
the existing order’ best indicates what de-radicalisation means. In other words, de-
radicalisation means acceptance of the ‘established system and its institutionalised 
procedures’ and by default abandoning the notion of ‘change’ and ‘transformation’. 
The underlying notion expressed in Tucker’s conception of de-radicalisation is 
analogous to political socialisation, which translates into an acceptance of the world 
as it is, rather than how it ought to be.  More significantly however is that de-
radicalisation refers to a ‘change’ that happens to ‘movements”’. In fact Tucker 
espouses a comparative framework for analysing the de-radicalisation of Marxist 
movements. This framework was derived from his study of the similarities in the 
evolution of German social democracy and Soviet communism, and was premised 
on the principle that involvement of communist parties in democratic electoral politics 
makes them more pragmatic, non-heretical, and non-ideological (349).  
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Meanwhile, Hong Kim (1976), Sue Charlton (1979) deploy Tucker’s framework in 
their articles. Hong Kim, for example, argued that the success of communist Party 
(JCP) in Japanese elections in 1974, organisationally and electorally, could be 
attributed to the de-radicalisation of the Japanese communist movement which has 
taken place under the leadership of Kenji Miyamoto after 1961 (274). The term de-
radicalisation for Kim means making an ‘accommodation to the world as it stands’ 
instead of seeking the ‘ideal order’ through violent means (Ibid). More specifically it 
means the transformation of a revolutionary party into an electoral party that seeks 
power largely through the parliamentary process. Similarly, Sue Charlton uses 
Tucker’s framework to examine developments with French Communist in the 1970’s 
(1979, 42). The most interesting dimension however of Charlton’s study is the 
following hypothesis:  
 
On the basis of the French experience, one can hypothesis that as deradicalisation 
proceeds, it will inevitably affect the ideology of a Marxist movement as well as its 
practice and tactical doctrine: the tension generated by maintaining an obvious 
contradiction between ideology and practice would end by discrediting the party even 
more than by altering basic revolutionary tenets, this recalls the point made earlier, 
that the process of deradicalisation creates further pressure for deradicalisation. 
Deradicalisation is thus a conflictual, dialectical process.  
(Carlton 1979, 58) 
                                                                                                                          
The underlying notion here regarding ideological change of Marxist Movements is 
that it follows changes in practice, and does not precede it. In other words, it is only 
after achieving worldly or political success or confronting a structural reality, that 
104 
 
ideological revision ensues in order to reconcile ideology and practice. This is an 
important point to consider given the emphasis the role ideology has in the 
PREVENT’s strategy’s conception of de-radicalisation.  
 
Meanwhile, Donald Searing’s (1986) study presents a theory of political socialisation 
by examining institutional support and the de-radicalisation of political parties, their 
activists, and parliamentarians. Notably, he does not define de-radicalisation but 
uses the term loosely to mean a type of moderate orientation or beliefs towards 
economic and social policy (345). In this respect, Searing’s conception of de-
radicalisation was vague and adds little to our understanding conceptually.  
 
However, Searing’s study is nevertheless useful because he conceives de-
radicalisation as a crucial dimension, in conjunction with theories on institutional 
support, in theories on political socialisation. For example, institutional support 
claims that a ‘consensus behind political rules of the game, behind constitutional and 
procedural conventions, is essential for democracy's survival’ (348). More significant 
for our understanding of de-radicalisation, Searing explains the link between 
institutional support and de-radicalisation and socialisation: ‘...there is no reason to 
expect people to support the rules of the game unless they learn to believe in them’ 
(Ibid). In Searing’s view, being increasingly involved with political institutions and 
system increases the likelihood of de-radicalisation, which means adhering to status 
quo views on political, economic, and social policy. Thus de-radicalisation in his 
conception, e.g. learning the rules of the game and believing in them, becomes a 
possibility the more individuals, organisations, and movements become increasingly 
involved with the political system. This claim, that institutions are buttressed by 
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encouraging defenders of the system as well as absorbing insurgents, is aptly 
underscored by a quote from a Labour MP: ‘I think instead of me turning this place 
inside out, they turned me inside out a little’ (372).  
 
2.4.2 Contemporary Conceptions of De-radicalisation: Disengagement, 
Collective De-radicalisation, and the Adoption of Values 
 
 
There has been scant consideration of the conceptual ontology of de-radicalisation in 
the literature, and what little discussion that has taken place has focused on making 
distinctions between cognitive and behavioural variables. Whilst there are other 
characteristics to de-radicalisation conceptually, namely the distinction between 
voluntary/involuntary, state/non-state programmes and between programmes/ 
initiative (Bjorgo &Horgan 2009, 3), the salient issue ontologically remains analysing 
the influence of cognitive and behavioural factors, something which is again reflected 
in the PREVENT’s strand’s formulation of de-radicalisation. 
John Horgan, for example, critiques current understandings of de-radicalisation for 
failing to distinguish between cognitive and behavioural dimensions of de-
radicalisation. De-radicalisation is predicated on the reorientation of ‘worldview’ and 
cognitive shift of detainees taking part in such programmes (Bjorgo and Horgan 
2009, 5). However, one aim of de-radicalisation is to get armed Islamist groups to 
renounce violence, which is in fact a behaviour change-also known as 
‘disengagement’. Unlike de-radicalisation, disengagement does not require a change 
of ideals or views but only the renunciation of violence. Therefore the most 
significant problem with current assumptions about de-radicalisation is the failure to 
divorce conceptually between behavioural and cognitive dimensions. In other words 
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it is based on the misleading assumption that ‘radical views predict radical behaviour’ 
(Ibid). Instead, Horgan argues that the relationship between behaviour and cognition 
and how they interact is more complex than previously understood. Contrary to 
misconceptions, research demonstrates that more often than not extremist views are 
acquired after an individual joins a group, and not before (Ibid).  
 
Based on the principle that behavioural changes can and does occur before changes 
to the view of militant individuals, Horgan emphasises the need to focus more on 
disengagement. As a result Horgan prefers to use the term ‘risk reduction initiatives’ 
than de-radicalisation because the deeper scrutiny of such programmes actually 
reveal that de-radicalisation is about ‘reducing the risk for ‘engagement (and/or re-
engagement) in terrorism and illicit activity’ (Horgan 2009).  Ultimately, Horgan 
argues the case for disengagement as the preferred strategy for counter-terrorism 
policy-makers whilst critiquing the conceptual viability of de-radicalisation.    
In contrast, Omar Ashour’s conceptual understanding of de-radicalisation uses a 
different methodological approach that situates de-radicalisation as a process of 
relative change which occurs at the collective level within Islamists movements 
(Ashour 2009, 5). It does not thus address the strict conceptual separation between 
behaviour and cognitive variables as a process at an individual level. Instead Ashour 
distinguishes three different levels of de-radicalisation (Ibid: 6):  
 
   1.  Behavioural: refers to groups abandoning the use of violence 
   2.  Ideological: relates to the de-legitimisation of violence.  
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   3. Organisational: refers to the demobilisation of members and can only occur after 
the former two levels are achieved.  
   
In contrast to Horgan, Ashour is more open about the potential of cognitive change in 
inducing a more ‘substantive’ level of de-radicalisation through the delegitimising of 
violence in counter- ideological provisions. In addition, Ashour’s conceptualisation 
encompasses three dimensions (Ibid):  
 
1. Pragmatic: refers to behavioural de-radicalisation without ideological change 
2. Substantive: this encompasses both behavioural and ideological changes 
3. Comprehensive: this occurs when de-radicalisation happens at all three levels 
 
Indeed the categorisation of different types and levels is useful as a framework to 
understand de-radicalisation since it does way with problematic dichotomy in the 
cognitive-behavioural formulation. In other words, Ashour offers a conception that 
does not presume a causal relationship between cognitive and behavioural variables 
at an individual level. However the challenge with Ashour’s conceptual 
understanding of de-radicalisation is that it is context specific. De-radicalisation in 
Europe for example appears to be concerned with processes at the individual level 
and does not occur amidst the same influences inherent to Egypt and Algeria, e.g. 
repression by the state in processes of de-radicalisation, and thus questions arise 
regarding the transferability of his framework.  
Meanwhile, there is an important caveat to consider about discussions on ‘cognitive 
change’ in the literature. Indeed de-radicalisation is predicated on the idea of a quick 
fix - the undoing of years of social and behavioural conditioning that has led an 
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individual person to harbour certain views or engage in terrorist activities. Putting 
aside the practical question about the feasibility of this actually occurring, it is not 
always clear what is meant by ‘cognitive change’; on the one hand there is 
unequivocal agreement that at a policy level it entails changing attitudes towards 
violence. On the other hand there is also recognition that conceptually de-
radicalisation is about the softening of views and attitudes with respect to issues like 
democracy and women’s rights, which is important to ‘reintegrate into mainstream 
society’.  
For example, whilst Rabasa et al. (2010) and Demant et al. (2008) do not advance a 
conceptual framework for de-radicalisation, both reports nevertheless stress the 
significance of a particular type of ‘cognitive change’, one entailing belief change on 
issues like democracy and women’s rights. The ambiguity that such a conception of 
‘cognitive change’ entails is also reflect in Demant et al.’s conclusion that even if an 
individual’s radical beliefs has not changed then de-radicalisation would still have 
‘taken place’ (2008, 13). Rabasa et al. and Demant et al. therefore present an 
expansive view of de-radicalisation, one in which substantial ‘cognitive change’ 
occurs when participants in these programmes not only abandon violence but also 
embrace the views and norms of the host society. 
In contrast, both Ashour and Horgan conceptualise de-radicalisation as being about 
getting violent takfirri jihadist to abandon violence. Ashour explicitly states that de-
radicalisation in Egypt is not about changing attitudes towards democracy and other 
norms, claiming that many de-radicalised groups still uphold ‘misogynist, 
homophobic, xenophobic, and anti-democratic views’ (Ashour 2009, 6). Cognitive 
change therefore does not entail the adoption of liberal values and norms that has 
become associated with de-radicalisation in the European context (Demant et al. 
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2008, 13; Rabasa, et al. 2010, 2). Consequently, Horgan’s and Ashour’s studies on 
de-radicalisation, as well as the wider field analysis seem to suggest a disjuncture 
between de-radicalisation as a notion and actual de-radicalisation as practice.  
Within these debates, Horgan and Ashour provide the ontological foundations of a 
new research area. Horgan crucially questions the conceptual coherence of de-
radicalisation and suggests an alternative policy in the form of disengagement whilst 
Ashour offers the most detailed conceptual categorisations of collective de-
radicalisation of armed Islamist movements in the literature. Despite laying down 
some foundations to the ontological makeup of de-radicalisation, Horgan’s and 
Ashour’s conceptions, not least Demant et al. and Rabasa et al. contributions, 
remain divorced from the context specific reality of de-radicalisation in the UK.  
 
2.4.3 Foucauldian Interpretations of De-radicalisation 
 
 
Neil Aggarwal (2013) tries to establish convergence between Foucault’s model of 
disciplinary power in ‘Discipline and Punish’ and prison de-radicalisation 
programmes in the M.E and S.E.A. He begins by tracing the influence of psychiatry 
on the knowledge production of what constitutes de-radicalisation (2013, 264-265). 
Interestingly, Aggarwal claims that by adopting the language and concepts of 
psychiatry, Ashour and Horgan have laid the foundation for corrective interventions 
(265).  For Aggwarwal, the production of de-radicalisation knowledge can be divided 
into ‘secular psychological’ and ‘religious reformist’. Aggarwal believes that de-
radicalisation programmes have high recidivism rates, which means that high 
percentage of inmates recanting from violence end up reoffending, and he makes 
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the argument that there is a correlation between the ‘religious reform model’ and 
high recidivism rates. Hence de-radicalisation are said to target the symbolic form 
rather than actual cause of violence (274).  His account affirms the comparisons 
between Foucault’s ‘Discipline and Punish’ and de-radicalisation with reservations 
regarding the effectiveness of religious rehabilitative models divorced from political 
and economic context. As well as identifying the emphasis on ‘religious reform 
model’ in de-radicalisation interventions as the cause behind high rates of recidivism 
(274), he concludes that de-radicalisation programmes indicates an attempt of the 
state to create docile subjects:  
This technical transformation of individuals is an attempt to instil discipline and self-
governance to render subjects obedient to the state. 
                                                                                                                   (2013, 272)   
Aggarwal’s contribution to the conceptualisation of de-radicalisation lies in making a 
link between the discursive production of knowledge on de-radicalisation and 
programmes of interventions, as well as critically questioning the religious-ideological 
focus of de-radicalisation programmes. Aggarwal’s analysis however, similarly to the 
bulk of the literature on de-radicalisation, largely depends on the works of Horgan 
and Ashour and his analysis remains restricted to prison environments, albeit 
interpreted through a Foucauldian filter. In other words, Aggwarwal’s analysis is 
divorced from the realities of de-radicalisation in the UK context. 
Perhaps the most relevant reading of de-radicalisation to the UK context is advanced 
by Lasse Lindekilde (2015). His analysis of de-radicalisation focuses on individual 
interventions in Denmark after their revised counter-radicalisation policy of 2011, 
which was influenced by the separation of community cohesion projects from 
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counter-radicalisation efforts in the UK (229).  His study presents two crucial 
addendums to other accounts of de-radicalisation in the literature; the first relates to 
the pastoral dimension of mentoring in de-radicalisation and the second to the fact 
that de-radicalisation is situated within Foucauldian governmentality.  
 
In the first instance, the pastoral dimensions of mentoring of de-radicalisation in the 
UK context brings to the fore the fact that de-radicalisation interventions are built 
upon existing crime-prevention infrastructures (225). By examining the mentoring 
aspects of de-radicalisation, Lindekilde elucidates the flexible and pragmatic nature 
involved in de-radicalisation interventions.  For example, he notes the diversity of 
opinions on what it means to achieve de-radicalisation as the end goal of mentoring 
interventions and that often the goal of interventions fell short of comprehensive de-
radicalisation, which is the formal policy goal of de-radicalisation in counter-
radicalisation policies (233-4). With regards to the second point, it is through the 
multifunctional role of the mentor, e.g. mentors as role models, supervisor, coach, 
and ‘significant other’ (232), that he situates the pastoral logic within the workings of 
neo-liberal governmentality. He also challenges the ‘post-political nature’ of targeted 
de-radicalisation interventions, which distinguishes it from ordinary crime prevention 
because it essentially entails protecting individuals against political and religious 
views (236).  
 
Lindekilde’s argument echoes a number of key features present in UK de-
radicalisation interventions. This includes the fact that de-radicalisation was built on 
pre-existing crime prevention infrastructure, the multifaceted use of mentors in 
interventions programmes, the political nature inherent to such programmes, and 
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situating de-radicalisation within neo-liberal governmentality. However, whilst 
Lindekilde does situate de-radicalisation within policy objectives to re-calibrate 
counter-radicalisation efforts to a narrow the focus of PREVENT’s activities, it does 
not directly trace the relationship between discourses on radicalisation and de-
radicalisation intervention, nor does it allude to the interplay between discursive 
domains and their concretisation in institutions and programmes. Yet it has been the 
discursive production of ‘radicalisation’ that has distinctively characterised the British 
experience in relation to fighting terrorism and which much of the literature on de-
radicalisation has evaded and overlooked.  
 
2.5 The De-radicalisation Process 
 
 
Understanding the process of de-radicalisation effectively deals with the factors that 
lead individuals to disengage and exit from militant groups. Given the absence of 
data and in depth studies on the process of de-radicalisation, some of the literature 
draws on the work on gangs, cults, and social groups and is applied to terrorist 
groups in order to understand processes of de-radicalisation (Bjorgo & Horgan 2009, 
7-10; Disley et al. 2011; Edwards 2015). The literature on the de-radicalisation 
process could be categorised into: factors leading to individual disengagement; 
factors leading to collective de-radicalisation; rational choice theory; and social 
movement explanations.   
 
Contributions on the disengagement process at the individual level are made by 
Horgan and Bjorgo (Bjorgo & Horgan 2009). Based on interviews with terrorists, 
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Horgan identifies two factors of disengagement- psychological and physical. 
Psychological factors include (21-22): 
 
 Disillusionment arising from incongruence between the initial ideals and 
fantasies that shape a person’s initial involvement and their subsequent 
experiences with the reality of what is entailed by involvement- in other words, 
the mismatch between the fantasy and the reality;  
 Disillusionment arising from disengagement over tactical issues; 
 Disillusionment arising from strategic, political, or ideological differences 
 Becoming burned out 
 Changing personal priorities  
 
Whereas physical factors include (25):  
 
 Voluntary exit from the movement 
 Involuntary  exit from the movement 
 Involuntary movement into another role 
 Voluntary movement into another role 
 Involuntary exit from the movement altogether 
 Experiences stemming from psychological disengagement that acts as a 
catalyst for physical disengagement across 1 to 4 above. 
 
Also, arrest, imprisonment, and death are identified by Horgan as the most dramatic 
examples of physical disengagement (Ibid). These psychological and physical 
factors can therefore either become linked, occur independently, or/and converge. 
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Moreover a salient point about this process is that the occurrence of these factors 
does not necessarily lead to complete and total disengagement; it may lead instead 
to ‘role change’ (26).  In this instance the individual may renounce violence but 
remain active with the group’s activities in another way or role, and uses the example 
of a known IRA militant that moved away from militant role to a political role in Sin 
Fein (Ibid).   
 
Horgan does provide an explanation of processes that occurs at the level of the 
individual, which he admits does not supersede explanations focusing on collective 
dynamics, since terrorism does happen predominantly at the collective level (18), but 
instead contributes to a multi-level approach to understanding terrorism.  Indeed the 
focus of de-radicalisation programmes in Europe is predominantly on the processes 
at an individual level, which makes Horgan’s approach transferrable. Another 
interesting point about Horgan’s disengagement process is the absence of ideology 
as a motivating factor in disengagement, which is a notable area of contention in the 
literature and de-radicalisation programmes.  
Meanwhile, Tore Bjorgo draws on interview data (50 individuals) in order to shed 
light further light on disengagement process but from the perspective of right-wing 
extremism. Bjorgo makes a distinction between ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors (Ibid: 36-40). 
‘Push’ factors include: 
 Negative social sanctions may cause some to reconsider their affiliation. 
These may range from parental scolding and social isolation to criminal 
persecution and harassment or violence by militants anti-racists. (36) 
 Some lose faith in the ideology and politics of the group or movement;  
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 A feeling that ‘things are going too far’ (37); 
 Disillusionment with the inner workings and activities of the group;  
 Losing confidence, status and position in the group (38); and  
 A feeling of exhaustion and that they can no longer take the pressure. 
‘Pull’ factors in contrast refer to factors attracting the person to a more rewarding 
alternative. This includes: 
 A longing for the freedoms of a normal life (39);  
 Activist feeling they are getting too old for what they are doing,  
 Activist caring about career prospects and personal futures; and  
 Establishing a family with new responsibility for spouse and children (40).   
Moreover Bjorgo believes that ‘how’ questions are more useful than the ‘why’ 
questions when trying to persuade an individual to leave an extremist or violent 
group (42). He identifies three main strategies to facilitate disengagement: 
individuals need to make a public break with the group and therefore renounce 
attitude and ideologies it represents (Ibid); breaking with the group without breaking 
the ideology (43); third, a quiet and gradual withdrawal. Interestingly, Bjorgo 
concludes the following: 
Anti-racist campaigns with a focus on ideology and values- the favourite measure of 
politicians who ‘want to do something against racism and right-wing extremism’- are 
not likely to have much effect in terms of preventing youths from joining racist groups 
or of inducing anyone to quit such groups. 
                                                                                                                           (48) 
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As a result of the stress on behavioural approaches to the understanding of 
disengagement, the role of counter-ideology as factor in disengagement is 
disregarded. The behaviour over cognitive approach has been translated in real life 
through the EXIT programmes in Scandinavian and other European countries 
(Norway, Sweden, Finland; Germany; and Netherland) that deal with right-wing 
extremism, a project Bjorgo has influenced and been involved with (47).  
The only real attempt to understand the process of de-radicalisation directly has 
been made by Omar Ashour (2009). Ashour’s study is based on case study 
examination of collective de-radicalisation efforts in Egypt and Algeria and uses 
comparative qualitative research that combines content analysis and interviews (17). 
His analysis shows that the de-radicalisation process relies on the dynamic interplay 
between the following factors (102-109): 
 State repression: this incorporates a range of actions by the state to bring 
about political quiescence- restrictions on free speech, violation of rights, such 
as torture and imprisonment, as well as state sponsored terror in the form of 
assignations, civilian slaughters and mass-murders. (14-15)  
 Selective inducements (material incentives: refers to explicit or implicit socio-
political/socio-economic incentives to Islamist movements, which include 
ceasing systematic torture or offering a power-sharing formula for participation 
in the government. (15)  
 Social interaction with significant others: refers to internal and external 
interactions with individuals and groups within and outside their own group 
and with others and takes place mainly in prisons. (Ibid)  
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 Involvement of influential leaders in the process: only leaders/leadership are 
seen by the majority of followers as pious, theologically knowledgeable, and 
preferably with a history of ‘struggle’ could cast legitimacy on the de-
radicalisation process. Leaders have a considerable influence over followers. 
(15-16)   
 
Ashour states that a combination of all these factors played a role in the de-
radicalisation of Islamic Jihad and Islamic Group in Egypt (102-109). Despite 
providing the most detailed case study of de-radicalisation in the field, Ashour’s work 
is context specific to Egypt. A factor like state repression, for example, is not 
transferrable into de-radicalisation programmes in the UK.  In addition, whilst it is 
clear that counter-ideology played a role in the collective de-radicalisation efforts in 
Egypt, Ashour’s analysis actually demonstrates a more complex picture in which 
other influences, particularly structural political factors, played a greater role in the 
de-radicalisation process. 
 
Furthermore, Rabasa et al. (2010) report’s for RAND provide a breakdown of 
individual disengagement process through their examination of the literature on 
gangs, cults, and group. Interestingly, the authors claim that de-radicalisation may 
not be radicalisation in ‘reverse’ and the pathways to each could be ‘different’ (iii).  
Their conception however outlines a general path of disengagement for 
violent/extremists but says little about the trajectory of de-radicalisation. Their 
process of individual disengagement is (11-26): 
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 Trigger: the beginning of the process occurs during a traumatic event, like 
arrest or death, which leads to a cognitive opening that allows the individual to 
begin weighing the pros and cons of disengagement. 
 
 Turning point: Using rational choice theories. This stage refers to the 
individual’s rational calculations between motives, strategies, and structures 
and makes a decision 
 
 
 Disengagement: this stage in the process is about leaving the group entirely 
 
 A new identity and integration into society; this is followed by the desire of the 
individual for a new life, a new identity, and to reintegrate into society 
 
 
 Likelihood of recidivism: the last stage deals with the condition which reduce 
the prospect of reengagement, also known as recidivism, which depends on 
the individual finding a job, new social network, and whether the person is de-
radicalised. 
Meanwhile, Demant et al. (2008) examine radical social movements in the 
Netherlands and identify three degrees of commitment to radical/extremist groups by 
individuals and therefore present a different set of factors to consider in the de-
radicalisation process. These factors can be categorised into (115-116):  
1. Normative: deals with meaning and ideology for the individual, 
2. Pragmatic; deals with the cost benefit analysis of staying or leaving the group 
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3. Affective; deals with the emotional attachments of individuals to these groups 
through friendship and identity.  
Demant et al. conclude from their examination of the literature that Islamically 
inspired individuals and groups are more ideological than other extremist groups 
(129). Consequently, de-radicalisation programmes geared towards Muslim radicals 
in the Netherlands should include counter-ideological components. However, their 
emphasis on the role of counter-ideology in tackling Muslim radicalism contradicts 
their analyses on the decline of radical movements, like the radical Moluccans, the 
Squatters’ movement, and extreme right movement in the Netherlands, which 
revealed that disengagement and collective decline was predominantly due to non-
ideological factors, such as organisational failure and changes in practical 
circumstance (122-126).  
Another contribution to the debate of de-radicalisation process is made by Rohan 
Gunaratna (2009). Gunaratna identifies four modes of rehabilitation: religious, 
psychological, social and vocational. Of the four, he considered religious 
rehabilitation to be the most important because with it came the ‘unlocking of the 
terrorist mind’ and ‘it has the power to make a beneficiary of rehabilitation repent, 
become remorseful and re-enter the mainstream’ (150). Second, psychological 
rehabilitation involves psycho profiling, assessment and solution (ibid). Third, social 
rehabilitation is about providing assistance to the family of the captured terrorist. This 
takes the form of providing aftercare by way of jobs, monetary assistance, and a 
fresh outlook. Fourth, vocational rehabilitation is concerned with preparing inmates 
re-integrate into society with skills development and educational attainment (152).  
Gunaratna also pointed out several parameters within which rehabilitation could be 
optimally used. It should be used as a complementary strategic tool to fight 
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extremism and terrorism. Every rehabilitation programme should be accompanied by 
a community education programme. Ultimately, despite the marked absence of any 
empirical data, case studies, or reference to any other in depth examination of the 
‘rehabilitation’ of inmates, Gunaratna provides a holistic take on the concept of 
‘rehabilitation’ without explaining factors and process of disengagement and de-
radicalisation.  
 
Consequently, besides Ashour, all the others- Horgan, Bjorgo, Demant et al., 
Rabasa et al., and Gunaratna- provide accounts of disengagement and rehabilitation 
at the individual level and not de-radicalisation. The scant and limited examination of 
processes, factors, and pathways of de-radicalisation in the literature unanimously 
concludes:  
1. The inconclusiveness of the role of counter-ideology in the de-
radicalisation process: since de-radicalisation programmes include both 
material and counter-ideological components, it is difficult to evaluate what 
factors are the most important (Chowdhury and Hearne 2008, 16). 
 
2. Counter-ideology plays little or no role in the process of de-
radicalisation: in fact the literature shows ideological factors play little or no 
role in persuading individuals to enter or leave such groups and movements 
(Bjorgo 2009, 36-40). In fact Horgan, Bjorgo, Demant et al. conclude the 
same and prefer to emphasise disengagement, a behavioural focus, over de-
radicalisation, which focuses more on cognitive change. Ashour does 
consider ideological revisionism and de-legitimisation an integral feature of 
the de-radicalisation process but based on the four chief processes he 
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identifies needed for successful de-radicalisation, it is clear counter-ideology 
plays a limited role in contrast to state repression, selective inducements, and 
the role of leaders (the role of social interaction encompasses ideological 
revision).  This fact was poignantly corroborated by the findings of a study of 
145 people across four European member states on behalf of the European 
Commission published by the Change Institute in 2008 (one of the very few 
empirical studies done in radicalisation studies). The report- ‘Beliefs, 
ideologies and narratives of violent radicalisation’- concluded that developing 
and promoting counter ideologies is unlikely to suffice in itself (140) and that: 
 
…..there is little, if any, historical evidence that ideology, whether radical, violent or 
otherwise, can be defeated solely by the employment of a counter-ideology. More 
often ideology collapses or comes to be seen as redundant as its explanatory power 
comes into question in the face of accumulating evidence that it is unable to explain. 
                                                                                       (Change Institute 2008, 143)       
3. Material provisions are more influential than ideology in the de-
radicalisation process: Abuza’s review on de-radicalisation programmes in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore targeted at Jimaah Islamyia (JI) is instructive 
here. He conveys that many of those ‘de-radicalised’ remain committed goals of JI in 
establishing an Islamic state and the imposition of Sharia (Horgan and Bjorgo 2009, 
194). Perhaps more interesting is the observation he makes those detainees 
completing de-radicalisation programmes still had a commitment to Sharia and 
maintained their ‘cognitive radicalism’ (211). Moreover, many segments of society 
hold and share and would ‘not think JI did anything wrong in the first place’ (194). 
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Abuza writes how providing support for detainee’s families had a dramatic impact on 
detainees involved in de-radicalisation programmes, leading the overseers of the 
programme to conclude that the ‘economic aid, however, is ultimately more 
important than religious arguments in changing prisoner’s attitudes’ (Ibid).  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter reviewed the literature on de-radicalisation. The first section provided a 
brief snapshot of the state of the literature on de-radicalisation as a whole. There 
were a number of critical challenges posed by the study of de-radicalisation, which 
included: the newness of de-radicalisation as an area, which primarily begins after 
2006, the absence of empirical data, the majority of the literature are considered 
reviews of programmes, little in depth study of de-radicalisation, little or no robust 
methodologies used, no evidence for policy development, and not a single 
examination of de-radicalisation in the UK context exists. The section after surveys 
the existence of de-radicalisation programmes. It shows that there is a diversity of 
de-radicalisation programmes, with different methods, objectives, and focus. Most 
the programmes are prison based and used a combination of ideological and 
material based provisions in interventions. In the UK however, the focus is on 
individuals outside of prison environments and civil society and on ‘extremist’ instead 
of militants convicted of crime. Another challenge was evaluating the success of 
programmes. 
The third section outlined eight definitions of de-radicalisation. There were many 
different definitions of de-radicalisation, the term was synonymous with other terms, 
all of which underscored the notion that de-radicalisation was an ill-defined term that 
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‘meant different things to different people’. Section 2.4 analysed the conceptual 
framework of de-radicalisation. This section revealed the older conceptions of de-
radicalisation were associated with Marxist movements and that the move away from 
radicalisation was precipitated by material changes first, not ideological ones. More 
importantly it analysed the two main conceptions of de-radicalisation: John Horgan 
argued against the use of the concept of de-radicalisation and for disengagement, 
whereas Omar Ashour offers a more multi-layered framework of collective de-
radicalisation. The main tension in the ontological discussion of de-radicalisation is 
the relationships between ‘cognitive’ and ‘behavioural’ dimension and its viability as 
a policy. In addition, two other perspectives on de-radicalisation conceptually came 
from the use of Foucauldian analysis, which contributed to the conceptual armoury of 
de-radicalisation.  
The section after examined the literature on the actual de-radicalisation process. 
This is important given the stated objectives of policymakers of wanting to move 
individuals away from violence, as well as preventing people from heading towards 
radicalisation.  Of the five accounts, only Ashour identifies some credible factors 
leading to collective de-radicalisation. Others accounts emphasises factors relating 
to disengagement and rehabilitation. The significant finding here is that the literature 
emphasises the importance of material components of interventions or affective 
factors at individual level over ideological dimension in successful interventions. It 
illustrates the disjuncture between the valorisation of counter-ideology associated 
with the idea of de-radicalisation on the one hand, and the actual reality of de-
radicalisation interventions on the other. 
Consequently, my fieldwork investigation of de-radicalisation will attempt to 
understand and reconcile the lacuna evident in the literature and the disjuncture 
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between the idea and practice of de-radicalisation in the UK. My aim is to answer the 
question: What is de-radicalisation? 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Concept of De-radicalisation: an Analysis of Fieldwork Data 
 
It became clear in chapter 2 that no substantial academic work on the de-
radicalisation has been conducted. This investigation takes the conception of de-
radicalisation articulated in the PREVENT strategy as a point of departure. The 
apparent meaningless discourse on de-radicalisation therefore begs the following 
questions: What is de-radicalisation? What is de-radicalisation supposed to tackle if 
the targets of interventions are non-violent youths with no links or association to 
terrorist groups? Is it about tackling the threat of violence for policy-makers?  Or is it 
about affirming and suppressing certain identities in the UK? What is the relationship 
between de-radicalisation and PREVENT? What is the relationship between de-
radicalisation and counter-terrorism? 
 
This chapter attempts to answer the first question using data from 27 interviews. The 
first section outlines the methodology used in my investigation of the ontological 
make-up of de-radicalisation. The section after presents the fieldwork data in 
tabulated and graphical form. The aim is to illustrate what interviewees thought de-
radicalisation was. Section 3.3 analyses the definition of de-radicalisation and the 
terms used to describe it, whilst the section after analyses the conceptual framework 
of de-radicalisation in more detail. It conveys the existence of four understandings of 
de-radicalisation and a confusing conceptual framework. Section 3.5 assesses the 
implications of having multiple conceptions of de-radicalisation.  The  section after 
evaluates the data and situates its significance in relation to the literature and what it 
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entails with respect to understanding the ontological reality of de-radicalisation.The 
last section of the chapter evaluates the research process itself. The conclusion 
opens the discussion for an alternative way of conceptualising de-radicalisation. 
 
3.1 Research Methodology 
 
 
My research seeks to investigate the ontological conceptual framework of de-
radicalisation. Policymakers are making causal claims about human behaviour 
based on the principle that cognitive change leads to behavioural change in both 
conceptions of de-radicalisation, without substantially addressing the question of 
ontology. Hence I am interested in the ‘what’ question: What is it? And what does it 
mean? Given the opacity and absence of conceptual clarity surrounding de-
radicalisation I aim to use the data collated from my fieldwork to disentangle the 
confusion and assumptions that currently characterise the idea and policy of de-
radicalisation and say something more substantively on it. I was particularly 
interested in finding out from the interviews the actual meaning of de-radicalisation 
conceptually and as a strategy of counter-terrorism in a way not captured in the 
literature and not reflected in policy. To do this, I needed to find out (1) what 
interviewees thought de-radicalisation was about conceptually and (2) understand 
the wider context of de-radicalisation, which included de-radicalisation interventions, 
the PREVENT policy, and the politics accompanying it. Notably, this chapter 
analyses the first set of data, whereas the second category of data will be examined 
throughout the rest of the thesis. 
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My research will therefore conduct the investigation using the case study method. 
The case study method is defined as: 
  
An empirical inquiry about a contemporary phenomenon (e.g., a “case”), set within 
its real-world context—especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident.  
                                                                                                         (Yin 2009, 18) 
 
There are two important features of the case study method that is pertinent and 
useful to my research enquiry: the first relates to my objective of conducting a study 
of de-radicalisation in order to understand the ontological framework of de-
radicalisation in more detail, whereas the second concerns my wanting to 
understand the wider context of de-radicalisation. Indeed these objectives are linked 
to some key assumptions implicitly underlining my research investigations. The first 
is my motive to try and directly address my research question, which is a descriptive 
as well as exploratory enterprise. Given the paucity, confusion, and lacuna in current 
conceptions of de-radicalisation, this exploratory aim is consequently concerned with 
gathering data, making sense of it, and offering an ontological account of de-
radicalisation.  This exercise is however tied up by the question: is there another way 
to frame the concept of de-radicalisation? This type of analysis begins with what I 
have discovered and potentially offers an alternative concept of the reality of de-
radicalisation in the UK context. Hence the motivation to describe, explore, and offer 
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conceptions of de-radicalisation in the following investigation are inextricably tied to 
my research objectives stated above. 
The case study method will enable me to accomplish both research objectives.  A 
case study is an in depth study of a particular situation used to narrow down a very 
broad field of research into one easily researchable topic (Yin 2009). The ‘case’ 
being investigated in this research is the idea and practice of de-radicalisation in UK 
Counter-terrorism. A ‘case’ is generally a bounded entity (a person, organization, 
behavioural condition, event, or other social phenomenon), but the boundary 
between the case and its contextual conditions may be blurred. Case study research 
assumes that examining the context and other complex conditions related to the 
case(s) being studied are integral to understanding the case(s) (Yin 2009). The case 
study method will thus allow me to explore the wider context, in terms of themes and 
concepts from which the idea and practice of de-radicalisation emerged and 
developed in the real world.   
However, the case study method does have drawbacks. The first major drawback is 
the notion that case study methods are a less rigorous inquiry (Ibid). This stems from 
the notion that case study research is the exploratory phase for using social science 
method and serves only a prelude to further and more substantial investigations. A 
second critique of the case-study method is that case study procedures lack 
credibility in that it does not sufficiently protect against researcher bias and its effect 
on research findings (Ibid). Lastly, the case study method is perceived to lack the 
ability to generalise the research findings to a wider level (Ibid).  
The notion that the case study is exploratory is in the context of de-radicalisation, 
given the rudimentary state of research on it, an advantage. Also, bearing in mind 
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my objectives of investigating the wider context of de-radicalisation, the data can 
potentially provide interpretations beyond a restricted exploratory remit. This thesis 
will attempt to elaborate in chapters 4 to 7 that this was in fact the case. Regarding 
the second concern, I acknowledge this as a general reality of research in the social 
sciences as a whole. However as will be explained below, this critique is mitigated by 
this research’s presumption philosophically that objective and value free knowledge, 
as professed by positivist epistemology, does not apply to the human world. Finally, 
the problem of being able to generalise case study data is better understood by 
distinguishing between two types of generalizing: statistical generalizations and 
analytic generalizations (Ibid, 38–39). For case study research, the latter is the 
appropriate. In contrast to statistical generalisations, analytic generalizations depend 
on using a study’s theoretical framework to establish a logic that might be applicable 
to other situations. Ultimately, generalisation of data is not likely to achieve the status 
of ‘proof’ in geometry, but the claims must be presented soundly and be able to 
resist logical challenge. Despite some evident drawbacks, the case study method 
remains the most appropriate and potentially knowledge yielding for my research 
objectives.  
Accompanying the case study method in my investigation is the qualitative approach 
to gathering data. Qualitative approaches were favoured over quantitative ones for 
philosophical reasons, as well as suiting my research objectives. I am cautious of the 
claims made by positive epistemology that it can arrive at hard objective and value-
free ‘facts’ like in the natural sciences (Dela Porta and Keating 2007, 31). This is due 
to a philosophical position that I hold that humans are meaning seeking beings, 
which means that there are countless ways of seeing, experiencing, and interpreting 
any given phenomenon, event, and the world. Interpretative approaches are based 
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on the belief that social action can only be understood by interpreting meaning and 
motives in which it is based (Ibid, 26). Quantitative data, which functions under the 
assumption that a true representation of the real world can be represented in 
numerical data, will not give you this. The unit of investigation of the hard sciences is 
the inanimate world and even investigation of more complex phenomenon’s, like the 
animal world, is not characterised by the same level of generating capacities as 
humans. As a result, the main criticism of interpretative approaches to phenomenon 
of the human world is that qualitative interviewing is seen as more subjective than 
quantitative interviews. This because the evaluator/researcher decides which quotes 
or specific examples to reproduce and interpret in particular ways and that qualitative 
data may be more reactive to personalities, moods, and interpersonal dynamics 
between the interviewer and the interviewee than methods such as surveys found in 
quantitative data.  Context is thus considered very important since research is 
dependent on an individual’s situational self-interpretation (Ibid, 27). 
Despite this, my investigation proceeded on the notion that every individual 
interviewee will bring their own biases, prejudices, and personal take on the reality of 
de-radicalisation. I also labour under the proposition that interpretive approach 
endows the investigation with a richer, more meaningful, and deeper exploration of 
phenomenon than what quantitative methods allows for. The other charge of course 
against interpretive approaches is that of relativism. I do not have space to address 
the epistemological challenges involved in research methodology. However, 
following an epistemological approach that shuns the crudeness of positivism does 
not mean that any interpretation of the data goes or is accepted; nor does it prevent 
better and more illuminating version and account of de-radicalisation from coming 
forth. I do accept that some level of solid knowledge acquisition in the social 
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sciences is possible, that some knowledge is more objective than others, or more 
accurate or even useful than others.27 Accordingly, I hope to make the case that my 
interpretation of the data is reliable, convincing, and best describes the conceptual 
ontology of de-radicalisation as far as the data allows, at least more substantially 
than contemporary conceptions of de-radicalisation. 
Secondly, research questions are different in quantitative and qualitative 
methodologies. Qualitative research questions are used to seek understanding of 
phenomena that are not fully developed, where quantitative methods are used to test 
hypotheses (Dela Porta & Keating 2007, 29). In qualitative research, the research 
question leads the evaluator into the data where the issue can be explored and 
allows the participant to describe what is meaningful or important to them using in 
their own words rather than being restricted to predetermined categories. In light of 
the definitional, conceptual, epistemological, methodological and empirical 
challenges confronting de-radicalisation, my investigation was attempting to collate, 
explore, and develop knowledge on the phenomenon of de-radicalisation, which the 
qualitative approach facilitates more effectively than quantitative, which is more 
suited to hypothesis testing and narrowly focused enquiries. In contrast to 
quantitative approaches, qualitative interviews allow researchers to probe for more 
details and ensure that participants are interpreting questions the way they were 
intended. The qualitative approach would also provide me with the flexibility to use 
my knowledge, expertise, and interpersonal skills to explore interesting or 
                                                          
27
 Similar to a position called ‘the search for commensurable knowledge’, which is a middle ground 
between the extremes of positivism on the one hand and hyper subjectivist approach on the other 
(Dela Porta & Keating 2007, 33). This approach admits differences in paths to knowledge, shaped by 
choice, context, question, and problem. ‘…..nobody in mainstream social science now denies the 
existence of the physical world or maintains that reality is entirely subjective and in our minds. This 
encourages a cross-fertilization in a large middle ground’ (Ibid, 35). 
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unexpected ideas or themes raised by participants.  In short, the qualitative 
approach is best suited to my research objectives. 
Qualitative interviewing is typically semi-structured. The interviewer has a focus but 
is also afforded flexibility. In semi-structured interviews the interviewer generally has 
a list of questions and discussion prompts, but the order in which they are asked can 
vary in each interview. The interviewer may ask additional questions and probe 
beyond the questions on their lists. It is the balance between some consistency in 
questioning and some flexibility to probe further during interview that attracted me to 
semi-structured approach. Accordingly, this research is based upon 27 semi-
structured interviews I conducted between December 2011 and May 2013. 
Participants were identified for their expertise and knowledge on PREVENT and de-
radicalisation from across a cross section of bodies, and organisations. This included 
PREVENT Engagement Officers, Police Officers, a de-radicalisation intervention 
provider, think-tanks analysts, academics researchers, Muslim organisations that 
received PREVENT funding, community activist, Prevent practitioners, and a former 
counter-terrorism officer. This targeted sample was the most effective way of 
collating data on a phenomenon that is under studied, misunderstood, and lacking in 
rigorous methodology. Interviewing 27 individuals as I had planned was determined 
primarily by the time designated for fieldwork, access to interviews, and the quantity 
and quality of the data obtained. At 27 Interviews I was not sure how different 30 or 
35 interviews would have been to the data trends. I stopped once I felt that I had 
interviewed sufficient diversity of participants and could identify a number of trends 
and patterns to begin answering my research question. 
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3.2 Presentation of Fieldwork Data 
 
This section aims to present descriptively the results of my fieldwork data and 
explain the way that data was codified. It is important to emphasise out the outset 
that the data in this section and the chapter as whole relates to the first objective of 
my investigations, which seeks to answer the question: ‘What is de-radicalisation?’ 
The data regarding the context of de-radicalisation will be analysed in subsequent 
chapters. The data presented here is the by-product of 27 interviews conducted over 
a span of eighteen months, between December 2011 and May 2013, over thirty 
hours of recorded interviews and over three hundred pages of transcribed interviews. 
Overall, the data reveals twenty eight ways of defining de-radicalisation, nine main 
conceptual features, and four conceptual interpretations.  
Part of the condition for acquiescing to be interviewed participants signed a 
statement of confidentiality stipulating that their names would not be mentioned. 
However, participants accepted to be referred to by their 
position/organisation/company, even if their attitudes and opinions expressed in the 
interviews was their own. In fact the data analysis throughout the thesis employs the 
name of the person’s occupation and not their names. I have included the 
interviewee’s place of occupations here because it adds greater weight to the 
credibility and usefulness of the data given that many of the interviewees were at the 
forefront of work on PREVENT and de-radicalisation. For example, as shown below 
in table 3, interviewee No. 14 was the former Secretary General (SG) of the MCB, 
and No.17 was one of the directors of the Muslim Contact Unit (MCU), and No. 23 
was the Director of Siraat, an organisation that was providing prison de-
radicalisation. These interviewees represent community approaches to PREVENT, 
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which I will elaborate more on in chapter 7. Similarly, interviewee’s No.21 and No.22 
are PREVENT practitioners in Lancashire, whilst interviewee No. 25 works for 
Quilliam, an organisation that has enjoyed a lot of influence of policymakers. This 
group of interviewees constitute influential PREVENT practitioners. In short all the 
interviews were involved in PREVENT in some form, with the majority playing a lead 
role in the formulation and implementation in policy. The high profile status of my 
interviewees therefore enhances the results of the data, particularly with regards to 
the reliability, relevance, and usefulness of the data, which I will come to later in 
more detail.  
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Table 3: Details of Fieldwork Interviews 
No. Organisation 
Date of 
Interview  
No. Organisation 
Date of 
Interview 
1 DEMOS (Think-Tank) Analyst 08/12/11 2 
Director of Arts Versa (countering 
extremism on campus) 
14/12/11 
3 
Ex-President of the Federation of 
Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS)  
19/12/11 4 
Institute for Public Policy Research 
(IPPR) (Analyst) 
20/12/11 
5 
Director of Khayaal Theatre 
Company (received PREVENT 
funding)   
21/01/12 6 
Academic/Director of the ESCR’s 
‘New Security Challenges 
Programme’ (NSC) 
03/02/12 
7 
Academic and former PREVENT 
practitioner (Police and 
Community Engagement) 
21/02/12 8 
PREVENT Practitioner in 
Birmingham (worked on counter 
terrorism at the West Midland’s 
Police)  
21/02/12 
9 
Institute for Strategic Dialogue 
(Think-Tank) (Analyst) 
27/02/12 10 
Investigative Journalist (author of a 
number of security books) 
01/03/12 
11 
Academic (leading experts on 
Islamophobia) 
20/03/12 12 
Academic/ free-lance Consultant on 
PREVENT Community 
Engagement  
20/03/12 
13 
Former Vice Chair of the Muslim 
Safety Forum (MSF) 
11/04/12 14 
Former Secretary General of the 
MCB 
17/05/12 
15 
Academic (on new religious 
movements)  
21/05/12 16 
Former President of the National 
Association of Muslim Police 
[NAMP] 
30/05/12 
17 
Founder and Former Head of 
MCU 
31/05/12 18 
Founding Chair of the Muslim 
Safety Form (MSF)  
12/06/12 
19 
Academic / Activist (detained for 
six days by the Police whilst a 
student) 
25/11/12 20 Academic (Islamophobia expert) 21/12/12 
21 
PREVENT Engagement Officer in 
Lancashire 
05/02/13 22 
Senior PREVENT Engagement 
Officer in Lancashire 
05/02/13 
23 
Director of Siraat (Prison 
Intervention provider and co-
director of STREET)  
07/02/13 24 
Former Chief Inspector and 
PREVENT Delivery Board 
18/02/13 
25 
Quilliam Foundation (Think-Tank) 
Senior Researcher (former Jihadi) 
25/03/13 26 
Forward Thinking (Think-Tank) 
Analyst 
26/03/13 
27 
President of the Cordoba 
Foundation (Think-Tank )  
10/04/13 
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 During interviews I asked all of the 27 participants the question: what is de-
radicalisation? The research data revealed that there were for over 28 ways of 
referring to de-radicalisation by interviewees, which included:  
(1) de-legitimisation, (2) disengagement, (3) disaffiliate, (4) dissuade, (5) re-educate, 
(6) counter-ideology, (7) brain washing, (8) counter-brain washing, (9) counter- 
radicalisation, (10) counter-subversion,(11) rehabilitate, (12) reintegrate into 
mainstream, (13) de-programming, (14) re-programming, (15) re-balancing, (16) 
desisting, (17) empowering, (18) detox, (19) thought-control, (20) behaviour change, 
(21) cognitive change, (22) propaganda, (23) supporting vulnerabilities, (24)  de-
construction, (25) disaffection, (26) reversing radicalism, (27) pacifying, and (28) de-
nazification.  
Meanwhile, I collated the definitions from the 27 interviewees and began to read 
them, underline key words, and group together all the key words and phrases into a 
table on an Excel sheet. I then recorded the repetition of the same descriptions, or 
similar references. For example, I would colour code the word ‘young’, ‘child’, or 
‘youngsters’ every time a respondent mentioned the word in their explanation of de-
radicalisation, and tally up the total number of times ‘young’ was used. This was 
done for all the sub-themes and central themes that emerged from participants 
responses. This method allowed me to group reoccurring and pivotal ideas into 
themes. There were roughly seventeen themes.  Tables 4 below illustrates the 
seventeen themes, while the bar chat overleaf represents the nine conceptual 
features or categories with respect to the number of times the category is mentioned. 
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Table 4: The Conceptual Themes of De-radicalisation 
 
Ontological 
Components 
 
 
 
 
No. of 
references 
Cognitive Change 
 
Cognitive Change  
 
10 
Extremism  9 
Counter Ideology  5 
  
Behavioural Change 
 
Preventing 
violence/terrorism  
 
12 
Violent Extremism   4 
  
Interventions 
 
Support/vulnerable/probation  
 
9 
Interventions  5 
  
Transformation and Change 
 
Change  
 
9 
Transform  5 
  
Expertise and Knowledge 
 
Think Tanks  
 
8 
Educating/ Debate  5 
  
Political Remit 
 
Political Agenda  
 
5 
Islam  5 
  
 
Young 
 
  
9 
 
Individual 
 
  
5 
 
Radicalisation 
 
  
7 
 
Don’t Know 
 
  
4 
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The first category has been labelled ‘Cognitive Change’. This category encompasses 
the themes of cognitive change (mentioned 10 times), ‘extremism’ (9), and ‘counter-
ideology’ (5). The three themes were expressing the same idea in different ways, 
which was that de-radicalisation related to the change of the individuals worldview. 
The second category ‘Behavioural Change’ includes all references to terrorism and 
violence (12), and ‘violent extremism’ (4). This category could be quite confusing 
given that all these terms are synonymous with ‘violence’. Some interviewees 
believed that there was a relationship between ‘Worldview’ and ‘Violence’ in 
conceptions of de-radicalisation whilst some others merely believed that it related the 
change of the worldview without the need to stop the violence. The third category 
encompasses all references to de-radicalisation in terms of ‘support’, ‘vulnerable’, 
and ‘probation’ (9) with those describing it as interventions (5). The fourth category, 
labelled ‘Transformation’ includes all references to de-radicalisation as a state of 
change (9) and/or process (5). The category after, ‘Expertise and Knowledge’, 
encompasses the 8 references to think-tanks, with 6 mentions of Quilliam and 2 
mentions of Policy Exchange, in relation to de-radicalisation, as well as all 
references to de-radicalisation as ‘education’ and debate’ (5). This particular 
category was interesting because de-radicalisation was never understood as a by-
product of experts and those with knowledge in the literature. The category on 
‘Political Remit’ is extremely important despite only tallying up in sixth place in terms 
of mention by respondents in relation to de-radicalisation. This theme refers to the 
direct and indirect mention of governmental/political objectives (5) in relation to de-
radicalisation; whilst the theme of ‘Islam’ refers to the fact that de-radicalisation is 
associated with the promotion of a particular form of Islam in the UK (5). The 
category ‘Other features’ includes three categories ‘Young’ (9), which means that de-
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radicalisation targeted the young, ‘Radicalisation’ (7), which refers to the association 
of de-radicalisation with radicalisation for some interviewees, and the ‘Individual’ (5), 
which views de-radicalisation as interventions targeting individuals. They were not 
grouped in terms of separate boxes of categories for presentational reasons. Finally, 
the theme ‘Don’t know’ was kept despite not representing a conceptual feature 
because it was useful in assessing the problem of defining de-radicalisation. Again, 
referring to the table 4, these seventeen themes were grouped further into nine 
categories, illustrated below in chart 1. The nine categories all tell us something 
about the ontological makeup of de-radicalisation in the UK context. 
A clearer illustration of the nine categories or conceptual features of de-radicalisation 
according to the data is shown in Charts 1 and 2. Chart 1 shows the seventeen 
themes of table 4, grouped into the nine categories, which represented the total 
number of times the word is mentioned out of 27 in relation to each other. Chart 2 is 
a pie chart representing the bar chart in relation to the total concept of de-
radicalisation. 
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Chart 1: The Conceptual Features of De-radicalisation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 2: The Conceptual Features of De-radicalisation 
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The data provides a more nuanced and complex picture of what de-radicalisation 
entails conceptually. De-radicalisation is thus comprised conceptually of the 
following:  
1. Cognitive Change   
2. Behavioural Change  
3. A process/journey of change experienced by the individual  
4. Programmes of interventions  
5. Expertise and knowledge  
6. Political Remit   
7. Targeted at young people  
8.  Radicalisation  
9. Individual level 
As enumerated above, the data from my fieldwork validates the main argument of 
the debate in the literature about the relationship between cognitive and behavioural 
factors underpinning conceptions of de-radicalisation. However in contrast to the 
various conceptualisation of de-radicalisation discussed in the literature review, there 
were other factors that interviewees considered, referred to directly or indirectly, as 
well as understood, when discussing de-radicalisation. In particular, numbers 5 to 8 
above are unique and distinctive to the UK understanding of de-radicalisation.  An 
analysis of the definitional and conceptual features will be undertaken in subsequent 
sections. 
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3.3 Bewitched by Language: the Many Faces of De-radicalisation  
 
This section attempts to address the problem of defining de-radicalisation. It 
transpired in chapter 2 that there were eight definitions of de-radicalisation, whereas 
fieldwork data revealed that there were over 28 ways of referring to de-radicalisation 
by interviewees. Also linked to the myriad ways of defining de-radicalisation is the 
fact that it is synonymous with other terms like ‘disengagement’, ‘disaffection’, ‘de-
legitimisation’, ‘disaffection’, and ‘counter-radicalisation’, amongst others. Indeed 
during the interviews terms were used interchangeably. For many, the term ‘violence’ 
was used synonymously with the term ‘terrorism’, as well as other concepts like 
‘extremism’, ‘non-violent extremism’, and ‘violent radical’. The sheer diversity of 
definitions relating to de-radicalisation and its association with other terms provokes 
a number of questions: how do we account for the plethora of terms associated with 
de-radicalisation? Why did some struggle to define it? And why did some ‘experts’ 
working in the field of counter-terrorism feel it was sufficient and permissible not to 
define it? Would practitioners in other fields tolerate the same laxness with respects 
to key terms and concepts in their knowledge domain? If not, why is there a 
discernible resignation to the use of vague and ambiguous terminology in this field? 
This section argues that the inability to define de-radicalisation, coupled with the 
existence of various terms connoting the same phenomenon, can only be 
understood employing the semantic logic of ‘language games’. It shows that despite 
the terminological confusion and conceptually opacity, the underlying meaning of de-
radicalisation is secured in the ‘language games’ played in the domain of PREVENT.  
I want to examine the semantic logic that underpins the search for objective and 
precise meanings of words, known as the designative theory of language. The 
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designative semantic logic works by ascribing names to objects in the world. It 
makes the meaning of words clear and is concerned with tracing relations between 
sentences and their truth conditions (Taylor 1995, 220-221). It came into its own in 
the seventeenth century with Descartes, Bacon, and Hobbes, where a meaningful 
view of the universe was abandoned in favour of an objective view of the world 
(224). According to Taylor this theory of language is suited to the canons of modern 
science (220-221). However, since language is not just about ascribing terms to 
corresponding objects in the world, it is clear that the designative theory of language 
does not take us far and we have to look elsewhere for explanations. The fact that 
de-radicalisation is associated with so many other ideas for example confirms this. 
Similarly with the term de-radicalisation, the word itself does not seem to be 
important in designating the phenomenon of de-radicalisation in the world.  
Consequently, a different semantic logic is needed in order to understand the vague 
meaning of de-radicalisation, the inability to pin it down, and its diverse associations.  
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy offers a different route. In Philosophical 
Investigations (1958), Wittgenstein introduced the concepts of ‘language-game’ to 
designate forms of language simpler than the entirety of a language itself, ‘consisting 
of language and the actions into which it is woven’ (7), and connected by family 
resemblance or ‘Familienähnlichkeit’. The concept was intended ‘to bring into 
prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of 
life’ (23) which gives language its meaning. Some examples are needed to illustrate 
the profound importance the concept ‘language-games’ has for understanding the 
conundrum of de-radicalisation in terms of meaning. Wittgenstein urged his 
interlocutors to consider examining what all the various ‘games’ that are played have 
in common: 
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Consider for example the proceedings that we call “games”. I mean board-games, 
card-games, ball-games, Olympic Games, and so on. What is common to them all?- 
Don’t’ say: “There must be something common, or they would not be called ‘games’- 
but look and see whether there is anything common to all.- For if you look at them 
you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a 
whole series of them at that. 
                                                                                                                     (Ibid, 66) 
 
Thus the things we call ‘language games’ are indeed related to one another, but they 
do not all share a defining characteristic. If we examine all the things we call games, 
we will not find any one feature in common, but simply a number of relationships 
between kinds of games. Wittgenstein calls the similarity between different kinds of 
games a ‘family resemblance’ because a family is also distinguishable by certain 
similarities in features, but is not defined by any one or number of those features. 
The notion of family resemblance is fruitful in trying to make sense of the fact that 
de-radicalisation is associated with so many other terms, like radicalisation, 
extremism, and terrorism. Hence whilst it is clear on the one hand from the data that 
interviewees found the existence of many terms, as well as the lax application of 
those various terms in conjunction with de-radicalisation problematic, on the other 
hand the notion of ‘family resemblance’ does suggest, in contrast to the designative 
theory of language, that exact definitions are not required for meaning to be secured. 
Instead, as Wittgenstein shows, use comes before the individual meaning of the 
word. In other words, we know what a word means not because there is some fixed 
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meaning attached to it with which we are familiar, but because we know how to use 
that word in certain contexts. This is expressed by the following interviewee:  
 
 I’m going to take a hard line view.  For me I think de-radicalisation is about 
empowerment... what you are trying to do I guess... well it’s a good question. I’m just 
going to say empowerment because you can get into difficult territory otherwise.  
                                                     (Interview 7, Academic and PREVENT practitioner) 
 
What seems at first glance to be pointing to the notion of de-radicalisation as a 
confusing and misleading term also suggests upon closer inspection that the 
meaning of de-radicalisation can be secured without having to define it. The word 
‘empowerment’ is a concept and term that can take on countless other meanings and 
associations. To say therefore that de-radicalisation is ‘empowerment’ is to connote 
any number of meanings (e.g. subjects undergoing intervention gain more 
confidence, skills, resources, mental health, literacy, etc.). However, as a result of 
the language ‘games’ that interviewees played, the meaning of de-radicalisation in 
connection with ‘empowerment’, rather than merely signifying an attempt to evade 
the necessity of defining and explaining the term, actually makes sense in the 
context of youth development, probation services, and mentoring, an area of work 
this interviewee specialises in. 
With the notion of ‘language games’ and ‘family resemblance’ in mind, we can situate 
the status of de-radicalisation with respect to meaning more clearly. De-radicalisation 
as term, word, and idea belongs to its own language game: it makes sense in the 
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context in which it is employed, which for interviewees means the policy domain of 
counter-terrorism. Every single word of the 28 words/phrases has a unique meaning 
and yet each shares similar connotations/meanings. In the context of radicalisation, 
particularly the radicalisation of young British Muslim men, it is clear or understood, 
without any precise definitions, what is broadly meant by de-radicalisation, as 
articulated below: 
 
I mean there’s a problem with the terminology and even people in the Channel 
Project would say that they don’t like the word de-radicalise because they are not 
trying to de-radicalise people. People use the term in different ways so it’s important 
to realise that people that use the term are probably saying we are trying to move 
someone down from a violent extremist angle away from violence.  
                                                                         (Interview 10, Investigative Journalist) 
 
In the context of de-radicalisation therefore the general meaning pertains to getting 
individuals away from violence using discursive debate and education and as the 
data highlights this phenomenon can be expressed in a multitude of ways. However, 
an important matter to consider besides the plethora of terms denoting de-
radicalisation by practitioners in this policy domain is the fact that confusion 
enveloping the term remains a glaring problem for practitioners, evidenced by the 
fact that four of the interviewees openly stated that they did not know the meaning of 
de-radicalisation. This is shown by the following respondents, both of whom 
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attempted a definition but who first conceded the ambiguity of de-radicalisation as a 
term. 
  
So de-radicalisation....I don’t know what it means, I’d be surprised if anyone even 
knows what it means.  
                                                                            (Interview 18, Chairman of the MSF) 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Yeah I know but I don’t know much about it. I don’t know why the government 
doesn’t take a more humanist approach to all this instead of seeing young Muslims 
as statistics.  
                                                                  (Interview 5, Director of Khayaal Company) 
                                                                                                                                       
 
Whence does the confusion emanate? A clear problem with the use of the term de-
radicalisation is the conflation with other concepts, discourses, and knowledge 
domains. The following statement highlights the confusion surrounding the concept 
of de-radicalisation.  
 
So the problem is when you have that approach and you use the term de-
radicalisation, you could easily say that what you are trying to do is make someone 
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not extreme. In order to deal with the threat of terrorism you have to tackle all radical 
and extremist thinking. That becomes problematic because how then do you define 
extremist and radical thinking (?)....We need to focus on the issue of terrorism rather 
than the issue of extremism per se because the language of extremism is muddying 
the waters.  
                                                                       (Interview 10, Investigative Journalist) 
 
The respondent believes that the language of ‘extremism’ rather than ‘terrorism’ is 
‘muddying the waters’. In the coming section this chapter elucidates some of the 
potential reasons why policymakers are employing certain terms and why a lot of 
confusion surrounds the term de-radicalisation. These reasons include policymakers 
lacking the knowledge to tackle radicalisation, the fact that policymakers have 
alternative political objectives to accomplish, and the fact that ambiguous definitions 
and terms can still function practically, as demonstrated through Wittgenstein’s 
‘language games’. Also, I argued that the ‘family resemblance’ approach to 
conceptualisation was a better way of understanding de-radicalisation, because it 
was based on grouping common features under the same term rather than 
concentrating on the veracity of the word to its designative phenomenon in the world. 
The undetermined status of de-radicalisation in terms of definition and meaning 
should consequently be understood within the context of ‘language games’. 
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3.4 The Conceptual Framework of De-radicalisation 
 
The data conveys that while the concept of de-radicalisation encompasses nine 
themes, there are four main understandings of the concept of de-radicalisation, 
which include: the renunciation of violence, counter-ideology/extremism, the re-
integration of individuals into mainstream society, and youth empowerment. This 
section addresses these four conceptions of de-radicalisation and their implications 
for the ontological framework of de-radicalisation.  It will be argued that the four 
conceptions of de-radicalisation point to both conceptual confusion and to an 
incoherent and muddled policy.  
The first interpretation of de-radicalisation views it as a way of getting radicalised and 
militant individuals to abandon their use/support for violence. The data conveys that 
16 interviewees, almost 60 % of the sample, believed the de-radicalisation signified a 
move ‘away from violence’. This also represents PREVENTs conceptions of de-
radicalisation and essentially aims to reduce the risk of violence committed on British 
soil by intervening in the worldview of the militant before they cross the line. The 
following respondent explains the logic underpinning this predominant interpretation 
of de-radicalisation. 
 
It’s just reversing radicalism and getting extremist ideas out of people’s heads and 
especially violent extremist. Many committed terrorists in the country, Saudi Arabia, 
and Egypt have admitted their path was wrong and have publicly recanted.   
                                                                 (Interview 25, Quilliam Senior Researcher) 
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This view of de-radicalisation is posited as a solution to the security threat posed by 
transnational terrorism, which security thinking post 7/7 believes is primarily 
motivated by a perverse and dangerous ideology. The assumption underlying 
cognitive change in conceptions of de-radicalisation is that the justification for 
violence by militants is sanctioned by a particular ideology; de-radicalisation is 
therefore about dislodging the theoretical construct behind it. In other words, 
ideology and/or set of particular ideas are a causal factor in pathways towards 
terrorism. Hence whilst de-radicalisation purportedly aims to achieve behavioural 
change, i.e. to stop terrorism, behaviour change is considered secondary to cognitive 
change.  It is in this sense that de-radicalisation is presented as a strategy that seeks 
to tackle the ideas that lead to violence: 
De-radicalisation, to do it, you need to be able to deconstruct the ideas that formed 
in that persons mind and give him a better way of understanding the proof and 
evidences that led him to those thoughts. Plus we have to give him an alternative to 
taking that course of action.  
                                                                                    (Interview 23, Director of Siraat) 
                                                                                                                         
The second interpretation of de-radicalisation presents it as an attempt to counter 
the ideology of extremism in a broad sense and not just the way it is deployed by 
militants seeking to justify violence:  
 
Having said that, it’s equally possible to see de-radicalisation has been part of the 
process that is not at all concerned about people’s behaviour or about moving 
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people away from violence, whether it’s gang violence or extreme violence, but it’s 
more about de-radicalising people from this ideology.  
                                                                   (Interview 17, former Director of the MCU) 
                                                                                                                          
In contrast to the first conception of de-radicalisation, an alternative view of this 
ideology, one that emphasises the political, social, and cultural threat of such ideas, 
was articulated by a number of interviewees. This alternative interpretation suggests 
that the theological-political framework underpinning ‘violent-extremist’ ideology, 
outlined above, is re-framed and represented as the framework underpinning the 
ideology of ‘non-violent extremists’.  
 
The Salafis, some of the Brotherhood groups, Hizb-el-Tahrir, basically preached in 
this country for many years that a good Muslim cannot integrate and be a loyal 
citizen of this country; cannot serve in the military or the police because that’s 
allegiance to a Kufr system or man-made laws; so a lot of these Islamist ideas are 
holding back Muslims in this country and also it kind of builds up rage, with an over 
emphasis on foreign policy.  
                                                              (Interview 25, Quilliam Senior Researcher) 
                                                                                                                           
This interpretation of ‘worldview’ is more expansive than the first because it is not 
only concerned with tackling the threat of violence. It is an interpretation that 
consequently bought many individuals and groups into the category of ‘extremism’. 
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The category ‘extremist’ encompassed ‘non-violent’ individuals, as well as violent 
individuals on the cusp of radicalisation towards terrorism. Indeed this new 
categorisation was introduced with the second revision of PREVENT in 2009. It was 
not merely violence therefore that was problematic but also issues like ‘integration’, 
‘citizenship’, and ‘loyalty’ to Britain. Instead of terrorism therefore this expansive 
focus on ideology belongs to a strategy of counter-subversion. As a result, with this 
interpretation of ‘worldview’ in mind, it became feasible to conceive of a more 
substantial conception of de-radicalisation, one preoccupied with the purging of 
political and social spaces of these theological and political ideas in the UK.  The 
former President of the Muslim Association of Police Officer draws analogy between 
de-radicalisation and the ‘detox’ of certain ideas a. 
 
I look at it in my head as it being like going to a detox clinic and getting cleansed and 
you come out and I’m not now on drugs or alcohol or anything. Look, this is not as 
simple as that.....To answer your question, a journey to radicalisation and 
backwards, where to a point you are considered by the government to be a saint and 
don’t pose a threat and you hold Islamic values that are compatible with the Prevent 
strategy.  
                                                              (Interview 16, former President of the NAMP) 
                                                                                                                             
The third interpretation of de-radicalisation evident in the data sees it as a 
programme designed to re-integrate individuals to the political and social 
mainstream. Unlike the two previous conceptions, this view of de-radicalisation is 
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less about moving away from radicalisation and extremism and more about 
emphasising the move towards the mainstream. This view is encapsulated by a 
retired Police Officer who has served on the PREVENT Delivery Board:  
 
I think the agenda is to stir disaffected young people into the mainstream viewpoint. 
Getting them to sign up to those elusive British values we were talking about, getting 
them to sign up to liberal secularism. 
                          (Interview 24, former Police Chief Inspector and PREVENT Board) 
 
This understanding of de-radicalisation focuses on changing an individual’s 
‘worldview’ and moves the concern of policy-makers beyond violence. It suggests 
that de-radicalisation in the UK shows a greater concern than programmes in the 
M.E and S.E.A with the adoption of values and norms by individuals undergoing 
intervention. A closer examination also indicates that this understanding of de-
radicalisation is more about the socialisation of individuals, not only into mainstream 
society, but also towards a political mainstream view. It is therefore a conception that 
seeks a more substantial transformation in the individual and suggests that in the UK 
context, it is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to get violent individuals to 
renounce violence as part of the de-radicalisation process. In other words a 
necessary and sufficient condition for de-radicalisation to occur entails both 
abandoning violence, as well as adopting the values and norms of wider society. 
Two respondents expressed this holistic conception of de-radicalisation in the 
following ways: 
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It’s almost like mind control, thought control, it’s about your thought, your beliefs, 
your understanding is wrong and we will put you through something that will actually 
make you have the correct thoughts. It brings us back to the idea that, is what we are 
trying to achieve here is a version of Islam that is palatable to a British political 
mindset?  
                                                                                             (Interview 11, Academic) 
                                                                                                                                 
 
So you spoke about British values earlier on; if you feel someone isn’t well integrated 
and believes Britain is the enemy and that kind of narrative and that’s somebody you 
consider to be radical, then de-radicalisation is about pacifying this person to try and 
make him understand that actually, Britain and the West doesn’t have a problem with 
Muslims and British society and values are great.  
                                                                    (Interview 26, Forward Thinking Analyst) 
 
                                                                                                                                        
The fourth understanding of de-radicalisation and perhaps unique to the UK 
understanding of de-radicalisation, is its preoccupation with youths and their 
empowerment, in addition to crime prevention strategies. In fact as seen in section 
3.3, the data indicates that nine interviews mentioned youngsters in relation to de-
radicalisation. This amounts to a third of interviewees and suggests that this feature 
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is unique to the UK context in comparison to de-radicalisation in the M.E. and S.E.A. 
For example, here is a senior PREVENT Officer discussing de-radicalisation in terms 
of crime rehabilitation: 
As Police Officers....we’ve began a process of holding that persons hand, picking 
them up, and walking with them; to places where they can get voluntary experiences, 
be mentored, and meet people outside his universe of reference; he’s never met 
anybody outside his community other than his own and that, and if he was 
radicalised, well that’s de-radicalisation.  
                                                                     (Interview 22, Senior PREVENT Officer) 
                                                                                                                                       
As indicated in the statement, this view of de-radicalisation has a tenuous link with 
tackling terrorism and violence at the level of ideas. Another example is also shown 
below by a community activist, who not only talks in terms of youth empowerment 
and crime prevention, but also interestingly evokes other phenomenon’s, like 
extremism and political violence, in her definition of de-radicalisation:   
 Ideally it’s about making disenfranchised young people make the right choices. 
Deradicalisation could be about any route. So in this instance it should be about 
becoming extremist Muslim and going to fight wars abroad and stopping that. But it 
should be about giving young people choice and money should be pumped out, you 
know, to help them staying out of gangs.  
                                                             (Interview 13, former Vice-Chair of the MSF) 
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This conception of de-radicalisation indicates a greater preoccupation with crime 
prevention strategies than counter-terrorism strategies. In the PREVENT strategy for 
example, de-radicalisation falls under ‘supporting vulnerable’ individuals and the 
relationship between preventative approaches to crime and youth empowerment is 
evident in the police run Channel project. This view of de-radicalisation indicates a 
pastoral logic, one that extols the importance of caring for ‘vulnerable’ individuals 
and ‘extremists’, and providing them with support, education, and resources to 
overcome radicalisation.  
In summation, the data shows that there are multiple understandings of de-
radicalisation in the UK context: one concept of de-radicalisation relates to the 
renunciation, through thought-reform, of violence only; a second conception situates 
de-radicalisation as part of an attempt to domesticate Islam by suppressing 
extremism and promoting more liberal version of Islam in public spaces; the third 
conception, emphasises the need to have individuals adopt the political and social 
values of the country as a sufficient and necessary condition for a successful de-
radicalisation to occur; and the fourth conception situates de-radicalisation within the 
preventative framework of youth empowerment, probation services, and crime 
prevention. Overall, the data corroborates the contested conceptual framework of 
de-radicalisation presented by PREVENT. The next section elaborates the 
implications of the data in more details.  
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3.5 The Implications of Multiple Conceptions of De-radicalisation 
 
What are the implications of the articulation of four different conceptions of de-
radicalisation in the data? And what does it mean in terms of understanding the 
ontological framework of de-radicalisation? It reveals four important elements to 
consider: (1) that de-radicalisation as a concept suffers from definitional and 
conceptual confusion; (2) that de-radicalisation interventions indicate a muddled 
policy logic at the heart of the UK counter-terrorism policy; (3) valorising ideology in 
counter-terrorism policy shifts the focus of policy on to other issues unrelated to 
terrorism; and (4) The data shows the limits of the inductive method to understanding 
de-radicalisation, suggesting both an academic and policy imperative to find an 
alternative conceptualisation of de-radicalisation 
Regarding conceptual confusion, the data corroborates findings in the literature that 
de-radicalisation as a term and concept ‘meant different things to different people’. It 
also reinforces the critiques made by the likes of John Horgan and Bjorgo regarding 
the conceptual weakness of de-radicalisation. Not to mention the fact that the data 
also proves that the PREVENT conception of de-radicalisation is confusing. However 
two of the four conceptions of de-radicalisation expressed in the data were not in 
seen in the literature, namely the second and fourth interpretations relating to de-
radicalisation as counter-subversion and youth empowerment respectively. This 
points to the important role of disciplining the Muslim population in the case of the 
second interpretation of de-radicalisation (counter-subversion) and the role of 
pastoral power in the case of the fourth interpretation of de-radicalisation (youth 
empowerment).  
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The data reveals other important conceptual features of de-radicalisation in the UK 
context, like the significant role of knowledge and expertise as well as the 
relationship of de-radicalisation with radicalisation. Thus whilst the data sheds light in 
greater detail on de-radicalisation in the UK context then found in the literature, it 
does not provide a coherent conceptual framework of de-radicalisation.  In any case, 
which of the four accurately embodies the idea and practice of de-radicalisation in 
the UK? Could all four interpretations be valid? It is in this way that de-radicalisation 
represents a conceptual confusion. The conceptual confusion surrounding de-
radicalisation do not get us closer to a coherent and robust conceptual framework 
that enable academics to understand the phenomenon properly or even for 
policymakers to build an effective policy. 
However, there are two suggestions in the data explaining the confusion of de-
radicalisation: the role of experts in formulating de-radicalisation and the impact the 
concept of radicalisation had in the way that de-radicalisation developed. For 
example, 8 interviewees mentioned the role of think-tanks in formulating de-
radicalisation.  Of the 8, 6 identified Quilliam as a key player in shaping de-
radicalisation, the other 2 respondents mentioned the Policy Exchange. This is 
interesting because de-radicalisation as a policy and idea was not the by-product of 
Quilliam’s work and yet for 6 of the interviewees de-radicalisation is explicitly 
associated with them. The association of de-radicalisation with the work of Quilliam 
nevertheless shows the success of Quilliam in being able to position itself as an 
‘anti-extremism’ think-tank, as well the fact that de-radicalisation connotes counter-
ideology; and Quilliam’s work has primarily focused on counter-ideology. More will 
be said on this in chapter 7. Interviewees below make the link between de-
radicalisation and the influence of the Quilliam Foundation. 
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...you know, people like Quilliam think that you could re-programme these people in 
a different way, like denazification....  
                          (Interview 24, former Police Chief Inspector and PREVENT Board) 
 
De-radicalisation is the word often used by Majid Nawaz at Quilliam. It’s the journey 
backwards after you’ve gone on the path of being radicalised but then....     
 
                                                            (Interview 16, former President of the NAMP) 
 
I think it was clear that de-radicalisation from a government’s perspective was to 
intervene with people whose ideological heart lies in more retribution action against 
British policy interests. This was defined for instance by Quilliam, and they managed 
to shift the definition to be wider than it was originally.  
                                                                             (Interview 2, Director of Arts Versa) 
 
Meanwhile, the second factor explaining the confusion of de-radicalisation is 
exemplified by the importation of the ideas, theories, and language of radicalisation, 
which had predated the emergence of de-radicalisation as a policy in 2011. Indeed 
as illustrated in section 3.3, 7 interviewees mentioned radicalisation in conjunction 
with de-radicalisation. This shows that for almost 25% of the interviewees, de-
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radicalisation was understood in relation to radicalisation, a relationship which will be 
explored in chapter 5.  
 
Despite the discernible relationship between both concepts, both have their origins in 
different genealogies. As enumerated in chapter 2, most the literature on de-
radicalisation is based on work undertaken in other places before 2006, as well 
according to completely different contexts. De-radicalisation in the M.E. and S.E.A 
was concerned with terrorism and not radicalisation.  However, in contrast to the 
M.E. and S.E.A, the UK conceptualised the ‘new security threat’ posed by 
transnational terrorism in the register of radicalisation, with the UK government 
sponsoring the codification of radicalisation as a body of knowledge to accompany 
its move towards preventative approaches in counter-terrorism. By 2011 discourses 
on radicalisation had formed into a body of knowledge with its own theories, experts, 
and concepts. Radicalisation discourses encompassed a number of concurrent 
discursive formations, which included the security discourse; the integration and 
identity discourse, the fragmented knowledge domain of terrorism studies, foreign 
policy (different in its own right to discourses on security) discourse, and discourses 
on Islam and Muslims, amongst others.  
The by-product of the discursive explosion on radicalisation was a particular thinking 
that shaped the formation of de-radicalisation interventions in the UK. This includes 
the primacy of tackling the worldview of radicalised subjects, the fact that it targets 
individuals, the existence of a process, and the importance of identity. Hence while 
the definition of de-radicalisation in PREVENT 2011 adopts the language found in 
the literature that conceives de-radicalisation in terms of ‘cognitive’ and ‘behavioural’ 
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change, in reality, de-radicalisation interventions through Channel indicate a greater 
affiliation with the thinking produced by radicalisation discourses. This explains some 
of the confusion surrounding de-radicalisation that is evident in the data. The 
influence of radicalisation theories on de-radicalisation is articulated by the former 
President of FOSIS. 
 
De-radicalising people- what a stupid and horrible thing to do; if you are talking about 
radicalisation as someone becoming extremists then you need to know what makes 
an extremist in the first place and is going to go on and be a terrorist.  As far as I 
understand it there’s no roadmap to say that A+B+C+D equals terrorist. Actually 
quite the opposite; I guess this deradicalisation process, which you have noted here, 
and perhaps Prevent is trying to do, relies on there being this conveyor belt to a 
person becoming a terrorist.  
                                                                         (Interview 3, former FOSIS President) 
 
The second significant implication of the data is that the four interpretations of de-
radicalisation highlights the fact that de-radicalisation is a muddled policy. As 
explained in the introduction of above, the conflation of several policy domains is 
manifested in PREVENT’s conception of de-radicalisation: a policy designed to 
‘reverse radicalism’ is situated in a preventive strategy and then compared to crime 
prevention. Similarly, the four interpretations correspond to four different policy 
domains and agendas: the first interpretation of de-radicalisation, getting individuals 
to abandon violence, fits with the counter-terrorism agenda. This is motivated by the 
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need to secure the lives of citizens, manage the backlash against Western military 
involvement in Muslim-majority lands, and the implementation of risk-management 
strategies and institutional resilience building.  
The second interpretation, where de-radicalisation is about counter-ideology in a 
broad sense, in which Salafi and Islamist ideas and practices are purged from public 
spaces, coupled with the promotion of ‘moderate Islam’, fits in with a strategy of 
counter-subversion. This interpretation views political and religious Muslims as 
subversive elements within the UK that need to be disciplined and controlled. Here 
analogies with counter-subversion of the communists and the Trade Union 
movement in Britain during the Cold War can be made.  
The third interpretation of de-radicalisation, which conceives it as a policy designed 
to re-integrate individuals into mainstream society, relates to the community 
cohesion agenda. This interpretation is a complex one given that it brings together a 
number of issues and concerns regarding the integration of Muslim in Britain and the 
political and national identity of Britain. Hence problems related to immigration, anti-
EU sentiments amongst the public and the rise of a neo-nationalism are conflated 
into the integration agenda. As part of the discourse of the integration agenda, the 
position of Muslim vis-a-vis the majority is debated, their loyalty questioned, and 
norms and values acquire greater significance in discourse and social and political 
practice. This interpretation consequently places emphasis on the adoption of British 
values and norms by Muslims.  
The last interpretation of de-radicalisation stresses the development of the youth, 
which relates to work done in crime prevention. The onus in crime prevention is on 
the pastoral care of youngsters through mentoring, courses, and relationship 
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building.  Since the majority of those deemed radical in the UK are youngsters, the 
aim of this policy logic is to prevent them from becoming radicals further up the line. 
These policies often involved the probation services, parents, and a number of other 
agencies.  
 
Ultimately, the data shows that de-radicalisation as a policy exhibits a tangled logic 
in which it performs the functions of counter-terrorism, counter-subversion, 
community cohesion, and crime prevention altogether. Insofar as de-radicalisation 
encompasses all four logics, then it is clear to see that it represents an incoherent 
policy that moves the concern of policymakers far beyond terrorism.  
The third significant dimension relates to the primacy placed on ideology, or as 
PREVENT states it, ‘cognitive change’. This observation was reflected in the data in 
section 3.3, which illustrates that almost 89% of interviewees believed that ‘cognitive 
change’, either in the form of counter-ideology or counter-extremism, was a central 
feature in the conceptualisation of de-radicalisation. Given that there is no criminal 
liability for possessing a particular state of mind, why is one of the strategies of the 
UK’s counter-terrorism policy placing particular emphasis on certain ideas?  
The answer can be gleamed from the logic underpinning all four interpretations of 
de-radicalisation: the belief that behaviour change (whatever the outcome) is 
dependent on cognitive change. In other words, the realm of ideas is conferred with 
agency and has become the locus for human behaviour in accounts of radicalisation 
and de-radicalisation. Another way to put it is that de-radicalisation is an account of 
human behaviour in which human action in the real world is determined by ideas, 
beliefs, and values. Without delving into the philosophical veracity of such a 
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proposition here, this section is more interested in what ideas actually constitute a 
threat to policymakers. According to interviewee’s 23 and 25, these ideas are linked 
primarily to concepts and rulings found in Islamic Jurisprudence surrounding, in no 
particular order: 
 
1. Jihad (‘Struggle’ but in this context violent struggle),  
2. Kafir (Non-believer or ‘infidel’),  
3. Khalafa (Islamic political institution akin to a Sultanate),  
4. Ummah (General Community of Muslims). 
5. Sharia (Islamic Law) 
Notably, the majority of interviewees did not go into this much detail. As articulated 
by almost 50% of interviewees this type of technical language and specialist 
knowledge highlights the important role that expertise and knowledge plays in 
constructions of de-radicalisation, and PREVENT strategy more generally, an area 
that will be addressed in chapter 5 and 7. Nevertheless according to the data the five 
point theological-political formulation above forms the constitutive block of the 
‘worldview’/ideology of violent militants.  
The PREVENT strategy’s conception of de-radicalisation, shared by some of the 
interviewees, is that this ‘worldview’ causes violence and must consequently be 
challenged. However, as confirmed by the data, many interviewees believed that the 
focus on ideology was not merely confined to the problem of violence but to also the 
perceived problem of the subversive threat posed by Muslim mobilisation, the threat 
to community cohesion as a result of illiberal values, and the inability of ‘vulnerable’ 
Muslim youth to effectively think through ideology and make the right choices. In 
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other words ideology is represented as a pervasive and penetrating force that guides 
all Muslim action. This type of agency is not merely conferred on to ideology but also 
to Islam more generally.  
 
The important point to note here is the repercussion such a valorisation of ideas and 
beliefs has in counter-terrorism policy. This represents the most distinctive 
dimension in UK counter-terrorism. The impact is primarily three-fold: it enables 
policymakers to problematised particular forms of Muslim theological and political 
thinking; it justifies interventionist policies in the theological and political lives of 
Muslims, and it enables the expansion of governmental remit and intervention 
beyond terrorism and into other spheres of life. There is limited space to discuss 
each point here but they will be analysed throughout the rest of the thesis. However 
the problematisation opened up by placing ideology at the heart of counter-terrorism 
policy is aptly summarised by the academic below, as the statement implies that the 
focus of de-radicalisation has moved far from terrorism.  
 Is it your views on women? Or you views on democracy? Or you views on foreign 
policy? Or is it your views on domestic policy? Or is it you your views on 
violence?...they’re saying it’s not just about terrorism and violence it’s about all these 
other things that somehow makes you vulnerable to the violent part.  
                                                                         (Interview 10, Investigative Journalist) 
                                                                                                                              
The last significant implication of the data is that it reveals the limit of the inductive 
method. De-radicalisation suffers from poor definition, is conceptually confusing: is it 
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about tackling violence, ideology, identity, crime, or the management of risk? It 
indicates conflicting policy logics: is it governed by the objectives of counter-
terrorism, counter-subversion, community cohesion, or crime prevention? And the 
primacy of ideology in de-radicalisation has made the boundaries between legitimate 
and illegitimate thinking and behaviour murky. Taken altogether the data 
demonstrates the fact that de-radicalisation rests on a weak conceptual framework. 
Consequently it shows the disjuncture between the idea and practice of de-
radicalisation and between the notion of preventive notions of counter-terrorism and 
the reality of counter-terrorism. When we consider the additional lacuna in the 
literature with regards to the absence of robust research on de-radicalisation, the 
non-existent empirical basis for de-radicalisation, and the unavailability of data on 
intervention programmes, then the picture of what we know and can confidently 
pronounce on de-radicalisation is grim. To that effect, the data reveals how little we 
continue to know about de-radicalisation. However this oblique state of affair with 
respect to understanding de-radicalisation compels us to search for an alternative 
way of conceptualising de-radicalisation. Some of the contours such a concept 
should take will be outlined in chapter 4.    
 
3.6 The Evaluation and Significance of the Fieldwork Data 
 
The first dimension to consider is the reliability of the data. Insofar as a number of 
key themes were reoccurring in most interviews, that the content of the data could be 
substantiated, and that the data was relevant and insightful, then it can be asserted 
that the data was largely reliable. However, this is not the reliability extolled in the 
natural sciences in which repeating the same methods would yield the same results 
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or that the findings can be checked. Although I am confident that similar results, 
instead of the same results, would be possible if the same questions were asked and 
the same attention was paid to the quality of interviewees. In the domain of de-
radicalisation the quality of the interviewee is determined by their credibility, which is 
judged on their knowledge, expertise, and experience. I deliberately chose 
practitioners and experts with experience of PREVENT and knowledge of 
radicalisation given the scarce experts on de-radicalisation, save two or three 
interviewees. It is the focus on experts and practitioners that enhances the quality 
and reliability of the data accumulated. This is based on the rationale that experts 
have accumulated a certain experience that allows them intimate knowledge of a 
field (Yin 2009).  
Moreover, the reliability of the data was reinforced during the fieldwork process 
when, to my surprise, similar themes, concepts, and critiques were consistently 
coming through the data. This consistency of themes in the data can be attributed to 
the nature of the policy domain and the methodological approach of semi-structured 
interviews. In the case of the first, PREVENT has been a highly politicised and 
publicised policy, whilst radicalisation has become the chief way of thinking about the 
Muslim problem in the UK since 2005. A number of the ideas, issues, and challenges 
associated with PREVENT and knowledge domain of radicalisation had been known 
to most if not all the interviewees. Therefore, despite the different personal, 
organisational, and philosophical positions of all 27 interviewees, there was 
nevertheless a pool of common ideas, concepts, and themes. Finally, the semi-
structured interviews were characterised by questions that were the same, similar, 
and different.  An example of the same question I put to interviewees were question 
such as ‘What is de-radicalisation?’ and ‘what is your verdict on PREVENT?’ Whilst 
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such questions elicit a diversity of responses, they nevertheless result in similar 
ideas being expressed, albeit worded different.  
Secondly, the data was largely valid. Again, caution must be exercised with the use 
of ‘valid’ since I do not employ it in the same way as in the natural sciences. As 
explained in the section on methodology, my research inquiry rejects the positivist 
claim of objective and value-free knowledge. Thus at the outset my investigation was 
not committed to the proposition that a factual statement of the social world could be 
made. However, I explained elsewhere that the best explanation or even the most 
valid representation of the human world could be attempted. To that effect, the data 
was contextually valid, that is, it accurately depicts the picture of what de-
radicalisation is like in the UK, but is less valid externally, which means it cannot be 
applied as well in other contexts outside the UK. 
 With respect to the construct validity of the data, this was substantiated by 
researcher reflexivity, the fact that my literature review, background reading, and 
frequent exposure to conferences, events, and news coverage allowed me to judge 
the reliability of the information coming from interviewees. This made up for the lack 
of data triangulation in my analysis. I did not read my data, for example, in 
conjunction with other data sources, such as observation data or even quantitative 
data, like surveys and questionnaires. This type of triangulation of data was not 
required given the type of inquiry I conducted, the background information I 
possessed, and sufficient enough exposure I had in the field. Consequently, I am 
confident that my data can make statements about de-radicalisation. 
 Regarding external validity, this was restricted due to the nature of the inductive 
nature of case-study approaches. The problem effectively relates to generalisability 
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and transferability of the data to the real world case. With respect to the UK, the data 
is moderately generalisable, but does not apply to other cases of de-radicalisation, 
e.g. right wing de-radicalisation, or other categories, such as collective de-
radicalisation, or other places such as the M.E. and S.E.A, or even prison 
environments. The data speaks to the UK context, which is unique, as attested 
before, for all sorts of reasons.  
Another dimension to consider is the usefulness of the data. The data was useful in 
three ways: it presented original data on de-radicalisation in the UK context, it 
brought additional conceptual features and other information to light, and it debunked 
some prevalent presuppositions on de-radicalisation. With respect to originality of 
data, my research data represent the only primary data available on de-radicalisation 
in the UK context. This is significant for the corpus of work on de-radicalisation given 
the limited availability or absence of data missing in the literature on de-
radicalisation. It thus offers distinctive insights about de-radicalisation ontologically in 
a more nuanced and meaningful way than stated in policy and think-tanks 
documents. In particular, the research data illustrates that features comprising the 
conceptualisation of de-radicalisation, like expertise and knowledge, political remit, 
young people as targets, and relationship with radicalisation discourse, are explicitly 
unique to the UK context in comparison to conceptualisation of de-radicalisation in 
the literature.  
Secondly, the data brings our attention to new perspectives untouched or hidden in 
the literature. For example, the data suggests that de-radicalisation in its current 
iteration in the UK represents the conflation of four agendas; it reflects concerns with 
the security agenda and with mitigating violence; it reflects the concerns with 
counter-subversion and the domestication of Islam; it shows a preoccupation with 
170 
 
social and political integration agenda, as well as broader agendas of crime-
prevention and youth empowerment.  The data was also useful in revealing the full 
extent to which de-radicalisation was in a conceptual morass. Hence it is in this way 
that key aspects of de-radicalisation were more clearly ascertained.  
Lastly, the data was useful was in debunking some of the ‘conventional wisdom’ on 
de-radicalisation. For many, the term was a signifier that meant ‘moving away from 
violence’. Indeed policymakers are selling de-radicalisation as an instrument of 
counter-terrorism designed to reduce the risk of violence. The data however 
suggests that another way perhaps of understanding de-radicalisation, besides 
conventional concerns with terrorism, is to view it as being concerned with wider 
political and governmental objectives relating to reconstructions of the state, identity, 
and citizenship. Overall therefore the data was useful in understanding de-
radicalisation conceptually. 
The final strength of the data is the possibility it offers to integrate data into a 
different framework, one which opens up possibilities for our understanding of de-
radicalisation. Qualitative case studies are methods that approach data inductively 
as opposed to deductively. Hence I did not have a hypothesis to begin with, even if I 
had some implicit inclination of where the data might take me. I was open and keen 
about letting the data direct me. So I did not start with a set theory or hypothesis and 
then went out into the field to confirm and substantiate any pre-conceived notions of 
what de-radicalisation is. I was fully aware from the literature review that my data 
would corroborate the contested nature of de-radicalisation ontologically, even if 
qualitative results are not generally used for confirmation of existing theories; neither 
was this my objective. Whilst an entirely original theory of de-radicalisation did not 
emerge from qualitative inquiry, the data nevertheless did directly towards an 
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existing theory- it is Foucault’s theory of the ‘technology of the self’ which I have 
decided to interpret the rest of the data in forthcoming chapters. Theoretical 
frameworks can provide explanations and deeper understanding when interpreting 
qualitative data.  I hope to demonstrate in chapter 4 that the ‘technology of the self’ 
presents an alternative and novel way of conceptualising de-radicalisation. 
It is important to note here some of the methodological limitations of my data set. 
The first is sample size. I interviewed 27 individuals, which although is a reliable set 
in order to identify patterns and be able to draw coherent interpretations, it is 
nevertheless a small and selective sample size, which makes resounding 
conclusions challenging to affirm. A mention must also be made with respect to 
demographic issues. I deliberately chose individuals who were working in the field of 
counter-terrorism and PREVENT, as well as individuals who have specialist 
knowledge of the field. One of the drawbacks of the sample was that I was unable to 
gain access to interviews with politicians that knew this area, who were high profile 
and difficult to reach. The other group of experts I wanted to interview were journalist 
and those in the media. Despite persisting with this group, I was able to only secure 
one interview. While it would have added to the data the usefulness and quality of 
the data was not comprised by their absence in the sample. This due to the fact that 
patterns had already emerged in the data and that many of themes were commonly 
referred to in interviews.  
Furthermore, it could be argued that a more effective data set would have included 
interviewing individuals who were ex-militants and/or had been through a Channel 
intervention in order to capture some of the conceptual threads underpinning their 
transformation in the de-radicalisation process. However, it was not practically 
feasible to interview individuals who have been through Channel for the simple 
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reason that the identity and cases of those individuals are classified. With respect to 
interviewing ex-radicals, I interviewed at least two ex-radicals; however, these 
individuals spoke about de-radicalisation and PREVENT in their capacities as 
professionals working for organisations rather than as de-radicalised individuals. 
Perhaps even more sought after of course is data from actual real life militants and 
yet this is problematic for ethical and practical reasons and access to such high risk-
high profile interviews seldom happens (Disley, et al. 2009, VI). My data does not 
shed new light on how somebody actually becomes deradicalised. In part of course 
this is due to the scope of my research, which is more concerned with understanding 
de-radicalisation ontologically. Finally, it must be stated that my research is, after all, 
a preliminary ontological investigation into a complex phenomenon. More empirical 
data is needed with a large sample of people over a long time period to fully 
contextualise some of my findings as well as accentuate its implications further.  
 
 
3.7 Researcher Reflexivity 
 
In this section I am concerned with the factors that influenced the type and quality of 
the data I collated. What, in other words, affected my data? Alvesson and Sköldberg 
(2000) describe this exercise as the ‘interpretation of interpretation’ - another layer of 
analysis after data has been interpreted. Reflexivity involves making the research 
process itself a focus of inquiry, laying open pre-conceptions and becoming aware of 
situational dynamics in which the interviewer and respondent are jointly involved in 
knowledge production. Undertaking this exercise of reflexivity is important for other 
reasons; in subsequent chapters, namely chapters 5-7, the bulk of the data will be 
deployed to paint- what the data reveals to be- a more accurate picture of what de-
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radicalisation is really about in the UK. In these chapters, I deliberately eschew 
taking a critical approach to analysing the data. This is not because I take what 
interviewees say at face value. On the contrary, I am fully aware of the multiple 
influences involved in knowledge production, which include: the wider political, 
social, economic, and historical context, organisational/institutional factors, personal 
motivations, where interviews take place, and the level of trust between the interview 
and interviewee. Knowledge production is thus unequivocally a deeply embedded, 
multifaceted, and complex process. Instead, I deploy the fieldwork data in order to 
paint, what I claim, is a coherent picture of de-radicalisation. In what follows 
therefore, reflexivity allows me to take a more acute and critical look at the fieldwork 
process. 
It is important to begin with the wider historical and policy context of my PhD 
fieldwork. I began my interviews at the beginning of December 2011. The third 
iteration of Prevent had just been published in June 2011. At that time, Prevent had 
been running since 2006 and so had been operating for five years. Due to being a 
controversial policy, in conjunction with other political expediencies, the Coalition 
government suspended Prevent II and had it examined by the House of Commons 
Select Committee. As I write about in more detail in chapters 6 and 7, Prevent 2011 
marked a new departure from ‘old’ prevent. The identity elements associated with 
the community cohesion agenda was removed; funding was terminated to the 
majority of counter-radicalisation projects, the focus increasingly shifted away from 
‘community’ approaches to ‘value’ based approaches to counter-terrorism, and 
PREVENT recalibrated its resources towards de-radicalisation programmes like 
Channel. 
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Indeed, these changes affected the interviews I conducted. A large number of the 
interviewees had been recipients of PREVENT money. At the time of interviews, 
their money had been cut off. This, from an organisational perspective, is a huge 
loss that only adds pressure to resources and staff- the blood line of organisations 
working in this field. I can only infer, though with some confidence, that this made it 
easier for many of the interviewees to be critical of Prevent. Had I conducted the 
same interviews 4 or 5 years earlier, I would have had a different response on a 
whole range of issues. The person receiving money and generating work is not 
likely, except in rare circumstances, to acrimoniously knock down their funders. It 
must be granted, of course, that this did not prevent people from coming forward to 
critique PREVENT in the early years. In fact immediately at the outset, criticism had 
been made by leading figures in the Muslim communities, amongst a few others, 
regarding the predominant accounts of radicalisation and the ulterior objectives of 
Prevent. The first time, however, that public critique of Prevent was taken seriously 
was with the publication of Arun Kundnani’s report ‘Spooked’ in 2009. Despite the 
numerous examples of critical voices before 2010, these remained, on the whole, 
marginal. In the end, it became a lot easier and common to criticise PREVENT post 
2010, something that was reflected in the data set.    
The historical and temporal period I conducted my interviews- between 2011 and 
2013- also impinged on the kind of responses I elicited. Hypothetically speaking, 
suppose I conducted my investigation in the 1970’s? I would venture to say that de-
radicalisation would be associated with left-wing/communist radicalism. In fact, this is 
corroborated in the literature review in chapter 2 where it was shown that older 
conceptions of ‘de-radicalisation’ were used in relation to communist parties and 
their engagement with democratic politics. By the same token, if I conducted my 
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investigation in the future then the meaning would change again. This is what is 
meant, in effect, by Jacques Derrida’s (1982) non-concept of ‘Differance’. Derrida’s 
notion of différance exploits the play of meaning in the French original, which means 
both ‘to differ’ and to defer’. He makes the point that since meaning is not entirely 
present in any signifier, language creates an endless deferral of meaning. As the 
signifier is relational and not fixed, it becomes constantly subject to change, often 
changing with context. Terms are therefore perpetually re-signified and re-defined, 
which allows it to mean different things in different places. It can never be fixed 
eternally or trans-historically.   
Hence we can say of ‘radicalisation’ (for de-radicalisation acquires its meaning from 
radicalisation) that it is a concept that slides and floats- it is a floating signifier; it is 
never completed or achieves wholeness in its meaning. There is always space for an 
outsider or someone Other or exotic or different that can assume its meaning, 
dislodge it, and take its place. There is no escape from the fact that in the end 
meaning is always a process of interpreting what is represented. And Interpretation 
is dependent on historical and culture context.  Thus in the historical period in which I 
conducted fieldwork interviews there was a palpable lack of knowledge and 
understanding, if not confusion regarding de-radicalisation. This is because despite 
being mentioned in PREVENT 2009 it was not until 2011 that the concept of de-
radicalisation was elaborated, and in fact continued to be developed thereafter. In 
effect, I conducted my investigation of de-radicalisation at a point in history when its 
meaning was both sutured by the radicalisation discourse and paradoxically was still 
in formation. De-radicalisation has not, in other words, had sufficient time to 
articulate its meaning clearly. The instability of the term and concept is therefore 
reflected in the responses of interviewees.  Another factor impacting the data was 
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the influence of the organisation/institution the interviewee’s work/worked in. One of 
the glaring observations evident in the data was that all interviewees use terminology 
used in their specialism or line of work. For example, the two PREVENT Officers I 
interviewed work in what they call ‘soft’ counter-terrorism, which is actually more 
connected to crime prevention work that focus on the development of the youth. 
There is little wonder therefore that they spoke a lot about ‘vulnerability’, ‘risk’, 
‘engagement, and ‘what if’ scenarios. Similarly, of all the interviewees, the only 
interviewee with an overwhelmingly positive view of PREVENT was the senior 
researcher at Quilliam. Again, there is little to be surprised about here. As I elaborate 
further in chapter 7, Quilliam was heavily supported by the New Labour Government, 
and till this day, despite the fact they no longer receive PREVENT money, enjoy a 
high profile in the media. It makes sense, in this respect that this particular 
interviewee does not step out of line with his organisations stance on many of the 
prominent issues characterising the discourse in this policy domain.  So it is perfectly 
sensible that when giving interviews individuals do not deviate beyond the accepted 
boundaries set by their employers. 
This somewhat banal observation- that individual views and opinions closely align 
and seldom diverge from those of their organisations- does not accurately reveal 
where an interviewee’s personal and organisational views begin and end. I’m not 
making the crude point that an individual’s knowledge, views, and opinions are 
determined by their institutional affiliation. This, naturally, is not always the case. The 
field and place one works in does however, whether one is consciousness of it or 
not, provide the paradigm and conceptual lens with which one understands and 
grapples with things in that world. As I alluded to in a previous section, this partly 
explains how we can have so many different definitions of de-radicalisation. For an 
177 
 
interviewee working in crime prevention, for example, they understand de-
radicalisation as ‘desistance’, whereas the interviewee with a religious studies 
background comes to de-radicalisation through ‘de-programming’. This is, then, the 
other and more indirect way organisational/institutions mould interviewees’ 
conceptions on many issues.        
 
There are personal motives involved for interviewees which also impacts the data 
produced. Admittedly, this is a clumsy phrasing, for discussions about ‘personal 
motives’ are largely redundant. After all, a person’s motive is seldom transparent to 
others, not always even to the person themselves.  Instead, what I mean here, which 
I explore in chapters 5-7, is the motive of the expert in a competitive market place. 
As I explicate further in chapter 4, the cultural norm of the UK is predominantly 
defined by neo-liberal governmentality. As a result, individuals are encouraged to be 
responsible and autonomous individuals who should inculcate entrepreneurial 
values. Subjects are expected to self-regulate according to commercial values, 
which includes being a consumer, being financially prudent, and managing one’s 
own brand. The latter point in particular has been exacerbated by the proliferation of 
social media. As a result, it is more fitting to view experts working in PREVENT as 
entrepreneurs who try to draw on a range of ‘capital’ (money, knowledge, 
experience, networks, access, position, etc.) to borrow Pierre Bourdieu’s (1986) 
concept, to maximise their position and status in a given field.  PREVENT is, 
therefore, a policy terrain where people complete for prestige, status, money, and 
fame. It is possible, according to the entrepreneurial logic governing the actions of 
experts in this field, that some of the interviewees participated in my fieldwork or said 
certain things in order to keep their status as experts going.  
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However, I should not of course omit other motives, which may be considered more 
benign. Some of the individuals I interviewed wanted to make a difference and 
influence the direction of policy in a positive way. As I expound further in later 
chapters, there was a notable tension between what came to be referred to, 
employing the phrase of one my interviewees, ‘community’ and ‘elite’ approaches to 
counter-terrorism. It is undeniable, in the case of this particular interviewee, that he 
was motivated by wanting to implement the most effective solution to the problem of 
radicalisation whilst simultaneously avoid stigmatising and criminalising Muslims in 
Britain. That this came at significant personal cost to the individual was testament to 
the fact that some experts in this policy domain do genuinely have additional motives 
beyond utilitarian ones. For some, it is not just about, to paraphrase one interviewee, 
Prevent being ‘sexy’. It is also possible that many of the interviewees acquiesced to 
participate in my investigation in order to get, what they perceived to be, the right 
narrative ‘out there’.  Others perhaps, contrary to my point above regarding 
organisational/institutional constraints, use opportunities like academic research, 
where they can guarantee at least a more robust treatment of the data then, say, the 
media, to ‘set the record straight’. In short, there are diverse factors and motivations 
influencing the data I collated.    
Another factor shaping data output was the type and number of questions I asked 
during interviews. Being selective with the questions posed is important because it 
shapes the quality and type of data obtained and affects the way I would later 
answer the question I set myself.  I considered the questions before, during, and 
after interviews with the aid of a notebook. Revisions were normally made to either 
some of the questions asked or to the themes I should exclude or emphasise.  With 
regards to the pre-formulated questions, very early on in the process, even after the 
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first interview, I was compelled to re-examine some of the questions I had prepared, 
as well as the number of questions I could ask. I could not ask all the questions I 
wanted and some of the questions induced confused or quaint responses. I also had 
to make a judgment about what questions were fixed and those questions I would 
ask naturally as issues arose ad hoc during interviews.  
In addition, I was compelled to examine other themes surrounding de-radicalisation 
that arose during interviews which either directly impinged on de-radicalisation, like 
the role of experts in its formulation, or influence how we think about it at the 
periphery, e.g. Islamophobia. Wider themes like ‘narrative’ and ‘language’ became 
salient in a way I could not foresee before beginning fieldwork. It has forced me to 
think about how I should include it in this thesis.  Moreover, sometimes I could not 
follow up questions on important things that were said which could have opened 
other areas to explore. This was due to constantly having time constraints; some 
interviewers did not, because of their busy schedules, complete the designated hour. 
So I had to make judgments during the interview of what I should pursue, follow up, 
or ignore. In some cases I had to just press ahead with the questions I had 
formulated beforehand. This naturally shaped the data coming through, allowing 
even for some flexibility between each interview.  
Furthermore, and more counter-intuitively perhaps, the place and settings where 
interviews take place impacted the data. Interviews were conducted in different parts 
of the country- Manchester, Liverpool, Preston, Birmingham, Coventry, and across 
London- and in different settings- Universities, local cafes, libraries, and meeting 
rooms. During interviews I realised the importance setting had on the mood of the 
interviewee and quality of the data. For example, conducting an interview in the 
private office of an academic at a University usually resulted in quantifiably more 
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data and more conceptual discussions, whereas some of the interviews held in a 
loud cafe were shorter in length and were generally less conceptual.  This suggested 
that time and place were had an effect on the interview as well as the transcribing 
process. Ultimately, I became consciousness of that fact that meaning was a by-
product not merely of the words in the text, but the actual settings and context of 
interview, not to mention that relationship I had with the interviewer. 
Equally significant to the success of my fieldwork was that interviewees could ‘trust’ 
me. Trust is highly important in this policy domain because it determines whether 
you are granted access to the right people, as well as the quality and quantity of data 
obtained. In the hypothetical scenario of an absence of ‘trust’, a few people would 
acquiesce to be interviewed, and even if they did, I would not get very much from 
them.  
However, in PREVENT and counter-terrorism generally the lack of trust was real. 
There was a palpable feeling of distrust and suspicion.  I knew I would struggle to 
obtain quality data if others saw me as an industry ‘insider’ or become suspicious of 
my motives for undertaking research on these issues. I overcome this challenge by 
primarily arranging interviews through my networks and relationships. My supervisor, 
Jonathan Githens-Mazer, had fortunately put me in touch with a number of 
interviewees, who were in reality only granting me access as a result of my affiliation 
with Jonathan, who is a leading expert on radicalisation and someone who had 
cultivated relationships in the field over a number of years. A considerable number of 
other interviewees were secured through other contacts I had. Of the twenty seven 
interviews, I only managed to secure one without a contact in between and other 
individuals outside my networks and contacts were pursued without success. This 
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made me reflect on the significance of social networks and how it is tied up with 
knowledge and power in the formulation of policy. 
A potential consequence of conducting research this way was obtaining data by 
groups of experts who think similarly on particular themes and issues, resulting in a 
narrow sample of interpretations. This would affect the usefulness, reliability, and 
validity of my data. However, this potential outcome was mitigated by the sheer 
diversity of participants selected, who hailed from different sides of the political fence 
and who worked in the field of PREVENT in different capacities. The diversity of 
participants was important given many of the interviewees understand de-
radicalisation and events in this area through the prism of their work, discipline, and 
personal experiences. So PREVENT practitioners saw it more positively and in terms 
of caring for Muslims whilst some academic were more critical, which is normal given 
their profession.  
Finally, I believe that my being a PhD student with no affiliation to any organisation, 
bodies, or paid position, made me more trustful in the eyes of interviewees. I had 
disclosed such information in my interview information sheet I sent to potential 
interviewees. Participants would did not have to worry about the data being 
published in a sensational fashion or being used by competitors against them.  The 
trust between me and most interviewees was exemplified by the frank discussion 
during and after interviews, the way many of them were helpful with suggestions of 
the name of individuals I could interview after, and the quality of the data I obtained. 
In the end, in a policy area rife with suspicion, mistrust, and competition, I was able 
to secure the trust of participants in a way that yielded fruit for my investigation. 
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3.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter analysed and evaluated the result of data gathered from fieldwork 
conducted between November 2011 and May 2013. Section 3.1 outlined the 
methodology used to answer the question governing my research inquiry. The 
research was conducted employing the case study method, qualitative approaches 
to data gathering, the use of semi-structured questioning, and selecting targeted 
sample of 27 practitioners and experts. The section after presented the fieldwork 
data. The aim there was to explain how the themes and concepts were grouped and 
then represented into tables and graphs. Section 3.3 analyses the definition of de-
radicalisation and tries to understand the countless definitions illustrated in the data 
through the concept of Wittgenstein’s ‘language games’. Section 3.4 attempts to 
identify and assess the most salient aspects of the data with respect to the 
conceptual understanding of de-radicalisation amongst interviewees. Four 
interpretations of de-radicalisation were identified, which correspond to four separate 
policy domains. Section 3.5 assess the impact of multiple de-radicalisation concepts, 
which include the fact that the PREVENT concept of de-radicalisation suffered from 
conceptual confusion, policy confusion, and throws the valorisation of ideology into 
scrutiny in terms of its effects on counter-terrorism policy.  Section 3.6 deals with the 
evaluation of the data itself and argues for the reliability, validity, and usefulness of 
the data overall, not least its compatibility with theory. In the final section I undertake 
reflexivity in order to evaluate the research process and to identify some the factors 
involved in the production of knowledge.  Ultimately, in terms of contribution to 
knowledge, this chapter makes the case that the data represents the first of its kind 
on de-radicalisation in the UK context, as well as offering important insights into both 
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the ontological reality of de-radicalisation and the possibility of an alternative 
conceptual frame of engagement.    
Notwithstanding the greater inroads made into understanding the conceptual 
framework of de-radicalisation, the inductive method nevertheless does not entirely 
succeed in providing us with a coherent and cogent understanding of de-
radicalisation. The existence of countless definitions and multiple conceptual 
understandings does not allow us to analyse and describe de-radicalisation in a 
meaningful way.  Since this chapter has only focused on the conceptual framework 
of de-radicalisation, the remainder of the thesis will advanced an alternative 
framework of de-radicalisation using the rest of the data.  
However, an alternative conception will need to eschew the conceptual problems 
inherent in the PREVENT strategy’s conception of de-radicalisation. It must also try 
to overcome the limitations associated with cognitive/behaviour factors in 
conceptualisation of de-radicalisation, not to mention the predominant association of 
de-radicalisation solely with the objectives of counter-terrorism. Additionally, it has to 
offer a way of understanding the explicit contradictions in the policy logic of de-
radicalisation between pre-emptive and preventive orientations, the disjuncture 
between the ideas (ideology) and practice of de-radicalisation (renouncing violence), 
and the ostensible paradox of premeditated interventions targeting youngsters 
categorised as ‘vulnerable’. Consequently, I will present the rest of the data through 
the theoretical lens of the ‘technology of the self’. Reasons for this will become clear 
in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
An Alternative Concept and Theory: De-radicalisation as a 
‘Technologies of the Self’ 
 
“There is nothing greater on earth than I, the regulating finger of God”- thus the 
monster bellows. 
                                                                           (Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra) 
 
 
I don't think that we should consider the "modern state" as an entity which was 
developed above individuals, ignoring what they are and even their very existence, 
but, on the contrary, as a very sophisticated structure, in which individuals can be 
integrated, under one condition: that this individuality would be shaped in a new form 
and submitted to a set of very specific patterns.  
                                                                                                    (Foucault 1982, 783) 
 
What is de-radicalisation? According to data analyses in chapter 3 there are 28 ways 
of defining de-radicalisation and there are four conceptions of de-radicalisation: de-
radicalisation as renunciation of violence; as counter-ideology; as socialisation into 
the mainstream; and as youth empowerment. It is also associated with four different 
policy domains: counter-terrorism, counter-subversion, community cohesion, and 
crime prevention. The contested nature of de-radicalisation conceptually renders 
academic enquiry into the phenomenon extremely challenging. It also makes 
analysis of policy difficult-what are we analysing exactly? Not to mention the adverse 
effect on policy domains unrelated to terrorism. It results in the diminishing ability of 
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policymakers to counter terrorism effectively. Whilst the data has enriched our 
understanding on the salient features of de-radicalisation in the UK context, it 
nevertheless remains unable to bridge the gap between the idea and the practice of 
de-radicalisation, resolve a number of conceptual problems, and says very little 
about the wider context, beyond terrorism, surrounding the concept.  As a result, it is 
imperative that a new conceptual framework is formulated in order to make better 
sense of de-radicalisation in the UK context. Given the important role de-
radicalisation has for policymakers, the ongoing securitisation of Muslims identity, 
and the various challenges facing the UK, a coherent and operationally robust 
concept of de-radicalisation is vital and desired.    
Drawing on the works of Michel Foucault, this thesis will attempt to make the case 
that de-radicalisation should be seen as a ‘technologies of the self’. The rest of the 
thesis will henceforth analyse the data gathered from my fieldwork through the 
theoretical lens of the technology of the self. This alternative framework not only 
incorporates the conceptual features emanating from the data, but accommodates 
the wider context of de-radicalisation, reconciles many of the conceptual fissures 
evident in the literature, and provides a more accurate and coherent concept than 
provided by policymakers. This chapter outlines the co-ordinates of an alternative 
concept and theory of de-radicalisation.  
The first section is a detailed breakdown of the technology of the self. It tries to 
explain where it comes from, what it entails, and how it relates to de-radicalisation. 
The section after provides an additional context to the technology of the self by 
situating it within the theory of governmentality. The fourth section in the chapter 
examines a number of useful theories: the concept of the ‘central sphere’, the 
‘paradigm’, ‘normalisation’, the ‘political’, and ‘neo-liberalism’. It provides deeper 
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theoretical tools to understand how power works outside conventional juridical 
notions and situates contemporary debates within a different field of analysis. This 
chapter claims that de-radicalisation should be analysed through the technology of 
the self.  
4.1 The Technologies of the Self 
 
This section presents the case for conceptualising de-radicalisation as a technology 
of the self. The concept of the technology of the self was formulated by Michael 
Foucault in a series of seminars at the University of Vermont in 1982. As a context 
for the summary of his own work on the subject, Foucault proposes four major types 
of technologies, ‘each a matrix of practical reason’, that ‘human beings use to 
understand themselves’: (1) technologies of production, (2) technologies of sign 
systems, (3) technologies of power and (4) technologies of the self (Foucault 1988a: 
17).  Reflecting on his work, Foucault admits that he concentrated perhaps too much 
on the technology of domination and power in his earlier work and that he was more 
and more turning toward the study of the technology of self, “the interaction between 
oneself and others … the history of how an individual acts upon himself…” (Foucault 
1988a, 18). The ‘technologies of the self’ is defined as that:  
 
....which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a 
certain number of operations on their bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and the 
way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of 
happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality. 
                                                                                                     (Foucault 1988a, 18)  
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As a self-steering mechanism, the technologies of the self comprises of four critical 
dimensions (Foucault 1998, 26-28; 1997, 263-6; Dean 2010, 26-7): 
(1) Ontology: what is the part of oneself that is the object of thought and work? 
Foucault’s answer to this question is the ‘ethical substance’. In other words is 
one working on their thoughts, body, desire, or identity, etc.? For example, in 
Christian ethics one works on the flesh, whereas in Sports it is the body. 
  
(2) Ascetics: how does the self achieves the ethical goal? How is the ethical 
substance worked upon? This takes the form of exercises and techniques and 
other practices (confession, diary writing, group discussions, and the twelve 
steps programme of Alcoholics Anonymous). 
 
 
(3) Deontology: this relates to the question of ‘who’ we are when we are 
governed in such a way (e.g. active jobseekers in social programmes). ‘Is it as 
a member of a kin group or nation or religious tradition that one should 
observe them, or as an occupant of a particular social status?’ (Laidlaw 2014, 
103)  
 
(4) Teleology: this is concerned with ‘why’ we are governed and the ends 
sought.  What is the mode of being the subject aims to achieve? What codes 
of knowledge support these ideals, and to what ethical valorisation are they 
tied? (Salvation, money, beauty, etc.) (Rose 1996, 133) 
188 
 
 
These four dimensions notably constitute the ontological conditions and techniques 
involved in the formation of the self. The fourfold is deployed to interpret de-
radicalisation as a technology of the self as part of UK governmentality (more in the 
next section). For example, the conventional view of de-radicalisation see it as an 
attempt to tackle the ideology (Islamism) and cognitive dimension of “radicals” 
(ontology), through the practise of interventions, programmes, and pastoral 
techniques (ascetics), targeting general Muslim subjects and radicalised Muslim 
subjects in particular (De-ontology),  for the purposes of behaviour change, which 
means the abandonment of violence (Telos).   
 
However, although the four step breakdown accurately describes what the 
technologies of the self entails, in the context of de-radicalisation, the real difference 
concerns teleology, because the real goal is less about abandoning violence, but 
more the reconfiguration of citizenship and the production of politically approved 
subjectivity. Furthermore, this thesis offers a modification of Foucault’s concept of 
the technology of the self. Although his conception situated self fashioning as a form 
of freedom undertaken by individuals, I will use it more explicitly to conceptualise the 
focus of governmentality with the conduct of individual citizens. As I will elaborate 
further on, while it is true that governmentality also explains the governing of 
collective populations, I will demonstrate in this thesis that the concept of the 
technology of the self is appropriate in capturing the focus of de-radicalisation in the 
UK with individuals and not groups and networks. I also want to deploy it in an 
expansive sense to include the way that all individuals and not just radicalised 
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individuals fall under the preview of de-radicalisation. There is a sense that all 
citizens and subjects should scrutinise and hold their ideas in check in relation to 
Islamist thinking and practices (synonymous with religion, politics, and foreign 
policy).   
Borrowing therefore the ethical fourth-fold that constitute the process of self 
fashioning, I will present my fieldwork data through the domains of discursive 
technology (chapter 5), disciplinary technology (6), and confessional technology (7). 
Organising the chapters this way enables me to incorporate Foucault’s oeuvre over 
twenty-five years into my work: discursive technology, which corresponds to early 
Foucault, disciplinary technology with middle Foucault, and Confessional with 
middle-to-late Foucault. It also aligns the interconnected framework that shape 
governmental relations that characterise political rationality in the modern age with 
the ethical constitution of subjects.  For example, this form of government power 
entails the relationship between truth, power, and identity or it’s ‘episteme, techne, 
and it ethos’ (Dean 2010, 27).  This tripartite formulation corresponds to the ethical 
components outlined above: ontology (discourse), ascetics (discipline), and de-
ontology (confessional). Chapters 5, 6, and 7 deal with the three technologies 
involved in producing a particular Muslim subject in the UK. To elaborate further, 
these are: 
Discursive Technology (Truth): incorporates both the production of discourse and 
knowledge, which is about the objectification of objects, events, and people in order 
to manipulate and transform, as well as the construction of representation, which 
frames things through discourse. This technology codifies and produces the 
‘problem’ and makes it intelligible within structures of governance. As will be argued 
in chapter 5, the production of radicalisation constitutes the ‘Truth’ of de-
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radicalisation, which formulates the ontological dimension of self-government. Its 
findings are rendered malleable for concrete action in non-discursive domains 
(Foucault 1991; Miller, Peter and Rose 1990; Heath-Kelly 2013). 
 
 Disciplinary Technology (Power): refers to the way that institutions (Education, 
Health, Criminal & Justice, etc.) interventions (rehabilitative, preventative), 
programmes, and rationalities of government (Civil Society) work and operate 
together to create ‘docile subjects’. The discipline and control of populations is 
achieved through surveillance, judgement, and different forms of the ‘examination’. 
This is accomplished through the materialisation of systems of knowledge and 
normative frameworks known as ‘regimes of truth’, which subjects internalise. In the 
context of de-radicalisation, the Channel programme and the PREVENT strategy are 
used to inscribe ‘regimes of truth’ into the bodies of the population. This is analysed 
in chapter 6 and corresponds to the notion of ‘ascetics’ formulated above. 
 
Confessional Technology (Identity): refers to pastoralist practices in the 
governance of the population, which focuses on the body and soul of the individual, 
traced to Christian confessional practices, based on the relationship between experts 
and citizen, in order to acquire knowledge that feeds into discourses, as well as 
transform the subjectivity of individuals. Although the confessional can also be seen 
as a form of ‘ascetics’, this thesis conceives of the confessional as the deontological 
dimension of self formation because of the need to highlight the fact that the Muslim 
radicalised subjects has to see themselves as deviant/problematic, that an imposed 
identity has been constructed through the production of radicalisation, which has to 
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be rejected in favour of a more sanitised identity. Notions of ‘sin’, ‘speaking truth to 
power’, and ‘redemption’ characteristic of the confession do well to capture the fact 
that radicalised subject are compelled to view themselves as bad citizens, deviants 
with pathologies who are need of reform. This will be examined in chapter 7. 
An important addendum to the aforementioned theoretical lens that will be used to 
analyse the data in chapters 5-7 must be made. The first concerns how I intend to 
use the fieldwork data. Chapter 3 discussed some critical reflections regarding 
fieldwork data, much of which was critical of the data. In proceeding chapters, I am 
not using the data in a critical way. That is to say, I will not be examining the data or 
scrutinising the claims and assertions made by interviews. Instead I will be using the 
data in order to make an argument and prove that the comments of PREVENT 
practitioners are better understood in light of the chapter’s theoretical lens. The data 
was chosen in this way in order to maintain the thrust of the argument. 
Secondly, the way the data has been organised into sections and chapters follows a 
particular logic, no matter how arbitrary it may seem upon first glance. Admittedly, 
some of the data could be organised differently. Some sections in chapters 5 and 6 
can easily sit coherently in alternate chapters. For example, the section on 
‘supporting vulnerable people’ (a second pillar of PREVENT) in chapter 6 could also 
have been placed in chapter 7, which examines de-radicalisation interventions more 
directly.  However, I opted to have that section under Disciplinary Technology 
because it reinforces the way that anomalies, i.e. ‘radicals’/’extremists’ are examined 
and detected before being placed on a porgramme of ‘re-education’. It therefore 
dovetails the other dimension of de-radicalisation, beside concerns with the rooting 
out of individuals, who are ‘vulnerable’, namely the analysis of the management of 
society in modern state structures and how the identity of the mainstream and its 
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socialisation into a norm (more on this later) is achieved. A similar rigorous thought 
process has been applied to the arrangement of the rest of the data in chapters 5-7.  
 
I want to return to the point regarding the interconnectivity of these technologies and 
how they shape modern subjects. This is because these technologies above form 
the anonymous structures, networks of knowledge, social and cultural institutions 
that embody, as well as produce, structural environment of the subject. All those 
structures shape people’s life and set the rules or procedures to be followed; they 
‘determine conduct of individuals’ (Foucault 1988a, 17).  It is also important at this 
juncture to clarify what is meant by ‘technology’ in the mechanistic formulation of the 
‘technology of the self’. Nikolas Rose provides a comprehensive definition of 
Foucauldian understanding of technology as:      
    
....any assembly structure by a practical rationality governed by a more or less 
conscious goal. Human technologies are hybrid assemblages of knowledge, 
instruments, persons, systems of judgment, building and spaces, underpinned at the 
programmatic level by certain presuppositions about, and objectives for, human 
beings.  
                                                                                                    (Rose 1996, 131/132)  
In other words, ‘technologies’ encompasses all those things that go into shaping the 
self in our contemporary society. Technologies are always local and multiple and 
enable the implementation for corrective interventions in order to accomplish 
particular ends: 
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….our very experience of ourselves as certain persons- creatures of freedom, of 
liberty, of personal power, of self-realisation- is the outcome of a range of human 
technologies, technologies that takes modes of being human as their object.  
                                                                                                    (Rose 1996, 131/132)  
 
The technology of the self is compatible with the post-modern take on identity that 
conceives the self as emerging as a result of discourse and regular self-fashioning 
practices. Indeed, the post-modern concept of the self posits the self as emerging in 
response to linguistic practices and culturally available narrative forms (Hall and Du 
Gay 1996). It is a conception critical of the Enlightenment conception of an 
autonomous, rational, and disengaged self.  This is why despite Foucault’s constant 
interest in the theme of the subject he did not develop a theory of the subject. He 
refused to set up a theory of the subject for the reason that  
…beginning from the theory of the subject, you come to pose the question of 
knowing, for example, how such and such a form of knowledge was possible.  
                                                                                                     (Foucault 1987, 121)  
 
According to Foucault, setting an a priori theory of the subject implies an idea of a 
universal and timeless subject which attaches people to specific identities, a position 
he rejected. There is no autonomous transcendent subject which exists outside its 
context, but rather the subject should been seen as embedded within historical and 
social context. Stressing the point that the subject is not a substance but a form, 
Foucault noted that this form is not always identical to itself (Foucault 1987, 121). 
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The subject and the notion of identity is therefore not fixed, but is instead constantly 
modified.  
Notwithstanding the fluidity of identity or the fact that it is negotiable and no longer a 
given today, paradoxically one of the major drawbacks of the post-modern concept 
of the subject is the notion of a floating subject that can easily be made and re-made. 
After all, these accounts present the self as unfixed and ‘decentred’ (Hall 1996).  
However, the lack of permanence inherent in conceptions of the ‘decentred’ subject 
does not explain adequately the investment individuals make in taking up more 
secure identity positions. The attempt to soften the term, to acquit it of the charge of 
‘essentialism’ by stipulating that identities are constructed, fluid, and multiple- leaves 
us without a rationale for talking about ‘identities’ at all and ill equipped to examine 
the essentialist claims of contemporary identity politics. This is why theorists like 
Stuart Hall moved away from the notion of identity and preferred to speak about 
‘identification’ (Hall 1996, 16) or Judith Butler in terms of ‘performativity’ (2006). As 
Hall asserts, for Foucault the ‘decentring of the subject is not the destruction of the 
subject’ (Hall 1996, 27). Foucault’ account of the practices of subject self constitution 
in later seminars, ‘The uses of Pleasure’ (1998), and the ‘Care of the Self’ (1990) 
(more below) provides a more measured and nuanced place to talk about the 
‘subject’. 
The question of agency is important to consider here. The biggest criticism levelled 
at Foucault is that he denies the notion of interiority for the human subject and more 
importantly denies the role of human agency (Laidlaw 2014, 93; McNay 1994; 
Connolly 1985). In particular his account in Discipline and Punishment depicts the 
political subjugation of ‘docile bodies’ in the grip of disciplinary powers and the way 
the self is produced by processes of objectification, classification and normalisation 
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in the human sciences (Foucault 1991; Connolly 1985). The passive subject is the 
outcome of power effects, where ‘power produces the subject that becomes not a 
mere fiction of theory and law, but a real artefact’ (Connolly 1985, 371). 
Paradoxically the very analytical theory that situates the subject at the heart of its 
concerns is also the theory that does away with subjectivity. After all, one reading of 
Foucault’s work is that there is no subjectivity outside of discourse practices (McNay, 
1994, 104).  
Foucault himself regarded his ‘ethical turn’ as a continuation of his earlier work on 
the subject but approached from a different angle (Foucault 1998, 5-6). However the 
‘ethical turn’ entailed rethinking the concept of how power worked as well as how the 
subject was constituted. In his 1982 essay the ‘power and the subject’ Foucault 
affirms that power is only power when it addresses individuals who are free. Power is 
defined as: ‘action on others’ actions’: that is it presupposes rather than annuls their 
capacity as agents’ (Foucault 1982, 790). ‘Power’, he said, ‘exists only over free 
subjects and only insofar as they are free’ (Dreyfus and Rainbow 1983, 221).  He 
also proposed two meanings of the word ‘subject’:      
....subject to someone else by control and dependence; and tied to his own identity 
by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which 
subjugates and makes subject to.  
                                                                                                      (Foucault 1982, 781) 
Foucault also makes the distinction between the subject and the individual. The 
individual is transformed into the subject and the transformations take place as a 
result of outside events and actions undertaken by the individual. Indeed Foucault’s 
work on the technologies of the self includes analyses on the techniques of self-
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formation, ‘specific techniques that human beings use to understand themselves’ 
(Foucault 1988a, 18). By this point Foucault saw individuals ‘as self-determining 
agents capable of challenging and resisting the structures of domination in modern 
society’ (McNay 1992, 4). I thus read Foucault’s later works as an attempt to revise 
some of the overtly limiting space for the subject within the broad continuity of his 
oeuvre and not as an abrogation of his previous positions on power and the subject. 
Notwithstanding the possibility for agency, Foucault does not however set the 
subject free to do just anything. Foucault explained the change in his thinking on 
subjectivity:  
I would say that if now I am interested, in fact, in the way in which the subject 
constitutes himself in an active fashion, by the practices of self, these practices are 
nevertheless not something that the individual invents by himself. They are patterns 
that he finds in his culture and which are proposed, suggested and imposed on him 
by his culture, his society and his social group. 
                                                                                                     (Foucault 1997, 291) 
Subjects therefore take on different characteristics according to the range of cultural 
constraints that exist in a particular socio-historical context. Hence while Foucault 
does endow the subject with the possibility to actively constitute themselves or ‘act 
upon themselves’ (Foucault 1988a, 18), they are constrained by the resources 
available to them and not entirely free to act as they wish. Rose suggests that we 
understand the material concept of the self through Deleuze’s concept of the ‘fold’ 
(Rose 1996).  The fold is a critique of typical accounts of subjectivity - those that 
presume a simple interiority and exteriority (appearance and essence, or surface and 
depth) - for the fold announces that the inside is nothing more than a fold of the 
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outside. Another way of framing the position of the subject and the process of self-
formation is through the concepts of structure and agency. It is this small room for 
choice within wider relations of power that permits Foucault to employ ‘technology 
self’ rather than ‘technology of the subject’.  
In summation, the technologies of the self is thus a third-person material conception 
of self formation and not a first-person perspective centring on how the ‘I’ is shaped 
psychologically or through interiority. Instead, it examines subject formation through 
the three technologies outlined above- discursive (truth), disciplinary (power), and 
confessional (identity). It also situates self formation within institutions of 
government, intervention programmes, and governmental policy. In this way it 
incorporates the way that schools, universities, prisons, and governmental agencies 
play a role in the socialisation of individuals, as well as the relationship between 
discursive domains and state structures. Another benefit of the technology of the self 
is the recognition that knowledge and expertise play a critical role in guiding the lives 
of individuals, the important place of pastoral power in everyday life. Finally, the 
technology of the self accommodates the agency of the self within structures of 
power and thus offers a sensible take on the relationship between structure and 
agency. Ultimately, these relations are constructed and historical and are to be 
addressed from the perspective of government relations, which is addressed in the 
next section. 
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4.2 Governmentality and Bio-Politics  
 
As a technology of the self, de-radicalisation concerns itself with operating on the 
bodies, souls, thoughts, and conduct of individuals in order for those diagnosed as 
‘radical’/ ‘extremist’ to transform themselves. Importantly, the technology of the self is 
deployed in this thesis as a form of individuating power belonging to governmentality. 
A short definition of the term governmentality is captured by the phrase the ‘conduct 
of conduct’ (Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991, 2; Dean 2010, 17). Conduct refers 
the attempt by government to shape with some degree of deliberation aspects of our 
behavior according to particular sets of norms and for a variety of ends (Burchell, 
Gordon, and Miller 1991: 2; Dean 2010, 18). A more expansive definition of 
government as the ‘conduct of conduct’ is: 
Government is any more or less calculates and rational activity, undertaken by a 
multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms 
of knowledge, that seek to shape conduct by working through desires, aspirations, 
interests and beliefs of various actors, for definite but shifting ends and with a 
diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes.    
                                                                                                           (Dean 2010, 18) 
Governmentality therefore refers to political rationalities, or mentalities of rule, where 
rule becomes a matter of the calculated management of the affairs of each and of all 
in order to achieve certain desirable objectives (Rose 1996, 134). In his historical 
examination of governmental practice- the Greek City state power, Christian pastoral 
power, early modern European police and classical liberal state, and finally neo-
liberalism post world war two- Foucault found that all concerns of governmental 
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power was linked by a single theme- ‘Omnes et singulatim’ (all and each). In other 
words, Foucault saw in Western societies the tendency towards a form of political 
sovereignty which would be the government of all and each and whose concern 
would be at once to ‘totalise’ and to ‘individualise’ (Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991, 
3). Foucault found that the practice of government was characterised by the way it 
took freedom itself and the ‘soul of its citizens’ as a correlative objective of its own 
capacity (Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991, 5) and ‘to develop those elements 
constitutive of individuals’ lives in such a way that their development also fosters that 
of the strength of the state’ (McNay 1994, 121). 
Significantly, this understanding of governmental power shows the relationship 
between government and ethics. For example, government takes an interest in 
promoting lifestyles, knowledge’s, and mentalities that encourage the promotion of 
health and longevity for its citizens, such as stressing the importance of regulating 
diet and exercise. In similar fashion, in the context of de-radicalisation, individuals 
are expected to regulate and refashion their views and behaviours which are 
deemed ‘radical’ and ‘extremism’. It is important when discussing the relationship 
between practices of government and ethics to distinguish between the practices of 
the self from the practices of others by government. Whilst governmentality 
encompasses the notion of the government of self and others, the concept of the 
technologies of the self refers to the practice of the self. As explained in the previous 
section, this practice of the self within the sphere of governmental relations 
presupposes a freedom, which is critical to single out given that it provides a means 
for the resistance of norms of domination. Overall governmentality allows us to place 
the concern expressed by policymakers through the discursive production of 
radicalisation and the formulation of de-radicalisation as belonging to the sphere of 
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governmental activities, which is concerned with regulating the behaviour of  
individuals, and not merely as a policy designed to counter terrorism.  
Furthermore, the concept of ‘Bio-power’ provides an additional dimension to consider 
in making the case for de-radicalisation to be viewed as a technology of the self. Bio-
power elucidates the backdrop to how governmental practices became concerned 
with the life of individuals within its territory. Bio-politics signified the way that political 
rationality became concerned with the ‘power over life’ above the ‘right over death’. 
In the pre-modern world power was more appropriately characterised as ‘deduction’ 
and ‘subtraction’, or in terms of seizure: ‘in things, time, bodies, and ultimately life 
itself’ (Foucault 1998, 136). Foucault demonstrates that with time, the rise of 
industrialization, capitalism, and the growth of the ‘police’, this type of deductive 
power was superceded by a mechanism of power working to ‘incite, reinforce, 
control, monitor, optimize, and organize forced under it’ (136). Moreover, Foucault 
traces the development of two poles of power in the beginning of the seventeenth 
century, both of which come together by the nineteenth century: one of the poles 
centred on the body, the other the species body.  The first relates to the power of the 
body as machine:  
 
 …its disciplining, the optimization of its capacities, the extortion of its forces, the 
parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration into systems of 
efficient and economic controls, all this was ensured by the procedures of power that 
characterised the disciplines: an anatimo-politics of the human body.  
                                                                                                                              (139) 
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The second pole, concerned with the population, is 
 
…...imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological 
process: propagation, births and morality, the level of health, life expectancy and 
longevity…. 
 
                                                                                                                             (139) 
 
Both these poles were no longer characterised by the right to kill but by the power to 
‘invest life through and through’ (139).  In short, bio-power was thus concerned with 
the welfare of individuals as well as collective populations. It is in this sense that 
government rationality was characterized by the power of individuating, as well as its 
tendency for totalizing rationality.   
 
This transformation has considerable consequences: whereas before the classical 
period political rationality and power was exercised in defence of a sovereign over a 
territory, was couched in the language of juridical law, and belonged to the higher 
order of the heavens or the ethical/political community, bio-power  
 
….brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made 
knowledge/power an agent of transformation of human life . . . . Modem man is an 
animal whose politics places his existence in question.  
                                                                                                                              (143)   
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In essence, bio-power encapsulated the modern form of power and how it was 
directed towards humans as living beings. Moreover, following Foucault, Julien Reid 
(2006) illustrates powerfully how the process of bio-power is intertwined with the 
emergence of disciplinary societies, which became concerned with the 
transformation of human bodies. Reid calls this process ‘logistical life’ which he 
defined as:  
 
…...live lived under the duress of the command to be efficient, to communicate one’s 
purposes transparently in relation to others, to be positioned where one is required, 
to use time economically, to be able to move when and where one is told, and to be 
able to extol these capacities as the values for which one would willingly, if called up, 
kill and die for. 
                                                                                                                          (20) 
 
We see how ‘logistical life’ operates through the example of sexuality, in which 
‘individuals are supposed to discern their own fundamental nature as sexual beings 
and, on the basis of this self-knowledge, transform their lives’ (Gutting 2005, 96). In 
this example, sexuality operates as a tool for the infusion of bio-power into the social 
body.  
 
Through the deployment of sexuality bio power spread its net down to the smallest 
twitches of the body and the most minute stirrings of the soul . . . the body, 
knowledge, discourse and power – were brought into a common localization. 
  
                                                                               (Dreyfus and Rainbow 1983, 169)  
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The way that sex was used to intervene and shape the conduct of the population is 
analogous to the way that radicalisation in the UK context was deployed. With 
respect to the de-radicalisation in the UK therefore, bio-power situates radicalisation 
within the two ordering poles of disciplinary bodies (the individual) and the population 
(the collective), and explains how power works to shapes the subjectivity of 
individuals and wider population, through the technique of de-radicalisation. 
Ultimately, bio-power is a useful concept because it reconceptualises power as a 
positive and not merely a negative force, whilst also emphasising the way that 
government activity takes the life of humans as its main purpose, on the principle 
that enhancing human life strengthens the state.  
 
However there are critical differences between bio-power and governmentality. One 
such difference is the re-conceptualisation of power from objectivising power- a 
process that involves the transformation of individuals into objects or docile bodies- 
to viewing power as a subjectivising force (McNay 1994, 122). It is governmentality 
that affords space for the critical process of subjectification. Governmentality is the 
indirect manipulation of the mind and soul of individuals:  
…this form of power cannot be exercise without knowing the inside of people’s 
minds, without exploring their souls, without making them reveal their innermost 
secrets; it implies knowledge of the conscience and an ability to direct it. 
                                                                                 (Dreyfus and Rainbow 1983, 214) 
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Viewing de-radicalisation as a technique of governmentality concerned with shaping 
the conduct of individuals, allows us to understand why policymakers and PREVENT 
in the UK are preoccupied with what Muslims are thinking. Secondly, despite the 
negative conception of power as subjection, this power should not be understood as 
domination, as articulated in Discipline and Punish (1991) and History of Sexuality 
(1998). This is the second difference: ‘the process of subjectification through which 
individuals are regulated also provides the basis from which resistance to such 
government can be articulated’ (McNay 1994: 123). Overall it is governmentality 
rather than bio-power, despite the analytical uses conferred by bi-power, which 
provides the subject some autonomy to resist. This is important for our conception of 
the technology of the self in both the broad sense, encompassing individuals in 
everyday life and how they act upon themselves and occupy certain subject 
positions, and also simultaneously in the narrow sense, which strictly pertains to 
individuals undergoing different forms of interventions, particularly de-radicalisation.        
Governmentality accommodates the variety of techniques, strategies, and 
development of certain practices characterising the evolution of governmental power. 
It also enables power to be conceptualised as positive and not merely negative, and 
bottom up and multi-directional, instead of top-down and linear. It also embedded the 
relationship between knowledge, power, institutions and interventions, and the 
conduct of subjects in its conceptualisation of power. This is important because it 
moves us beyond analysing de-radicalisation merely as a response to terrorism, or 
to view discourses on radicalisation as an isolated knowledge domain disconnected 
from policy, or even that change in conduct is merely brought about by elites. By 
conceptualising de-radicalisation as a technology of the self within governmental 
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relations we understand the role that the multi-faceted dimensions of power played in 
executing de-radicalisation.   
 
4.3 Regulatory Norms: the Political and Neo-Liberalism as Paradigmatic Ideals
  
 
This section attempts to explain in greater detail the significance of the ‘background’ 
or normative ideals that regulate the behaviour of citizens and individuals in the UK. 
If governmentality is about the ‘conduct of conduct’ and the technology of the self is 
concerned with normalising individuals into a prescribed norm, it begs the question: 
what are these norms that citizens and subjects are encouraged to adopt? And how 
does this work? In order to explain this normative ideal, or what I later refer to as the 
‘central sphere’, I will draw on a number of concepts, which include Foucault’s notion 
of ‘normalisation’ and ‘neo-liberalism’, Thomas Kuhn’s ‘paradigm’, and Schmitt’s 
concepts of the ‘central sphere’ and ‘the political’. 
In order to explain the ‘background’ and begin situating the technology of the self as 
an individuating power of governmentality, it is useful to begin with the metaphor of 
the ‘paradigm’.  In ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’ (1970), Kuhn shows that 
scientific research operates by setting up a total interpretation of some region of 
reality. The ideal of ‘normal’ science is to show how the anomalies that emerge can 
be fitted into this total account. Kuhn calls such total interpretations and agreed upon 
science, ‘paradigms’ (43-63). Kuhn notes how ‘results gained in normal research are 
significant because they add to the scope and precision with which the paradigm can 
be applied’ (35-36).  The paradigm therefore works in a way to reinforce its own 
structure by perpetuating ‘normal science’ whilst simultaneously bringing anomalies 
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within its scope. In short, all the research conducted is codified, ordered, shaped, 
and transformed in order to fit the paradigm, for the good of both the anomaly and 
the paradigm itself. It is the paradigm which demarcates and defines what is 
considered ‘normal’ and what differentiates what constitutes ‘anomaly’. 
 
This metaphor of the ‘paradigm’ is also explained in terms of the ‘central spheres’ by 
Carl Schmitt (1929) in his paper ‘The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations’. 
Schmitt identifies four stages over four centuries in which the ‘European mind has 
moved’ and the ‘intellectual spheres’ which formed the centre of human existence- 
from the theological to the metaphysical sphere, and from there to the humanitarian-
moral and finally to the economic sphere (131).  According to Schmitt, Europeans 
sought a ‘neutral sphere’ at each of the four stages in which there would be no more 
conflict and where disputes can be settled (137).  Notably, a sphere becomes central 
when 
 
...the problems of other spheres are solved in terms of the central sphere-they are 
considered secondary problems, whose solution follows as a matter of course only if 
the problem of the central sphere are solved.  
                                                                                                                            (135) 
Schmitt illustrates how the ‘central sphere’ functions in his example of European 
technical progress during the nineteenth century and how ‘technicity’ (the religious 
belief in technology) was the central sphere that affected all ‘moral, political, social, 
and economic situation’ in the twentieth century (134). All these aspects were 
defined in relation to technical progress. Thus all concepts including:  
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God, freedom, progress, anthropological conceptions of human nature, the public 
domain, rationality and rationalization, and finally the concept of nature and culture 
itself derive their concrete historical content from the situation of the central sphere 
and can only be grasped therefrom.  
                                                                                                                            (136)   
Similarly, in the age of theology when religion was the central domain in Europe, the 
driving force of thinking and behavior was moral education and the ethical life and 
thus all domains were defined in relation to the paradigmatic morality. Progress in 
that context would be measured in reference to the Christian theological and moral 
ideal. The central sphere should thus be seen providing the distinctive locus of 
purposive action and thought for subjects in a given place and time.  What then, is 
the ‘central sphere’ defining the activities of government and society today?  There 
are of course a number of different perspectives on what actually constitutes the 
‘central sphere’ of our day. The social science literature for example have identified 
‘post-modernity’, ‘late modernity’, ‘globalisation’, ‘technology’, ‘secularism’, ‘global 
capitalism’, and the ‘nation-state’, amongst other, as central domains. In reality there 
are many ways of defining and understanding the structure or paradigm shaping the 
locus of our thoughts and actions today.   
In this thesis I will argue that the ‘central sphere’ that constitutes the regulatory ideal 
today is the nation-state. However, it is a take on the nation-state that comes with 
two caveats. The last section conveys that I have opted to use the concept of 
governmentality instead of the nation-state, albeit I sometime employ each 
interchangeably. The concept of governmentality offers a distinct analysis of power 
from the various theories of the nation- state. In fact Foucault deliberately defined his 
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concepts of governmentality in opposition to prevalent notions of the state by both 
Liberal and Marxist thinking. For Foucault, he avoided the state ‘in the sense that 
one abstains from an indigestible meal’ (Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991, 4). 
Liberals viewed the state as a problematic repository of power, in which the freedom 
and autonomy of the individual was embodied in civil society and pitted against it 
(McNay 1994, 118). This theory presented the state as unitary and as a result 
modern activities in government are deduced from essential properties of being a 
state. Foucault was more concerned with practice and transformation of state 
practice rather than structures of institutions (Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991, 4). 
Meanwhile, the Marxists viewed the state as playing a functional role in the service 
of capitalism and that power relations were located in certain sections of the 
populations. Such constructions of the state led for calls to denounce power as 
repressive and espouse notions about occupying the state in order to ameliorate 
excess. Instead of Liberal and Marxist notions, Foucault spoke of the 
‘governmentalisation of the state’ (McNay 1994, 18).   
Analytically therefore I employ the category of governmentality, however, the term 
‘nation-state’ will continue to be used in a more loose sense, perhaps tentatively and 
with reservations, to denote the constructed historical entity in which the state is the 
highest order in a territory able to make claims on a population. As explained in 
chapter 1, every ‘state’ needs to have ‘nation’ and it is useful to maintain the concept 
of the ‘nation’ because it not only underscores the fluidity, historical, and constructed 
nature of ‘nations’, but analytically continues to help us make sense of the issues at 
hand.  The three themes I have identified in chapter 1- the changing logic of security 
practice towards pre-emptive risk, questions of identity and belonging, and the 
relationship between the secular and religion in the European context- can only be 
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understood within the category of the ‘nation-state’. In other words governmentality 
has more explanatory power, whereas the category ‘nation-state’ has greater 
purchase on the imagination.    
Secondly, the nation-state is one of those social science terms that has become 
reified and taken for granted in terms of its complexity and historicity.28 There is also 
a tendency to view the state as single unified entity that is ahistorical and fixed. 
Instead of delineating further what I mean by the nation-state I want to elaborate 
further on two particular features of several constitutive dimensions of the nation-
state (see the last footnote) – (1) Sovereignty but focusing on the ontological 
conditions that make sovereignty possible, which I identify as the Schmittian 
‘Political’; and (2) the cultural-social feature of the nation-state ambit, which is being 
managed by neo-liberalism of governmental practice (not to be confused with neo-
liberalism as theory29). The focus on the two different features of the ontological state 
is not contradictory because both dimensions should be seen as complementary and 
two sides of the same coin. The difference between these two distinct theories 
should be seen mostly in terms of the function of perspective. I have chosen to focus 
                                                          
28
  Wael Hallaq (2013 23-36) identifies five form-properties possessed by the modern state: (1) Its 
constitution as a historical experience that is fairly specific; (2) its sovereignty and the metaphysics 
which it has given rise;(3) its legislative monopoly and the related feature of monopoly over so-called 
legitimate violence; (4) its bureaucratic machinery; and (5) its cultural-hegemonic engagement in the 
social order including the production of the national subject. Another take on the state is offered by 
Francis Fukuyama (2012, 469), who presents successful state development under contemporary 
conditions to comprises of (1) State Building (2) Rule of Law (3) Democracy (4) Economic Growth (5) 
Social Mobilisation and (6) Ideas/Legitimacy. Together, these dimensions represents everything 
needed to be a modern successful state, which is different from the prerequisite features required to 
form a functioning state, not to mention the fact, that very few States today are able to achieve a 
healthy balance between all dimensions. 
29
  Foucault (1997, 73-79) saw Liberalism less as a coherent doctrine or a politics pursing clear goals, 
but of a critique of governmental practice. Liberalism breaks with ‘reason of state’ in Nineteenth 
Century England, which had sought to strengthen the state, and framed the problem of government in 
terms of ‘too much’. Whilst there is no doubt that market reality and political economy as a theory 
played a role in Liberal critique, in reality the market sphere proved to be ‘testing ground’ where the 
excess of government could be stablished. In reality it was the question for regulation of government, 
through law rather than through the ‘wisdom or moderation of the governors’, that ushered in the birth 
of liberalism and not theory and doctrine. 
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on these two features because of the different features of the nation-state they help 
explain the background context shaping the discourse on radicalisation, PREVENT 
policy, and de-radicalisation initiatives.  
My understanding of ‘the Political’ derives from the work of Carl Schmitt (2007). 
Schmitt argued that whilst key domains can be defined by the relations of antithesis, 
such that in the realm of ‘morality the distinction is between good and evil, in 
aesthetics between beautiful and ugly, in economic profitable and unprofitable’, the 
Political was consequently defined as the friend-enemy distinction (26). The enemy 
is a stranger, the other, something different and alien (27). However, this self-other 
distinction did not apply to individuals or the private sphere but to collectivities and 
the public sphere. And the enmity that comes as a result of the friend-enemy 
distinction did not have to be real- it just had to be perceived as real. Driven by the 
bio-power logic of administrating life, the political is about political identity, what 
constitutes the ‘nation’, and what is considered the focal point for activities within the 
state and externally with other states. The intense antagonism defining the political is 
what makes the political meaningful, whereby men could ‘be required to sacrifice life, 
authorised to shed blood, and kill other human beings’ (35). It is only though the 
construction of an Other therefore that the self is formed and the ‘political’ exercised.  
 In this sense, the political precedes politics because it creates the conditions for 
politics. Mouffe distinguishes between the political and politics as that between the 
ontological, which is concerned with the way society is instituted and the ontic, which 
has to do with manifold practise of conventional politics (Mouffe 2005, 8-9).  As a 
result the political cannot be restricted to certain type of institutions or confused with 
or reduced to the state but must be ‘conceived as a dimension that is inherent to 
every human society and that determines our very ontological condition’ (3). Seen in 
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this light, there can be no juridical concepts of law, citizenship, or even the notion of 
the ‘social contract’ without the foundational grouping to which an entity belongs. The 
political community, held together by political identity, must therefore exclude in 
order to exist, must base its politics on the spirit of antagonism and not the 
elimination of conflict and strife through rational debate. The ‘political’ reaffirms the 
role of antagonism, conflict, and war as features of how societies are managed and 
how government operates.30 
The political creates the condition for the nation-state. The nation state exists for its 
own end following the development of what Foucault called the ‘reason of state’- a 
political rationality that emerged in the sixteenth century and is embodied in the 
‘Polizeiwissenschaft’, which is the rational concern for populations, the efficient 
management of resources, and the promotion and safeguarding the power of the 
state (Foucault 1997, 74). However, for Schmitt, ‘reason of state’ was analogous with 
metaphysics, the modern secular state constituting a temporalised God. Schmitt 
argued that as sovereign being, the states’ ‘decision has the quality of being 
something like a religious miracle: it has no reference except the fact that it is’ 
(Schmitt 1985, xiv). This was because ‘all significant concepts of the modern theory 
of the state are secularised theological concepts’, whereby ‘the omnipotent God 
became the omnipotent lawgiver’ (Schmitt 1985, 36). The state for Schmitt was the 
new God that made claims on its citizens. The citizen is an extension of the 
sovereign will and the ultimate manifestation of citizenship is sacrificing one’s life for 
the state (Hallaq 2013, 28). Since the ‘decision’ was analogous to an act of miracle, 
it is the ‘decision’, outside the constraints of rational deliberation, parliamentary 
                                                          
30 Foucault inverts Clausewitz’s assertion that ‘war is the extension of politics by other means’ so that 
‘politics is the extension of war’ by other means. By this Foucault meant that the logic of war is 
inscribed it in social institutions, in economic inequalities, in language, in the bodies themselves of 
each and every one of us’ (Foucault 1988b, 90 and 2004, 15-16).  
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systems, and juridical law, that actualises sovereignty. The real Sovereign of a state 
is he who rules by ‘exception’, who is able to make the decision that matter.  
 
Consequently, it is in the non-juridical space of the ‘exception’ that politics post 9-11 
must be situated. As mentioned in chapter 1, 9-11 effectively ushered in a 
securitised pre-emptive order; one which is future orientated, geared towards 
tackling potential risks, dangers, and threats, and which is characterised by 
mitigations in the present, through the execution of wars abroad, risk-management 
strategies domestically, ‘resilience’ in infrastructure, extensive architecture of 
surveillance, and use of new technologies. The political provides the pretext that 
legitimises the securitisation of many domains unrelated to security, like education 
and health. It is also in the name of the ‘omnipotent Law giver’ that the ‘exception’ 
has been normalised and extended. Not to mention, it is under the ordering principle 
of the political that redrawing of the political frontier between friend and enemy in the 
UK and the West developed. In the aftermath of the cold-war, the political situates 
Islam broadly as the enemy of the West and Muslims, as embodied subjects of the 
enemy, as problematic citizen. The political also expedites the formation of collective 
identity around liberal values, which is posited as the antithesis of Islam, the source 
of values for the enemy. In this sense, the political creates the conditions conducive 
for the production and adoption of neo-liberal values (more below). Given that 
citizenship is contingent on the Omnipotent Lawgiver, Muslim subjectivity (but not all, 
for then the political would cease to exist) has to be refashioned in the image of the 
new God- the nation-state.   
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Meanwhile, neo-liberalism must be analysed and understood in terms of an art of 
government and less as a political and philosophical idea (Foucault 1997, 74). The 
idea of liberalism begins with society as its end point, and not the state (75). 
Foucault stated that it was the existence of society that allowed the principle of ‘too 
much’ to be posited in relation to the rational justification for government. Thus in his 
readings of liberalism, Foucault found that ‘liberalism forms an auto-critique of 
governmental reason: a governmentality which develops and corrects itself through 
its own critique’ (Donzelot and Gordon 2008: 57). It is the modern Anglo-Saxon 
variant of liberalism, belonging to the Chicago school of the 1970’s that Foucault 
finds that the principle of market rationality being extended to non-economic domains 
like the family and penal policy (Foucault 1997, 79).  
 
Neoliberalism was striking because it not only blurred the lines between private and 
public, market and society, but it also deployed market rationality as a criteria to 
judge and shape other spheres of life. David Harvey (2005, 2) posits that 
neoliberalism is a theory drawn from political economy that proposes the idea that 
human well-being is best advanced through ‘private property rights, free markets… 
and free trade’. In this respect neo-liberalism refers to governmental practice 
associated with late-Capitalism, which prizes capital accumulation, efficient markets, 
and state interventions to ensure that markets are ‘free’; not least to privatise and 
reconfigure social relations and subjectivities along market lines; and a set of political 
doctrines championing the autonomy and freedom of individuals with the principles 
of equality and Human Rights. 
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Furthermore, neo-liberal governance is identified with ‘a political rationality which 
seeks to develop a congruence between the economic subject – the rational, utility 
maximising individual – and the responsible, self-sufficient, moral individual’ (Miller 
and Rose, 1990;  Rose 1999, 230-232). In essence liberal democratic societies seek 
the cultivate a citizenship able regulate itself thereby enabling political government to 
relinquish its responsibilities for providing security, health care, education and so on 
for its citizens. Hence the fact that the neo-liberalism framework drives the 
individual/citizen towards imbibing values like autonomy, freedom, and self-
realisation (Rose 1996, 145). Neo-liberalism as a practice of government that is 
concerned with imposing limits on itself consequently ‘acts at a distance’ upon the 
choices and values presented to citizens and tries to forge symmetry between the 
political values (consumption, profitability, efficiency etc.) and citizens’ lives. 
Contemporary government according to Rose thus operates through the ‘delicate 
and minute infiltration of the ambitions of regulation into the very interior of our 
existence and experience as subjects’ (Rose 1999, 10/11).  
 
Furthermore, for Dean neo-liberalism has a certain affinity to technologies of risk 
(Dean 2010, 194).  We see today the re-emergence of a prudentialism that 
emphasises the monitoring of risk by ‘active citizens’, which include ‘physical and 
mental ill health, of sexually acquired disease, of dependency (on drugs, alcohol, 
nicotine, welfare or in personal relationships), of being a victim of crime, of a lack of 
adequate resources in retirement, of their own and their children’s education, of low 
self–esteem and so on’ (194-195).  Ultimately neo-liberalism seeks to create self-
regulating, autonomous, and responsible citizens, who are governed by market and 
consumerist logic, who are de-politicised, and whose identity is alterable. 
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Equally important to consider is the fact that neo-liberalism and the political do not 
have a monopoly on values, regulatory ideals, and normative models that exist in 
society or which operate within a state. Whilst these form the background to which 
strategies, programmes, and techniques work against, other domains like the family, 
religion, philosophies, alternative lifestyles, social movements, political ideologies, 
different cultural practices, education, etc. also play a part in forming and constituting 
the subject. Indeed, it is crucial to stress the heterogeneity of the ideals or models of 
personhood deployed in different practices. There are so many understandings, life 
style choices, and different teleology’s of how the existence of human beings should 
be defined, promoted, and worked towards:  
..…manliness, femininity, honour, modesty, propriety, civility, discipline, distinction, 
efficiency. Harmony, fulfilment, virtue, pleasure- the list is as diverse and 
heterogeneous as it is interminable… 
                                                                                                          (Rose 1996, 130)  
 
The regulatory ideals differ too across places and time.  And it is also important to 
reiterate that whilst the political and neo-liberalism may form the central domain that 
defines other domains and presents the regulative ideal that citizens are expected to 
adopt and internalise and then embody, the paradigm nevertheless generates 
counter ideas and practices, accommodates inconsistencies and contradictions. And 
many still fail to realise Neo-liberal and mainstream ideals.  
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To reiterate, it is the job of the technologies of the self in our society to bring the 
diverse assemblages of knowledge, techniques, persons, experts, and practices to 
bear on individuals in order to reconcile the subjectivities of individuals with the 
paradigmatic value of the state and society. Another way to understand this process 
is through the power of ‘normalisation’. Notably, normalisation was Foucault’s way of 
explaining how power works outside the conventional ‘monarchical’ view of power in 
which there is the unified symbol of power in the form of the King, institutions like the 
army, and the effects of juridical power. Instead of top-down and singular, power in 
modern societies for Foucault was circular, multiple, and operated through new 
invisible and continuous practices of control.  Normalisation is a technique of power 
which   
imposes homogeneity; but it individualizes by making it possible to measure gaps, to 
determine levels, to fix specialties and to render the differences useful by fitting them 
one to another. 
                                                                                                     (Foucault 1991, 184)  
 
This concept refers to the standardisation of the human population, followed by 
differentiation. Human bodies are ranked and ordered in relation to each other and 
specialities fixed to each body.  Based on this grid, individuals are not judged by the 
right and wrong of their actions (e.g. the law) but by where their actions place them 
on a ranked scale that compares them to everyone else. It does this by making a 
totalising grid of ‘normality’, in which clinical assessment of all anomalies are made 
by the social institutions of the state; individuals are then either normalised or 
pathologised with respect to all aspects of their behaviour according to this grid of 
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normality. Corrective technologies are applied to those who deviate from the norm. 
Normalisation techniques, such as the technologies of discipline and confession are 
supposed to be an impartial way for ‘dealing with dangerous deviations’, but that 
ultimately, according to Paul Rainbow, the ‘end of government is the correct 
disposition of things- even when these things have to be invented so as to be well 
governed’ (Rainbow 1984, 21). What matters in the end in modern forms of 
government, is the ontological reality of power: the totalising all-encompassing 
ordering of things. It is in this sense that normalisation can be distinguished from 
concepts of socialisation, which Hubert Dreyfus explains eloquently: 
 
Normalization is, of course, more than socialization into norms. Socialization into 
norms is the universal way the understanding of being or power governs the actions 
of the members of any society. In the new arrangement which has emerged more 
and more clearly since the Classical Age, however, norms are progressively brought 
to bear on "all aspects of life" What makes normalization different (and dangerous) is 
that it seeks to cover all practices.       
                                                                                                              (Dreyfus1996)                                                                         
 
In this way de-radicalisation must be seen as a corrective technique of normalization 
operating to bring deviant individuals that fall outside the values and ideals of the 
central sphere into line and closer to these ideals. Notably, the underlying principle of 
de-radicalisation applies not only to individuals on intervention programmes but also 
to individuals in everyday life, in civil society, at home, within the family. Seen in this 
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light, de-radicalisation as a technology of self targets all citizens, and consequently 
blurs the lines between the ‘public-private’ dichotomies. The private is subject to the 
control of the public; all spheres of activity in essence belong to the public; that 
governmental practice is in the business of ‘governing the soul’ (Rose 1999). It is 
fruitful in fact to see the technologies of the self, and therefore de-radicalisation, as 
an inclusive mechanism as opposed to viewing it as a mechanism of exclusion and 
marginalization. It is nevertheless true that the before this drive too inclusivity can 
begin, power has to exclude and divide subject from others and within themselves. 
After the anomaly or deviant has been identified, objectified, represented as 
divergent and different, then the process of inclusion begins.  
4.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter endeavoured to outline an alternative framework for conceptualising de-
radicalisation. It has argued that de-radicalisation be viewed through the conceptual 
lens of the technology of the self. The first section laid down the coordinates of the 
technology of the self. This entailed a breakdown of the four dimensions of what the 
government of the self comprises of at an individual level (ontology, ascetics, 
deontology, and teleology) and the three broader technologies in terms of 
governmental relations of discursive, disciplinary, and confessional technology. The 
aforementioned technologies correspond to the tripartite formula: ‘Truth’, ‘Power’, 
and ‘Identity’. In addition, the first section defined the term ‘technology’ and what 
Foucault meant by the ‘self’ and the role of agency for the subject in conceptions of 
de-radicalisation. The section after situates the technology of the self within the 
theory of governmentality. This is important because it places subject formation at 
the heart of governmental activities. Through the concept of bi-power an attempt was 
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made to show how modern forms of power in practices of government focus both on 
the individual and the collective population simultaneously. It also significantly 
presents power as life giving force and not merely as a negative force of deduction 
and constraint on human freedom. It thus elucidates the preoccupation of 
government with the welfare of its citizens and the interest shown in government of 
the soul.  
The section after tries to situate the technology of the self within wider normative 
frameworks; if governmental practices constitute ‘the conduct of conduct’, then this 
‘conduct’ proceeds according to regulatory norms. Employing the concept of the 
‘paradigm’ and the ‘central sphere’, the argument was made that all human activities 
are defined by a norm or criterion and that deviations from the norms activate the 
techniques of ‘normalisation’. The ‘central spheres’ identified as defining the locus of 
activity in the UK was the nation-state, with a focus on two particular features of the 
nation state- the political, which triggers sovereignty and forms the self-other nexus 
that is a prerequisite for the formation of political community; and secondly neo-
liberalism as a practice of government, which represents the socio-cultural 
dimension of the nation-state, insofar as it manages society and seeks to forge 
symmetry between political objectives, economic exchange, and the norms and 
values citizens aspire to, as well as adopt. Hence the technologies of the self 
operate to bring individuals in life with these regulatory norms. Through the 
processes of governmentality, ‘difference’ is expedited by the process of 
normalisation, which is effectively a pervasive socialisation process of inclusion.  
The subsequent chapters will attempt to demonstrate that the technology of the self 
is the most fitting concept that describes and explains de-radicalisation in the UK 
context. As a concept, it sidesteps many of issues associated with the concept of de-
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radicalisation in the wider literature (chapter 2) and fieldwork data (chapter 3).  The 
technology of the self enables us to sidestep the definitional morass and overcome 
the positivist cognitive/behavioural distinction. It also allows us to connect the 
concept and ideas of radicalisation with the policy of de-radicalisation, thus bridging 
the gap between the idea and the practice of de-radicalisation.  More importantly, it 
situates de-radicalisation theoretically within governmental relations and not merely 
as an isolated policy measure.  
In this way, de-radicalisation is re-framed theoretically- it is no longer merely about 
the mitigation of terrorism but actually the shaping of subjectivity and the production 
of particular conducts amongst Muslims. This explains why policymakers are 
preoccupied with the ideas and practice of young Muslims, which makes more sense 
than claiming that the views of a twelve year old can be used to gauge the future 
likelihood of becoming a terrorist.  Viewing it as a technique of government also 
answers the various challenges posed about its pastoral dimensions, like the fact it 
targets the young, not to mention the non-juridical approach of de-radicalisation, e.g. 
its pre-emptive logic, which is a feature of how governmental practices seek to 
govern risk.  
Moreover, the concern with the ideas and practices of young Muslims echoes the 
themes expressed in chapter 1 regarding the problematisation of Muslim identity and 
the need to govern the future by intervening in the present, to redirect the ‘hearts and 
minds’ of young Muslims. Finally, analysing de-radicalisation as the technologies of 
the self enables us to account for the interplay between discursive domains, its 
actualisation through interventions and places of public institutions, and the 
internalisation of such norms and conducts through pastoral relationships and 
techniques. Ultimately, the concept of the technology of the self is the most apt and 
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robust framework for both capturing the reality of de-radicalisation in the UK, as well 
as re-framing it, by opening up spaces of discussion on pertinent issues to do with 
politics, power, and identity.  
Forthcoming chapters are concerned with substantiating de-radicalisation as a 
technology of the self.  Specifically these chapters elaborate the way government 
guides self formation of its citizens through discursive technology, which 
corresponds to ontology, disciplinary technology, which relates to ascetics, and 
confessional technology, which tallies with deontology. As a result, the prospective 
chapters will analyse the remainder of fieldwork data through the conceptual lens of 
the three technologies that are constitutive of the technology of the self. As 
previously explained, I will not be using the data in a critical fashion, but will instead 
deploy it to augment my argument, not least to help me paint my canvass. As you 
will see, de-radicalisation in the UK would not exist without a discourse on 
radicalisation, the disciplinary regimes of Prevent and Channel, and the pastoral 
practices of ‘experts’ and the confessional techniques for subjects. The task of the 
next three chapters is to make the case, supported by the data, that de-radicalisation 
is best conceptualised as a technology of the self.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Discursive Technology (Truth): the Production of Radicalisation 
 
Truth is not outside of power or itself lacking in power . . . . Truth is of this world; it is 
the product of multiple constraints. . . . Each society has its own regime of truth, its 
general politics of the truth . . . .  
                                                                                   (Foucault in Rainbow 1984, 73) 
 
Time was that ‘radical’ was a term of approval. A radical was on the side of progress, 
a radical ‘exhausted the limits of the possible’. And radicalisation meant being open 
to the world as a changing thing and engaging with others to leave the imprint of 
difference, of change. Above all, radical was associated with being on the Left, on 
the side of progress, a history that took humanity to a higher plane. 
                                                                                                                 (IRR 2012, 1) 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Crucially, chapter 2 highlighted that one of the chief omissions from the main corpus 
of the literature on de-radicalisation was the disconnection between the research on 
de-radicalisation and the discursive development of radicalisation since 2004. This in 
large part explains the divergent conceptions of de-radicalisation between Europe 
and the M.E and S.E.A found in the literature. In the UK, radicalisation was an object 
of study by government, academia, experts, the media, and the wider public. It is the 
concept of radicalisation therefore that undergoes a discursive explosion and not de-
radicalisation. It is the conceptual framework of radicalisation, which is deployed in 
PREVENT that shapes the underlying assumptions framing the conception of de-
radicalisation in UK. As demonstrated in chapter 3, the relationship between both 
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concepts was identified by 7 interviewees, about 26 % of participants, in their 
definition of de-radicalisation.  
This chapter analyses fieldwork data through the theoretical lens of discursive 
technology. As mentioned in chapters 3 and 4, I will not be critically examining the 
data but rather allowing the data to speak through the conceptual lens of ‘Discursive 
Technology’. Discursive technology is the first dimension of three constituting the 
technology of the self. Discursive technology is about the incitement to discourse in 
order to codify a phenomenon for the purposes of understanding it and rendering 
that knowledge amenable for action in governmental institutions and structures of 
governance. At the heart of discursive production is the coupling of 
knowledge/power. Power deploys knowledge with the help of the human sciences 
and a plethora of experts to represent objects through the claims of scientific 
methods and language. The role of discursive technology in the technology of the 
self is to construct ‘regimes of truth’ (Rainbow 1984, 74), which subjects are 
disciplined in reference to, and then subjected according to.  
The first section provides a contextual overview of the institutional and political 
factors shaping the advent of radicalisation post 2004. Section 5.2 addresses the 
notion of ‘problematisation’, which refers to the way Muslim populations became 
framed as problematic; whilst the section after analyses the role of expertise and 
knowledge in the production of radicalisation. The fourth section examines the 
ontological makeup of the process conception of radicalisation articulated in 
PREVENT, whilst the last section assess radicalisation as a body of knowledge. 
Overall, it will be shown that rather than reflect the reality of the phenomenon on the 
rea world accurately, ‘radicalisation’ is instead produced for the purposes of 
intervention and mitigation in structures of governance. 
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5.1 The Birth of Radicalisation  
 
Radicalisation did not exist before 2004. In fact the term radicalisation was seldom 
referred to in the press before 2001 and that the greatest increase in the usage of 
the term in the media was between 2005 and 2007 (Sedgwick 2010, 480). Indeed ‘as 
late as the early 2000’s, hardly any reference to radicalization could be found in the 
academic literature on terrorism and political violence’ (Neumann 2008, 3). The word 
‘radical’ has a number of meanings, one of which is the noun: ‘person who 
advocates thorough or complete political or social reform; a member of a political 
party or part of a party pursuing such aims’ (Oxford Dictionary). Or the adjective: 
‘characterised by departure from tradition; innovative or progressive’ (ibid). In 
modern times radicalism was primarily associated politically with the Left, the Civil 
Right Movements in the United States, Student ‘Social Revolutions’ of 1968, and the 
Feminist movement (Githens-Mazer 2010). Radicalism was also not merely the 
preserve of the Left, since it was also associated with former conservative Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher in the 1980’s. Being a ‘radical’ and ‘radicalism’ generally 
meant ‘change’ and ‘innovation’ in the political sphere and was on the whole 
regarded as a positive attribute, if not a celebrated feature of democratic societies. 
However, today the current understanding of ‘radical’ has become synonymous with 
fundamentalism, extremism, terrorism, Al-Qaeda, Islamism, and loosely applied in 
conjunction with Islam (Githens-Mazer 2010; Tahir Abbas 2005). How did the 
meaning of the term ‘radical’ change and how did the concept radicalisation come to 
signify the journey by Muslims towards terrorism?  This section traces the birth of 
radicalisation and its relationship to counter-terrorism policy. 
225 
 
The changing security environment post 9-11, coupled with the severity of the 
attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) brought a new urgency to understand 
terrorism. This shift in the understanding of terrorism is explained by Peter 
Neumann. 
 
Following the attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, however, it 
suddenly became very difficult to talk about the ‘roots if terrorism’, which some 
commentators claimed was an effort to excuse and justify the killing of innocent 
civilians. Even so, it seemed obvious (then) that some discussion about underlying 
factors that had given rise to this seemingly new phenomenon was urgent and 
necessary, and so experts and officials started referring to the idea of ‘radicalisation’ 
whenever they wanted to talk about ‘what goes on before the bomb goes off’. In the 
highly charged atmosphere following the September 11 attacks, it was though the 
notion of radicalisation that a discussion about the political, economic, social and 
psychological forces that underpin terrorism and political violence became possible 
gain. 
                                                                                                 (Neumann 2008, 4) 
 
The advent of radicalisation as a term and concept enabled policymakers, 
researchers, and the public to investigate the question of the ‘root-causes’ of 
terrorism. This was a welcomed development given the long neglected search for the 
causes of terrorism (Jackson et al. 2011). The Madrid attacks prompted the EU and 
its member states to break new ground in their approach to counterterrorism, 
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compelling them to delve into the mechanisms underpinning the recruitment of 
individuals into terrorism (Coolsaet 2010, 858). A number of policy documents 
expounding this new thinking in counter-terrorism were developed in 2004. For 
example, the ‘EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism’ was adopted in June 2004 
and by November 2004 the European Council adopted the ‘Communication on 
prevention, preparedness and response to terrorist attacks’ and the ‘Hague 
Programme’. These documents refer to the need of identifying factors that cause 
people to take a path of violence and terror (Change Institute 2008, 8).  
Following the 2004 Action Plan, the European Commission Communication 
published ‘terrorist recruitment; addressing the factors contributing to violent 
radicalisation’ in 2005, which presented the initial development of a long-term EU 
strategy for addressing the complex factors that contribute to radicalisation and 
recruitment to terrorist activities (Ibid). Following this Communication, the European 
Commission adopted the ‘EU strategy and Action Plan on Radicalisation and 
Recruitment’ in December 2005 (Ibid). In this document, the concept and term of 
radicalisation was first defined as: the ‘phenomenon of the people embracing 
opinions, views, and ideas which could lead to terrorism’ (CEC 2005, 2).  Despite 
Europe’s long history with various forms of terrorisms for over a century (NSC 2007, 
1; Jackson et al. 2011), the EU document merely referred to terrorism perpetrated by 
Al Qaeda. 
It was thus at the European level that preventive approaches to counter-terrorism 
were formulated. More significantly, this new focus on the ‘root cause’ of terrorism 
situated the problem of terrorism at a stage preceding it, what came to be known as 
‘radicalisation’. The term ‘radicalisation’, as well as a strategy geared towards 
preventing terrorism, was further buttressed into the architecture of EU counter-
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terrorism framework following the London attacks. The fact that the UK held the 
rotating presidency of the EU in the second half of 2005 enabled it to play a key role 
in shaping counter-terrorism at the EU level. It brought 
....order to the chaos and elaborated—mirroring the structure of its own recently 
adopted counterterrorism strategy—an overall European Union Counterterrorism 
Strategy, effectively streamlining the ad hoc measures into a single framework.  
                                                                                                     (Coolsaet 2010, 860) 
Meanwhile, the London bombings not only provided the political impetus to firmly 
anchor the concept of radicalisation in the EU counter-terrorism framework, not to 
mention at member state level for the UK, Netherlands, and Denmark in particular, 
but it also embedded ‘radicalisation’ with the ‘home-grown bomber’ theory (Ibid: 
869). This theory moved the focus away from the threat of international terrorism to 
domestic terrorism, emphasising the threat of violence posed by citizens of the 
Islamic faith. The narrative of the ‘enemy within’ represented a significant shift from 
the narrative accompanying the September 11 attacks, which stressed the 
international and foreign nature of the terrorist threat. The ‘home-grown bomber’ 
narrative had the effect of legitimising the move towards ‘softer’ approaches in 
counter-terrorism policy. In the UK, for example, the New Labour government made 
public the Home Office Counter-Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST) in 2006, which was 
accompanied by a new preventive approach to countering radicalisation, known as 
PREVENT. It is clear that the growing currency of the term and concept in this period 
was primarily linked to developments in the policy world.   
Following the London attacks in 2005, the then New Labour government set up 
working groups, called ‘Preventing Violent Extremism Together’ (2005), to 
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investigate the causes of radicalisation. In December 2006 the EC funded three 
related studies in order to further understand the subject of ‘violent radicalisation’: 
motivation and desisting factors for violent radicalisation; the beliefs, ideologies, and 
narratives of violent radicalisation, and the socio-economic factors contributing to 
violent radicalisation (Change Institute 2008, 8).  In the UK, in early 2007, a research 
project titled ‘The New Security Challenge’: Radicalisation and Violence- A critical 
Reassessment’ and funded by Foreign Office, the Arts and Humanities Research 
Council, and the Economic and Social Research Council, was set up, with a pot of 
£2.5 Million to examine and assess the causes of radicalisation (ESRC 2007, 4).  
The project incidentally was nearly aborted due to the fact that a number of 
researchers had expressed their concerns about the potential risks the project, 
particularly its connection to agencies interested in intelligence gathering on British 
Muslim communities (ESRC 2007, 8). According to an evaluation of the project, the 
legacy of the ‘false start’ and further issues led to the eventual disengagement of the 
FCO (Tilley, Bouhana, Braithwaite 2011, 1).  Notably, by 2011, the project had 
produced 3 books, 2 journal special issues, and more than 40 peer-reviewed journal 
articles (Ibid).The UK government and the EC were thus directly sponsoring and 
funding research on radicalisation. It was government and policy-makers in effect 
that stimulated the proliferation of radicalisation as a discourse, as well contributing 
to the legitimisation of it as an academic concept, which dovetailed strategies of 
counter-terrorism.  
 
Conceptually, radicalisation had undergone some revisions in the three PREVENT 
iterations between 2006 and 2011. In 2006, radicalisation was defined in the 
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PREVENT strategy as a ‘process whereby certain experiences and events in a 
person’s life cause them to become radicalised, to the extent of turning to violence’ 
(HO 2006, 9). In 2009 PREVENT II defined radicalisation as: ‘the process by which 
people come to support terrorism and violent extremism, and in some cases, then to 
join terrorist groups’ (HO 2009, 82). The term ‘violent extremism’ was added in the 
2009 version in order to resolve the ambiguity inherent in the 2006 definition, where 
‘the question of why and how the government should take an interest in thwarting 
radicalisation was left open’ (Edwards 2015, 55). The term ‘violent extremism’ was 
perceived as the link between the radicalisation process and the turn to violence, 
albeit it conflated the distinct problems of support for terrorism, ideology, and 
terrorism itself. However, the term ‘violent extremism’ was subsequently abandoned 
in the revised PREVENT strategy in 2011. Radicalisation became defined as ‘the 
process by which a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism 
leading to terrorism’ (HO 2011, 108).  
 
Meanwhile, the term ‘extremism’ was defined as ‘vocal or active opposition to 
fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty 
and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and belief’ (HO 2011, 107-8). 
Whilst this most recent formulation of radicalisation is more nuanced than it its 
previous articulation in 2009, it nevertheless leaves unresolved the question of how 
non-violent radicalism, e.g. ‘extremism’, leads to terrorism. Linked to this question is 
the question whether something that does not lead to violence, such as ‘extremism’, 
could be considered a threat (Sedgwick 2010, 484). Despite the growth of 
knowledge on radicalisation there still remains a legacy of confusion as to what 
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radicalisation actually is and what forms of radicalisation should be the focus of a 
counter-terrorism strategy (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010). 
 
Regardless however of the frequent revisions of the radicalisation as a concept, the 
various definitions articulated amongst policymakers, academics, and others, the 
explosion of discourse, the emergence of the counter-radicalisation industry, and 
three iterations of PREVENT, radicalisation still emerged as a term and concept with 
a distinct framework. Table 2 in the Appendix illustrates some examples of 
definitions of radicalisation (this is not exhaustive). Despite in some instances of 
differing conceptions of radicalisation, characterised primarily as disagreements 
concerning the relationship between radicalism and violence and between thought 
and action, some of the official definitions of radicalisation reveal some agreement: 
not all radicals are terrorist, the interchangeable use of radical and extremism, and 
that radicalism is a function of threat.  
Consequently, between 2006 and 2011 the framing of radicalisation acquired salient 
features. Radicalisation became a loosely defined conceptual framework constructed 
by government officials and the media, with the help of academics to understand the 
processes and causal factors which lead individuals to support extremist ideas or 
even to support or commit violence- or ‘what goes on before the bomb goes off’ 
(Neumann 2008, 4). The framework implied the existence of a spectrum of the 
archetypal ‘bad’ and ‘good’ Muslim at opposite ends, or integrated on one end, and 
‘religious extremist/ violent extremist’ on the other. Along this spectrum a process 
occurs which leads such individuals to support or in rare cases, commit acts of 
violence.  It is a process which the Home Office and the Foreign Office described as 
the ‘terrorist career path’ (HO/FO 2004, 15).  Radicalisation was shorthand for the 
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process in which ‘extremist’ ideas prevalent amongst Muslim communities might lead 
some individuals to undertake acts of violence. 
However, conceptually radicalisation remains a source of confusion. Despite the 
popularity of radicalisation as a term and concept, there is marked absence of a 
consensus with respect to its meaning. Sedgwick (2010) has shown that 
radicalisation is used a variety of contexts and in reference to different policy 
agendas: security, integration, foreign policy, and private Islamic agendas. 
Consequently, the line can be drawn in unusual places. In Moskelenko and 
McCauley definition, outlined in table 4 in the appendix, the line is placed between 
political activism and violence, whereas Githens-Mazer situates the line between 
apathy and political activism. Moskelenko and McCauley’s definition therefore 
situates political activity within the process towards terrorism, whereas radicalisation 
for Githens-Mazer is the transition towards action and not violence.  
Another poignant example of where the line can be placed in unusual places is 
gleamed from Denmark, where a Dutch newspaper remarked that since Danish 
culture is not religious, that ‘reducing Muslim’s religiosity is therefore a triumph for 
integration’ (2010, 490). Sedgwick notes that on this basis that the normal practice of 
Islam may be classified as ‘radical’. This expansive understanding of radicalisation is 
the by-product of the fact that radicalisation conceptually was intertwined with issues 
of integration, social policy, multiculturalism and the representation of minority 
groups (Coolsaet 2010, 870).  
By 2010, despite the political, financial, and emotional capital invested in the 
construction of radicalisation and the question about root-causes, there was no 
evidence supporting the transition of ‘radicalised’ groups and individuals to violence 
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(Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010). However the outcome of the multiple discourses on 
radicalisation, in a plethora of spaces- politics, the media, academia, various public 
institutions, society, etc. was the concept and body of knowledge on radicalisation.  
This section traced the explosion of discourse on radicalisation, as well as the 
spaces in which they were expressed. It has argued that in response to the changing 
security and political environment, EU and UK policymakers were the prime catalyst 
behind the development of radicalisation as a concept. Radicalisation was the 
vehicle by which policymakers and the media acquiesced made sense of the 
‘problems’ represented by its Muslim population. Its trajectory as an analytical 
category has been mired by contention. Rather than a scholarly and academic 
attempt at understanding the phenomenon of terrorism, the radicalisation discourse 
became circumscribed by the demands of counter-terrorism policy.  
 
5.2 The Construction of Threat Narratives   
 
The data indicates the existence of several narratives about problematic Muslim 
identities, which can be simplified into two main narratives: the security threat posed 
by individuals in the British Muslim communities on the hand and the inability of 
British Muslims to ‘integrate’ on the other. Both narratives were accompanied by sub-
narratives: there were at least three narratives in the security context (Al-Qaeda, new 
terrorism and home grown bomber)31 and two with respect to the integration agenda 
(Muslims inability to integrate because of their religion and political multiculturalism 
                                                          
31
 Croft and Cerwyn (2010) identify four threat narratives in the aftermath of 9/11; (1) Al-Qaeda as a 
central organisation conducting hostile operations; (2) Decentralised networks working strategically in 
common but uniquely tactically in disparate areas; (3)‘Home-grown bombers’, where radicalised 
young people in Britain are drawn to terrorism by ideology or the internet; (4)  apocalyptic threat, with 
a focus on the perceived determination of the ‘new terrorism’ to inflict extraordinary damage through 
the use of weapons of mass destruction (823). 
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as the problem). These narratives framed the Muslim population as problematic and 
constituted the bedrock of the development of radicalisation as a concept. 
 
According to Roselle, Miskimmon, and O’ Loughlin (2014) narratives ‘explain the world and 
set constraints on the imaginable and actionable, and shape perceived interests’…. 
Narratives can be a power resource setting out what characterizes any state in the world, or 
how the world works’ (76). They also identify three levels in order to understand how 
narratives operates as a ‘soft power’ (Ibid): (1) International system Narratives, which 
describes how the world is structured, who the players are, and how it works; (2) National 
Narratives, that set out the story of the nation state and what values and goals it has; and (3) 
Issue Narratives, which set out why a policy is needed and desirable, and how it will be 
successfully implemented or accomplished. All three levels are at play in the radicalisation 
discourse. The narratives in this section set the context for the PREVENT policy. 
The ‘War on Terror’ problematised the threat of violence and terrorism posed by Al-
Qaeda inspired groups, stressing the religious dimensions and ‘exceptional’ nature 
of religiously inspired terrorism. One interviewee frames it in the following way: 
 
...9/11 makes us feel incredibly threatened, nuclear weapons, and all the rest of it- 
we are going to be destroyed. And then the next level comes, which is of course the 
‘home grown’ threat; because for a period of time post 9/11 it’s about foreigners 
coming to do something to do things to us. In the period up to and not just from the 
London bombings there’s the increasing concern about the ‘home-grown’..... So what 
does it mean to say there’s a home grown threat if you want to use this kind of 
language? It means people must go from being us to them. The foreigners were 
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never us but they’re gone. You’ve got to describe this road from being mainstream to 
radical and that is the label given to radicalisation.  
                                                                    (Interview 6, Academic/Director of NSC) 
                                                                                                                                                
The ‘home-grown bomber’ narrative emerged after the attacks on 7/7 and moved the 
focus away from international terrorism to the threat of violence posed by domestic 
militancy (ESRC 2007; Croft and Cerwyn 2010, Githens-Mazer and Lambert 2010b). 
The former Secretary General of the MCB explains: 
 
Well 9-11 was done, although there are no absolute proofs, by Muslims; 7/7 was 
done by Muslims and there were the Madrid bombings in 2004, which was done by 
Muslims. That meant that here is a community that is producing terrorists, then what 
is it doing that it is producing these sorts of people? Then there must a problem in 
this community. Then if there’s a problem with the community there must be a 
problem with Islam, although none of this was evidence based. 
                                                                           (Interview 14, former SG of MCB) 
 
Both statements below, the first by former chairman of the Muslim Safety Forum and 
second by Director of the Cordoba foundation mention the impact of the new-
terrorism thinking in practical terms. 
We’ve always said to the police and the government we want to stop the crime. The 
police said the problem with this kind of terrorism is with the Irish it was okay to stop 
them at the last act but with this kind of terrorism-the police call it international 
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terrorism- with international terrorism it’s not the same thing, we have to stop them a 
few stages before the last act and the reason is because they would do suicide 
bombing whereas the Irish never did suicide bombing. 
                                                                      (Interview 18, former chairman of MSF) 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
The term terrorism in its modern mode I argued in my thesis was maybe first 
cemented by Netanyahu in 1996 in which he first brought to light the danger of 
Islamic based terrorism as a new threat to Western way of life. That was adopted 
after 9/11 as a result of the attacks and it became a part of the language.                                                                                                 
 
                                                         (Interview 27, Director of Cordoba Foundation) 
 
The second major threat narrative pertains to the problem of integration and identity 
posed by the Muslim population in the UK. Interviewee data suggests that this major 
narrative about integration and identity is characterised by two sub-narratives: the 
first places the problems of integration on Islamic beliefs and practices, whilst the 
second locates the problem with political multiculturalism. The overall narrative 
encompassing these two sub-narratives however frames the UK Muslim population 
as an obstacle to the wider political project of a cohesive single British identity. The 
following respondent summarises the underlying message of this narrative.  
 
This notion that we are of a particular identity and this identity is how we succeed 
and solve our problems and that any other element is alien to our main structure, is a 
cost, a burden, and possibly a threat- that is what is emerging from the narrative and 
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is being perpetuated by policy. The remit is to find this harmonious society that looks 
at one. 
                                                             (Interview 27, Director of Cordoba Foundation) 
 
This focus on identity became not only a feature of the conceptual framework of 
radicalisation, but the overall ‘integration’ agenda, suturing such narratives, was also 
the locus of the Home Office’s response to the London bombings (Blair 2005). This 
interviewee situates the problem of Muslim communities within the integration 
narrative.  
 
It’s related to extremism and integration because what was clear was that there was 
a lack of integration by certain Muslim groups in Britain. The Salafis, some of the 
Brotherhood groups, Hizb-el-Tahrir, basically preached in this country for many 
years that a good Muslim cannot integrate and be a loyal citizen of this country; 
cannot serve in the military or the police because that’s allegiance to a Kufr system 
or man-made laws. So a lot of these Islamist ideas are holding back Muslims in this 
country and also it kinds of builds up rage with an over emphasis on foreign policy.  
 
                                                                    (Interview 25, Quilliam senior researcher) 
                                                                                                                                    
 
This interviewee highlights the first sub-narratives- the inability of Muslims to 
integrate and adopt British values.  According to this sub-narrative, the problem 
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resides in the incompatibility of the ideas and practices of the Muslim population with 
mainstream political, cultural, and social spaces. Similarly to the security threat 
narratives in which there is a marked absence of a consensus on the nature of the 
threat, there are several narratives depicting Muslims as the foreign and problematic 
‘Other’. Another academic describes the absence of socio-economic factors in 
discussions about the challenges facing Muslims. Instead the discourse on Muslims 
is characterised by reductionist accounts that employ an essentialised reading of 
Islam. This tendency to speak about Islam in a monolithic way is highlighted by 
interviewees below. 
 
If you look at deprivation it’s about socio-economic status and not about your 
religion, identity, or ethnicity. We use all of this to problemitise the Muslim 
communities and in all those spaces we use Islam as the explanation for that. 
Muslim communities that are isolated, well, it’s because they are Muslims and their 
Islam tells them that......It’s this constant problematisation of Muslims and Islam that 
has been accepted in all the different arenas of the British spaces that reinforces this 
problem.....  
                                                                                            (Interview 11, Academic) 
 
If a Muslim does a bad thing it becomes racialised or Islamised- if I’m allowed to use 
this word. But if a similar kind of crime is done by other communities, then it remains 
an issue of individuals. The Eurabia and Londonistan theories are becoming more 
mainstream in European countries.  
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                                                                              (Interview 14, former SC of MCB) 
 
However, the second sub-narrative is defined by the ‘death of multiculturalism’ 
debate. This narrative situates discussions about radicalisation, extremism, and 
problems posed by Muslims within wider attempts of policymakers to renegotiate 
Britain’s political policy of managing diversity and immigration. An academic 
specialising on community approaches to counter-terrorism elucidates below. 
 
I think it’s about structural issues with how minorities are viewed in the UK and again 
it goes back to the colonial mentality of there are problematic subjects and you have 
to treat them in silos as problematic communities and you deal with them like that 
and it’s always about integrating minorities into a majority or people who are 
abnormal into an normative thing- that’s a broad framework for operating..... That 
was the immediate go to problem, it’s all about integration and immigration, which is 
a constant theme since post-war migration and that lazy thinking, has made it into 
CT arena.   
                                                                      (Interview 12, Academic/practitioner) 
                                                                                                                              
The growing call by media commentators, the think-tanks, and official statements by 
politicians, to move away from political multiculturalism were exacerbated with the 
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London attacks in 2005.  An academic working on Islamophobia explains ‘death of 
multiculturalism’ discourse and its link to British values. 
 
So what you saw for a year or two years after 7/7 the discourse of radicalisation 
emerged and with it went hand in hand the death of multiculturalism. Because the 
politicians have allowed the community, and this is the mindset- ‘allowed’- to be 
themselves, to develop, grow, and have their own identities, because 
multiculturalism requires us to respect difference without making a difference the 
argument went that because we allowed them to do that, we’ve also created this 
problem where within those communities they can “hate us” and want to destroy us. 
........The argument was multiculturalism needs to die; it needs to come to an end so 
it gets to a stage when everybody can buy into Britishness, British values, and so on.    
                                                                                              (Interview 11, Academic) 
 
More importantly, a return to a singular mainstream identity highlights the way the 
logic of counter-terrorism became intertwined with the notion of identity. This was 
reflected in David Cameron’s Speech in 2011 at a security conference in Munich in 
which he made a link between integration, multiculturalism, and security. 
 
You saw that with David Cameron’s speech in Munich, where he started talking 
about that if you got a lack of integrated young men then you’ve got a terrorism 
problem. They’re conflating two separate things and drawing the wrong conclusions; 
you can look at Aunty down the road who doesn’t speak a word of English, she’s not 
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blowing things up. Well I mean, my sister, a Muslim convert with generations of 
forefathers in Scotland- you couldn’t really describe her as not integrated?  
                                                                        (Interview 12, Academic/practitioner) 
                                                                                                                            
Despite the powerful effect of these various narratives about the Muslim threat, these 
narratives are not objective but are constructed. In other words these narratives are 
not based on “objective facts”. Academic and Director of the New Security Challenge 
Research explains: 
 
So basically what I’ve argued is that it’s a set of constructed narratives; there isn’t an 
objective way of rooting these sorts of things and because they are a set of 
narratives, it’s always emotional, it’s always moving, and there are a set of political 
projects that are trying to shape it in particular ways.  
                                                                 (Interview 6, Academic/Director of NSC)   
                                                                                                                                          
Connected to the construction of the threat, some interviewees believed that the 
threat of Islam and Muslims were over-exaggerated. The interviewee below 
highlights a critical point. He points to the disproportionate ‘funding, attention, and 
discourse’ invested in radicalisation by policymakers for political expediency in a way 
that does not reflect the reality of the threat. The very small likelihood of attacks 
against the UK indicates the huge disjuncture between the reality of the threat and 
the social perceptions of this threat. This was reflected in the comments of the 
following academic:   
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The point I want to make is that the proportions dedicated to extremism and 
radicalisation is much higher than the reality is. I have spoken to hundreds of 
Muslims all over the UK and I can tell you they are more bothered about football, 
relationships, and Ex-Factor, like other citizens are, and what we need to accept that 
if a Muslim is against foreign policy, which many Muslims are, it doesn’t make them 
an extremist or likely to commit terrorism. Those people that are likely to commit a 
terrorist act are a small number of people but the amount of funding, attention, and 
discourse, is much higher than it needs to be and I think it’s a fundamental political 
tactic, which anyone who studies politics knows, that if you want to generate support 
from the mainstream population the best way to do that is to create the problem and 
to show that you are tackling it effectively. 
                                                                                             (Interview 20, Academic) 
                                                                                                                                  
 
This section has shown the significant role that threat narratives played in the 
construction of the Muslim problem for interviewees. Overall, there were two major 
narratives produced- the security threat and the problem of integration- with a 
number of other concurrent sub-narratives also peddled. These narratives produced 
the problematisation of the Muslim presence in UK, which becomes embedded in 
policy documents, and become a feature in the construction of radicalisation, which 
will become evident in this chapter.  
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5.3 The Contested Boundaries of Expertise and Knowledge 
 
Chapter 3 highlighted the fact that 13 interviewees, roughly 48% of the sample, 
referred to the importance of experts in the formulation of de-radicalisation. Similarly, 
the data indicates that the formulation of radicalisation as a body of knowledge was 
not the result of organic academic enquiry but was instead constructed and 
developed by a diversity of ‘experts’- academics, media ‘experts’, and think-tanks. 
Moreover, the data shows that the expertise in the policy domain of counter-terrorism 
is contentious, with many interviewees critical of the notion of the ‘expert’. It also 
indicates the importance conferred on particular modes of knowledge and the 
competition amongst experts. This section attempts to elucidate the significance of 
expertise and knowledge in the explosion of discursive production.  
The data points to the existence of a multitude of ‘experts’ involved in the production 
of radicalisation, drawn from diverse and seemingly disassociated fields: probation 
officers, managers, public servants, academics, and social worker, mentors, 
therapists, and PREVENT Police officers, amongst others. However, many 
respondents were critical of the notion of the ‘expert’ in counter-terrorism.  
 
I think the expert circuit is very much a politicised circuit because experts that talk to 
government are selected because they say to government what they would like them 
to hear or think they like what they are going to say. Experts who go on the media 
again have....if you look at simple qualitative assessment of the terrorism literature, 
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which has been done now, basically demonstrates that the literature overwhelmingly 
excludes the role of the state in directly or indirectly cultivating terrorist practices.                  
                                                                        (Interview 10, Investigative Journalist) 
                                                                                                                                       
According to the interview above the expert circuit is ‘politicised’; it is characterised 
by the selection of certain experts, a media presence, and the absence of critique of 
state power. In other words, experts in this policy domain are seen as individuals 
who legitimise the government’s narrative and policy. This presents a pejorative view 
of experts, which questions the objectivity and the knowledge produced by some 
experts. Indeed some of the data thus suggests that ‘expertise’ in the field of 
terrorism studies and policy domain is constructed in the interstitial spaces between 
the state, media, and academia. The interviewee below brings to light the business 
demands of the media for ‘explanations’ and how this compels them to find ‘experts’. 
Also intrinsic in his response is the notion that discourse emanate from ‘elites’ and 
how it flows down to institutions in order to convert into action, one of the institutions 
being the media.  
 
When ‘that’ elite had a shared discourse that there was this big new radical threat to 
the United Kingdom, it created the consequences that flowed through each of those 
institutions. When it flowed through the media it created the demand; the demand for 
expertise-who are the people who can come and create some explanations and 
understanding? Actually it’s normally some commentary to fill a bit of a newspaper or 
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fill a few seconds on radio. And you know, it’s a capitalist society, when you create 
demands you get supply.  
                                                                   (Interview 6, Academic/Director of NSC)   
                                                                                                                                            
This respondent raises important points regarding the fact that a shared discourse 
come from elites and the business needs to fill media headlines, couched in terms of 
the language of economics- ‘supply and demand’. This view of the relationship 
between experts and the media is supported by the interview below.  
 
But I would say on the whole terror experts are on the right and the press are 
naturally attracted to them for that reason. They usually say a lot of crap and the 
press rely on that crap in order to run their own stories and that their papers have 
stories on terrorism on them so that they can sell papers, creates hysteria, gets 
people clicking onto websites and a bit of panic doesn’t harm either.   
                                                                              (Interview 19, Academic/Activist) 
 
 
The implication of such a close relationship between experts, government, and the 
media undermines the notion of genuine knowledge on terrorism and radicalisation.32 
                                                          
32 For Awan, Hoskins, and O’Loughlin ‘radicalisation’ has been ‘incubated in the cracks’ of the new 
media ecology (2012, 6). The new media ecology is characterised by a set of somewhat paradoxical 
conditions of ‘effects without causes’ and profound connectivity through which places, events, people 
and their actions and inactions, seem increasingly connected (5). 
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A community worker from an organisation known as Muslim Safety Forum explains 
how PREVENT work created a space for ‘expertise’ and created work for people 
who did not necessarily have the knowledge and expertise. 
 
I don’t know what I’m talking about but I still want money. I’ve seen quite a few so-
called experts who don’t know a thing about a thing…. Okay, you can be called an 
expert only because you’ve been in the area longer than anybody else and there’s a 
niche, there’s nobody here, there’s a gap for the Muslim community, certainly. If you 
then put so called experts and people around Prevent, Prevent officers and all that, 
it’s only because there’s nobody else. Put them next to an expert in another field, 
they will fall down quite drastically.  
                                                                       (Interview 13, former vice-chair of MSF) 
 
This respondent highlights the poor knowledge base of some experts and the real 
motive for many experts: money. Other interviewees mentioned the low level entry 
requirement for experts in this policy domain and the financial imperatives 
underpinning the work of many experts. Indeed there are clear instances of 
academics, organisations, and individuals with no prior experience in this field 
moving into the policy domain in order to contribute to it. The ability of some experts 
to capitalise on the opportunities generated from funding and work in this area was 
discussed below. 
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Anthony Glees is a great example of someone whose entire career was completely 
in a different area of expertise and was able to move into this field. People are pulled 
in because they are the talking heads. So I think it’s about the setting of a discursive 
frame amongst ‘that’ London elite and the consequences of that flowing down those 
various institutional channels and when it is the media the editors want to have 
coverage on these topics and as I said demand creates supply. And some people 
made a lot of money out of it.  
                                                                    (Interview 6, Academic/Director of NSC)   
 
                                                                                                                                    
This respondent frames some experts as ‘talking heads’ and explains the role of 
supply and demand. As a result, the data shows that the boundary of legitimate 
expertise and illegitimate expertise is fluid. This has hitherto been attributed to the 
fact that the state anoints experts, the role of the media, and the competition for 
money, jobs, and prestige in a capitalist system. However, a few interviewees have 
expressed the view that research on radicalisation and the PREVENT strategy as a 
policy has morphed into an industry.    
You know there are many people out there looking for money and a job. I know 
think-tanks who have sought money from government sources and what is 
interesting is how they’ve tailored their approach and outputs to suit what 
government will like….. There’s a lot of insincerity in the expert industry; they are not 
talking based on research, evidence, and passionate belief but instead for money 
and status. If you go on the news or are mentioned in a policy paper then that’s 
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something to be proud off and it’s also an opportunity for you to get funding for your 
organisation to conduct research and keep yourself alive.  
                                                                                          (Interview 20, Academic) 
                                                                                                                            
This interviewee not only highlights the influence of money and the role of 
government in selecting experts. There are thus structural, organisational, and 
personal reasons for the emergence of the expert industry. The notion that the 
experts in the policy domain of counter-terrorism has become an ‘industry' was 
acknowledged by an analyst at DEMOS. 
 
Yes, I would call it a cottage industry that’s popped up out of nowhere and has 
probably been detrimental, and I include myself in all of that; there is suddenly a 
million of Prevent experts and terrorism experts who knew nothing about the subject 
three years ago and are now parading themselves as the world’s leading experts on 
the subject but they’re all bringing a lot of baggage with them. I’m just as guilty and 
I’m open about that.  
                                                                                   (Interview 1, Demos Analyst) 
 
However despite the overall critical response by many to the role of experts in 
radicalisation discourse, the data does reveal a more nuanced categorisation of 
expertise. For example, the data shows the different types and levels of expertise 
and knowledge. This includes experts belonging to different epistemic domains such 
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as the intelligence services, government, academia, communities, think-tanks, the 
religious sphere, and politics. An analyst at IPPR explained to me that despite the 
diversity of actors conceiving, implementing, executing and adapting the principles of 
counter-terrorism, the overall hard-hitters were ‘white guys in suits’.         
David Omond is important; he was head of GCHQ and was the government’s 
intelligence and security coordinator; he was on our IPPR security commission; he 
was a primary architect of CONTEST....But who’s making the decisions? I think on 
this stuff the answer has to be senior civil servants and a handful of tomatoes; the 
Foreign Office, the Home Office, the Treasury, no. 10, and they are probably doing it 
within a framework laid down by senior ministers that say muscular liberalism or go 
here and don’t go there; they lay out the parameters and civil servants fill in the 
details. The spooks would be pretty influential so MI5 and MI6 people; but I think it’s 
one of those areas that isn’t about public debates and think-tanks, it’s about a few 
experts- white guys in suits- deciding, because when it comes to national security 
there’s a sense of leave it to the experts, which I think is misguided.   
 
                                                                                      (Interview 4 IPPR Analyst) 
                                                                                                                                               
Notably, the categorisation of expertise in this field does not necessarily correspond 
directly to a vertical hierarchy. In fact all forms of capital- personal relationships, 
flows of knowledge, competition for space, dissemination of knowledge, competition 
for influence- leveraged by experts are actually in constant interaction. Knowledge 
became extremely significant in the production of radicalisation discourses. 
Knowledge was important not only to codify the reality of radicalisation but from the 
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perspective of many experts was crucial in enhancing their status. This explains the 
democratisation of the enterprise of collating knowledge on radicalisation, as well as 
the horizontal structure of expertise given that premium was placed on particular 
forms of knowledge. In terms of radicalisation, knowledge was required on a very 
niche area- Islam (encompassing many areas of specialisation) and political Islam 
and other related knowledge domains. This was attributed to the fact that the source 
of the problem was placed on Islamist ideology. The comment below illustrates the 
highly specialised nature of expertise. 
 
Also, through our research we found out that there were generally five topics that 
Muslims who were classed as radicals or extremist, had misunderstandings in. 
Those five were:  Takfir- Calling Muslim’s non-Muslims and the understanding of 
that. Another one would be Jihad and their understanding of that- what is Jihad and 
what is allowed and not allowed in Jihad? Another understanding would be what 
would you class as a place of war? Another would be there what are the 
responsibilities of Muslims in places with no Islamic rule? ...What was the last one? 
And the last one is where did they take the knowledge from? And what is something 
that you can say that you took knowledge in the correct manner?  
                                                                           (Interview 23/ Directors of Siraat) 
                                                                                                                                 
This passage shows the type of knowledge valorised by policy-makers in this field; 
especially the technical nature of this knowledge, and the way in which experts 
employed this knowledge to stamp their authority and augment their claims to 
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expertise. Based on the data above, critical to the attributes of authority were 
proficient knowledge of Islam, theology, politics, history, and Arabic. Indeed an 
understanding of this niche knowledge legitimised the credibility of many experts, 
many of whom capitalised on this discourse to great effect, not least because it was 
lucrative in career terms.  
In fact the classical tradition, which holds a special status within Islam, was referred 
to in various ways by diverse range of experts for different ends and strategies. For 
example, whilst the interviewee above refers to the tradition, he nevertheless does 
so from a particular school of thought within the tradition (one that stresses the right 
of the individual to interpret the tradition without the aid of scholars); whereas the 
interviewee below, an analyst at Quilliam, provides an example of how the classical 
tradition can be understood, accessed, and then deployed from the perspective of 
another school of thought within Islam, that is even more liberal with respect to 
interpretation of texts;33  
 
As someone with a background in Islamic Studies I could only talk about from an 
Islamic point of view, which is losing the balance of life. So religion is supposed to be 
balanced, this was the Sunnah of the Prophet (PBUH).... From the teachings of the 
prophet and the classical tradition of Islam it’s always been understood that if you get 
too extreme in your Islam or your thinking then you’re basically wrong....  
                                                                                          (Interview 25 QF Analyst) 
                                                          
33
 Ramadan (2004, 24-28) identifies six trends: (1) Scholastic Traditionalism (2) Salafi Literalism (3) 
Salafi Reformers (4) Political Literalist Salafism (5) “Liberal” or “Rationalist” Reformsim (6) Sufism. 
Although I do not know precisely the hermeneutical grouping the aforementioned interviewees 
subscribe to, based on their organisation affiliation and interviews, it can be said that the Quilliam 
Analyst interprets the classical tradition from the position of liberal reformism, whereas the Director of 
Siraat argues from the standpoint of Salafi literalism. 
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The analyst at Quilliam, like the Director of Siraat, invokes the ‘classical tradition’ and 
reminds me of his credentials as someone with a ‘background in Islamic Studies’. 
Despite working for different organisations, their divergent approaches to tackling 
radicalisation, and their different understanding of the Islamic faith, these experts 
nevertheless both refer to Islamic Jurisprudence and the classical tradition. They are 
effectively making a claim to possess knowledge and expertise. A crucial dimension 
to consider here is the existence of a vast diversity of schools, interpretations, etc. 
making competing claims of what the ‘real’ and ‘correct’ interpretation of Islam as a 
religion and discursive tradition actually is.  
 
However, it is clear from that data that knowledge and expertise on Islam and the 
classical tradition are not the only prerequisite criterion that gives a person a license 
to be an ‘expert’ on radicalisation. Other knowledge domains unrelated to religion are 
a feature of expertise in the PREVENT strategy. These include knowledge on the 
diverse subjects such as youth empowerment, mentoring, psychology, Middle 
Eastern politics and history, the local community, to name but a few. For example, 
the importance of ‘local’ knowledge being based in communities is further explained 
below. 
 
I think when it works when people actually give a damn and that can only work 
locally. So someone from London coming down to tell me how to do de-radicalisation 
is never going to work because you cannot explain why, what we talked about 
earlier, why something always feels right. Because you look at multiple factors in 
what is actually happening and know why that person came to that mosque and stuff 
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like that. Local knowledge is with local people. They are able to know what’s 
happening and know what’s best for their community.  
 
                                                                          (Interview 8, PREVENT Practitioner) 
 
                                                                                                                                           
Interestingly however a senior PREVENT officer does stress the importance of 
expertise in tackling radicalisation but distinguishes instead between the kinds of 
expertise in her department that specialises in ‘preventative’ approaches vis-a-vis 
the kind of expertise in traditional counter-terrorism. 
 
It’s a skills and expertise thing. The traditional skills of CT were in investigative skills 
rather than understanding communities and what vulnerabilities look like. ...The CT 
world is not going to do that and so it’s really important if you’re looking at a 
preventive strategy that you haven’t got an investigative arm leading that 
preventative strategy because they’re not going to know where to start; they will not 
theoretically understand it and in practical terms they have no idea.  
                                                                    (Interview 23, Senior PREVENT Officer) 
 
This section has tried to present the production and development of radicalisation as 
a discourse that was formulated by policymakers, popularised by the media, and 
legitimised by a plethora of experts. It also highlighted the sheer diversity of ‘experts’ 
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involved in the production of discourses on radicalisation and the various ways that 
experts make claims to expertise. In fact one of the distinguishing characteristics of 
expertise in the production of radicalisation is the competitive dynamic between 
distinct epistemic knowledge domains. It suggested that through competing analysis 
and solutions advanced by experts, those who are given credibility and are allowed 
to speak are those legitimising governmental policies, evidenced with the dominance 
of the idea-action formulation underpinning the conceptualisation of radicalisation. 
The ontological makeup of radicalisation that became legitimised and substantiated 
by expertise will be explored in the next section. 
 
5.4 The ‘Conventional Wisdom’: The question of Root-Causes and Process 
 
With the emergence of radicalisation as a concept and discourse, the enterprise of 
developing and codifying the science of radicalisation focused on the ‘root-causes’ 
and ‘process’ of radicalisation. Indeed the preoccupation of identifying ‘root-causes’ 
and ‘process’ in explanations of radicalisation mirrors the methodology of the hard 
sciences, where the methods of building knowledge depend on establishing 
universal fixed ‘laws’ for all places and time. However, ‘root-causes’ and ‘process’ 
are distinct ways of conceptualising radicalisation. Understanding radicalisation in 
terms of ‘root causes’ tries to ask questions about the objective of radicalisation, e.g. 
restoring a caliphate or reversing Western foreign policy, whereas the ‘process’ 
definitions of radicalisation views the phenomenon as a linear narrative and does not 
ask questions of ‘why’ but is more concerned with questions of ‘how’ (Githens- 
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Mazer 2012, 5).34 The PREVENT conception of radicalisation represents the process 
view of radicalisation. This section analyses the ontological framework of 
radicalisation governing PREVENT.    
 
The majority of respondents did not dismiss the findings articulated in the literature 
on the process of radicalisation.35 Many believed that factors like ideology and social 
group’s dynamics were important to the radicalisation process. The objections by 
some however to the focus on ideology in conceptions of radicalisation and 
PREVENT is two-fold: (1) the degree of influence accorded to ideology in 
radicalisation and how it actually functions and (2) the policy ramifications of 
valorising ideology in explanations of radicalisation. The notion underpinning the 
process conception of radicalisation is that ideology directly leads to violence. The 
two statements below by director of Siraat and researcher at Quilliam explain this 
logic. 
So what tafkir does, takfir is legitimate in Islam, but the wrong understanding means I 
can label a Muslim a non-Muslim and then allows me to put them in a category which 
makes it easier for me to justify killing them.  
                                                                                 (Interview 23, Director of Siraat) 
                                                                                                                           
                                                          
34
Based on his study of the sources relevant to the study of radicalisation by 2011, Githens-Mazer 
identifies 107 sources, of which 56 do not offer any definition of radicalisation (2012, 4). Of the 
remaining 51 sources, the way ‘radicalisation’ was defined can be grouped into three categories: 
process, causation, and those who define it negatively (4-5).  
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When we are looking at Islamist extremism it’s very clear that notions of Jihad and 
the misuse of the notions of Jihad which drives people towards violence. They 
convince themselves, or delude themselves, that they are carrying a sacred duty and 
that they will be martyrs or Shahid.  
                                                             (Interview 25, Senior Researcher at Quilliam)                                                                                                                                      
 
The role of ideology presents radicalisation in terms of the direct causal relationship 
between ideas and actions. For example, the interviewees believe that a 
misunderstanding of the ideas about ‘Takfir’ and ‘Jihad’ leads to terrorism. A few 
others, express the belief that ideology plays a role at the end of a long process. In 
his view, ideology does not necessarily lead directly to violence but is actually one 
factor amongst many which allows the radicalised subject to interpret the world in a 
certain way. 
 
Ideology is the kind of final factor, it’s not the driving force that radicalises someone. 
It’s the final factor where someone has gone through this whole process and they’ve 
looked for something to do and the ideology comes and the ideology plays off the 
fact that you’re probably isolated, you probably don’t connect with you family, you 
don’t have a safe space at home, you don’t have a safe space externally, so this 
network provides you with that space, that belonging, provides you with a sense of 
worth and purpose.  
                                                                      (Interview 10, Investigative Journalist) 
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However, for many respondents having ideology as the primary cause of 
radicalisation and enshrining it as the first objective of PREVENT in counter-
terrorism policy had a number of consequences. Given the influence afforded to 
ideas as a prime mover in the radicalisation process (since ideas lead directly to 
action), the PREVENT strategy valorised count-ideology as a strategy and has led to 
an inordinate focus on what individuals are thinking rather than doing. This was 
poignantly articulated by the director of the research programme on the ‘New 
Security Challenge’.  
 
However the principles, the idea for example, that there is a conveyor belt from ‘X’ 
through radical to terrorist which can or can’t be interdicted at various points is 
commonly shared. And that phrase ‘radicalisation’ is like a black box in the middle of 
someone’s mainstream life on one end and someone’s terrorist life on the other. So 
anybody’s views we don’t like, ‘we’ the mainstream don’t like, can be black boxed in 
that way and by definition imagined to be on the road towards terrorists acts.  
                                                                      (Interview 6, Academic/Director of NSC)   
                                                                                                                                   
                                                                                                                                                    
The interviewee below, who has been arrested for trying to download material online, 
also explains how the focus on ideology leads to a criminalisation of ideas. 
 
So what they are saying is that violence comes after the ideology and this is what the 
centre right were saying, like Quilliam. And then what you do is counter the ideas 
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and by default people won’t want to commit the violence. What you’ll find is that if 
you start countering ideas and don’t allow them to engage with ideas that challenge 
their own understandings and views then how they will ever develop an 
understanding about how to take action; that leads to frustration when you start to 
criminalise people for trying to understand things.  
                                                                                 (Interview 19, Academic/Activist) 
                                                                                                                                   
A second implication of having ideology as the prime catalyst of the radicalisation 
process is that radicalisation becomes synonymous with violence. In the PREVENT 
conception of radicalisation, it almost always means or implies violence. 
 
There are three priority areas and ideology is the first and most important priority in 
the new Prevent strategy. So they say that actually ideology matters; there are 
certain ideologies that are compatible with the potential drift toward violence and we 
won’t work with anybody with that ideology because it’s a slippery slope towards who 
knows what.  
                                                                                            (Interview 9, ISD Analyst) 
                                                                                                                                        
This lead to models of radicalisation in which the distinction made is between 
political activism and violence, rather than between apathy and political mobilisation 
(Moskalenko and McCauley 2008; 2010; Baker 2011). The salient features in these 
models is (a) the causal link between ideas and action, between ideology and 
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violence and (b) placing political participation by Muslims along the same spectrum 
as violent radicals. The conceptualisation of radicalisation in these models thus has 
the effect of making ideas the central concern and preoccupation of policy-makers, 
as well situating the political participation of Muslim individuals and organisation in 
the UK, not as a positive form of democratic practice, but rather as representing the 
beginning of a radicalisation process that might tautologically lead to violence. This 
consequently means that political mobilisation is viewed within a security lens and 
therefore potentially criminalises democratic legitimate activism. This model stressed 
in short the causal relationship Islamism as the first step towards terrorism.  
 
I think it’s the idea you don’t end up being a terrorist without being an Islamist first 
and therefore Islamism is the first step towards terrorism; Islamism is your marijuana 
to your terrorism is your cocaine.  That’s the basic idea. I think there are Islamists 
who never thought a violent thought and there are terrorists who were never 
Islamists and certainly weren’t members of HT.  
                                                                                        (Interview 4, IPPR Analyst) 
 
                                                                                                                               
Doing this has effectively justified criminalising certain ideas, because it is believed 
to be leading to violence. The focus on ideas also justifies intervention in the 
theological lives of Muslims, legitimising the surveillance approach of PREVENT 
which seeks to monitor public spaces in the name of purging it of early signs of 
radicalisation. Second, as explicated above, it is deployed to delegitimize the 
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involvement of certain individuals and organisations in PREVENT, despite their 
effectiveness in countering radicalisation (more in chapter 6). 
 
Meanwhile, the second major factor identified in models of radicalisation is the role of 
identity. The problematisation of Muslim identity is constructed in various discourses. 
This is reflected in the data in different ways. One interviewee situated the identity 
problem abstractly within wider questions about modernity.  
 
So identity choices are just a way of life now and some of them are great, some of 
them empower people.  People get empowered to things they couldn’t imagine they 
could do and it’s great, whether it be in the commercial world, in religious life, 
whatever, it’s fantastic. But there is that radicalised edge as well that people might 
shop in. They might go into that radical shop; they might stay there and buy lots; they 
might go in and come out. I don’t know you can play with this metaphor in all sorts of 
ways.  
                                                                   (Interview 6, Academic/Director of NSC)                                                                                                                                 
 
This interviewee employs the metaphor of the ‘shop’ to frame the issue of identity as 
a reflexive process intrinsic to modern life. This is linked to the narrative expounding 
the crisis of identity experienced by young British Muslims, articulated in chapter 1. 
We saw there how the wider literature explains the move towards radicalisation in 
terms of British Muslims embracing the transnational ‘ummah’, made possible by 
globalisation, in which they adopt the more rigorous practices of Salafism. A former 
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analyst at Forward Thinking challenges the narrative that a lack of integration leads 
to radicalisation.  
 
Yes the teacher from Leeds. If you look at whether he was integrated or not, some 
would argue that he was really integrated. He broke the norm within his family by 
marrying someone outside his kinship, which was a big issue in his family.... If you 
talk about integration would you say that he wasn’t well integrated as British values 
were concerned? ....We all have our own understanding of British values are and 
from Prevents perspective it was about the narrative that a lack of integration led 
certain people to become radicalised.  
                                                                            (Interview 26, former analyst at FT) 
                                                                                                                                    
Hence the narrative propelled, seen in previous sections, is that a lack of integration 
leads to radicalisation. Whilst some interviewees were sceptical about the validity of 
this narrative, others saw the issue of identity as crucial in the radicalisation process. 
 
What I’m arguing and others are too is that we need to look at this as a structure 
where the individual goes through the process, because of the perception of being 
an outsider and due to foreign policy grievance as well as the sense that many 
Muslims, not all but many, feel like they are not being treated the same as 
mainstream society, then that creates the feeling of an outsider’s identity.    
                                                                          (Interview 10, Investigative Journalist) 
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The notion expressed in the comments above-the importance of identity, the link 
between identity and radicalisation, and the experience of Muslims with being an 
‘outsider’- all point to the problematisation of Muslim identity. The respondent below, 
a consultant for Muslim Safety Forum, eloquently describes the way in which 
categorical Muslim identity was pushed on to her by others. 
 
I think it’s a good question, what is British? If you asked me a few years ago what I 
was, I don’t think I chose to define myself as a Muslim British person- I thought I was 
just a normal person. About five or ten years ago or whatever I suddenly noticed and 
identified as a Muslim. So what am I, a Muslim what?  
                                                                                  (Interview 13, MSF/consultant) 
                                                                                                                            
Another way that the problem of identity is articulated is through the concept of 
‘vulnerability’.  Although this concept will be addressed properly in chapter 6 because 
it is an essential feature of PREVENT and de-radicalisation, it is nevertheless 
important to note that the question of identity, radicalisation, and ‘vulnerability’ are 
connected. The way in which the problem of identity and the concept of ‘vulnerability’ 
are linked is through the idea that a lack of identity is one of the ‘vulnerability’ factors 
that make some individuals susceptible to ideology and therefore radicalisation. This 
is explained by a PREVENT Officer. 
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Radicalisation is where the people who have extreme views find somebody who is 
vulnerable in order to make them believe they could change things. So if somebody 
is a vulnerable position, whether it is being in prison, criminality, drugs, or not having 
an identity or not understanding religion, it could be anything that gets that 
vulnerability.   
                                                                                  (Interview 21, PREVENT Officer) 
                                                                                                                                        
However, the problem of identity is not only seen as a symptom of vulnerability. It is 
also viewed as an indication of ‘risk’. So an identity problem makes you vulnerable 
and puts you at risk of radicalisation. The dominant narrative posits that vulnerable 
individuals adopt alternative points of identification, which when activated amongst 
religious groups or online environments, ignites the radicalisation fuse. It in this way 
that ‘identity’ is understood in policy terms as playing a causal role in the 
radicalisation process.  
 
What was equally instructive, besides those factors that were deemed within the 
legitimate scope of the narrative on radicalisation, was what was excluded or 
marginalised within the formation of the discourse: the role of foreign policy in 
accounts on the ‘root-causes’ of radicalisation. The following research analyst at ISD 
explains how the official narrative did not acknowledge the role of foreign policy in 
the radicalisation of Muslims. 
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….I’ve always got the sense when I’ve done interviews in communities, back at that 
time particularly, people were angry at foreign policy, but so was everybody frankly, 
but one of the things most people were angry about was they were not even allowed 
to talk about it. There was a complete lack of willingness to go there and that was 
while at the same time behind the scenes memos were being prepared for the Home 
Office and other departments that were saying that we know the war in Iraq and 
foreign policy is directly causing recruitment. When you have a situation when a 
government doesn’t have legitimacy because it’s refusing to acknowledge obvious 
truth because it doesn’t suit its immediate ends, that can’t be a good thing, right?  
                                                                                         (Interview 9, ISD Analyst) 
 
This ‘official’ line on the causes of radicalisation was contrasted with the statement 
and actions of prominent Muslim public figures. At the PET workgroups in 2005 
Muslim representatives requested that the working groups look into the effects of UK 
foreign policy on Muslims and called for a Public Inquiry to help place ‘facts as 
opposed to speculation-informed or otherwise- into the public domain about the 
process by which some British Muslims are being radicalised’ (Brighton 2007). While 
this request was rejected, others like Shahid Malik, (ex-Labour MP) and Salma 
Yacqoob (former RESPECT Party member) as well as bodies like the MCB, amongst 
many others, stressed the role British foreign plays in radicalising British Muslims. In 
addition, this ‘official’ position had been contradicted by the video statement of the 
ring-leader Mohammed Sidique Khan, who had invoked the Iraq War as a motivation 
to take ‘revenge’ for his ‘brothers and sisters’ (Brighton 2007; Rai 2006; Devji 2008). 
It was also discredited by numerous leaks from government documents linking 
foreign policy to the radicalisation of British Muslims (HO/FO 2004). 
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Moreover the concern with the influence of foreign policy by some Muslim was 
reported by the security services to the British government a few weeks before the 
7/7 bombing in 2005, acknowledging that events in Iraq were continuing to act as 
‘motivation and a focus of a range of terrorist related activities in the UK’ (Rai 
2006,19). In fact, Eliza Manningham-Buller, Director General of MI5 between 2002 
and 2007 told a parliamentary enquiry in 2010:  
Our involvement in Iraq radicalised, for want of a better word, a whole generation of 
young people – not a whole generation, a few among a generation – who saw our 
involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan as being an attack on Islam. 
                                                                     
                                                                   (Awan, Hoskins, and O’Loughlin 2012, 1)  
 
Notably, it became easier to discuss the impact of foreign policy as a source of a 
radicalisation only once former Prime Minister Tony Blair left office in 2007, given 
that he had been associated with the War on Iraq (Briggs 2010). However, a legacy 
of this period was that the PREVENT policy formulated, with the assistance of the 
radicalisation concept, a narrative that focused on micro factors affecting the 
individual, primarily ideology and identity, with macro factors, like Western foreign 
policy, being marginalised (Kundnani 2012; Baker-Beall, Heath-Kelly, and Jarvis 
2015, 1). The following interviewee aptly speaks of the ‘psychologicalisation’ of 
radicalisation accounts and the identifying instead what he considers being the real 
cause of radicalisation-Western foreign policy.  
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I actually don’t think human beings are as complicated as psychologists make them 
out to be.  So there’s a lot of psychologicalisation, if such as word exists, of the 
terrorist- what motivates them? Why? Was he traumatised? Was the father absent? 
No actually it’s actually quite simple way people chose to commit political violence. 
It’s because they feel disempowered at the might of the Western military 
superstructure that does do unjust things in the Middle East.  
                                                                                        (Interview 20, Academic) 
 
This section attempted to understand what interviewees thought on the ‘conventional 
wisdom’ of radicalisation and the factors believed to lead some individual British 
Muslims to terrorism. Respondents did not dismiss the role that ideology and identity 
crisis played in radicalisation and some believed that they were indeed significant 
factors. However the majority of interviewees were critical of the emphasis placed on 
these particular factors at the expense of others and frequently commented on the 
consequences of privileging ideology in accounts of radicalisation. The main issue is 
that the central role afforded to ideology enabled the activation of a type of counter-
terrorism policy that becomes more preoccupied with policing thought crimes in 
public institutions than actually fighting terrorism. Other interviewees identified 
foreign policy as a critical source of radicalisation but one which was deliberately 
marginalised in accounts of radicalisation. Focusing on micro factors like ideology 
and identity shifts the focus away from more macro and politically contentious issues 
like foreign policy and politics. Prospective chapters will address the impact the 
conceptualisation of radicalisation had on PREVENT, the Channel programme, and 
de-radicalisation.  
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5.5 Radicalisation as a Body of Knowledge: Spurious Social Science  
 
The explosive incitement to discourse on radicalisation made ostensible claims to 
the language and methods of the natural sciences. As addressed in the last section 
this could be seen in the language used in this discourse- ‘root-causes’, ‘processes’, 
and ‘models’. This positivist framework employed by ‘experts’ is used with the goal of 
providing solutions to the problem of radicalisation. However, many interviewees 
were very critical of radicalisation as a research area. The major point raised by 
interviewees is the flimsy research foundations underpinning the codification of 
radicalisation enterprise. This section addresses radicalisation as a field of 
knowledge. 
Despite claims to scientific rigour and the appropriation of scientific methods, many 
interviewees were explicitly clear that the concept and idea of radicalisation was not 
rooted in the sciences or backed up by ‘empirical evidence’. This contradiction 
between the aspirations of many theories on radicalisation to acquire the 
legitimisation of being scientific and the actual reality of these theories and causal 
explanations is raised by a think-tank analyst whose reports were influential in the 
early days when the PREVENT strategy was being formed. 
 
I think that on the whole, particularly in the preventative area, it hasn’t been evidence 
based as much as it should be. In many ways it’s because the evidence is really 
hard to get. As I was saying, there’s great theories on all this stuff... let’s imagine we 
were talking about, rather than violent extremism, talking about a particular health 
issue, what would we do? We would find a big enough sample size, we would create 
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that sample and compare it to a control group, we would have longitudinal data, we 
would have large data sets, we would test, triangulate, we would apply all sorts of 
scientific rigour to the analysis of whatever data it was we were going to use. We 
simply haven’t done that in this area. There are some areas where there’s scientific 
rigour. You know, a lot of it is qualitative, a lot of it is based on views of frontline 
workers, a lot of it end up being dominated by individuals who’ve got polemical 
views, are able to communicate them effectively and then they’ve got hold and then 
they become the dominant norms in terms of thinking.  
                                                                                           (Interview 9, ISD Analyst) 
 
This respondent makes an important critique of PREVENT- that in contradistinction 
to other policy areas, research on radicalisation was not evidence based and 
scientific enough. In terms of methodology for example, she notes the absence of 
substantial data, the lack of data analysis, the predominance of qualitative data, and 
the tendency towards polemical approaches in counter-terrorism. The absence of 
robust methodologies characterising research on radicalisation, as well as the scant 
evidence base for policy development is also highlighted by the following think-tank 
analyst at Demos. 
 
First how difficult it would be to identify the root causes and everyone has their 
personal philosophical view and there isn’t any evidence to support any of it. So 
some people say it’s the ideology because they hate the ideology. Some people say 
the ideology is a symptom of broader structural problems and inequality in society 
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and discrimination against Muslims in Britain. Some people say what the spark here 
is, is the war in Iraq, so if we wanted to prevent anything we should stop the war in 
Iraq. But we are not going to do that so we what can we deal with? I don’t think 
there’s anyone to blame for all of that. It just happened very quickly without being 
able to answer the root cause.  
                                                                                      (Interview 1, DEMOS Analyst) 
                                                                                                                                  
                                                                                                                                     
An important point is raised by this interviewee was the notion that discussions 
regarding ‘root-causes’ of radicalisation reflect ‘personal philosophical views’. It 
reinforces the shaky empirical and methodological foundations of research on 
radicalisation. Equally important is the idea that the question of ‘root causes’ was not 
in the end answered because ‘it happened very quickly’. Both pervious observations 
suggest that the production of discourse on radicalisation was ultimately 
characterised by the absence of methodological rigour, empirical data, and was in 
the end undermined by policy imperatives. The same two interviewees questioned 
the overall objective of radicalisation as a body of knowledge.  
 
Now I don’t think we are ever going to answer root cause because it’s different for 
each person. But even if were able to perfectly identify root causes, which is a fool’s 
errand for social scientists anyway, it wouldn’t necessarily tell us anyway what our 
response would be.  
                                                                                      (Interview 1, DEMOS Analyst) 
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So I went through this really exhaustive process of all these dominant theories of 
radicalisation, whether they were grievances, segregation, divisions, criminal 
networks, ideologies, and so on. It all sounds great in theory. Then when you start to 
define, what are the things you would do to prevent each of those causal factors and 
how would you measure each of those to know your moving in the right direction. It’s 
actually like the emperor’s new clothes, when you actually look at it, it actually looks 
really ridiculous because you think even if all more indicators were moving in the 
right direction does that mean there would be less radicalisation? 
                                                                                           (Interview 9, ISD Analyst) 
                                                                                                                                  
According to these interviewees the government does not have the resources to 
tackle radicalisation. There are too many factors involved in radicalisation for the 
government to be able to address it. There is thus a disjuncture between the 
discourse of radicalisation and the actual political capacity to resolve the problem of 
Muslim radicalisation. This observation is coupled with the fact that the development 
of radicalisation was not the result of organic academic enquiry but was formulated 
by policymakers and popularised by the media before it found its way into academia.  
 
Consequently, the radicalisation discourse brings into question the relationship 
between the codification of knowledge by the social sciences and wider 
governmental objectives. In other words, was the discursive production of 
radicalisation actually supposed to accurately codify the radicalisation process in the 
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real world or what is merely supposed to provide a retrospective blanket narrative for 
already agreed political objectives for policymakers?  The implication there is that 
given the relationship between government funding and the research community, the 
independence and objectivity of the research, knowledge, and overall discourse 
produced is compromised.  
 
The terrorism field is a big field and huge money has been poured at it. How much of 
it is real solid? It’s not solid in the same way that other disciplines in social sciences 
are which have been around for over a hundred years and have evolved, you know, 
and terrorism is a very new field in that sense; it’s very modern, it’s very driven by 
government agendas. This is the other thing: who’s funding terrorism research? 
Overwhelmingly its government’s and even academic governing grant making bodies 
that are giving funding are doing under the parameters established by states.  
  
                                                                          (Interview 10, Investigative Journalist) 
 
The issue at hand relates to the politicised nature characterising the production of 
knowledge on terrorism and political violence. The funding provided by governments 
to academia is one of the chief ways research grants and money is provided in 
research. In particular, topics like political violence and radicalisation requires 
funding because the study of radicalisation and terrorism are not considered 
disciplines in their own right and primarily belong as sub-branches in International 
Relations. Research contributions to the field have been made from numerous other 
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disciplines- like psychology, medicine, criminology, sociology, economics, etc. Thus 
research has been overwhelmingly fragmented and multi-disciplinary and 
undertaken in the crevices and sub-disciplines of academia. For example, the 
interviewee below explains the popularity of psychology amongst politicians and 
media in explaining radicalisation over sociology.  
I think it’s the easy option; it’s the easy way out for politicians. The politicians and the 
media actually love psychologists and don’t actually come to sociologists for 
solutions. Psychologist offer quick-fix solutions and formulas; follow these description 
and it’s very black and white, it’s like statistics. The politicians and the media love 
statistics because it’s a quick fix. Psychological models suit the agenda and the 
speed at which politics needs to work at. So if someone talks about a 
deradicalisation programme- it sounds nice, it’s easy to sell, easy to fund and 
implement. But if a sociologist comes and talks about social policies and different 
structures, this isn’t easy to manipulate and implement. There is also a myth around 
psychology that it is scientific, which seems to give them more credibility that they 
are dealing with the problem. But they don’t want to address root causes about 
British foreign policy.  
                                                                                         (Interview 20, Academic) 
 
In other words the respondent believes that the time and scholarship required to 
produce quality research are not amenable to both the imperatives and objectives of 
the world of policy and 24-hour media, centres of power that demands simple, 
accessible, and quick information and the spectacle of an event. Psychologists, 
‘experts’, and many commentators that deploy information are therefore more suited 
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to the logic of the media and policy machine. Again this reinforces the inbuilt 
politicised and sensationalised approach to knowledge building. Another academic 
underscores the policy driven nature of knowledge development in PREVENT. 
 
These people do not have any background in social science and academic research. 
They haven’t done any research they’ve just claimed first-hand experience and some 
politicians just buy it like this. They don’t realise that actually the expertise of these 
people are pretty much secondary. I’m not saying we can’t learn from them, of 
course we can, but only as once source amongst other sources, and distinguishing 
between what they actually experienced and their accounts of these experience, 
which are obviously already processed and catered for certain people, politicians, so 
Prevent programme, whatever. Look at the Quilliam papers; they’re always policy 
driven.  
                                                                                               (Interview 15, Academic) 
 
His gripe is with the so-called ‘experts’ making knowledge claims that are not rooted 
in the social sciences. According to this academic the problem is thus not the social 
sciences. Instead the problem is that the discourse is being led by the experiences of 
certain individuals. Again the suggestion here is that personal experiences are not 
scientific enough. Given that the social sciences, as well as a diversity of actors 
outside the social sciences, played a significant role in the production of multiple 
discourses, knowledges, and theories, it is striking that the conceptual framework of 
radicalisation, as posited by policy-makers, and supported by academic discourse 
273 
 
and research, can be reduced to a few salient features.  Despite such shortcomings, 
a whole raft of counter-radicalisation measures and the implementation of the 
PREVENT strategy was delivered on the basis of this knowledge on radicalisation. 
This raises an important question: does the same laxness towards the veracity, 
integrity, and credibility of research exist in other policy domains? In other words, 
would other policy areas like Education or Health build their strategies and polices on 
the basis of such weak research foundations?    
This critique of the knowledge foundations of radicalisation was also corroborated in 
two reports commissioned by the Home Office in order to examining radicalisation. 
The first report, ‘Understanding vulnerability and resilience in individuals to the 
influence of Al Qaida violent extremism’ (HO 2011b), was prepared for the OSCT. 
Having reviewed the main thirty-nine studies that looked at Al-Qaeda influenced 
violent extremism, the report identified the key challenges characterising research in 
this areas from an empirical perspective; the difficulty of interviewing or accessing 
actual terrorists and as a result much of the current literature provides only anecdotal 
evidence (1). Another challenge is that when factors leading to terrorism are 
evaluated and analysed it is done without referencing the fact that the vast majority 
of people who share the same background as terrorists do not become involved in 
terrorism (Ibid). Moreover, there is limited evidence that can provide suggestions on 
what causes individuals to become involved in violent extremism. With respect to 
methodology the report concluded that: 
 
The majority of studies are based on a small number of case interviews or secondary 
analysis of documents, such as trial transcripts, radical websites or other 
publications promoting violent extremism, where terrorists document their thoughts. 
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Qualitative research involving interviews with participants is often limited to those 
who are more peripherally involved in terrorism than suicide bombers, such as 
bombers’ family or friends, or other group members who have not taken that final 
step towards violence. There is also a large body of ‘think-pieces’, based largely on 
anecdotal evidence.   
                                                                                                                               (2) 
 
Meanwhile, the second report, ‘Al-Qaeda influenced Radicalisation: a rapid evidence 
Assessment guided by Situation Action Theory’ (2011), provides a useful summary 
on the problems of conducting research on radicalisation.  
 
The study of the causes of radicalisation in particular, and of course on terrorism in 
general, is in its infancy. A number of factors contribute to the scientific immaturity of 
the field, among them: the low volume of incidents and the relatively small number of 
individuals implicated, notably in the West; the security issues involved in accessing 
non-open data; the lack of integration between disciplines; and the imprecise 
boundaries of the problem area.  
                                                                                (Bouhana and Wikstrom 2011, 2)  
In summation, the research foundations of radicalisation and its integrity as a 
research area were questioned by many interviewees. The rocky foundations of 
radicalisation as a body of knowledge was also corroborated by government 
commissioned reports. There was a salient contradiction between the claims made 
by the social sciences to the methods of the natural sciences and the reality of the 
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research output.  Despite, the weak state of the field, the knowledge on radicalisation 
was incorporated into the PREVENT Policy, as well as counter-radicalisation and de-
radicalisation efforts. 
 
 
5.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter analysed the discursive formation of radicalisation between 2004 and 
2011.The first section provided an overview of the conditions of emergence for 
radicalisation as a term and concept. It traced the emergence of radicalisation and 
the production of discourse to elite policymakers in the UK and the EU. 
‘Radicalisation’ thus acquired its current association as a result of legitimisation by 
key institutions and by political elites. The section after elucidates the numerous 
narratives depicting the threat posed by the UK Muslim population. Indeed the data 
conveyed that it is hard to grasp the precise nature of the threat. It also indicated that 
there was a substantial gap between the reality of the security threat in real life and 
the perception of that threat. Section 5.3 analyses the role of experts and knowledge 
in the production of radicalisation. The data revealed the blurred boundaries of 
legitimate claims to knowledge, the contested nature of expertise, and competition 
amongst various experts in discourses of radicalisation. Interviewees believed that 
‘legitimate’ expertise was intrinsically linked to governmental objectives and that the 
construction of radicalisation had created an ‘industry’. Section 5.4 examined the 
‘conventional wisdom’ of radicalisation, which describes the transition of ‘good’ 
Muslim to ‘bad’ Muslim primarily in terms of problems of identity and ideology. This 
conceptualisation resulted in the marginalisation of Meso and Macro factors in the 
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PREVENT conception of PREVENT, even though both were identified in the wider 
literature (including government sources) and wider public debate as pivotal in 
arriving at a more comprehensive account of radicalisation. In particular, there was 
an attempt by many prominent British Muslims post 7/7 to emphasise the role of 
foreign policy in the debate on radicalisation. The last section assesses radicalisation 
as a body of knowledge. The majority of interviewees expressed the verdict that 
radicalisation as a field is in its infancy and that it has been comprised by the 
absence of epistemological and methodological rigour, not to mention limited 
availability of primary data, and the inbuilt politicisation to knowledge growth.   
 
The arguments made in this chapter echoes the themes outlined in chapter 1. There 
I explained how the problematisation of Muslim identity was shaped by the changing 
security environment, the challenges posed to the nation state by changing 
citizenship and identity, and the experience of religion within secular modernity in 
Europe. The by-product was the securitisation of Muslim identity in a way that 
pathologies Muslims. Identity and ideology become causal variables in both the path 
towards violence and the source of social tension. Given that the problematisation of 
Muslims in the UK has been conceptualised in terms of radicalisation, it is 
unsurprising that the prescribed solution (de-radicalisation) becomes understood 
according to the norms of radicalisation.  Hence the focus of this chapter has been 
on the production of radicalisation as a discourse because it is ‘radicalisation’ that 
produces de-radicalisation. In fact the PREVENT conceptualisation of de-
radicalisation inherits the legacy of the thinking on radicalisation undertaken between 
2004 and 2011. This is reflected by the inbuilt conceptual implications of de-
radicalisation, such as the importance of tackling ideology, the focus on individuals 
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rather than groups, theological revision, and the need to promote safe identities.  It is 
in this way that discursive production constituted the knowledge base for 
administrative rectification (PREVENT) and programmes of threat-mitigation 
(Counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation).  
 
Consequently, it is important to situate discursive formations on radicalisation within 
the theoretical lens of discursive technology. The technology of the self is about the 
transformation of the self according to a particular social and political norm and thus 
depends on the existence of normative discursive paradigm with its own concepts, 
language, and experts, that perform the function of what Foucault called ‘regimes of 
truth’. In the context of de-radicalisation, it is the discourse of radicalisation that 
enables de-radicalisation interventions. Since radicalisation was intended to be 
applied in policy terms, the next chapter will analyse how the knowledge of 
radicalisation was implemented in structures of government through disciplinary 
technology. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Disciplinary Technology (Power): Surveillance, Detection, 
Discipline 
 
It reinforced the idea of bad and good Muslims; it reinforced the idea of those who 
want to be a part of us and those who don’t, and as the independent review of the 
Prevent programme stated, “Prevent was a means for government to impose a 
British version of Islam on Muslim communities”, and this was from an independent 
Prevent review; the perception was that this was a way of gendering a form of Islam 
that was palatable and suitable to British social and political spaces. 
                                                                                               (Interview 11, Academic) 
 
 
The UK’s de-radicalisation programme known as Channel had emerged under 
PREVENT II in 2009, and yet the concept of de-radicalisation itself was not 
articulated until PREVENT III in 2011. De-radicalisation was only mentioned in 
passing in PREVENT II, without an attempt to define it (HO 2009, 90). By 2011, de-
radicalisation was considered by policymakers to be a more streamlined and 
effective approach to countering radicalisation than PREVENT I and II’s wide remit.  
However, a number of questions became pertinent.  If PREVENT shows a long term 
concern for terrorism (future oriented), and de-radicalisation seeks to reverse 
radicalism (crossed the line), which points to conflicting policy logics, why does de-
radicalisation sit within PREVENT? Why is Channel preoccupied with ‘vulnerability’ 
and ‘extremism’ and not terrorism? What is the significance of employing the 
language of ‘vulnerability’ in a counterterrorism strategy? Why is Channel 
preoccupied with religious and political makers in its identification process? 
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This chapter will argue that PREVENT and the Channel programme should be 
viewed through the lens of disciplinary technology. Underlying disciplinary 
technology is the working of a more subtle and pervasive form of power. According 
to Foucault the purpose of the punishment of crime evolved from retribution in the 
pre-modern world to reform and rehabilitation of the criminal in the modern world 
(Foucault 1991). This rehabilitative model is premised on the logic that transforming 
the soul leads to changes in behaviour (Foucault 1991, 104-134). The focus is 
therefore on discipline and control of subjects rather than physical retribution and 
punishment. Crucial to the execution of disciplinary technology is the apparatus 
encompassing the institutions, buildings, as well as strategies of government, 
through broader domains like civil society, with the assistance of networks of 
authority (Doctors, psychologist, teachers, youth workers, managers). This is done 
through surveillance, in which subjects are aware of being observed and thus 
internalise norms through self-regulation/self-policing, in conjunction with 
‘normalising judgment’ and the ‘examination’; both of which is concerned with 
judging and placing subjects in relation to grids of ‘normality’ in order to control their 
behaviour (Foucault 1991, 170-194).   
 
The first section analyses interviewees view’s on PREVENT, whilst the second 
brings to light the construction of classification systems in PREVENT and the impact 
it had in the execution of policy. These two section focus on the way that PREVENT 
was deployed to reconfigure new communities amongst the Muslim communities and 
alternative conceptions of Muslim conduct. The last two sections focus on the 
second and third objectives of PREVENT, supporting vulnerable people and 
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supporting institutions and sectors where there is risk of radicalisation. Both 
objectives involve the Channel programme. This chapter discusses the impact of 
such objectives and situates Channel within wider disciplinary techniques.  
 
6. An Overview of PREVENT in CONTEST  
 
The aim of the PREVENT strategy is to ‘stop people becoming terrorists or 
supporting terrorism’ (HO 2011, 61). The rationale underpinning PREVENT was that 
government would work in partnership with Muslim communities to counter the long-
term conditions that lead to violent radicalisation. This ‘soft’ turn in counter-terrorism 
was largely the by-product of the Preventing Extremism Together (PET) workforce 
and the Wilton Park Conference in 2006, which had predated the PREVENT strategy 
and had bought Muslims leaders and the government together in order to address 
the issue of violent extremism.  
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The PET workforce published their recommendations in November 2005, some of 
which was incorporated in the PREVENT strategy of 2006 (HO 2006, 82). PREVENT 
II also built and led to other initiatives, like the publication by the Department 
Communities and Local Government (DCLG) in April 2007 of ‘Preventing Violent 
Extremism: Winning Hearts and Minds’, which set out a community-led approach to 
tackling violent extremism; the sponsoring of the ‘Radical Middle Way’ by the FCO 
and DCLG to challenge terrorist ideology; and a programme of work to improve the 
capacity of NOMS and other agencies to manage the risks posed by violent 
extremist offenders, amongst other initiatives (HO 2009, 82-83) A consensus 
emerged between 2005 and 2006 that the most effective and legitimate strategy for 
tackling violent extremism was through the support and mobilisation of the Muslim 
communities (Briggs, Fieschi, and Lownsbrough 2006; Briggs 2010; Lambert 2011).  
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The delivery of PREVENT fell on the DCLG with funding available to organisations 
and charities in local municipalities seeking to counter radicalisation. PREVENT 
allocated £6M in 2007, which increased to £140M by 2008-2009 (HO 2009, 16; 
Briggs 2010, 971). PREVENT funding was distributed according to the population 
size of Muslim communities in a particular locality (HO 2006; 2009; HC 2010, 50). In 
2008, the PREVENT strategy was rolled out nationally, along with National Indicator 
35 (NI35)—building resilience to violent extremism—which incorporated a measure 
of a local authority’s ‘engagement with and understanding of Muslim communities’ 
(Briggs 2010, 975). All local areas were therefore required to report to government 
whether they had engaged with the Muslim communities as part of their performance 
measures (Briggs 2010, 975).  Police PREVENT coordinators were also created in 
2008, as well as the trialling of the Channel project (Ibid). Since its inception in 2006 
PREVENT has undergone two revisions and is currently in its third iteration (2006, 
2009 and 2011).  
The first and second PREVENT strategies were designed to address the causes, or 
drivers, of radicalisation at a variety of stages. The strategic objectives were 
designed to (HO 2009, 80; HC 2010; Briggs 2010): 
1. Challenge the ideology behind violent extremism through targeted 
communications and work with credible religious authorities both in the UK 
and overseas to counter the extremist narrative; 
 
2. Disrupt the activities of those who seek to recruit vulnerable people; 
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3. Provide interventions to support vulnerable people, largely  concentrated in 
high priority, high risk geographical areas as well as within specific sectors, 
such as prisons and higher education; 
 
4. Build community resilience primarily through work at a local level but also 
including initiatives to build community capacity, such as the support of 
national bodies and the establishing of best practice guidance for mosques;  
 
5. Address wider grievances including work in the UK and overseas.  
 
However, the introduction of a second version of PREVENT (2009) was 
characterised by two important features. Firstly, PREVENT II shifted the focus further 
away from violence and towards new category called ‘non-violent extremism’ (HO 
2009, 81). The most immediate challenge was its meaning (Briggs 2010, 976). This 
new categorisation proved problematic given that some of leading partners of 
government in the delivery of counter-radicalisation initiatives, such as the MCB and 
STREET, in addition to several other organisations, were considered ‘non-violent 
extremists’ (more in chapter 7). The second critical dimension of PREVENT II was 
the move towards a greater focus on ‘Our Shared values’ (HO 2009, 87), defined 
loosely as a commitment to rights, support for institutions and democracy, and 
respect for the rule of law and equality (HO 2009, 87). This categorisation was used 
by the former Labour government not only to restrict and marginalise ‘non-violent 
extremists’, which by then included the MCB, who had previously been championed 
by New Labour as representatives of Muslim communities, but also to delineate a set 
of national and cultural values.  
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Meanwhile, the publication of Arun Kundnani’s ‘SPOOKED!’ in 2009 was a 
significant intervention in the discourse on PREVENT because it presented the first 
empirical critique of PREVENT in the public domain. The overall conclusion of the 
report was that PREVENT had little to do with preventing radicalisation and more to 
with counter-subversion, particularly intelligence gathering by the secret services and 
the government (Kundnani 2009). His report also stated that PREVENT was 
perceived by British Muslims as a way to police ‘thought-crimes’, restrict legitimate 
dissent, and construct models of the ‘good Muslim’ (39-41). With the arrival of the 
Coalition government in 2010 PREVENT was subjected to review by the House of 
Commons Select Committee. The Select Committee investigation highlighted a 
number of critical issues. These include but do not exhaust the following (HC 2010): 
  
 PREVENT is situated within a counter-terrorism strategy and the Muslim 
community is therefore guilty by association (8, para 11). 
 
 The focus on Muslims alienates them and legitimises the views of the Far 
Right and Islamophobes (8, para 13). 
 
 
 Problems with terminology: the language of Prevent ‘lends itself to the idea 
that there lies a dormant terrorist within Muslims’ (9, para 14). 
 
 Being labelled ‘at risk from violent extremism’ criminalises Muslims (9, para 17 
and 18).    
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 PREVENT was accused as being a vehicle for spying, surveillance and 
intelligence gathering (11-14). For example, in late 2007 the West Midlands 
Police created project ‘champion’. 218 CCTV Cameras in Muslim areas, particular 
Alum Rock and Sparkhill, were installed in Birmingham by the police. The installation 
of the cameras began in January 2010 and by April questions by the community 
began to be asked (Thornton QPM 2010, 8). By July 2010 the West Midlands Police 
agreed to halt the project. 
 
 PREVENT was using the Channel programme to delegitimise dissent, spy 
and pursue ‘suspects’ (14-17 and 52-55). 
 
 It promoted envy amongst other faith groups who wanted did not have access 
to the same amount of money and attention for community projects (18, para 
41-43). 
 
 South Asian Organisations were accessing PREVENT through emphasising 
the ‘Muslims aspect of their identity’. It had thus led to anti-cohesion projects. 
(19, para 43) 
 
 It did not target other forms of extremism in other communities and ideologies 
(20, para 45). 
 
 It did not appreciate the diversity of Muslims communities and the Muslim 
identity has been reduced to the faith persona. It has reified the Muslim 
identity and divided the Muslim communities even further (22, para 51). 
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 It tried to social engineer Muslim communities by promoting ‘Good Islam’ 
against ‘bad Islam’ (34, para 85-87). 
 
 It was accused for funding extremist individuals and groups (37-8, para 94-
95). 
 
 It conflated community cohesion work with the narrower objective of 
preventing violent extremism/radicalisation, which convoluted the ability of 
policy-makers to effectively tackle the problem of violent radicalisation (37, 
para 92 and pp. 56-961). 
 
 It was criticised for sitting within the DCLG Government. This meant that Local 
government had to deliver security work it was not familiar with (40, para 101 
& 108) 
 
 It could not be measured. Policymakers cannot gauge success (52, para 136-
138) 
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Consequently, a revised version of PREVENT was released in June 2011. 
PREVENT III was different to previous strategies in that it widened the scope of its 
objectives to cover all forms of terrorism and extremism, like those of the Far-Right, 
and not just Al-Qaeda inspired types, whilst narrowing the focus of the strategy, e.g. 
not funding integration projects (HO 2011, 60). Furthermore, the objectives of 
PREVENT, although similar in many respects focused on ideas, people, and 
institutions (HO 2011, 63):  
 
1. Respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from 
those who promote it; 
 
2. Prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are 
given appropriate advice and support; and 
 
3. Work with a wide range of sectors where there are risks of radicalisation 
which we need to address. 
 
                                                                                                                                 
According to the revised strategy, the biggest change was disentangling the 
integration strategy from the PREVENT strategy (HO 2011, 62). With this 
streamlined strategy, PREVENT officially introduced ‘de-radicalisation’ interventions 
under the second objective, ‘supporting vulnerable people’ (65) and delivered 
through the Channel Programme (59-71). Channel is a police run programme that is 
anchored institutionally in pre-existing crime prevention infrastructure and is 
administered through a multi-agency approach. It has 28 coordinators and a handful 
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of support posts and covers about 75 local authorities and 12 police forces (57). The 
total funding for Channel for the period April 2007 to March 2011 was approximately 
£4.7 million (60). Notably, this second objective of PREVENT is linked to the third- 
supporting sectors and institutions where there are risk of radicalisation (66). This 
includes Schools and Children, Higher and Further Education, Health, the Criminal 
Justice System, Prison and Probation, Youth Offenders and Youth Justice, 
PREVENT Policing Officers, and the Charitable Sector (66- 72). As part of the 
strategy, government will work with these sectors in order to raise an ‘awareness of 
the risks of radicalisation and of how radicalisers work and to develop an effective 
response’ (Ibid, 66). Where PREVENT II previously encompassed various 
community projects, the current strategy, focuses on Channel and de-radicalisation 
interventions.  
 
6.2. PREVENT: counter-terrorism, counter-subversion, community cohesion, 
or crime prevention?  
 
This section highlights the assessment of PREVENT by interviewees. Of the 27 
interviews, the senior researcher at Quilliam was the only interviewee who spoke 
positively about PREVENT. A couple of others, like the directors of Siraat and the 
MCU distinguished between ‘old’ and ‘new’ PREVENT and believed that ‘old’ 
PREVENT was a more effective strategy.  The notion of ‘old’ PREVENT refers to 
PREVENT I in 2006 in which organisations like Siraat and STREET were funded to 
counter-radicalisation. ‘New’ PREVENT designates PREVENT III, which terminated 
such projects out of the principle of not funding ‘non-violent extremist’. 
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This government now for example have fallen into the trap and got rid of all the work 
and just left it to people who profess what they profess. You don’t find Prevent 
anymore; you don’t find any successful prevent. That was even mentioned by Mr 
(inaudible) who came from the FBI in New York who came and sat with the Home 
Affairs Select Committee. What was his statement? Old Prevent is better than New 
Prevent. 
                                                                                                                                    
(Interview 23, Director of Siraat) 
 
However, interviewees were overwhelmingly critical of PREVENT. An example of a 
critical verdict of PREVENT is articulated by a former Chief Inspector and someone 
who sat on the PREVENT Delivery Board, as well as being responsible for assessing 
the community impact of counter-terrorism. 
 
It was an ill thought out strategic approach in my view and that’s been acknowledged 
by government now. The whole issue was poorly researched, not properly 
understood, and as a consequence of that we ended up with an ill-judged policy 
approach. 
                                                                                                                                            
(Interview 24, former Chief Inspector /PREVENT Board) 
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This interviewee provides an overview of PREVENT from someone who was 
involved in it at a strategic level. A more detailed breakdown of PREVENT from 
another prominent interviewee is explained by former SG of the MCB.  The 
interviewee highlights a number of problems with PREVENT, ranging from the way 
that the strategy was framed at the outset, to its delivery through local Councils who 
were reluctant to implement security work, to the negative impact on Muslim 
communities in terms of ‘spying’ and dividing Muslims. Again his comment is 
significant given his former position as one of the main representatives of Muslim 
communities.   
 
 
From day one it was seen from the community in a very negative light in the sense 
that government was giving lots of money to councils and many of them weren’t 
interested to do this sort of work because local Councils had done work in the 
Muslim communities-youth groups, mosques, and other bodies- but the way it was 
framed as if the problem was with the Muslim community and we have to 
deradicalise them. Many local Councils rejected it, and some Muslim organisations 
got some money and then realised it was Prevent money, which was seen as more 
or less spying on the community and then it divided the community. 
 
                                                                                                                               
(Interview 14, former SG of the MCB) 
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However, contra PREVENT, the data reveals a disconnect with the delivery of 
PREVENT between different stages of the policymaking framework, starting with 
policymakers at the top, such as the OSCT and the Home Office, to Local Authorities 
and the Police below them, all the way down to community organisations. In other 
words the data shows that PREVENT meant different things to different people. So 
while it was officially about the prevention of terrorism, beneath the surface it meant 
a plethora of things: to be publicly seen tackling a problem for politicians, career 
progression for civil servants, funding for organisations unable to get funds 
elsewhere, an administrative tick-box initiatives for local government, and the 
building of relationships with communities for the police, amongst many other things.  
Examples illustrating the myriad understandings of PREVENT from the perspectives 
of the different individuals and organisations can be seen below.  The first 
interviewee, explains his own career motives and those of civil servants for getting 
involved in PREVENT.   
 
The problem with OSCT, despite having a good guy at the top, was basically a 
bunch of young ambitious civil servants who thought they were spooks ....they put 
their mobile phones in the lockers as they go in because what they do is an 
important secret. But actually a lot of them worked there for six months, got the t-
shirt and left. None of them stuck at it, it was a flash place to be in government. Part 
of the problem with this whole agenda for ten years was that it was sexy. If I’m 
honest it was partly why I got into it, front page stuff every day. It was sexy.  
                                                                                                                                           
(Interview 4, IPPR Analyst) 
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This comment suggests that PREVENT was an attractive prospect from the 
perspective of career progression, in the interviewee’s words: ‘it was sexy’. There 
are other examples in the data set that reinforce the notion that PREVENT had in 
fact become an industry with money and jobs. The interviewee below, the director of 
Khayaal Theatre, an organisation that received PREVENT money for counter-
radicalisation projects, explains his organisations experience with PREVENT.   
 
It’s really interesting for us that the only significant resources we were able to access 
was through Prevent, the only significant press coverage we were able to get was 
press coverage that’s going to inform Prevent about Prevent. The press were never 
interested in any of the stories around the work we did about us being the first 
professional Muslim theatre company in the UK, around being a theatre company 
that brought together artists of different faiths, around our delivering work in places 
like Shakespeare’s Globe, the press was never interested. But the moment we 
started doing Prevent work all of a sudden there was all sorts of interest. 
                                                                                                                                            
(Interview 5, Director, Khayaal Theatre) 
 
His account shows that PREVENT money provided both crucial financial support and 
publicity for his company’s work. He told me that he had struggled to obtain funding 
from the art bodies before the advent of PREVENT. It is an insight into the reasons 
behind the involvement of many organisations with PREVENT. In other words, in 
many instances it was less about countering radicalisation and more about access to 
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funds in order to ensure organisational survival. Again, the key ideas here is that 
PREVENT was understood and implemented differently at all levels according to the 
individual and organisational remit. This exemplified below by PREVENT officer, who 
viewed PREVENT in terms of building relationships between the police and the 
community.      
 
So with Prevent the idea was it’s about taking some secret stuff and having a 
forward facing side in order to engage with the community. If something happened 
the public have a face to talk to and be able to build a relationship. So if I’m at 
Preston I know we have a link worker working with the Mosques and Imam’s and 
police officers now visit Mosques once a week or a month just as a normal routine to 
see if there’s any problems with crime or anti-social behaviour so that you build a 
relationship with your community and understand what their problems are. 
                                                                                                                                     
(Interview 21, PREVENT Officer) 
 
Ultimately, PREVENT was understood and implemented differently by diverse actors 
for all sorts of reasons and motivations. It is unsurprising then that the majority of 
interviewees were critical of the notion that PREVENT was supposed to tackle 
radicalisation or that it was in the end effective in directly preventing terrorism. There 
was a clear disjuncture between the objectives of PREVENT and the projects it 
funded. 
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There were lots of other somosa and pancake projects.....It was basically asking 
Muslim women to tackle violent extremism without any research, prior experience, or 
any practical tools or trialling. I think it was, again, doomed to failure because having 
people, or social workers, or at best do good-doers who felts they were proud to be 
British, and getting them to deal with something as heavy as this was ridiculous. 
They neither had the qualifications, nor the understanding of the problems, nor the 
time to bring on board academics or any other kind of strategy, so simply having a 
rolling out a range of projects... 
                                                                                                                                          
(Interview 2, Director of Arts Versa) 
The comment above by the director of Arts Versa a company involved in counter-
radicalisation work situates the failure of PREVENT in the securitisation of 
community cohesion projects or what he calls ‘somosa and pancakes’ projects.  He 
raises the important issue that local authority and public sector workers had neither 
the expertise nor experience to perform counter-terrorism related tasks. In addition, 
the notion of the push towards community cohesion projects in a counter-terrorism 
strategy is seriously questioned by the former Chairman of the Muslim Safety Forum, 
the main police-community relation body.   
 
But in real counter-terrorism terms it hasn’t done an iota of good and that’s 
something we and the police agree that Prevent has not done anything tangible in 
the fight against terrorism. I remember in 2006 and 2007 the DCLG did this 
conference at the Queen Elizabeth Centre to showcase what Prevent has achieved, 
you know, what the funding has achieved; they had six or seven projects and one of 
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these projects was we took these young girls to a camping trip, we took some boys 
to the cinema, we went to the seaside, fantastic... 
                                                                                                                               
(Interview 18, former chairman of the MSF) 
 
These comments highlight the disjointed nature of the implementation of PREVENT, 
particularly between the stated threat (terrorism), the proposed solution (Preventing 
radicalisation), the delivery of the strategy (Local government, police), and the 
means (community projects). In short, interviewees frequently pointed at the 
irrelevance of the bulk of PREVENT activities in relation to its objective, which is 
reflected above in the observation that PREVENT has not done anything ‘tangible in 
the fight against terrorism’.  In addition, a number of interviewees raised a significant 
weakness of the strategy- the absence of a criterion to measure the successes and 
failures of PREVENT. The inability to calculate the output of the strategy in relation 
to whether it has stopped or prevented terrorism is a remarkable drawback for such 
as high profile policy area. The following interviewee discusses the difficulty of 
measuring preventive work in this area.         
 
Well it’s really difficult isn’t it? It’s really hard to prove the negative of something. It’s 
difficult to prove something hasn’t happened because it might not have happened 
anyway. How do we prove that it not happening was because of something we did? I 
mean you are always in security area or most areas of preventative policy making 
that’s the challenge. And particularly when you have really, really, small numbers. So 
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for instance in Health policy there’s all sort of preventative policy you can prove. You 
can prove you know introducing more hand sanitation units in hospital you bring 
down MRSA or whatever it’s called. 
                                                                                                                                            
(Interview 9, ISD Analyst) 
She raises two crucial questions: how do you prove the negative of something? And 
conceding her point that proving preventive work in other policy domains is possible, 
why then is there a high tolerance by policymakers for the absence of measuring 
tools and techniques in PREVENT? Why invest political and financial capital on a 
policy you do not know is working? While this section does not attempt to answer 
directly these questions, such questions nevertheless challenge the assumptions 
that state that the strategy is supposed to tackle terrorism or even prevent 
radicalisation. The fact that PREVENT was not linked to terrorism and that 
policymakers were not preoccupied with establishing a direct connection between 
measuring PREVENT work and terrorism, provokes a significant question: what was 
the purpose of PREVENT?  
Overall, PREVENT was seen by interviewees to be a muddled policy exhibiting 
different policy logics.  Instead of an effort to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of Muslim 
communities, the data reveals that the majority of interviewees believed that 
PREVENT was about two main objectives: (1) the intelligence gathering on Muslims 
and (2) the social re-engineering of communities. With this in mind, PREVENT was 
viewed more as a counter-subversion strategy than as a counter-terrorism strategy.  
With regards to intelligence gathering, interviewees have pointed to a number of 
features: the fact that PREVENT was delivered in local areas with Muslim 
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populations; community projects had to be documented; signs of potential radicalism 
reported to the authorities; project Champion in Birmingham, in which cameras were 
placed to spy on the community (see footnote 39); the fact that PREVENT was 
coordinated by the police, amongst others. The long quote below is by someone who 
was arrested for downloading material as a university student. His comments aptly 
encapsulates the notion of intelligence gathering in PREVENT.   
 
….this is why they rolled out the programme to areas with more than 2,000 Muslims, 
was because they were trying to understand all Muslims and where the problem 
were, and then eventually they found that Universities were a problem, schools and 
colleges were a problem, community centres and Mosques were a problem and so 
the new Prevent strategy decided to focus on these institutions...... The Prevent 
programme was rolled out in order to gather information on the community which 
then became intelligence and then was used to form new policy and new actions by 
the police towards the community......  
                                                                                                                                              
(Interview 19, Activist/Academic) 
 
Crucially, he highlights the role of institutions marked out by policymakers as sites of 
potential radicalisation as well as focal points of surveillance networks in structures 
of governance, something this chapter address in subsequent sections. Meanwhile, 
the second dimension raised by many interviewees was the push by the government 
towards remaking Muslim communities. This view is expressed by the former head 
of the MCU and counter-terrorism specialist. 
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But then CLG started up, first with Ruth Kelly and then with Hazel Blears, they made 
very clear they were looking to engage with a different set of communities rather 
than communities that are or happen to be. But to construct new ones either with the 
help with created bodies like Quilliam and the Sufi Council of Britain and I remember 
witnessing that first hand and yes you could describe elements of that as post-
colonial. You need to ask the question of whether Labour government ministers 
could ever dream of taking the same approach with other communities. 
                                                                               (Interview 17, Director of the MCU) 
 
The interviewee calls the approach of government to Muslim communities ‘post-
colonial’ in reference to the fact that it was trying to recreate community leadership 
by promoting certain organisations and other religious denominations over existing 
ones. This view is also echoed in the comments below. Similarly to the interviewee 
above, this interviewee identifies the Quilliam Foundation and the Sufi Muslim 
Council as key players in the efforts of government to construct new partners. 
 
They tried to create the Sufi Muslim Council- that failed. They tried to create the 
British Muslim Forum-that failed. They have somehow coerced an organisation 
called MINAB, which has for all intents and purposes fallen flat on its face; they 
heavily funded the Quilliam Foundation, they took the money, they creamed it, I 
know Mr Majjid Nawaz very well- they’ve got nice houses and property out of it but 
what have they done? They’ve not changed anything and wherever they go they get 
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kicked and shouted at.  So all this money they spent on all this, all it’s done is help to 
identify who the sell outs are in the eyes of the community and who aren’t.  
                                                                                                                              
(Interview 18, former chairman of the MSF) 
 
The point in this section is to shed light on how PREVEENT was seen by many as a 
subterfuge for other governmental objectives.  PREVENT was sold as an attempt to 
counter radicalisation and yet the data reveals a disconnection at every level of the 
policy chain, from policymakers at the top, all the way down to the layperson at the 
receiving end of PREVENT. The availability of funding, delegating the delivery of the 
policy to DCLG, investing in community cohesion projects- all revealed the confusing 
logic at the heart of PREVENT and how far removed the work of PREVENT was 
from its stated objectives. However, a closer inspection of the data indicated that 
instead of tackling radicalisation, PREVENT was about the intelligence gathering, 
surveillance, and the reconstruction of Muslim communities. The next section 
examines the normative aim governing PREVENT in relation to Muslims.   
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6.3 ‘British Values’ and ‘Extremism’ in PREVENT: ‘Four Legs Good, Two Legs 
Bad’ 
 
Fieldwork data conveys how PREVENT created a dichotomy between the category 
‘British values’ on the one hand, and ‘extremism’ on the other hand. Whereas ‘British 
values’ encompasses notions such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
is associated with the mainstream and therefore the ‘Good’, ‘extremism’ connotes 
categories like Islamism, Salafism, Sharia, and violence, embodies the abnormal and 
deviant, thus representing the ‘Bad’. Whilst interviewees predominantly expressed a 
constructivist take on categories like ‘British values’ and ‘extremism’, they 
nevertheless argued that the aforementioned binaries had created a classification 
system which acts as a regulatory mechanism in policy terms so that activities, 
people, and objectives are ordered according to ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’. Classification 
systems apply ‘a principle of difference to a population in such a way as to be able to divide 
them and all their characteristics into at least two opposing groups- us/them’ (Woodward 
1997, 29). 
 
The concept ‘shared values’ became prominent in the second iteration of the 
PREVENT strategy in 2009. It is important to recognise that the notion of ‘British 
values’ (Albeit PREVENT does not refer to it as British values, but as shared values) 
is not enshrined in law and that it sits merely within a policy document. It does not 
have any juridical effect. Many interviewees believed that ‘British values’ were 
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constructed values. Below, for example, an academic expresses his understanding 
of British values.   
 
When you start to talk with people about what British values are, they will mention 
democracy, equality, and fairness, etc. and is that any different to the Swedish, or 
the Italians, or the Spanish, or the Canadians, or the Japanese? No..... At the 
cultural level you can go down the route of, you know, it’s the monarchy; but if you 
look back, they are German and Greek, not exactly British so then you look at the 
food we eat; the favourite dish is the chicken tikka masala, well, tikka masala might 
have been invented in Glasgow but it was invented by Pakistani and Bangladeshi’s 
for the British palate, you know, making a curry that reflected British sensibilities.... 
Where do we go? 
                                                                                           (Interview 11, Academic) 
 
The underlying argument above is that British values and the search for a singular 
and ‘mainstream’ national identity is depicted as an elusive exercise. It is instead 
arbitrary defined, which is shaped historically by various immigrant communities 
settling in Britain. Another example of the tenuousness of British values is expressed 
by the former Chair of the MSF who raises the contested nature of British values:  
 
So the idea of British values is a red herring. It fell flat on their face.... What did they 
come up with? Everything they came up with was airy fairy and universal. They were 
human rights things. I still can’t figure a single British thing. 
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                                                                 (Interview 18, former chairman of the MSF) 
 
Alongside discourses on British values in PREVENT is the notion of the ‘good’ 
Muslim or ‘moderate’ Muslim. Notably, some interviewees were not clear what the 
category ‘moderate’ Muslim meant. An academic below aptly describes the way that 
different groups and organisations not only compete to occupy the ‘moderate’ 
category but the way in which such groups and organisations compete for the 
‘moderate’ category in relation to each other. The ‘moderate’ category in short does 
not exist as an empirical fact and only makes sense in relation to other groups.  
 
So the carrots being dangled and what you have is one organisation saying ‘we are 
moderate Muslims’. Then you have another organisation saying ‘they are moderate, 
but we are moderate mainstream Muslims’ and then you have another group say 
‘they are moderate Muslims but we are middle of the road mainstream Muslims’ and 
then you end with a group that says ‘well, we are not even Muslim but we’ll deal with 
the problem.  
                                                                                            (Interview 11, Academic) 
 
The term is even rendered meaningless, encapsulated by the parody- ‘we are middle 
of the road mainstream Muslims’. In this case, terms like ‘moderate’ come attached 
with the ‘carrot’ of funding, as does the term ‘extremism’. In many respects the use of 
these terms can be understood in relation to the strategic manoeuvring of actors for 
various ends, thus reinforcing the hollow nature of such categories.  Another 
303 
 
conception of moderate relates to foreign policy. The criterion for being ‘moderate’ 
Muslims below is not then religious but is instead political, especially with regards to 
acquiescence with Western foreign policy.    
 
I think it was Tariq Ramadan who said that a real test of who is a moderate and 
extremist Muslim is who supports American foreign policy. So you can have people 
with extremist Islamic beliefs in Saudi Arabia but because they bump along okay with 
the US government, they are okay. But if you are Syrian or Iranian and you don’t like 
the US government and even though your concept of Islam might be a lot more 
moderate, you are an extremist.  
                                              (Interview 24, former Chief Inspector/ PREVENT Board) 
 
Again people have different conceptions of these terms. According to the director of 
the Cordoba Foundation, the distinction between the dichotomy of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ is 
the distinction between apolitical and political. The notion of ‘good’ Muslims 
corresponds to the idea of someone who is spiritual and prays but is non-political, 
and ‘bad’ Muslim is someone who is political. However this binary is challenged by 
the interviewee. If he has political views, then it is the result of being a ‘citizen’. Being 
a good citizen means he has the freedom to engage with society and politics. Again, 
this understanding of ‘bad’ Muslim inverts the prevalent understanding of ‘bad’ 
Muslims.   
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Good and bad Muslims today in the government’s eyes and mainstream 
establishments eyes unfortunately is about if you are somebody who prays and is 
into spirituality and the such and you embody that and that alone and whether you 
have a political dimension. My argument is this: I have a political view because I am 
a citizen of this country and have a freedom to do so not because I’m obliged to have 
this view by my religion.  
                                                       (Interview 27, Director of Cordoba Foundation) 
 
So the binary presents the ‘moderate’ Muslim according to interviewees as spiritual, 
non-political, and someone who agrees with Western foreign Policy. The ‘moderates’ 
are of course those who subscribe to British values. What then about the ‘other’? 
The ‘other’ in discourses of radicalisation is represented by ‘Islamism’, or ‘political 
Islam’. The director at the Cordoba Foundation explains the association the 
discourse has of Political Islam.    
 
Unfortunately Political Islam when we talk about it today say through the mainstream 
prism or talks to people in positions of governance and the like, the understanding is 
that the term pertains to the term Sharia, which pertains to subjugating women, 
amputating people and the penal code, which people take as whipping and stoning. 
So Political Islam is seen as something as enforced, which in my dictionary goes 
against the value system of Islam, which creates a schism in terms of rights for men 
and women, which again I see as contradictory to the value system of Islam. And 
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that it seeks to eliminate the ‘Other’; cannot exist within the realm of any other idea 
or faith and hence in order to exist has to eliminate everything else.  
                                                      (Interview 27, Director of Cordoba Foundation) 
 
So Political Islam, referred to often in the discourse as ‘Islamism’, is associated with: 
the sharia, the subjugation of women, amputating people, stoning, and eliminates the 
‘other’.  Political Islam also became associated with ‘non-violent extremism’ in 2009. 
The advent of ‘non-violent extremism’ in PREVENT 2009 was not only a symbolic 
distinction but also a policy re-calibration of resources and effort towards tackling 
‘extremism’. The underlying principle of this approach was that Government would 
not support groups and individuals who did not subscribe to British values despite 
the acknowledged experience and knowledge such groups and individuals have in 
tackling the threat of violent radicalisation. The category ‘non-violent extremism’ was 
superseded by the term ‘extremism’ in the PREVENT strategy of 2011 and was 
defined as: 
 
...the vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, 
the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths 
and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of 
members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas.  
                                                                                            
                                                                     (HO 2011, 62, footnote 52; HM 2015, 3) 
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Hence ‘extremism’ is defined as the opposite of British values. Despite the definition 
offered in PREVENT most interviewees believed that ‘non-violent extremism’ was 
synonymous with ‘extremism’ and that there were various understandings of what 
‘extremism’ actually means. The interviewee below discusses the difficulty in defining 
‘non-violent extremist groups’. 
 
There’s difficulty in defining who non-violent extremist groups are.  Because it is a 
relative term everyone has their own definitions.....Hypothetically let’s imagine we 
had a good definition: it’s a belief in this or that view makes you extremist. How do 
you then determine whether a group is an extremist group or not? Will it have to be 
written in their governing articles? Will it be based on the fact they once invited a 
speaker who once shared that view? What if you have a chairman, who used to be 
an extremist, but is now renounced, but used to sit on another board? And this is the 
problem; it’s not just about how you define but what is your criterion for making that 
decision? 
                                                                                        (Interview 1, Demos Analyst) 
 
However, as articulated above, the term is ill-defined and vague, a problem it shares 
with the word ‘extremism’. One view of ‘extremism’, explained below by a prison de-
radicalisation agency provider is that it leads to violence. His notion of ‘radical’ does 
not equate with that of radicalisation, which makes more of an explicit link between 
extremism and violence.  
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We made a distinction between radical and extremist. An extremist is somebody who 
would allow the killing of innocent people based on those five areas. A radical is 
somebody who misunderstands those five areas but wouldn’t go so far as to call for 
other people to cause harm.  
                                                                                 (Interview 23, Director of Siraat) 
  
Thus according to the director of Siraat an extremist is someone who legitimises 
violence whereas ‘radical’ merely has radical ideas but does not act upon those 
ideas. His understanding of ‘extremism’ emphasises the diversity of interpretations 
the word entails.  Another view of ‘extremists’ is not necessarily linked to violence but 
that it is associated with Salafi Muslims, as  explained by a PREVENT practitioner.  
 
If you ask people what extremism is and what de-radicalisation means, you have too 
many different things to explain; so you hide behind words that you don’t understand 
yourself. So ‘Salafi’ has become a buzzword of saying what is wrong rather than 
saying what is right.  
                                                        (Interview 8, Birmingham PREVENT practitioner) 
 
According to the comment above, Salafi Muslims are associated with ‘extremism’ 
and with ‘what is wrong rather than saying what is right’. Another perspective of 
‘extremism’ is shared below by an academic posing the question through the 
hypothetical eyes of the EDL. 
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You scratch the surface and you ask the EDL what does an extremist Muslim look 
like?.....So actually when you start looking at that, well, actually an extremist is a 
Muslim, who prays and goes to mosque and eats halal meat- they are all extremists. 
Actually you’ll find they are huge swathes of Muslim communities. So are we talking 
about extremist or are we talking about Muslim in culture terms only? Like cultural or 
secular Jews.   
                                                                                             (Interview 11, Academic) 
 
This comment suggests that according to the EDL ‘extreme’ Muslim equates to 
practicing Muslim, ‘someone who eats Halal meat, who prays, who wants a mosque 
to go to’. This conception of ‘extremism’ moves the lines of demarcation beyond the 
narrow fringe of individuals and small groups and situates the entire Muslim 
community within the purview of ‘extremism’. The problem therefore resides with 
Muslim communities and the religion of Islam and not extremism of thought and 
action. The suggestion above is that when Muslims abandon religion and become 
‘cultural Muslims’, then Muslims cease being seen as ‘extremists’. Overall therefore, 
‘extremism’ means different things to different people and yet it still occupies the 
position of ‘Bad’, violent, alien, and thus the opposite of British values. 
In light of the above, how do we make sense of the role of contested categories like 
‘British values’ and ‘extremism’, which remain undefined legally in PREVENT?  What 
in other words is the significance of British values in counter-terrorism? The first is 
the creation of a criterion for distinguishing in policy terms between the legitimate 
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(good) from the illegitimate (bad), whilst the second pertains to the discipline and 
control of individuals, organisations, and structures in line with this criterion. Hence 
the classification system produced by PREVENT created a regulatory norm. The first 
dimension is explained by an academic. 
 
We need them to see what is proper and improper and what is legitimate and 
illegitimate and so on. Policy-makers need a kind of criteria to know what is 
legitimate and what is not so they came up with the ideas of British values. And also 
it’s a good idea because it resonates with all sorts of public policy aspects and 
resonates with the general public.  
                                                                                            (Interview 15, Academic) 
 
This comment elucidates that classification systems are about drawing boundaries in 
public life for policymakers and thus delimiting the spaces and ideas of what 
constitutes acceptability. Moreover, it generates shared vocabulary- one that is 
moral, intellectual, scientific, and institutionally and organisationally workable. It also 
allows for the formation of the vast and loose associations to come together in 
administrating governance: between various governmental departments internally, 
and externally with other sectors and partners; think-tanks, pressure groups, civil 
society organisations, the media and their apparatus, the security establishment, the 
various public institutions, the market, experts, managers, and parents. 
Secondly, the by-product of this new classification was that organisations that were 
previously considered ‘moderate’ and partners in the delivery of counter-terrorism, 
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were branded as ‘extremists’ and eventually marginalised. This approach was 
explained by the former SG of the MCB in the following way.   
 
The problem with the current Prevent is that there are categorisations of Muslims, 
probably from QF’s paper, categorising Muslim organisation into violent and 
nonviolent extremist and advising government not formally talk with non-violent 
extremism. So these are the very laughable position the government has taken. 
Even organisations like the MCB and mainstream Muslim organisations like FOSIS, 
which has been around since 1963, organisations like these are seen, because they 
were defined by Quilliam Foundation and Neo-Cons as non-violent extremist- we are 
somehow extremists- and so now government won’t formally talk to them. So they 
will formally not talk to us but will talk informally.  
                                                                         
                                                                          (Interview 14, former SG of the MCB) 
 
The former president of the MCB highlights how the categorisation of ‘non-violent 
extremism’ effectively precluded and proscribed them from gaining access to 
government.  Such classification systems should also be viewed as an instrument of 
producing certain behaviours and conducts. The following interviewee explains the 
intended meaning behind ‘non-violent extremism’, which ultimately aims at creating 
‘moderate’ Muslims. 
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The Tories are double-speaking…..comes and says we are not interested in violent 
extremism but we’re interested in non-violent extremism. ...they have certain 
problems with Muslim theology and aspects of Sharia and Muslim life. They want 
Muslims whole heartedly to accept homosexuality and ideally they want Muslim 
women to stop wearing niqab, they would like Muslims women to freely marry non-
Muslims. We can’t get away from the fact certain elements within Western societies 
have a problem with elements and practices within Islam.  
                                      
                                                                  (Interview 5, Director of Khayaal Theatre) 
 
In summation, PREVENT produced a classification system dichotomised between 
‘British values’ and ‘extremism’. Data analysis conveyed that for the majority of 
interviewees these terms and ideas were contested and yet the intended meaning- 
‘we are good, they are bad’- was still secured through a classification system. A 
notable feature in the data was that Muslim identity, particular associated with 
politics, foreign policy, and religious commitment was synonymous with ‘extremism’. 
The promotion of ‘British values’ outside juridical channels is consequently seen as 
the antidote to ‘extremism’, or Muslim surfeit. The classification system was 
deployed to discipline certain players, promote others, whilst also producing a 
particular conduct labelled ‘moderate’ Muslims.  
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6.4 The Channel Programme: Supporting ‘Vulnerable’ People  
 
When you are talking about de-radicalisation, you are talking about Channel, which 
is about diverging people away from becoming extremist or terrorist. They would say 
that Channel is the only long-term solution to preventing this problem. 
                                                                                (Interview 21, PREVENT Officer) 
 
As articulated above, de-radicalisation in the UK context is associated with the 
Channel programme and seeks to support ‘vulnerable people’ (Home Office 2011, 
64). The word ‘vulnerable’ has developed in conjunction with the discourses on 
radicalisation and is a central feature in both the Channel identification process and 
the PREVENT strategy. A number of interviewees critically questioned the term and 
concept ‘vulnerable’. The most immediate question consequently relates to the link 
between the concept of ‘vulnerability’, normally associated the young, disabled, the 
old on one hand, and violent radicalisation on the other. The academic below 
questions the relationship between vulnerable youths and violence.  
 
First of all the link between vulnerable youths and violence is highly questionable. In 
particular, when it’s also linked to radical ideas; whatever research we have on 
radicalisation we see that the most active people are by no means vulnerable. Many 
of them come from the most successful sections, like Ed Hussain, of the Muslim 
community. What they have, and nobody tries to make sense of it, someone like Ed 
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Hussain is bloody ambitious and he was very clear about this in the Islamist, he 
wanted to be the leader and now he’s using it in a different way but for the same 
purposes. So who is vulnerable? In what sense they are vulnerable? 
(Interview 15, Academic) 
 
 
This interviewee does not believe that radicals are ‘vulnerable’ but are instead 
‘ambitious’ and hail from ‘successful backgrounds’. Knowledge on the profile typical 
of those deemed radicals suggest that they are far from being ‘vulnerable’. In other 
words, in order for someone to be susceptible to radical ideas they need to educated 
and ambitious. He thus debunks the notion that vulnerable individuals are typically 
those most likely to go on to commit terrorism. Another interviewee critical of the 
notion of ‘vulnerability’, also asks the pertinent question regarding what constituted 
‘vulnerability’. 
 
It’s these words like ‘support’, ‘intervention’, and ‘vulnerable’, all of these words are 
okay if you knew what it actually meant but I don’t actually know what it means... 
Someone who says Osama Bin Laden is cool, is he vulnerable? Just because 
someone said it, what makes them vulnerable? 
  
                                                                 (Interview 18, former Chairman of the MSF) 
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There are however a number of interviewees who view the term ‘vulnerability’ as a 
legitimate concept in the radicalisation process. The rationale underpinning the 
notion of ‘vulnerability’ is that vulnerable people are more ‘at risk’, at danger, and 
more susceptible to embracing radical ideology or be attracted to extremist groups. 
Interviewees who were particularly positive with regards to the notion linking 
vulnerability with radicalisation included two PREVENT Officers, two academics 
based in Birmingham working on community engagement, alongside a local 
government employee working on PREVENT, and some of the think-tanks analysts, 
such as Quilliam and DEMOS. Most these interviewees were practitioners and 
perhaps as a result more appreciative of its role in the radicalisation process. More 
important is whether interviewees believed that the relationship between vulnerability 
and a future propensity to undertake violence could be established and was 
therefore a legitimate way of pre-empting potential problems in advance. An example 
of this logic can be seen in the way that a Senior PREVENT Officer understands the 
causes that lead someone down the route of radicalisation.  
 
What are the vulnerability factors in Keith’s life? He’s never had a father figure, 
whatever it is, he’s been to Somalia or Yemen, he has post- traumatic stress 
disorder, I’ve left the army and I’ve been made redundant and the right-wing are 
trying to recruit me and we are getting more and more right wing cases; as you see 
because of the economy we are getting more and more cases of mental health and 
people aren’t in work. Meanwhile the governments got its head on Al-Qaeda they’re 
not seeing some of those other risks.  
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                                                                   (Interview 22, Senior PREVENT Officer) 
 
In this comment we see an expansive view of ‘vulnerability’. Vulnerability is 
associated with a variety of factors; a person’s biography, where a person’s been, 
‘traumatic stress disorder’, being made redundant, mental health issues, being 
bullied at school, etc. The word ‘vulnerable’ according to this Senior PREVENT 
Officer has thus become shorthand for anything that happened in the past that may 
have played a part in that person’s trajectory towards radicalisation. The interesting 
feature nevertheless in her use of the word ‘vulnerable’ is the removal of agency 
from individuals who have been identified as ‘vulnerable’. This understanding of 
‘vulnerability’, which reflects the PREVENTs conception of ‘vulnerability’, removes 
agency from young people attempting to contextualise political, religious, social, 
cultural, and philosophical realities, and instead situates the burden on the evils of 
ideology and psychological problems. The problem, in other words, is a defect in 
character or the unfortunate circumstances engulfing the individual. The word 
‘vulnerable’ not only dilutes the seriousness of a crime but also evokes a concern for 
the vulnerable individual. This logic is explained by DEMOS analyst.  
 
It’s hard to say; because vulnerability is like a nice sort of forgiving left-wing term for 
it’s not their fault, they are being sucked in by radical preachers and we need to help 
them become more resilience to being manipulated and I think there’s some truth in 
that for some people. But other people aren’t vulnerable at all, they are actively 
empowered and going out and seeking these opportunities. Vulnerable, I think, has 
become a short hand, a pleasant non-discriminatory way of talking about it by using 
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a language of vulnerability you are not stigmatising them, you are trying to 
understand why they are getting involved in this. 
                                                                                                                                        
(Interview 1, DEMOS Analyst) 
 
Whilst he acknowledged that some are not vulnerable and go out ‘seeking 
opportunities’, he nevertheless aptly encapsulates the instrumentalising effects of the 
term, e.g. removing the stigmatisation associated with radical ideas and acts, as well 
as the fact that it is a ‘nice forgiving left-wing term’. The implication with the term 
vulnerability is that the individual was not to blame, should not be castigated, and 
instead requires support, care and education. This logic is also buttressed further by 
the fact that some of the individuals deemed vulnerable are young adolescents 
(more in the next section). It is more natural and fitting to view young adults (in some 
cases children) in terms of ‘vulnerability’ than seeing them as being empowered by 
the adoption of radical ideas and practices.  
Implicitly excluded in the use of ‘vulnerability’ therefore is the agency of those 
deemed vulnerable, particularly their ability to freely and rationally negotiate and 
contextualise their wider political, social, and religious terrain. By stating that 
someone is vulnerable in relation to extremism is to not only attribute the blame 
elsewhere, but it is also to suggest that the individual was brain-washed, duped, and 
deceived into extremism. In short the word ‘vulnerable’ affirms a particular framing of 
the problem whilst denying others. The overall implication is that ‘vulnerability’ 
indicates a pastoral logic embedded in PREVENT, and by default de-radicalisation. 
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Indeed the language of pastoral care is deeply intertwined with the concept of 
vulnerability. This can be ascertained from the language of the following respondent. 
 
The impression I get from Channel is that it’s nurturing, these kids aren’t criminals, 
just as the schools do and society has an obligation towards young people and for 
adults to help nurture them as much as with parenting or teaching.   
                                                                                                                                             
(Interview 25, Senior Researcher Quilliam) 
 
This interviewee employs words like ‘nurturing’, ‘obligation’, ‘parenting, and ‘teaching’ 
to describe Channel. Again the language used evokes a type of pastoral logic. Also 
important in this thinking is the idea that the ‘kids aren’t criminals’. This in fact is one 
of the striking features of Channel in PREVENT- it does not targets criminals or even 
individuals necessarily involved in extremist groups or activities. It is mainly 
concerned with individuals showing the potentiality in the future for radicalism. 
Before discussing how some interviewees believed that future radicalism can be 
detected, it is important to note therefore that ‘vulnerability’ denotes a category that 
describes the vague space between non-criminality, to ‘at risk’ of criminality, and 
risky or threat, which in this instance refers to radicalisation.   
However given the murky continuum between being vulnerable and hence ‘at risk’ 
and being considered a threat, it is a notable feature of Channel that non-threat 
vulnerabilities, such as mental health and social issues, become mixed up with 
threat-vulnerabilities (that is, extreme views indicating propensity for radicalism). The 
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fact that some individuals who are vulnerable in the non-radical sense get picked up 
by Channel is explained by an academic who has done PREVENT community work.  
 
...something say like the Channel Project I know there are community members who 
may assess and they’ll get a report from Channel saying this person looks like they 
are vulnerable and a person will see that and say: ‘no this person isn’t vulnerable 
they might have a mental health issue’ developing, lots of other things, they don’t 
need de-radicalisation’. So potentially you have many people going through the 
system who have no issues anyway.  
                                                                                                                                       
(Interview 7, Academic/PREVENT Practitioner) 
 
The conflation of different forms of ‘vulnerability’ in the case of Channel, between a 
general form of vulnerability and ‘at risk’ from being drawn into terrorism type of 
‘vulnerable’, is also acknowledged in PREVENT 2011. 
  
During the consultation to the Prevent review we found that the attraction of 
community cohesion work appears to have sometimes steered people towards 
Channel who may have been perceived as potentially vulnerable in some broader 
sense, rather than specifically at risk of being drawn into terrorism.  
                                                                                                  
                                                                                                (HO 2011, 65) 
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What then are the risk triggers that convey the right type of vulnerability that 
potentially puts someone on a de-radicalisation intervention? In April 2015, as part of 
the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, the ‘Channel Duty Guidance’ was 
issued. It was the first time a ‘vulnerability assessment framework’ was provided 
(HMG 2015, 11).   It is built around three criteria: (1) engagement with a group or 
cause or ideology; (2) Intent to cause harm; (3) Capability to cause harm. The three 
criteria are assessed by considering 22 factors that can contribute to vulnerability (13 
associated with engagement, six that relate to intent and three for capability). For 
more on the Examples of the 22 factors, see page 12 and Annex C on page 28.  
Despite this however PREVENT concedes, ‘at present OSCT-funded intervention 
providers do not have a ‘standardised’ risk assessment tool; each project has 
developed and deployed its own risk assessment’ (HO 2011, 61). 
 
However, there were two types of broad responses by interviewees. One view states 
that ‘vulnerability’ according to Channel corresponds to religious and political ideas 
and practices, whereas the second view, not antithetical to the first but merely places 
the emphasis on other factors, situates ‘vulnerability’ in terms of psychology, the 
individual, social background, and grievances. Again, these two views are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive and yet where the line is placed naturally lead to 
different policy approaches. The second view certainly tries to play down the political 
and religious context given the sensitivity with regards to the suggestion that 
government was intervening in the religious and political lives of Muslims. The first 
view is articulated below.  
 
320 
 
What we found is that the way they identified people who are vulnerable were very 
Islamophobic, to find a better word. So those who visited the mosque regularly, or 
whose parents were religious, Muslims who belong to a certain school of thought 
within Islam, whether it was Salafi or Ikhwani; those who were from South East Asia 
or North African would be identified. There was a phase when Somalis were 
identified as vulnerable, so now young Somalis are targeted because, you know, 
especially if they are talking about Somalia or are against African Union intervention 
there then those individuals would be identified.  
                                                                         (Interview 18, former Chairman MSF) 
 
According to this view Channel risk indicators correspond to the articulation of 
particular views and beliefs associated with religion and politics, in addition to 
changes in outward behaviour/ appearance. In other words professing a belief in 
‘sharia’ or the ‘caliphate’, the sudden adoption of certain clothing, the articulation of 
political views, and the networks individuals associate with flag up that particular 
individual as a potential terrorist (Gutkowski 2011, 352-3; HMG 2012, 12; Kundnani 
2014, 176-181; HMG 2015, 12). This is implicitly acknowledged by ACPO, the body 
overseeing Channel, but is couched in the language of countering ideology.  The 
second view on what constitutes ‘vulnerability’ is articulated by both PREVENT 
Officers. 
 
You are talking about a fine line here. It’s about that particular person, how they are, 
and what they do. It’s not about a change of dress, or change of different things. So 
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say some ones’ got a drug problem; if you look at someone like Isa Ibrahim in Bristol; 
he had a drug problem, he was isolated from his family, and then starts to learn 
about Islam over the internet and because of that makes a homemade explosives 
and then makes a suicide vest.  
                                                                                                                                               
(Interview 21, PREVENT Officer) 
 
This is what government doesn’t understand; their measurement would seem like I 
find someone who is radicalised and put them on a de-radicalisation course; I’ll get a 
provider, largely with theological and jurisprudence knowledge, I put them through a 
mentoring course, and Keith will magically transform and come the other side; 
meanwhile we haven’t dealt with his drug addiction, his dad doesn’t sit with him at 
the dinner table, and he’s got a grievance against Kashmir. We are not thought 
police in that sense. 
                                                   (Interview 22, Senior PREVENT Officer) 
 
This Senior PREVENT Officer emphasise general factors like identity, drug 
addiction, and personal experience. She is not dismissive of the other dimension but 
seems to suggest that a focus on theology and mentoring is futile without tackling the 
underlying personal and social vulnerabilities. Both conceptions of vulnerability not 
only frame the problem in a certain light, which actually guides the work of 
practitioners and intervention providers on the ground with respect to identifying it, 
but it also serves to legitimise interventions in the lives of individuals, which would 
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not otherwise be normatively and legally possible within liberal structures of 
governance, which theoretically prizes the sovereignty of the individual in these 
matters. It is the vocabulary of ‘vulnerability’ that legitimises the corrective 
techniques of de-radicalisation.  
 
6.5 Hotspots of Radicalisation: Sectors and Institutions 
 
This section examines the third objective of PREVENT, which is about supporting 
sectors and institutions where there are risk of radicalisation (Home Office 2011, 66). 
Identifying ‘vulnerable’ individuals requires institutions and sectors to have the 
knowledge and capacity to identify individuals ‘at risk’ from radicalisation and report 
them to Channel. Channel then examines the individual, makes a risk assessment 
and if the individual satisfies the risk triggers is assigned to an intervention provider. 
It is the job of sectors and institutions to identify and report potential radicals for de-
radicalisation interventions and for Channel to act as the hub which receives these 
reports as well as place individuals to agency’s providing de-radicalisation 
interventions. The director of Siraat explains the actual role of Channel in relation to 
wider work on sectors and institutions. 
  
Channel was basically...the Met Police, what they did, was try to set up in certain 
boroughs across community support where they can find individuals to sit on a board 
and tell the Met Police that we are concerned XYZ people. And then the Channel 
board would invite known deradicalisers to come and work with those individuals. So 
Channel was just a conduit to get information on people they thought were radical 
and try signpost a community de-radicalisation programme.  
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(Interview 23, Director of Siraat) 
 
Channel thus acts as a ‘conduit’ between the community and intervention providers. 
According to the data set there are seven or eight interventions providers, whilst 
others have also mentioned the existence of local community mentors who work on 
a contractual basis but who do not belong to an agency or organisation as such. The 
PREVENT strategy does not list the agency providers and this information is 
generally difficult to access online. The most commonly cited examples of de-
radicalisation intervention providers in most if not all papers and reports are STREET 
and the ACF. One respondent working on PREVENT discusses the different 
intervention providers.  
 
There are I think seven or eight intervention providers nationally, funded by the 
Home Office or operate different- this is about accreditation and a pool of mentors, 
that’s what’s unique about this bit and they’ve all undertaken a six day training 
course. I think in London you got ACF, Active Change Foundation, don’t know if 
you’ve met them; you used to have STREET and SIRAT for example but they’ve 
now be curtailed because they are too Salafi for the government- so they used to be 
intervention providers; you got Inner City Guidance in Birmingham. There’s an 
organisation in London called FAST, which do kind of family sort of therapy but they 
all concentrated on the hard range interventions.   
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(Interview 8, PREVENT Practitioner) 
 
This was the closest I could get to a general overview of intervention providers 
operating in PREVENT. More will be said on de-radicalisation intervention providers 
in the next chapter. To recapitulate, the radicalisation ‘hotspots’ incorporate Primary 
and Secondary schools, Universities, Hospitals, Local Government, Probation 
services and other institutions and bodies. One of the main aims is the building of 
networks and relationship between the various parts of society and government with 
the community. This is embodied in the role of Channel, which works with a board 
where various community and public representatives assess potential radicals. 
Channel relies on the active assessment of many stakeholders in the risk 
identification process and as a result there are two important features: first, a 
criterion of risk or what constitutes ‘at risk’ (albeit until recently this was not 
specified). These ‘risks’ refer to indicators which correspond to certain behavioural 
types and patterns, as well as the articulation of particular views and beliefs by 
individuals.  
A second feature of the identification process is the ability and capacity for 
employees, managers, and experts in civil society and public institutions to 
understand radicalisation and associated risk triggers. This idea is based on giving 
ordinary citizens in society the knowledge and education to identify and report ‘risks’ 
and threats in the community. Hence the investment by PREVENT in the teaching 
and training of individuals in professional positions across the various sectors and 
institutions on radicalisation and risk indicators.  For example, training is available to 
frontline staffs that are critical to the identification process. This includes the Home Office 
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developed Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent (WRAP) training. WRAP is an hour 
long DVD-led interactive workshop. PREVENT III claims that 15, 000 frontline staff have 
received WRAP training (HO 2011, 58) Also, the National Counter-Terrorism Policing 
Headquarters (NCTPHQ), in conjunction with the College of Policing, have developed an e-
learning package for Channel. There is training also available in local authorities arranged by 
local Police Prevent Co-ordinator (HMG 2015, 19-20). 
Regarding a criterion of risk in order to identity ‘vulnerable’ and radical individuals, 
interviewees overwhelmingly believed that the criteria were based on the religious 
and political views and behaviour of Muslims. The respondent below, an analyst at 
DEMOS, explains the way that young adults were referred to Channel based on 
political views expressed in class. 
 
In the beginning they didn’t know on what basis to refer someone.  So they were 
hearing about some kid in class mouthing off about Palestinian bombings being 
justified by religion, which isn’t controversial amongst many Muslims, and if you end 
up referring every Muslim that said that, you end up having hundreds of thousands. 
It’s a difficult case, especially young kids they are going to say that of course they 
are being segregated and got no other ways to express their freedoms, what do you 
want them to do? So initially they were referring people that were expressing that 
type of view and realised quite quickly it was stupid, not the right people to go 
through the programme.  
                                                                                                                                      
(Interview 1, DEMOS Analyst) 
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This comment implies that identifying people according to views was something that 
Channel has revised and improved on with time. There is the implicit suggestion that 
it is either not done anymore or that Channel has got better at identifying ‘at risk’ 
youngsters. Whilst some others have similarly acknowledged the learning process 
involved in identifying real risk from non-threat risk by Channel, the majority still 
believe that the identification process is linked with indicators pertaining to political 
and religious views. However interviewees were roughly divided into a group that 
questioned the existence of a coherent identification criterion and another group that 
spoke in terms of the criterion being nuanced, complex, multifaceted, and that 
assessment were undertaken according to each individual. Despite this, none of the 
interviewees however dismissed the notion that the risk triggers corresponded to 
religious and political views. Examples of both views on the criterion of risk held by 
interviews can be read below by a police and a PREVENT officer.   
 
I don’t think it works. First of all what are the indicators of being radicalised? I haven’t 
seen any written indicators. If you go by the line of questioning at Heathrow airport 
by counter-terrorism officers: Do you pray five times a day? Do you read the Quran? 
What are you view on the Iraq war? If you say yes to the first two and I don’t agree 
with the third, does that mean you are at risk of being radicalised? So I think there 
are questions to do with indicators and a question of awareness and understanding 
about people who refer people to Channel. 
                                                                                                                                        
(Interview 16, President of NAMP) 
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....when you‘re talking about where’s the line for intervention, the line is so variable 
sometimes. On top of that, what’s your level of intervention? ….Not everyone we get 
notified about gets referred to Channel, you know, all it is, is a way of doing things, 
and only if there’s evidence they are going down a certain road. It’s like a young lad 
starts ordering chemicals from the internet to do experiments with in his shed. Do 
you think we should do something about that? And it’s about intervening before 
something happens. 
                                                                                                                                             
(Interview 21, Lancashire PREVENT Officer) 
 
 
The first interviewee states that he has not seen any written indicators but only infers 
from the questioning at airports that such indicators related to religious and political 
views. The second point he raises relates to the relationship between ‘at risk’ and 
radicalisation. This is an important issue that was addressed in the last section 
between ‘vulnerability’ and radicalisation and the same applies with the notion ‘at 
risk’.36  Channel, for example, emphasises the importance of ‘risk’: ‘Risk is a theme that 
runs through the entire Channel process, i.e risk to the individual; risk to the public; and risk 
to partners or organisations providing support to the individual, including any intervention 
providers. The panel is responsible for managing the risk in relation to the vulnerable 
individual’ (HMG 2015, 16, paragraph 74). What is the link between being ‘at risk’ and 
radicalisation? 
                                                          
36
 Channel emphasises the importance of ‘risk’: ‘Risk is a theme that runs through the entire Channel 
process, i.e risk to the individual; risk to the public; and risk to partners or organisations providing 
support to the individual, including any intervention providers. The panel is responsible for managing 
the risk in relation to the vulnerable individual’ (HMG 2015, 16, paragraph 74). 
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Meanwhile, the second respondent talks of ‘variables’, ‘levels’, ‘evidence’, and non-
ideological factors, like ‘ordering chemicals’. Being a practitioner, this respondent 
articulated a complex view of the risk identification criterion. Both views thus highlight 
the centrality of religious and political indicators as highlighting whether an individual 
is ‘at risk’, whilst simultaneously remaining officially elusive.  
 
What’s that left us with is this wishy- washy thing without a clear criteria of how to 
actually identify how someone might be at risk. I think that’s why you have had this 
wide net approach because if you don’t know what the pathways are, and you know, 
anybody can become an extremist whether you are religious or not, then it’s kind of 
an open playing field, how do we identify people? We don’t know. Your criterion 
becomes diluted and as a consequence it vindicates this surveillance approach, well 
in that case we need to have endeavours like the Channel project.  
                                                                                                                                   
(Interview 10, Investigative Journalist) 
 
This comment alludes to the consequences of an ambiguous criterion. The 
respondent believes that it justifies the surveillance approach. It is important to 
examine however what interviewees said about the role of institutions in reporting 
radicals to Channel. An insight is given by the former president of FOSIS. 
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.......student unions have reported back to the NUS how they have been approached 
for data on Muslim students. This all kicked off with Christmas bomber Umar Farouk 
so UCL union were pressured into providing the contact details of Muslim students to 
the police without a warrant and they weren’t just details of Muslim students at the 
time of Umar but also of Muslim students who weren’t around at the time of Umar. 
Those contact details were handed over... We know this is happening it’s coming 
from Prevent.  
                                                                                                                                        
(Interview 3, former President of FOSIS) 
 
This passage describes the experience of Muslim students at the University College 
of London (UCL) following the revelation that the Christmas day bomber, Umar 
Farouk, had been ex-President of the Islamic Society at UCL. UCL were compelled 
to investigate and despite the fact that the investigation revealed that Umar had not 
been radicalised at University37, there was a lot of attention on ISOC’s at Universities 
by think-tanks like the Centre for Social Cohesion and Quilliam.38 The above 
interviewee highlights how this incident was used by the police to obtain the names 
                                                          
37 Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab tried to blow up transatlantic flight on Christmas Day 2009. In January 
2010 the Council, the governing body of UCL, set up an independent inquiry to investigate the case of 
Umar Farouk and whether he had become radicalised on campus. The panel concluded that ‘there is 
no evidence to suggest either that Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab was radicalised while a student at 
UCL or that conditions at UCL during that time or subsequently are conducive to the radicalisation of 
students’ (Caldicott 2010, 3). 
38
 The Centre for Social Cohesion produced a report ‘Radical Islam on UK Campuses’ in 2010 which 
made the case that ‘British university campuses are breeding grounds of Islamic extremism’ (2010, 
V). The Quilliam Foundation also published ‘The Threat of Radicalisation on British University 
Campuses’ using the Islamic Society at City University as a case study, the paper argued that Islamic 
Societies at Universities potentially represents a vehicle for radicalisation. 
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of Muslims students held by the NUS. It reveals the extent to which the university 
became subject to scrutiny.  
Notably the focus on institutions or sites of potential radicalisation in PREVENT has 
evolved over the three iterations. Initially the concern was with Mosques in 
PREVENT I, and then with Universities in PREVENT II and more recently with 
PREVENT III the focus has turned towards the internet (HO 2011; Neumann and 
Rogers 2007). This shift on hotspots of radicalisation represents the incorporation of 
knowledge into the strategy over time. The rationale underpinning supporting 
institutions is the notion that radicalisation and particularly ideology becomes 
incubated in certain places and so the strategy attempts to buffer institutions from 
such a threat. Another example of the pressures on institutions to report ‘radicals’ is 
shared by one respondent, who was arrested and for downloading material online at 
campus whilst a student at University.  
 
  
In a way I don’t blame the management for picking up the phone and calling the 
police; ten years of constant Islamophobic news reporting and pejorative words used 
to describe Muslims and negative headlines, create a moral panic about Islamic 
terrorist so when they did find me in possession of a book you could buy from WH 
Smith they reported that and that’s what they’re told to do. 
                                                                                                                               
(Interview 19, Academic/Activist) 
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He explains lucidly the impact the wider securitised environment had on the 
University management committee in making their decision to report him to the 
police. In addition, he situates this decision taken by the University which 
substantially affected his life in many ways to the fact that ‘that’s what they’re told to 
do’. Other interviewees have made remarks regarding the culture of suspicion 
accompanying the PREVENTs message of reporting signs of radicalism. The 
academic below alludes to the exhortation by a government Minister for Muslim to 
report other Muslims when they see the ‘tell-tale’ signs of radicalism. 
 
I remember John Reid and that amazing speech he did in East London to Muslim 
parents where he told them to look out for the ‘tell-tall’ signs in the children. So what 
are the ‘tell-tale’ signs? John Reid never told us. But I was like we don’t know, by 
‘we’ I mean the white British majority, we don’t know what the ‘tell-tale’ signs are but 
you know what, as Muslims, what the ‘tell-tale’ signs are. It’s again about putting the 
problem elsewhere.  
                                                                                                                                 
(Interview 11, Academic) 
 
There is the hint in this comment that the onus was put on the Muslim community to 
self-regulate radicalism in their communities. However it points to something more 
substantial than the instruction for parents to spy on their children. Instead it brings 
to the fore the notion of building institutional resilience as protection against 
radicalism. It suggests that the Channel programme and PREVENT more widely 
should be seen through the lens of risk management strategies. Indeed some of the 
332 
 
interviewees have spoken about the impact this risk management logic underpinning 
PREVENT has had both at an individual level and at a collective level. For example 
the Senior PREVENT Officer uses the language and logic of risk management to 
explain the work of Channel. 
 
What we are trying to build Lancashire into safeguarded hubs. So our referrals when 
they come in, there would be a risk assessment of whether it’s violence, sexual, 
extremism, or whatever, and then the case is referred to a panel of expertise exist to 
help that person. So we are trying.... some people may get referred to us thinking 
they’re being radicalised when actually what people are seeing is child exploitation 
going on. Partner agencies don’t have the skill to recognise what’s actually going on. 
That’s the approach we have here in Lancashire.  
                                                                                                                                            
(Interview 22, Lancashire Senior PREVENT Officer) 
 
The following respondent also analyses the work of Channel through the lens of risk 
management and the securitisation of spheres previously unrelated to security, like 
education. 
 
 
Otherwise they would be flagged up by teachers who are becoming increasingly 
concerned that little Johnny said something in class and later become a terrorist- are 
they going to be held responsible for not flagging this up? Again it’s about risk 
management and people getting a little bit scared because this mainstreaming of the 
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security consciousness has gone into all sorts of different areas, into housing, into 
education.  
                                                                                                                                          
(Interview 12, Academic / PREVENT Practitioner) 
 
The risk management logic therefore explains the relationship between being ‘at risk’ 
and radicalisation. It was believed, according to one respondent, that the 7/7 
bombers had written things about Osama Bin Laden in their exercise books at school 
and so the link between youngsters, certain behavioural indicators and radicalisation 
was established.    
 
I get the idea, the idea is you want to make sure that people like Mohammed 
Sadique Khan and some of the 7/7 bombers....there were identifiers, they were 
writing things about Osama Bin Laden from a young age at school. This came out 
apparently with one of the bombers. So there is this idea if we pick up on these 
things early we can actually talk to the kids.  
                                                                                                                                        
(Interview 10, Investigative Journalist) 
 
Despite being designed to address all forms of terrorism, research data, as well as 
limited data available on Channel, suggest that the identification process is 
preoccupied with individuals from a Muslim background. For example, of the 1,120 
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individual identified by Channel between 2007 and 2010, 290 were under 16, and 55 
were under 12 (HO 2011, 59).  When the Security and Counter-Terrorism Act came 
into law in July 2015, it was reported that there were 349 referrals that month (Tran 
2015). Of the 796 individuals referred to Channel between June and August 2015, 
312 were under 18 (Ibid). According to these figures a high proportion therefore of 
individuals identified by Channel was under the age of sixteen, with some being 
under 12. The interviewee below believed that anyone under the age of 18 was too 
young to be put on an intervention programmes. 
 
With the work we did we tried not to work with anybody below eighteen years of age 
because their ideas were not formed. We were asked to work with some fifteen to 
sixteen years old but we find that their ideas were not formed and more importantly 
the last issue- who they were hanging around with. They are just taking ideas of 
people they’re hanging around with.  
                                                                                                                                           
(Interview 23, Director of Siraat) 
 
Notably, on this matter, Channel states that:  
Participation in Channel remains voluntary and consent by the individual must be 
given by the individual or by parent/guardian in the case of a child (a child being 
defined as anyone under the age of 18). If consent is refused by a parent but 
sufficient evidence that the child is at risk of particular harm, then social services 
become involved in the decision making process (HM 2015, 16).  
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So Channel has established that de-radicalisation for those under 18 require 
consent. It is interesting nevertheless to see the negative reaction elicited by the 
notion of re-educatng youngsters without consent. Even the biggest advocates of 
countering extremism and counter-ideology found the prospect of primary school 
children being subjected to an intervention to be ethically questionable: 
 
Nine is too young, primary school kids, yes it’s a concern. I’m not convinced they 
should be in Channel; they could just grow up to be racist but not violent. They could 
become an offender or grow out of it, depends on friends and company. They could 
be normal with no issues. 
                                                                                                                                             
(Interview 25, Senior Researcher at Quilliam) 
 
The young targets of intervention and the ‘vulnerability’ label employed by Channel 
seem to suggest that the programme is administered according to the conventional 
mechanisms associated with the youth and probation services in its implementation 
of de-radicalisation. This, after all, is no surprise given that PREVENT 2011 stated 
that de-radicalisation programmes are akin to crime prevention programmes. 
Questions arise regarding the purpose of observing and looking out for ‘early sings’ 
in children in a counter-terrorism strategy. PREVENT is supposed to mitigate the 
likelihood of support and engagement with terrorism. The fact the Channel appears 
to be preoccupied with youngsters who have not committed a crime but exhibit signs 
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of ‘extremism’ suggest that the pre-emptive framing of Channel effectively makes 
particular subjects problematic (Muslim, political, religious, etc.) through future 
potential, thus permitting mediation in the present. Consequently, this section has 
argued that many interviewees understood the third objective of PREVENT through 
the lens of risk management. It aims to build institutional resilience and mitigate 
future risks of radicalisation through the surveillance of public space and the 
identification of bodies deemed radical for the purposes of rectification. 
 
 
 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter argued that the PREVENT strategy and Channel programme should be 
viewed through the lens of disciplinary technology. The first section analysed how 
interviewees understood PREVENT, while the second highlighted the classification 
system between ‘bad’ and ‘good’ Muslim embedded in PREVENT. Overall, the data 
indicated that the majority of respondents believed that PREVENT was not only a 
conflated strategy combining different policy logics, but more importantly, was seen 
by many as an attempt by government to gather intelligence on the one hand and 
remake Muslim communities on the other.  Although the majority of interviewees in 
section 6.3 again believed that categories like ‘British values’ and ‘extremism’ were 
socially constructed categories, it transpired that it had concrete effect in 
reconfiguring the community by rendering certain individuals and organisation 
beyond the pale, while promoting others in this policy domain. However this section 
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particularly elucidated the way that the aforementioned categories corresponded to 
constructions of ‘good’ and bad’ Muslim, a bifurcation which has normative 
reverberations beyond counter-terrorism. This has produced a dichotomised 
regulatory framework for Muslims in which no other way of being Muslim is afforded 
space.  
 
Meanwhile, sections 6.4 and 6.5 examine Channel. Both sections bring to light the 
way that surveillance is generated at a collective level, the way that individuals are 
identified for intervention, and the way that concepts like ‘vulnerability’ justify 
interventions of youngsters in a fashion compatible with liberal doctrine. Section 6.4 
explores the notion of ‘vulnerability’ and its connection to Channel since PREVENT 
makes the claim that de-radicalisation is about ‘supporting vulnerabilities’. This 
section demonstrated that couching the phenomenon of individuals flirting with 
terrorism as ‘vulnerable’ includes and excludes particular framings of the problem. It 
also demonstrated the pastoral logic underlying Channel, something the next chapter 
will address in more detail.  
 
The last section highlighted the attempt of PREVENT through Channel to build 
resilience into publics sectors and institutions. The data revealed that respondents 
viewed it as an attempt to build an infrastructure of surveillance between the 
community, public spaces, and the police, not to mention the actualisation of 
discourses of radicalisation institutionally. Crucially however a significant notion that 
was inferred from the data was that PREVENT and Channel should be seen as risk 
management strategies that operated through the problematisation of Muslim 
identity. This explains the preoccupation of Channel with political and religious 
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markers, as well as with youngsters who have not committed a crime but who are 
thought to hold ‘radical’ views.  
 
The data analysis in this chapter also corroborates the themes outlined in chapter 1. 
Section 6.3 shows how PREVENT inherited the presumptions espoused in public 
discourse over three decades regarding Muslim identity by trying to change the 
leadership of Muslim communities in Britain. The section after conveyed how Muslim 
identity was synonymous with ‘extremism’ and in light of the integration agenda, 
formulates ‘British values’ as a palliative to the ‘extremism’ embodied by Islamist, 
Salafies, and many Muslims more widely. The focus on Channel in Section 6.5 and 
6.6 raises many points that echo the assertions regarding the changing nature of 
security. PREVENT as a strategy is governed by the pre-emptive risk logic that has 
characterised politics and society since 9-11.  Under the pretext of potential and 
anticipated threats in the future, government is thus legitimised to intervene in the 
theological, sociological, and political lives of Muslims in the temporal reality of the 
present. 
 
Ultimately, the Channel programme, which makes de-radicalisation interventions 
possible, strongly exemplifies the working of disciplinary technology as a component 
of the technology of the self. The type of de-radicalisation envisaged and practiced 
by PREVENT cannot occur independent of disciplinary technology. This is due to the 
fact that such programmes are concerned with deradicalising individuals in public 
spaces and civil society rather than a group of known terrorist in a controlled 
environment. Disciplinary technologies encompasses the strategy (PREVENT), 
places (various Institutions and Sectors), partners (various experts, civil society) 
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interventions (counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation) that go into discipline of 
society and individuals.  It amplifies the argument made about the link between the 
ontological framework of radicalisation (ideology, identity crisis, and vulnerabilities) 
and the counter-radicalisation policies such as PREVENT (a policy which focuses on 
counter-ideology, counter-subversion, and British values).  As a process Channel 
allowed institutions to perform such discourses and convert them into reality, as well 
as identify the individuals categorised as deviant and problematic in need of 
cognitive and behavioural rectification. The structure of surveillance induces a form 
of self-policing, whilst society and Channel Panels perform an ‘examination’ of 
Muslim subjects. It is in this way that PREVENT and Channel should be seen as 
technologies of discipline. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
Confession Technologies (Identity): ‘Salvation in this Life’ 
 
This form of power applies itself too everyday life which categorises the individual, 
marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of 
truth on him which he must recognise and which others have to recognise in him.  
                                                                                                     (Foucault 1982, 781) 
 
This chapter is about the third component in the technology of the self-confessional 
technology. It will try to argue that de-radicalisation embodies a modern and 
secularised version of confessional technology, which aims at the salvation of the 
individual and the enhancement of governmental power. It does this in two main 
ways: incitement to discourse in order to improve the knowledge and codification of a 
phenomenon and secondly through the transformation of individual subjectivity. The 
Confession elucidates the logic of pastoral power governing not only de-
radicalisation interventions but also the PREVENT strategy more widely.  It also 
situates the preoccupation of policymakers with the welfare of the individual within 
wider governmental practices, as well as the role expertise plays in the management 
of our society.   
The first section provides a brief genealogical backdrop of how the confessional 
evolved and was incorporated into governmental practice. The section after 
examines community approaches to counter-terrorism, whilst the third addresses 
elite forms of expertise, focusing on Quilliam. These sections read the conflicting 
approaches between community and elite modes of expertise through the first 
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dimension of the confessional- the incitement to produce discourse. The fifth and 
sixth sections endeavour to provide an explanation of how subjectification in 
confessional technology occurs. The fifth highlights techniques of mentoring and 
psychotherapy in de-radicalisation, whilst the last section demonstrates that de-
radicalisation interventions aim to transform the subjectivity of young Muslims in 
order to reconcile Muslim subjectivity with wider society. 
 
7.1 A Genealogy of Confessional Technology   
 
Pastoral power has its origins in the Christian practice of Confession.  According to 
Foucault, the Church had in fact adopted many of the techniques of self-examination 
derived from pre-Christian practices, from the Stoics and even the Pythagoreans of 
fifth and fourth century BC (Foucault 1987; 1988a). These techniques included: 
‘mortification of the flesh, contemplation to rid oneself of earthly desires, absolute 
obedience to one’s spiritual director, and the examination of conscience as a prelude 
to public confession at the end of the period of penance, knowledge of the 
self...’(Foucault 1988a, 133). Since the Lateran Council in 1212, in which the 
sacrament of penance was codified, the confessional became a central feature in 
religious and civil power (Foucault 1998a, 58). The confessional was centred on the 
relationship between the Church and its flock, the priests and the congregants, 
between a party that speaks and confesses and an authority ‘who requires the 
confession, prescribes and appreciates it, and intervenes in order to judge, punish, 
forgive, console, and reconcile’ (Foucault 1998a, 62).  
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Notably, pastoral power encloses several important themes. The first dimension is 
that pastorship hinges on the notion that the leader is a shepherd in charge of a 
flock. What matters in pastoral power is the relationship between the shepherd and 
the flock, his ability to unite the flock, without him which the individuals would be 
dispersed. Also, the shepherd’s role is to ensure the salvation of his flock through 
‘constant, individualised and final kindness’ (McNay 1994, 120), not to mention 
watch over his flock with scrupulousness.  Hence pastoral power is a form of power 
that looks after both the community and the individual, which cannot be exercised 
without knowing the ‘inside of people’s minds, without exploring their souls, without 
making them reveal their innermost secrets’ (Foucault 1982, 783). This type of power 
therefore, unlike royal or legal power, is salvation orientated and individuating (Ibid, 
783).    
Whilst the influence of the Church has waned, the pastoral function has nevertheless 
evolved and moved beyond its previous localisation, even multiplying in the modern 
world, impacting a number of other domains. In a long passage Foucault describes 
the extent to which ‘Western man has become a confessing animal’:  
 
‘It plays a part in justice, medicine, education, family relationships, and love relations, 
in the most ordinary affairs of everyday life, and in the most solemn rites; one 
confesses one’s crimes, one’s sins, one’s thoughts and desires, one’s illnesses and 
troubles; one goes about telling, with the great precision, whatever is most difficult to 
tell. One confesses in public and in private, to one’s parents, one’s educators, one’s 
doctors, to those one loves; one admits to oneself, in pleasure and pain, things it 
would be impossible to tell to anybody else, the things people write books about. 
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One confesses- or is forced to confess..........Western man has become a confessing 
animal’.  
 
                                                                                                      (Foucault 1998a, 59)  
 
The Christian Confessional is governed by a religious logic that seeks salvation in 
the next life, whereas the confessional logic of contemporary society is concerned 
with ‘salvation in this life’ (Foucault 1982, 784).  ‘Salvation in this life’ assumes 
different forms, such as the promotion and safeguarding of individual and collective 
well-being, health and longevity, security, etc. (Foucault 1982, 783). Thus pastoral 
power has been employed in a whole series of relationships: ‘children and parents, 
students and educators, patients and psychiatrists, delinquents and experts’ 
Foucault 1998a, 63). Where the language used by pastoral power was once religious 
and then legal, in the modern world it became medical and psychological.  
Moreover, the techniques employed in confessional practices have been adopted in 
pedagogy, medicine, psychiatry, literature, and popular culture. It has taken on 
various forms, such ‘interrogations, consultations, autobiographical narratives, 
letters; they have been recorded, transcribed, assembled into dossiers, published, 
and commented on’ (Ibid). With these new techniques of self-inspection, self-
examination, self-evaluation, and self-regulation, citizens are persuaded and 
encouraged to be ‘free’, ‘true to one self’, and to ‘realise oneself’ (Rose 1999, 114).  
Similarly to the role of priests in the Christian confessional, today’s ‘experts’-  
therapists, psychologists, doctors, counsellors, mentors, academics, managers, etc.- 
are the new priesthood of our secularised societies. They perform the old pastoral 
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functions in terms of guiding and directing the individual in this life, selling their 
expertise and their knowledge, techniques, language, and models of self formation to 
everyone. Governing at ‘a distance’, expertise achieves its effects ‘not through the 
threat of violence or constraint, but by way of the persuasion inherent in its truths, 
the anxieties stimulated by its norms, and the attraction exercised by the images of 
life and self it offers to us’ (Rose 1999, 10). More significantly however for Rose is 
the fact that experts (psychologist, psychiatrist, and psychotherapists) are 
considered ‘engineers of the soul’ that operate in conjunction with neo-liberal 
government in the subjectification of citizens.  
However, implicit in the notion of ‘salvation in this life’, is the ‘repressive hypotheses’ 
(Foucault 1998a, 17-35). This hypothesis, which has become a valorised maxim in 
the West, states that power represses individuals and that the truth can be 
unleashed by opposing power. It posits that power and truth are diametrically 
opposed and also independent of each other. The belief in ‘salvation’ of the subject 
in popular discourse has therefore been deliberately depicted as hinging on the act 
of ‘speaking truth to power’. Foucault criticised the notion that somehow the 
suppression of sexuality was caused by power and questioned popular conceptions 
that ‘speaking truth’ to power and ‘coming out’ was a method of liberating individuals 
from repression (34). Instead, it is this underlying pressure to speak, to confess all, 
to lay bare, that must be seen as an instrument of power. In the confession the 
agency of domination does not reside in the person that speaks, but in the one who 
questions and listens. Confessing does not set you free, but makes you a subject of 
power. ‘Truth’ therefore according to Foucault exists through power, is shaped by it, 
and not outside of it (Rainbow 1984, 72-47).  
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Consequently, the confession has two primary functions: one relates to producing 
discourse on ‘truth’, which encourages the production of discourse. Knowledge 
gained from the confession is then recodified into discourses of medicine, psychiatry, 
etc. which establishes a normalising field- a regime of truth- in which individuals are 
categorised as deviant or normal (McNay 1994, 122). The second function of the 
confession is to direct and shape the subjectivity of the individual. Indeed, confessing 
and telling the truth, having one’s guilt absolved, repenting, and performing religious 
rituals has the effect of reconstituting the thoughts, soul, and behaviour of the 
individual repenting. Foucault aptly explicates the ritualising effect of the 
confessional on subjectivity:  
 
The confession is a ritual of discourse in which the speaking subject is also the 
subject of the statement....a ritual in which the expression alone, independently of its 
external consequences, produces intrinsic modification in the person who articulates 
it: it exonerates redeems, and purifies him; it unburdens him of his wrongs, liberate 
him, and promises him salvation.  
 
                                                                                                   (Foucault 1998a, 62) 
 
It is thus the act of verbalisation, alongside the act of proclamation that turns the 
individual into a subject. In other words it is the performative function of language 
that turns the individual into a subject (Besley 2005, 85). This occurs because the 
confession is both a communicative and an expressive act, ‘a narrative in which we 
(re)create ourselves by creating our own narrative, reworking the past, in public, or at 
least in dialogue with another’ (Rose 1999, 222). The critical role language plays in 
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the modification of subjectivity consequently reinforces the significant effect that the 
pastoral techniques in the de-radicalisation process (counselling, dialogue, debate) 
have on the radicalised subject. Concomitant with the guidance offered by experts, 
who are responsible for re-interpreting and re-constructing the knowledge professed 
by the radicalised individual, the act of recantation results in the individual acquiring 
self-knowledge, which paves the way for a recalibration of the self to occur.  
This chapter deploys the conceptual framework of the confessional to understand 
the pastoral dimensions inherent in de-radicalisation interventions in the UK. As an 
ordering power of government, pastoral power not only preoccupies itself with the 
welfare of individuals within its territory, but more importantly, their subjectivity. De-
radicalisation must be viewed through the lens of the confessional: the existence of 
countless experts involved in the identification process, as well as the 
implementation of intervention; the shepherd/flock relationship assumed by the 
imam/mentor/experts on one side and the radical/vulnerable/extremist individual on 
the other; the stated objectives by experts to have the radical/vulnerable/extremist 
individual transformed; and to ultimately have the individual re-integrated back with 
the whole flock, or mainstream society.   
7.2 Community Approaches to Countering Radicalisation: MCU, Islamists, & 
Salafis 
 
The use of communities and civil society actors to counter terrorism predated the 
PREVENT strategy. Special Branch at the Metropolitan Police had set up the Muslim 
Contact Unit (MCU) in 2003 to support the Muslim communities counter terrorism 
(Lambert 2011). According to the former Director of the MCU, their work was 
successful in tackling the influence of Al-Qaeda at the Finsbury Park Mosque, the 
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Brixton Mosque, and other places before the advent of PREVENT.  In the two 
passages below he explains what community approaches to countering terrorism 
entailed.  
 
....yes 2006, there was still that MCU approach which as far as possible was trying to 
adopt the post-Laurence approach of engaging with communities as they are; the 
idea really that the police should not be concerned with engineering change; that you 
work with communities as they are… 
                                                                               (Interview 17, director of the MCU) 
                                                                                                                                            
So I think that the Muslim Contact Unit just went to places where particular problems 
existed and so particular solutions. I don’t think there was any attempt to import 
some kind of solution that wasn’t local.   
                                                                                (Interview 17, director of the MCU) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Community approaches to countering terrorism were primarily characterised by (1) 
engaging with the Muslim communities as they existed on the ground rather than 
having to engineer a change of social and community representation; (2) that the 
solutions to the problem of radicalisation had to emanate from already existing 
communities, which required a type of expertise that was local rather than national. 
Moreover, the interviewee argues that the MCU’s community led strategy was based 
on deploying the Islamist at Finsbury Park and the Salafis in Brixton and was justified 
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on the basis of legitimacy and effectiveness. Legitimacy was derived from the fact 
that the likes of STREET and MAB had both the religious and political profile, as well 
as local experience working with their communities. Their effectiveness was based 
from the fact that they were legitimate to begin with and that they possessed the right 
skills and expertise. Their skills and expertise was based on both their religious and 
ideological similarity and therefore familiarity with religiously inspired Jihadi 
discourse, coupled with actual experience countering radicalisation. This notion of 
expertise was certainly the case with the Salafis in Brixton, who had the experience 
countering radicalisation in the 1990’s, as explained below. 
 
 
I think the best examples of successful elements are engagements with groups that 
had a long track record that sort of pre-dates Prevent. The one example I mention in 
the book is the Salafi community around the Brixton Mosque. I mean this community 
had the advantage of being well established and later becomes known as STREET, 
so I will use that name. When the individuals in STREET meet the top-down 
approach of the Home Office they have the skills and the experience to negotiate; if 
they think the police got something wrong, I mean I know this from experience, they 
were never frightened to say to the Muslim Contact Unit, “we want to do it this way”.  
So a number of factors I think would demonstrate that established groups that were 
well connected in their communities, and on the specific point of tackling violent 
extremism, they certainly benefited from Prevent and Prevent benefited from them.  
                                                                                                                  
                                                                               (Interview 17, director of the MCU)  
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Meanwhile, when PREVENT first began in 2006, it embraced the notion of 
community approaches in counter-terrorism, empowering organisations and 
individuals drawn from local communities amongst the Muslim population. 
Concomitant with preventative strategies post 7/7, a number of initiatives developed 
the notion of community’s working in partnership with government to counter 
radicalisation (see chapter 6). Positing the role of the Muslim community as a 
‘partner’  with the then New Labour government was cemented at the Wilton Park 
Conference in 2006, which hosted a number of think-tanks, community organisations 
and representatives, the Home Office and Foreign Office, amongst others (Briggs, 
Fieschi, and Lownsbrough 2006). Hence the theme ‘community approaches’ 
characterised the approach of PREVENT in the early years. A former research 
analyst at DEMOS at the time brings to light the overarching theme of community 
approaches to countering terrorism under the narrative ‘Bringing it Home’ (Ibid).  
 
So the ‘Bringing it Home’ report, it wasn’t the only thing written on that theme, but at 
that point of time a few of us were working very carefully on, you know, trying to 
reshape the counter-terrorism policy to broaden it out and put more emphasis on the 
preventative side of things. To a certain extent we succeeded. Obviously with the 
change of governments there are certain think-tanks that are more in favour at the 
moment.  
                                                                                             (Interview 9, ISD Analyst) 
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Community expertise was legitimised in the early days of PREVENT and it was this 
model that was championed by the Home Office. It was the pioneering work of 
organisations such as STREET, Siraat, and ACF, alongside community and political 
engagement by the likes of the MCB and Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), and 
others, in conjunction with academia, which lay the ground work in terms of 
knowledge building on radicalisation, not to mention the delivery of counter-
radicalisation and de-radicalisation interventions. This is explained below. 
 
I don’t want to trumpet us as the best thing since slice bread but most of that was 
because of the work we did- us, STREET, ACF- we were forerunners of Prevent and 
de-radicalisation from 2005, at least us definitely, between 2005 and 2011. It’s only 
when the new government came in that they decided to change the discourse.... the 
idea of how to do it and the best people to do it were generally looked at through our 
prisms because the police had done their research and they come and asked us and 
then the Home Office moved towards the way we were doing it.  
                                                                                (Interview 23, Director of Siraat) 
                                                                                                                                 
Whilst a few Islamist and Salafi groups had been identified as possessing the skill 
and knowledge to provide more bespoke interventions, it is worth mentioning that the 
number of individuals and groups involved in community approaches to tackling 
terrorism was in fact limited. The usual suspects mentioned are primarily three 
organisations- STREET, Siraat, and ACF- all of whom operate with the same model. 
351 
 
This limited number of best-practice example of counter-radicalisation and de-
radicalisation interventions could be attributed to the fact that work in this area 
demanded a type of specialised expertise that was scarce and in short supply, as 
well as the fact that it was a new strategy for the Home Office.  The interviewee 
below made this point directly.  
 
There’s kind a handful of celebrated people like Abdul Haqq Baker; actually the list is 
too short which means the same people use the same examples all the time, which 
is a problem. Everything you read....talks about Finsbury Park Mosque or Brixton 
Mosque, which is a limited set of examples to draw upon five years later. 
                                                                                          (Interview 10, IPPR Analyst) 
                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                    
However, the role of community approaches to countering radicalisation was 
challenged by thinks tanks like the Policy Exchange and the Quilliam Foundation. 
Instead of preventing ‘violent extremism’, these think-tanks stressed the importance 
of tackling ‘non-violent extremism’. Their criticism was twofold: attacking community 
organisations for being unrepresentative of Muslim communities and establishing the 
ideological similarity between Islamists and Salafies with violent extremists.  
Regarding the first critique, the MCB was criticised for representing a small 
constituency of the British Muslim communities who were Islamist in orientation 
Bright 2006, 26).  This argument were made by Policy Exchange at a time when the 
MCB, which enjoyed a degree of influence with the New Labour government in the 
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late 1990’s, was sidelined and ostracised by government for failing to support the 
government’s position on the Iraq War (Abbas 2005a; Brighton 2007). The director of 
the Cordoba Foundation explains the issue of representation and its link as an 
argument with other political factors.  
 
You know, when I write an article people come back to me and say “who do you 
represent?” I’ve always said I represent myself and whoever agrees with me, I don’t 
represent anyone. The common attack on the Muslim Council of Britain or the 
Muslim Association of Britain is that you don’t represent anyone. Well okay it doesn’t 
negate my views. The whole argument about the Muslim community itself needs to 
be revised. .. The MCB was once in the favour of the Labour government until they 
spoke against the War in Iraq and after that they marginalised them and government 
then went on the crazy track of trying to find a replacement of the MCB....  
                                                      (Interview 27, Director, Cordoba Foundation) 
                                                                                                                                 
The second critique made against the community expertise by Quilliam and Policy 
Exchange, was that PREVENT should not start with ‘violent extremism’ but with 
‘non-violent extremism’. This argument was based on the rationale that Islamist and 
Salafi groups shared a religious and ideological affiliation with ‘violent extremist’ and 
therefore these organisations were similar to ‘violent extremist’ in belief, their 
difference being merely one of tactic39 This was encapsulated in Quilliam’s 
                                                          
39
 It was an argument that was made forcibly by Policy Exchange in a pamphlet titled ‘Choosing our 
Friends Wisely’: ‘PVE is thus underwriting the very Islamist ideology which spawns an illiberal, 
intolerant and anti-western world view. Political and theological extremists, acting with the authority 
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catchphrase that ‘not every extremist is a terrorist but every terrorist is an 
extremist’.40  In effect, this argument situated STREET and the MCB on the trajectory 
towards violent extremism. Ascribing STREET and MCB to the category ‘non-violent 
extremist’ effectively rendered them part of the problem of radicalisation. In fact 
Quilliam considered many mainstream organisation and groups in the Muslim 
communities as ‘extremists’. Quilliam compiled a list of extremist sympathisers in a 
document entitled ‘Preventing terrorism; where next for Britain?’ and was sent to the Director 
General of the OSCT, Charles Farr in June 2010. The document was leaked to the press. 
Quilliam accused several organisations and institutions operating in the UK as the MCB, 
MAB, MSF, FOSIS, the Cordoba Foundation, Islam Channel, the MCU, the East London 
Mosque, and many others, who are sympathetic to Islamism (Nawaz and Hussain 2010, 59-
62). ‘The ideology of non-violent Islamists is broadly the same as that of violent Islamists; 
they disagree only on tactics’ (Nawaz and Hussain 2010, 7). The Director of the MCU 
explains how community experts became problematic ‘gate-keepers’. 
 
......and yet a group like the MCB has been put into this category of problematic 
Islamists, all of a sudden they are spoken as “gate-keepers” in the pejorative sense, 
and government says we are no longer going to do anything because you are 
somehow preventing us from engaging with real communities. I think somehow this 
is disingenuous because government doesn’t say that to other faith communities. I 
think this is one of the outcomes of all anti-Islamism hysteria, all this good and bad 
Muslim category and therefore you could also ask what the negative impact for 
Prevent when groups, whether it’s a national body like MCB or a local project like 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
conferred by official recognition, are indoctrinating young people with an ideology of hostility to 
western values (Maher and Frampton 2009, 5). 
40
 Quoted by Maajid Nawaz in the Express Tribune 26
th
 June 2010.  
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STREET, when either these groups are being excluded I don’t think the funding is 
the key issue.  
                                                                    (Interview 17, former director of the MCU)  
                                                                                                                              
This two-pronged strategy by Quilliam and Policy Exchange to discredit the likes of 
STREET and the MCB as ‘extremists’ was integrated into the second iteration of 
PREVENT in 2009, which was testament to the success and influence of the elite 
expert approaches. The category of ‘shared values’ and ‘non-violent extremism’ 
concretely impacted the role of community approaches to countering terrorism. It 
manifested in the way that government sidelined a number of previously key 
organisations, promoting other organisations like the Sufi Council of Britain, the 
severing of funding for PREVENT projects (albeit this was an outcome of a 
combination of factors following the 2010 review on PREVENT), and the 
centralisation of PREVENT.  Hence Quilliam and Policy Exchange were successful 
in changing the narratives surrounding the PREVENT strategy, thereby affecting the 
way the rules of the games was executed. Indeed the data largely supports the idea 
that think-tanks played a significant role in the PREVENT Strategy. 
 
...The MCU approach, instead of that being adopted, the policy Exchange/Quilliam 
approach was adopted.  This was an approach that could be described as top-down, 
you know it was an approach that the ideology was going to be tackled.  
                                                                               (Interview 17, director of the MCU)                                                                                                                                  
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Why was it easy to marginalise the likes of STREET and other Islamist organisations 
despite their early success in laying the groundwork for tackling radicalisation and 
developing de-radicalisation intervention programmes? One factor discerned from 
the data is the existence of a tension between the discursive domains of politics vis-
a-vis the distinct domain of professional experts.  This distinction between public and 
professional domain explains the political move by policymakers to support elite 
approaches over community expertise in delivering the PREVENT strategy by 2010.  
The disjuncture evident with the quality of expertise between community organisation 
and think-tanks like the Policy Exchange and Henry Jackson Society (Quilliam is a 
little different) suggests that behind closed doors professional expertise operates 
according to a logic that is governed by a greater commitment to knowledge and 
expertise, whereas the same expertise is not as useful in the public sphere of policy, 
public opinion, and political imperatives. The discursive dynamic in this domain has a 
different objective and strategy, which makes different use of the same expertise and 
knowledge. Indeed knowledge and expertise is subjugated to the demands of politics 
and has to therefore go through the political production line for sanitation and 
repackaging. The additional political dynamic makes the policy domain of counter-
terrorism more politicised and sensitive than other policy domains. This process is 
explained in the following way: 
 
But the discourse at the time was being led by organisations like Quilliam and the 
government looked like they were supporting that. Therefore they couldn’t come out 
openly and say they’re supporting us and the way we do things. They could however 
publicly support Quilliam and so the discourse became Quilliam-esque. And that 
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ended up being was written in the last Prevent document. What is written in the 
document isn’t exactly what people tried to do. Because if you ask anybody from the 
MET police, if you ask anybody from the Home Office prior to 2012, they will tell you 
who were the successful people and who weren’t. The will tell you why they had the 
outward facing discourse and then the ones actually doing the work.    
                                                                               (Interview 23, Director of Siraat) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Seen through the lens of the first dimension of confessional technology, another 
factor explaining the marginalisation of community expertise was the fact that their 
knowledge was integrated into a more centralised approach once a substantial 
amount of the knowledge has been extracted and codified. Despite the work, capital, 
and resources invested by community expertise in delivering PREVENT, they were 
not only branded as a part of the problem, but their approach to countering 
radicalisation was abandoned in favour of Quilliam and the Policy Exchange’s 
counter-ideological approach. It is important to note that their marginalisation began 
in 2006 but it was not until the advent of the Coalition government in 2010 that they 
became excluded from the PREVENT. 2010 is significant because the PREVENT 
strategy was suspended for re-evaluation under the new government. Debunking the 
position of community approaches in PREVENT therefore coincided with the apogee 
of the codification of knowledge on radicalisation and the initial experimental years of 
an innovative instrument in counter-terrorism policies. A substantial amount of 
learning and experience had occurred in this period off of the back of community 
expertise, in addition to the information gathering on Muslim populations, for 
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preventative strategies to become increasingly centralised. In short, community 
expertise had ‘confessed’ and passed over information and knowledge pertaining to 
Muslim populations in the UK into the structures of power. This made community 
expertise more disposable once government was able to lay down the foundations of 
a preventive infrastructure in counter-terrorism.    
 
 
 
7.3 Elite Approaches to Countering Radicalisation: the Quilliam Foundation  
 
Many interviewees emphasised the significant role that think-tanks such as Quilliam 
and the Policy Exchange had in shaping the PREVENT strategy. As analysed in 
chapter 3, many respondents associated de-radicalisation with Quilliam. In fact there 
is no evidence linking the emergence of de-radicalisation in the UK as interventions 
on the ground and its incorporation into the wider national strategy with Quilliam. 
Instead it was community experts such as STREET and ACF that developed local 
de-radicalisation interventions before it became centralised by Channel. The link 
between de-radicalisation and Quilliam in the minds of a number of respondents 
underscores the influence think-tanks had in this policy domain. Whilst several think-
tanks played a role in contributing to the discursive production surrounding the 
PREVENT policy, such as the and DEMOS, and I even interviewed analyst from 
others, like the IPPR, Forward Thinking, and ISD, this section primarily focuses on 
Quilliam because they are perceived by interviewees to be the most influential 
players in PREVENT.  
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Quilliam was set up in November 2007 by Maajid Nawaz and Ed Husain as Britain’s 
first ‘counter-extremism’ think-tank. Both were former members of Hizb-ut-Tahrir (the 
Liberation Party- HT), an organisation which was founded in 1953 in Jerusalem. 
Ideologically, it had its roots in the anti-colonial ideas of Palestinian Taqiuddin al-Nabhani. 
Islam is viewed as anti-nationalist, transnational, and pan-Islamic. HT is ideologically 
committed to establishing a political Islamic polity, with Sharia law and the Caliphate as its 
core aims. The Hizb has an estimated membership of 8,500 and is particularly popular 
amongst University students and professionals. In the 1990’s both Ed and Maajid had 
become active members, with Maajid occupying a senior role within the organisation, a 
position which saw him travel abroad trying to establish organisations roots in other 
countries. Whilst Ed naturally transitioned away from the Hizb (Hussain 2007), Maajid was 
imprisoned in Egypt in December 2001 and released in 2006. He left the Hizb in 2007 
(Nawaz 2013).   
 
Both Ed’s and Maajid’s transition from Islamism became publicly documented case 
studies in bestselling books, titled the ‘Islamist’ (2007) and ‘Radical’ (2013) 
respectively. Quilliam’s strategy as a think-tank was based on two broad objectives: 
(1) countering extremism, with a focus on addressing Islamist ideology and (2) 
Promoting a ‘Liberal’ Islam in Britain. As a trend within Islam, ‘Liberal’ Islam was born out 
the influence of liberal thought during colonialism in Muslim majority countries and seeks the 
application of social and political system that resulted from secularisation in Europe. Liberal 
Islam emphasises private and individual forms of practice and elevates reason above Quran 
and Sunna as reference points when it comes to norms and behaviour (Ramadan 2004, 27-
28). Both Ed and Maajid have articulated and prescribed an interpretation of Islam that 
confirms to this ‘liberal’ trend in Islam in their published works (Hussain 2007; Nawaz 2013) 
and a number of conceptual pieces published for Quilliam.  A subsidiary objective for 
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Quilliam was support for liberal and democratic values in order to counter (1) and 
promote (2).  
 
With respect to countering Islamist ideology, Quilliam distinguished between Islam 
as a faith on the one hand and Islam as an ideology on the other. Echoing the 
analysis in PREVENT, Quilliam argued that the ideological formulation of Islam was 
considered problematic because it was based on political considerations, which 
although did not lead to violence, nevertheless created the condition for violent 
extremism to flourish. The causal link between Islamist ideology and the transition to 
violence was stressed (See Chapter 5).  This is explained by the interviewee below.  
 
People like Ed Hussain.... when he bought out the Islamist and Majid Nawaz when 
Quilliam started there was this whole debate that....it’s the conveyor belt theory, you 
know, people that were involved in ideas and the radicalisation process; that it 
eventually leads them to becoming terrorists and involved in violent extremism.  
                                                                                   (Interview 19, Activist/Academic) 
 
The crux of this rationale was the belief that Islamist groups and ideas belonged to 
the same camp as ‘violent extremist’. Hence Quilliam forcefully pronounced the 
importance of tackling ‘non-violent extremism’ as a crucial dimension of PREVENT 
(Nawaz and Hussain 2010). In the early years their targets were mainly Hizb-ut-
Tahrir, but this changed later to include the majority of mainstream Islamist 
organisations. Indeed many respondents mentioned the counter-ideological focus of 
Quilliam. The Director of the MCU explains the attractiveness of adopting a counter-
360 
 
ideological approach, which enables the government to extend its reach nationally, 
as opposed to more local solutions, which is context specific. 
 
….....that Islamist ideology was going to be targeted and therefore the violence 
would be dealt with as well because, you know, the ideology understood to be 
feeding that violence was going to be tackled. I suppose on paper it had the merit, 
the potential to be adopted nationally anywhere. The great attraction from a policy 
point of view, of being clear and in theory being able to deployed anywhere. It had 
the notion that Hizb Ut-Tahrir in particular and those sorts of groups needed to be 
tackled as part of the strategy.   
                                                                              (Interview 17, Director of the MCU) 
 
Meanwhile, the quest to construct a Liberal Islam was concretised through a strategy 
of counter-subversion; Muslims organisations and individuals in Britain were 
categorised into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims. These tactics were exposed to the public 
when a document Quilliam had written to the director of the OSCT at the Home 
Office, Charles Farr, was leaked into public domain (Nawaz and Hussain 2010). In 
the document Quilliam listed a number of organisations they advised that the 
government should stop working with (see footnote 50). Although many respondents 
claimed that Quilliam’s role within the Muslim communities was discredited at the 
outset because of their affiliation to government, as well as their aggressive 
approach, according to one interviewee Quilliam’s approach weakened its 
relationship with government because they became seen as heavy handed in the 
delivery of the counter-extremism agenda.  
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I think they didn’t do themselves any favours in terms of how they presented 
themselves. Also they had a tendency to go in for kind of personal attacks on 
individuals. They were sending out these... I remember I was getting their updates 
like three times a day at one point, you know, they’d be sending ‘we condemn this 
individual for this that and the other’. Their tactics weren’t well received and then 
they kind of made it difficult for themselves to be seen as partners of government, 
they might have seen as liability for government.   
 
                                                                                             (Interview 9, ISD Analyst) 
 
                                                                                                                          
However, the data shows that Quilliam was very influential in a very short period of 
time, with a number of reasons cited: being funded by government, instant access to 
the media, links to influential right wing organisations, the compatibility of its 
message with PREVENT, and the expertise they possessed.Their influence is 
underscored by the fact that they were consulted in detail on Cameron’s 2011 Munich 
Speech on Extremism and Birmingham Speech in July 2015.  This was corroborated by Paul 
Goodman, editor of Conservative Home in a Guardian article (Shariatmadari 2015) and by 
investigative journalist Nafeez Ahmed (2015b).  With respect to receiving PREVENT 
money- this was not controversial since many organisations received PREVENT 
money, including the community organisations like STREET and the MCB. However, 
it was the level of funding that was particularly distinctive. Reports show that up till 
2011, Quilliam received 2.7 Million through PREVENT (Ahmed 2015b). The two 
excerpts below corroborate the fact Quilliam were funded by government to 
implement PREVENT objectives. 
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And they were really influential and he was almost like a celebrity within the police, 
he was invited to all the conferences. Quilliam were heavily funded and nobody knew 
for a long time where the money was coming from. We did establish later on that 
they were being paid by government departments like FCO, Home Office, and CLG.  
                                                                                 (Interview 16, Chair of the NAMP)  
                                                                                                                                 
They got the most money from CLG and from the Home Office and Foreign Office to 
present the public face of Islam so they gave them that money to change the 
discourse and because they gave them the money it gave the platform that allowed 
them to go be invited to speak to government Ministers.  
                                                                               (Interview 23, Director of Siraat) 
 
 Another factor that explains Quilliam’s popularity was the space afforded to them in 
the popular media, like tabloids such as the ‘SUN’, which has a readership of several 
millions. The MCU Director explains that this access to media was matched by very 
accessible and relatable narratives that were effective in getting the Quilliam 
‘extremism’ message across.  
  
 
When there was a terrorist incident the popular press would call upon Maajid Nawaz 
to explain what the problem was. It was done very effective, you know, by Dean 
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Goodson, who was writing in the Times, and in The Sun it was presented in 
accessible format by Maajid that before the joined Hizb-Ut-Tahrir they we regular 
guys, they enjoyed playing badminton and supported Liverpool football team, that 
was his football team I think. But they had these wonderful accounts tailor made for 
The Sun that kind of left out the important bits and thus made it clear that all these 
terrorist incidences were directly related to problems of the Mosque across the road.  
                                                                               (Interview 17, Director of the MCU) 
                                                                                                                              
Thirdly, many respondents believed that Quilliam were influential because they were 
‘Muslim Neo-Conservatives’ to quote the former leader of the MCB.  
 
Now why does the Quilliam Foundation do this? They are Muslim Neo-Cons in my 
opinion.    
                                                                          (Interview 14, former SG of the MCB) 
 
Quilliam has indeed explicitly identified itself with Neo-Conservatism, particularly 
their values-based approach to politics and foreign policy. However Nawaz stated 
that his organisation preferred to push liberal and democratic values through a 
bottom up approach in contradistinction to the American neo-Conservative’s top-
down approach (Nawaz 2011). In this respect Quilliam differed only in their approach 
rather than the principles of Neo-Conservatism. However, a few interviewees 
highlighted the relationship between the neo-conservatives and Quilliam and as a 
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result its ability to influence government. As the former FOSIS President put it, there 
is a ‘neo-conservative element within government’, which further underscores the 
influence of neo-conservatives. 
......that some of these think-tanks perhaps through neo-conservative think-tanks 
have too much say over the shaping of our policy today. I think that’s something to 
be concerned about. There seems to be a neo-conservative element within the 
government which is peddling certain narratives, Michael Gove for example being 
one. That’s something for us to be worried about.  
                                                                            (Interview 3, former ISOC President) 
This argument is buttressed by the fact that Michael Gove had in fact contributed to 
the discourse on radicalisation post 2005 with a book (Gove 2006) and was a 
leading player in the evolution of Policy Exchange, and sat on the Advisory Board for 
Quilliam.41 The Policy Exchange is not only Neo-conservative but they also play a 
public role advocating its ideological agenda for the Tory Party. Also, Douglass 
Murray of the Henry Jackson Society published a book advancing the merits of neo-
conservatism. The book is titled: ‘Neo-conservatism: Why We Need It’.  Interestingly, 
Douglas Murray was one of the people Gove thanked for helping him write ‘Celsius 7/7’ 
(Mills, Griffin, and Miller 2011, 40) In addition, the former Director of the MCU during his 
experience believes the scrutiny and negative smear campaigns against Islamists, 
reflects the working of a ‘sophisticated’ and ‘elite’ campaign, which is transnational, 
connected to American and ‘pro-Israeli’ networks. The influence of right-wing 
organisations in the shaping of PREVENT suggests that Quilliam benefited as a 
                                                          
41
 Quilliam Advisory Board (http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/press/quilliam-announces-new-head-of-
advisory-board/). Michael Gove became early trustee of Policy Exchange in 2002 and was its first 
Chairman. Its first director was Gove’s former flatmate Nicholas Boles, a Conservative member of 
Westminster City Council. See (Mills, Griffin, and Miller 2011, 36). 
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result of their link to these organisations, as well as the fact their stated agenda 
seemed to be compatible with the counter-subversion approaches of Neo-
conservative organisations.        
 
You know I suppose to a certain extent it is the organisation and the sophistication of 
the operations. When Daniel Pipes came over it became clear to me what I was 
witnessing was this very sophisticated movement; it’s like an elite campaign; of 
course it’s very pro- Israel in a particular sense and I suppose if you consider the 
media aspect and that Tony Blair was forging close relations with Robert Murdoch.  
                                                                               (Interview 17, Director of the MCU)                                                                                                                             
 
In contrast to other think-tanks working on counter-terrorism, such as Policy 
Exchange, the CSC, IPPR, ISD, Centri, Forward thinking, and DEMOS, Quilliam had 
in the form of Maajid, ED, and Usama Hasan, Muslims with actual years of 
experience with political Islam, who could speak Arabic, and were familiar with 
Islamist theological arguments.  Of all the think-tanks vying for influence and power 
therefore, only Quilliam could claim genuine credible expertise.  
 
Also they are articulate and eloquent, Ed in particular but both of them. What 
Whitehall had was as couple of guys that had been there done that and spoke a 
good game and suited them.  
                                                                                            (Interview 4, IPPR analyst) 
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More importantly however to note is the impact Quilliam from the beginning of its 
inception. Quilliam were positioned as the official experts on radicalisation amongst 
the civil service, politicians, and the media. Quilliam’s status as the experts on 
radicalisation was augmented by the popular and widely read book the ‘Islamist’.42  
The former Director of the MCU also identifies this book as being very influential in 
playing a role in getting Quilliam’s view of radicalisation rolled out at as part of a 
wider national strategy at the expense of local approaches represented by 
community experts.   
 
I think Quilliam managed to do more training than anyone else. So you are talking 
about an elite approach; Quilliam, as an agent of that approach is able to train junior 
police officers and civil servants; I soon became aware that our very small efforts 
here was being over-ridden by this national strategy, with Majid Nawaz and Ed 
Hussain’s view of the problem was being rolled out, and it was being backed up with 
a very readable book, the “Islamist”, and other surrounding literature.  
                                                                              (Interview 17, Director of the MCU) 
                                                                                                                                 
At the time, the lack of knowledge and understanding on radicalisation and Islamism 
made Hussain’s book mandatory reading for civil servants and officials in Whitehall. 
                                                          
42
 Investigative Journalist Nafeez Ahmed claims learning from a senior researcher at the Home Office 
that the Islamist was ‘effectively ghostwritten in Whitehall’: ‘he official told me that in 2006, he was 
informed by a government colleague “with close ties” to Jack Straw and Gordon Brown that “the draft 
was written by Ed but then ‘peppered’ by government input”. The civil servant told him “he had seen 
‘at least five drafts of the book, and the last one was dramatically different from the first’” (Ahmed 
2015a).  
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For example, the police officer below mentions the importance of the ‘Islamist’ as a 
reference point for senior police officers.  
 
 He wrote his book. A lot of senior officers read it. I even wrote an article in the Police 
Review, because everywhere I went I saw people reading his book.  
                                                                                (Interview 16, Chair of the NAMP) 
                                                                                                                                    
 
Seen through the lens of confessional technology, the ‘Islamist’ should be seen as a 
biographical and confessional account of Ed’s transformation from ‘radical’ to a 
liberal reformed person. Ed and Maajid’s experience encapsulates the repressive 
hypothesis embodied in the phenomenon of the ‘ex-radical/ex-Muslim’ syndrome, 
which epitomises the logic of ‘speaking truth to power’. In their public statements, 
publications, and in their discourse more generally, Ed and Maajid could be seen as 
concretised examples of individuals who had ‘confessed’ their sins and their bad 
ways.43 They had publicly recanted and laid bare their inner secrets, despite the fact 
that Ed and Maajid had not been violent in their ‘extremist’ phase. This suggests that 
the narrative of their experiences was more important than actual facts of what 
happened. Below are four statements by respondents, two academics and two from 
                                                          
43
 This is exemplified in a recently published Quilliam report, ‘In and Out of Extremism: ‘’The personal 
stories of Quilliam staff, including Maajid Nawaz and Dr Usama Hasan, have been fundamental to 
Quilliam’s success at deradicalising violent extremists….Each testimony highlighted the importance of 
these personal stories when delivering counter-narratives. Upon hearing these personal stories it 
prompted the then-extremists to rethink their own commitment to the cause’ (Manning and La Bau 
2015, 27). 
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the think-tank world, discussing the notion of ‘reformed’ or ‘ex’ Islamist/Muslim and 
its prominence in PREVENT.   
 
I think one of the reasons we had an emphasis on de-radicalisation, because many 
people didn’t come forward to help with Prevent, but those that did were the likes of 
Shiraz Maher, Shahid Butt, Majid Nawaz, Ed Hussain; these were people who 
claimed that they were ex-radicals and that they had an antidote to radicalisation and 
it was called de-radicalisation.  
                                                                                  (Interview 26, Forward Thinking)     
                                                                                                                            
I mean there’s even an industry in that context for ex-Muslims who will stand up and 
say ‘yes, I used to be one of them’. It’s not just the ex-extremist but it’s also the ex-
Muslims who are cashing in on money and politics. That’s what’s happening.  
                                                    (Interview 12, PREVENT practitioner and academic) 
                                                                                                                                 
And what we’ve seen after 7/7 is the rise of the group saying ‘well we are extremists, 
we are reformed extremists so we know even more than they do; we’ve actually 
been there, we understand it a lot more’. 
                                                                                              (Interview 11, academic) 
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Because they said to the establishment, look here we are, we used to be what you 
fear we’re not anymore and we got insight into things that nobody else has.  
 
                                                                                           (Interview 4, IPPR analyst) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Ultimately, the data reveals that a significant reason that Quilliam was afforded this 
influence on policy by government so early on is the fact that their narrative, conduct, 
and articulated vision embodied a normative model of Muslim identity the 
government was actively promoting.  This is explained by Director of Siraat, who 
discussed the fact that the government could not publicly support their organisation; 
it found it easier instead politically to support Quilliam because they were the 
‘acceptable face of Islam’, who fitted in with ‘secularism’, not to mention the fact that 
Quilliam was run by someone who called himself ‘Ed’ instead of Mohammed.   
 
Because they presented what the government thought was an acceptable face of 
Islam. The government is interested in who looks like us, talks like us, really into 
secularism, because we’re not really into religion in any shape or form, so who looks 
like that and better chimes with the public. Those who look like the Muslims blowing 
people up, we’re not accepting those people, like I’m dressing, whatever, we’re not 
accepting those, they’re not going to be the public face.....Doesn’t even make sense, 
but he dresses like us; looks like us, he can be an acceptable face of Islam. Same 
with Majid Nawaz and Ed Hussain- he doesn’t even call himself Mohammed, he calls 
himself Ed instead-become an acceptable face.  
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                                                                                (Interview 23, Director of Siraat) 
                                                                                                                              
Like the majority of organisations and interventional providers, the funding stream 
was cut by government with PREVENT 2011. Other factors for their diminished 
position post 2010 included the departure of Ed Hussain from Quilliam44; the fact that 
they had become a liability for government as a result of leaked memo and 
aggressive approach, and the emergence of a more streamlined PREVENT policy 
post 2011, which had less need for their input.  Regardless however of their 
diminished influence post 2010, the data indicates that as the representative of the 
elite approaches to countering radicalisation, Quilliam succeeded in discrediting and 
undermining the community approaches embodied by STREET, Siraat, as well as 
Islamists like the MCB and MAB, whilst simultaneously ensuring that their expertise 
was incorporated into a more centralised and national strategy post 2009. In many 
respects Quilliam encapsulated the confessional: it was run by individuals who were 
‘ex-radicals’ and who publically confessed their past activities, offered a breakdown 
of the ideology they previously professed, and were involved in the dissemination of 
such knowledge publicly. 
 
7.4 De-radicalisation Interventions: Mentoring and Psychotherapy 
 
Whilst the majority of respondents associated de-radicalisation with Channel, only a 
couple of interviewees were able to make more detailed comments about the nature 
of interventions.  However, it is clear from the limited data that de-radicalisation is 
                                                          
44
 21
st
 September 2010 ED declared he was leaving Quilliam for a position at the Council for Foreign 
Affairs (http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/press/ed-husain-to-join-us-council-on-foreign-relations/)  
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delivered through the pastoral care of mentorship. The importance of mentoring in 
de-radicalisation is also supported in the literature (HMG 2012, 21; HMG 2015, 17; 
Lindekilde 2015; Spalek and Davies 2012). Consequently this section examines the 
notion of mentoring as a vehicle for de-radicalisation and how it encapsulates 
confessional technology.  
In chapter 6 it was stated that Channel makes risk assessments of individuals and 
places ‘extremists’ on de-radicalisation interventions. Once Channel assigns 
individuals to an intervention programme, the premise is that the worldview of the 
‘extremist’ has to be tackled. How is this done? The data shows that de-
radicalisation is undertaken through the mentor-mentee relationship. The following 
respondent, a mentor and PREVENT practitioner, identified the link between the 
Channel programme and mentoring and described it as the link between the police 
and the community.  
 
The individuals, even now at this moment, who go through mentoring, are people 
from Channel, who are referred through Channel processes. That’s where the 
relationship between the police and the community is. The people who sat on the 
Project Board for the mentoring came from CTU, came from Birmingham and 
Coventry City Council, they were the funding bodies but we also got Probation and 
one or two of us from prisons who were involved in it. So they were the kind of 
stakeholders and in terms of how it then worked out- so now the projects gone live- 
you have say the police here in terms of Channel and CTU; we have commission 
and organisation called the Centre for Conflict Transformation, CFCT, which is 
based in Birmingham; they are a third sector community organisation who kind of, I 
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suppose, act as a neutral body through which to receive referrals and they do all the 
systems and processes so that when you get a referral from the police it goes 
through the Centre for Conflict; they kind of loosely use the eleven mentors we got 
on the books to kind of use them as consultants. 
                                                                             (Interview 8, PREVENT practitioner) 
                                                                                                                                     
In her description de-radicalisation is conceived as a ‘community’ initiative that 
involves several bodies and agencies that employ mentors. According to the 
interviewee (at the time of fieldwork) there were 11 mentors on the books at the 
CFCT in Birmingham. Meanwhile, another respondent, a senior researcher at 
Quilliam, highlights the pastoral components of de-radicalisation when asked about 
de-radicalisation: ‘one to one’, ‘vulnerability’, ‘didn’t have any friends’, ‘issues’, and 
‘journey’. These words once again show that radicalisation has been crouched in the 
language of ‘vulnerability’ but also stresses the pastoral features of the mentoring 
relationships. After all, pastoralist care essentially revolves around the welfare of the 
individual and their salvation. The language used by the interviewee to describe the 
signs that mentors examine in the radicalised subject does reflect the pastoral 
objectives of de-radicalisation interventions.  
 
It’s basically a process of mentoring on a personal one to one basis. Again because 
of the vulnerability factors a lot of these people become potential terrorist because 
they didn’t have any friends, didn’t have a steady job, or had been imprisoned or in 
trouble with the police before. There are all sorts of reasons why they are angry at 
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society- they don’t feel they fit in or feel any sense of brotherhood or sisterhood with 
people in a different environment. There are many issues to address and these 
interventions do and lead them away from their previous ideas to better ideas, 
helping them along their journey.  
 
                                                                  (Interview 25, Senior Research at Quilliam) 
                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                            
 
The relationship between mentor and mentee is analogous to the relationship 
between the priest and layperson in the Christian penance, which is characterised by 
the dynamic of the listener vis-a-vis the confessor. In other words, the mentor-
mentee relationship should be seen as the secularised version of pastoral power.  At 
the beginning of this chapter, we argued that the ‘repressive hypothesis’ was a deep-
seated practice of ‘speaking truth to power’ in Western societies. Indeed in the 
context of de-radicalisation, the ‘repressive hypothesis’ is manifested in the 
mentoring of the radicalised subject. The imperative to confess and reveal one’s 
innermost thoughts and secrets is a central technique in de-radicalisation 
interventions. Hence this first dimension of the confessional logic exists in de-
radicalisation interventions, as young ‘extremist’ are assigned to mentors and are 
encouraged to speak, argue, and confess. In fact my data identifies techniques such 
as dialectic discussions, rational debate, and argumentation as critical components 
of the process itself. The interviewee below explicitly mentions the discursive 
dimensions involved in de-radicalisation.   
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De-radicalisation, to do it, you need to be able to deconstruct the ideas that formed 
in that persons mind and give him a better way of understanding the proof and 
evidences that led him to those thoughts. Plus we have to give him an alternative to 
taking that course of action. For example, lots of people said they were angry about 
the Iraq War.  Okay well, you as an individual could you change the war in Iraq? 
Could you go at the time and get to Tony Blair to stop? The answer is no. But by 
blowing up somebody are you going to change the war in Iraq. The answer is no.  
On top of that you have to give him alternative outlets for his anger.   
 
                                                                                (Interview 23, Director of Siraat) 
 
                                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                             
The interviewee describes de-radicalisation in terms of ‘deconstruct’, ‘proof,’ and 
‘evidence’. These words connote the discursive dialectical technique involved in de-
radicalisation interventions. The rationale underlying discursive argumentation is that 
rational enquiry, debate, and the presumed superior knowledge of the mentor will 
result in the dislodgement and displacement of the thinking believed to support 
Islamist ideology. It adheres to liberal assumptions that cognitive change can come 
about through rational enquiry. More importantly the discursive interaction between 
the interlocutor and the radicalised subject takes place within the structured and 
formalised procedure and relationship of mentoring. The academic below views de-
radicalisation as ‘counter brain washing’ which occurs through persuasion, debate, 
and discussion.   
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I suppose it’s like brainwashing really; its counter-brain washing. They want to 
convince people that are convinced of something that they shouldn’t be that and 
should be convinced of something else. In a way I am in favour of that. I’m in favour 
of debate and discussion. If I see a Muslim who has an extreme interpretation, 
whether extreme in a peaceful way or in a violent way, I would try and de-radicalise 
them in a way using discussion and debate.  
 
                                                                                               (Interview 20, academic) 
                                                                                                                          
                                                                                                                                     
The de-radicalisation process stresses that cognitive change depends on the 
discursive interactions characterised by dialogue, debate, and language between 
listener and confessor. As mentioned earlier, speaking ‘truth’ to power by the 
radicalised subjects in de-radicalisation interventions is expected to play an 
important part in reconfiguring the identity of subjects. This is why discursive 
categories of ‘moderate’, ‘extreme’, ‘British values’, etc. are discursive devices that 
the subject is expected to embrace in order to become subjected.  It is discourse that 
guides the subject, ‘go here; don’t go there’. It is thus the act of verbalisation, 
alongside the act of proclamation that turns the individual into a subject. It is the 
performative function of language that turns the individual into a subject.  
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Furthermore, given the connotation of de-radicalisation with ‘brain-washing’, 
something which was evident in a few of the responses by interviewees, a notable 
feature of the mentoring process that is relevant to understanding de-radicalisation is 
the idea of ‘contract’ or ‘consent’ (HO 2011, 59; HMG 2015, 16). The notion of 
contract, according to the director of Siraat, relates to the fact that intervention 
programmes only take part with the consent of the radicalised subject. The idea of 
‘consent’ is central to counter claims and accusations that point to similarities 
between the concept of brainwashing and de-radicalisation. In this way, the 
mentoring relationship is contingent on the radicalised subject accepting the 
authority of the mentor and hence the ‘contract’.  
 
Behavioural change business means that if I want to change your behaviour then 
first and foremost we need to have a contract to say that you are going to accept 
something I say to you or at least give it credence and dialogue; in the same way 
that when you are at school you have a contract with your teacher that what your 
teacher says you’re going to take it on board.  
 
                                                                               (Interview 23, Director of Siraat) 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                             
The suggestion is that de-radicalisation is neither compulsory nor legally mandated 
but is a by-product of the subject’s acceptance. If this were true, then the subject has 
implicitly conceded that they have a problem or exhibits the symptoms of 
radicalisation that need to be treated. Insofar as the subject agrees to take part in the 
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mentoring process they consequently affirm their identity as radicalised subjects. 
Similarly therefore to the sinner or faithful confessing to the priest, the radicalised 
subject consents to confessing since their liberation is perceived to be hanging on 
the expertise of the mentor.  Again the fact that de-radicalisation interventions are 
based on the ‘consent’ and voluntary acquiescence of individuals is explained below 
by the researcher at Quilliam. Interestingly he explicitly mentions that pastoral 
objectives of such intervention, the fact that the radicalised subjects have not been 
arrested or changed.     
 
The point with the prison service, same with mentoring, is to try and help turn their 
life around because generally this country will try to look after the welfare of its 
people. Remember they are not criminalised; Channel is voluntary and has to be 
done with the agreement of the parents. They haven’t been arrested or charged and 
the criminal justice system works differently.  
 
                                                               (Interview 25, Senior Researcher at Quilliam) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Another critical point to consider in the mentoring process that structures 
interventions is the notion of ‘counselling’. Indeed it is this dimension relating to 
counselling, psychology, and therapy that connects and brings together the 
aforementioned features inherent to de-radicalisation, such as talking, consenting to 
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take part, and mentoring together. A mentor and PREVENT practitioner employs the 
analogy of counselling to explain the objectives of mentoring.    
 
It means when you have a referral sitting in with a client, that you’re not sitting there 
indefinitely to talk about life in general- this is something that has an outcome at the 
end and not to make the process ongoing you need to have an end point. It’s more 
around the basics of what counselling is about. So with counselling, for example, the 
idea of consent......  
                                                                             (Interview 8, PREVENT practitioner) 
                                                                                                                                            
This respondent’s answer sheds light on the structured logic of de-radicalisation, e.g. 
it has a beginning and an ‘end point’ and is compared to counselling.  Another 
interviewee, also employs the language of psychology to tackle radicalisation and 
speaks of the process in terms of ‘stages’, with the aim of putting ‘doubt’ in the 
subjects conceptions. 
 
 
.....we also need to tackle the psychology of that individual as well because we don’t 
know about the traumas in their life that might lead them to be the bomber instead of 
the bomb maker. At least if we can put enough doubt we can stop him becoming the 
bomber; put some more doubt and stop him becoming the bomb-maker; then put 
some more doubt and stop him becoming a supporter; and then that takes him back. 
It goes through a stage process.  
                                                                                (Interview 23, Director of Siraat)                                                                                                                                              
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Continuing the logic of a structured intervention based on consent, with an end in 
sight, deploying the discursive technique of psychotherapy, the words expressed by 
the radicalised subject undergoing intervention is recorded and monitored. Seen 
through the lens of confessional technology, one of the objectives of power in the 
incitement of discourse is to collate knowledge in order to feed it back into discourse 
that evokes the methods and language of science, which produces the ‘truth’. The 
PREVENT’s practitioner’s comments below highlights how this process works 
through mentoring. She describes de-radicalisation intervention as a formal 
programme in which ‘reports’ are written, ‘debrief’ sessions occur, and that 
information ‘passes upwards’. 
 
So there two mentors that go in for example. When you’ve had an intervention you 
write up a report and then you have a debrief session with the operations managers 
from the Centre for Conflict and the idea is that you aware of everything that 
happens in the process and you know exactly what will pass upward. 
 
                                                                            (Interview 8, PREVENT practitioner) 
 
                                                                                                                              
                                                                                                                                             
The similarities between the techniques of mentoring and psychotherapy and their 
associations with de-radicalisation intervention are evident (HMG 2015, 17). As 
argued thus far, this is due to the fact that the rationale, techniques and language 
employed by all these programmes have a common origin in the Christian 
confessional. And they are all based on the individual or subject having to discuss, 
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talk, and confess. An overview of psychotherapy elucidates this further. 
Psychotherapy is based on the notion that it provides for a medical, scientific, and 
objective way of diagnosing the problem experienced by a patient with ‘x’ symptoms 
and ‘y’ problems. Psychoanalysis depends on the expertise of the 
doctor/therapists/counsellor and their ability to interpret the language used by the 
patient, in which the patient provides a detailed account and analysis of their past, 
memories, feelings, hope, and expectations- in short, confessing their internal world 
to the expert (Rose 1999). The objective is that the doctor is able to interpret and 
diagnose the problem and then offer prescription that fixes the problem. The patient 
is offered a chance in this process of understanding and reconciling their issues and 
in the end being rehabilitated back to ‘normality’. Likewise, de-radicalisation 
interventions are based on programmes with several interlocutors, who shepherd 
and educate the individual, encouraging them to speak and confess, and have their 
positions re-examined and minds changed.    
 
 
 
7.5 Redemption: ‘integration into the Mainstream’  
 
De-radicalisation is predicated on the notion that intervention agencies and mentors 
are able to undo years of social, cultural, and political conditioning. Is this possible? 
The simple answer is: we do not know. Channel does not provide access to data with 
regards to the profile of individuals undergoing interventions, the success rates, or 
whether those young individuals have been re-orientated in conformity to the 
objectives of PREVENT. This means the public and researchers are unable to know 
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whether de-radicalisation interventions work overall. There a few other questions that 
arise: do interventions actually work according to the logic articulated in PREVENT, 
e.g. cognitive change results in behaviour change? What does a successful de-
radicalisation look like? And how do we know they were going to commit acts of 
violent anyways? The dataset is silent on these questions, as is the wider literature. 
During fieldwork data I was unable to interview ‘reformed’ extremist who had 
undergone de-radicalisation or even talk directly to mentors implementing an 
intervention, so I could not ascertain the phenomenological experience of being ‘de-
radicalised’. This is a notable weakness in the dataset. Despite the absence of data 
relating to the de-facto process of de-radicalisation itself, the data does however 
affirm that de-radicalisation ultimately seeks a transformed self, whose behaviour 
changes as a result of an internal change of the soul.  
The first major challenge for researchers wanting to understand de-radicalisation 
interventions as a process and not merely as an idea and policy is access to data 
and an ostensible lack of transparency when it comes to the activities of Channel. 
This is expressed by the majority of interviewees.  This means that we are unable to 
know if Channel is working and has been successful in implementing de-
radicalisation.45 One respondent noted that despite the absence of evidence to prove 
the success of Channel, policymakers are ‘proud’ of it.   
  
It’s almost like when Prevent first started, everybody is very proud of Channel. I have 
not seen a single document which is independent, which shows me the tangible 
results produced by Channel.   
                                                          
45
 ‘Evaluation of Channel has been primarily process based. We judge that mapping of outputs has 
again been hampered by a lack of quality-assured data (HO 2011, 59). 
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                                                                  (Interview 16, former President  of NAMP) 
 
As a result of the absence of any meaningful and transparent data, some 
interviewees suggested that Channel is being financed and supported by 
policymakers off of the back of conjecture.  And it is risk aversion that bears the 
fingerprints of political imperatives and pressures and not the mark of seriously 
evidence based research expected of governmental policy. The academic below 
poignantly articulates the contradiction between policy imperative that usually evoke 
the need for evidence to substantiate a policy and the absence of the same logic in 
PREVENT. 
    
If it was explained to me more, you know, the science, or the rational, or the 
evidence for it; now a days they talk about evidence base policing. Where’s the 
evidence for Channel? Where’s the evidence base for de-radicalisation? Where’s the 
evidence base for Prevent? These are not evidence base or led policies and if you 
compare it then with in stark contrast with Islamophobia, the argument against doing 
anything against Islamophobia is there’s no evidence to substantiate action or 
change. So we look at that and in one breath we can do a lot of things with no 
evidence whatsoever and in another breath we can’t do anything.  
                                                                                               (Interview 11, academic) 
                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                         
Another challenge for policymakers and researchers alike is measuring de-
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radicalisation. In the words of PREVENT:  ‘It is essential in this area, more even than in 
other areas of Prevent, that data collection is improved against a standard set of criteria.’ 
(HO 2011, 61). In other words how do we know when somebody has been 
successfully de-radicalised? The literature presented the notion of recidivism rates 
common to crime prevention, which is about measuring re-offending rates of ex-
convicts. There is still nevertheless something more intuitive about the notion of long 
term prevention. Measuring cognitive change however is fraught with greater 
challenges. One respondent explains this inherent ambiguity in the exercise of 
establishing successful de-radicalisation.   
 
There will always be ambiguity and I don’t know the answer to that; because 
remember the people that go through Channel, how do we decide they’re “clean”? 
What are you going to peer in their heads and see if they’ve changed their minds?  
                                                                                     (Interview 1, DEMOAS analyst) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Whereas this comment represents the sceptical view on how to measure de-
radicalisation, the respondent below for the use of recidivism rates in  measuring de-
radicalisation, which also encompasses an assessment of ‘vulnerabilities’.  
 
All we can look at is what the vulnerabilities were beforehand and what they look like 
after. So when they started, they had a drug addiction, a mental health problem, and 
some family problems and when they come out they still got two of four of those 
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indicators and say there’s been some progress. That’s all you can do is benchmark 
with an individual before and after and that’s what you’d do with any programme. So 
if you were looking at repeated criminal offenders you’d say: twelve months on how 
many have re-offended? Six years on how many have reoffended? Ten years on 
how many have re-offended?  And at the moment we have seven convicted terrorist 
and none of them have reoffended. Now we don’t know what reoffending rates in the 
country are. Again a part from the two in prisons, the others are in work or education.  
                                                                       (Interview 22, Senior PREVENT Officer) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Furthermore, another difficulty in analysing Channel is the clandestine nature 
surrounding the profile of individuals who have undertaken a de-radicalisation 
intervention. The interviewee advised me that interviewing individuals who had been 
on intervention programmes would benefit my investigation of de-radicalisation but 
that he also mentioned that I would not have access to them.  
 
But the people you really want to talk to are punter A, B, and C who went through the 
programme: how do they feel and what happened? I don’t know their names and 
you’re not going to get it in Google. A lot of them wouldn’t have known they were 
channelled and those that did probably don’t talk about it much. But if you ask to the 
government they will tell you there are hundreds of those.  
                                                                                           (Interview 4, IPPR analyst) 
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As a result, not only do we not know whether de-radicalisation interventions have 
been successful but we also do not know the actual reality of the process itself. 
What, for example, is the phenomenological experience of de-radicalisation? Does it 
operate the way formulated in the PREVENT conception of de-radicalisation in terms 
of cognitive change first? Again the absence of data surrounding the actual process 
in the UK means we can only speculate.  This provokes the following questions: Why 
persist with de-radicalisation if we cannot establish whether it has worked? And 
caring for vulnerable individuals may be important, but why does it have to be done 
under the auspices of a counter-terrorism policy? What is the overall goal of de-
radicalisation?  
 
There are two broad perspectives on the issue of the overall objective of de-
radicalisation; the first perspective is articulated in PREVENT and by policymakers 
that de-radicalisation seeks to get individuals to abandon violence and to do that 
requires a change in the worldview of the radicalised individual. The second 
perspective articulated by some interviewees is that the change of subjectivity and 
behaviour is less to with violence and more to do with the adoption of the 
‘mainstream’ worldview. The first perspective is encapsulated in the view expressed 
below. 
    
It’s quite simple, they have to renounce violence. We know from their own 
testimony’s that they are convinced that violence including terrorism is an illegitimate 
means of achieving the end. So they might say that we could attack British tax 
payers as they are legitimate targets because of the Iraq War and that they are Kufar 
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and we have to wage Jihad against the Kufar. A lot of individuals say things like that 
and after a successful intervention when they realised form religious experience, 
general experience, and practical arguments, they renounce those ideas and say it’s 
never right to kill innocent people.  
 
                                                                 (Interview 25, senior researcher at Quilliam) 
 
                                                                                                                                
 
                                                                                                                                   
The idea expressed here is that ‘arguments’ will lead the militant individual to 
renounce violence. This idea of deconstructing the thoughts that lead to violence is 
also explained by the Director of Siraat.  
 
What I or we class as radicalisation is somebody has the wrong understanding of 
those five things, not necessary all five, but enough of those five to justify unjustly 
killing people or unjustly harming people.  
                                                                               (Interview 23, Director of Siraat) 
                                                                                                                                    
                                                                                                                                                          
The five categorises mentioned above have been discussed in chapter 3 but in 
essence they relate to concepts like ‘Jihad’, Sharia’, ‘Caliphate’, ‘Kufr’, and ‘ummah’. 
With de-radicalisation interventions therefore policymakers and experts aim to 
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rearticulate and reshape the individual’s understanding of these terms. Thus both 
interviewees explain the fact that there problem with radicals was their 
understanding of central terms and ideas.  
 
I had a few objections to the definition of Islamist though. It said the Islamists 
believed in Sharia, Caliphate, and Jihad. Well I disagree with that. I believe in those 
terms but I have a modern understanding of them whereas I agree that extremist 
exploit those terms and have a medieval understanding of those three points.  
                                                              (Interview 25, Senior Researcher at Quilliam) 
                                                                                                                           
According to this perspective de-radicalisation is concerned with changing the 
worldview of the radicalised subject with respects to their understanding and 
interpretation of certain classical notions in the Islamic tradition. Whilst this approach 
seeks to suppress a particular Muslim identity, e.g. politicised Muslim identities, it 
does not necessarily require, in theory, the adoption of ‘British values’ or liberal 
values. The dividing line in this instance is violence.  
 
However, the second broad perspective views the objective of de-radicalisation as 
integration into mainstream society (See chapter 3). One of the definitions evidenced 
in the data is reflected in official definitions of de-radicalisation in the literature: 
‘dissuade somebody from the use of violence or/and reintegrate into mainstream 
society’ (UN Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force 2008, 5). The two 
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interviewees below make an explicitly associate de-radicalisation with a ‘return to the 
mainstream’. 
 
So when you are talking about de-radicalisation as a dictionary definition, what your 
saying is we are talking about moving people towards what mainstream society 
believes.  
                                                                         (Interview 10, Investigative Journalist) 
  
I understand Islam to be de-radicalisation, again with all the reservations about using 
the word, but bringing people back from the margins if you wish from the extremities 
of practice- whether it be religious, political, social, ideological- bringing them back to 
mainstream fold. 
                                                            (Interview 27, Director of Cordoba Foundation) 
 
The key question here is what is meant by the ‘mainstream.’ While some 
interviewees could not define what the ‘mainstream’ meant in practice, the following 
three interviewees associated the ‘mainstream’ with either ‘Liberal secularism’, 
‘British values’, or ‘values compatible with the Prevent strategy’. 
 
... if you feel someone isn’t well integrated and believes Britain is the enemy and that 
kind of narrative and that’s somebody you consider to be radical, then de-
radicalisation is about pacifying this person to try and make him understand that 
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actually, Britain and the West doesn’t have a problem with Muslims and British 
society and values are great.  
                                                                      (Interview 26, Forward Thinking Analyst) 
                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                         
To answer your question, a journey to radicalisation and backwards, where to a point 
you are considered by the government to be a saint and don’t pose a threat and you 
hold Islamic values that are compatible with the Prevent strategy.  
                                                              (Interview 16, former President of the NAMP) 
                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                         
I think the agenda is to stir disaffected young people into the mainstream viewpoint. 
Getting them to sign up to those elusive British values we were talking about, getting 
them to sign up to liberal secularism. 
                               (Interview 24, former Chief Inspector/ PREVENT Board) 
 
These comments suggest what that the purpose of de-radicalisation for policymakers 
is getting Muslim youngsters to adopt particular modes of subjectivity through 
pastoral care. In these examples the ‘mainstream view’ is represented by discursive 
categories like ‘British values’ and ‘secular liberalism’. As articulated by the 
respondents above, policymakers want to affirm through de-radicalisation 
intervention, a particular Muslim identity in conformity with society, and according to 
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one respondent the PREVENT strategy. Indeed overall this view of de-radicalisation- 
the second perspective on the objective of de-radicalisation- is more convincing. The 
first view is contradicted by the fact the majority of the individuals deemed 
‘extremist’, from the little we know, are predominantly young, non-violent, with little 
connection to actual militant groups. In addition, it has become clear through the 
analysis of data in this chapter, that de-radicalisation does not attempt to tackle 
terrorism but works to produce alternative Muslim subjectivity. This fact is explained 
by a PREVENT Officer.  
 
The difference is whether you consider that person crossing the line into criminality. 
People have this idea sometimes that Prevent wants to lock people up and stop 
committing terrorist acts; it’s not the case, we want to get to them before they get 
that far and realign their thinking, in many ways, and give them a balance in life.  
                                                                                  (Interview 21, PREVENT Officer) 
                                                                                                                             
 
                                                                                                                                    
The important points raised in the comment above are ‘get them before they get that 
far’, ‘realign their thinking’, and give them a ‘balance in life’. These notions support 
the idea argued in this chapter that de-radicalisation interventions are a form of 
pastoral power. This pastoral logic exhibits the logic of risk management (‘get them 
before they get that far’), care (‘realign their thinking’), and redemption (‘balance of 
life’). To do this, PREVENT has employed the discourse on radicalisation, which 
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problematises Muslim identity in terms of explaining terrorism and integration as a 
problem of religious and political practices (chapter 5), and through Channel identify 
the individuals that exhibit such problematic ideas and behaviour (Chapter 6), in 
order to apply corrective solutions to individuals categorised as ‘extremist’ through 
pastoral care (chapter 7), with a particular focus on theological and political revision.  
The outcome is a sanitised politically sanctioned Muslim identity. It is in this way that 
the radicalised subject is expected to adopt ‘British values’ (good), ‘secular 
liberalism’ (even better), and abandon extremism (e.g. Islamism, which is 
synonymous with bad). This is what a de-radicalisation point/position would ideally 
resemble. Hence from the point of view of normalcy, ‘normal’ adolescence is 
constituted by privatised religious practice, de-politicisation, and self-regulated 
citizenry. 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter examined the role of the confessional in the technologies of the self. An 
overview of the historical context of the Christian confessional and its integration into 
governmental practices was provided at the beginning in order to situate the data. It 
introduced important prerequisite notions for reading the data, which included: the 
important role experts play in government and the management of society; the logic 
of the ‘repressive hypothesis’ governing Western conceptions of liberation; the 
instrumentalised deployment of discourse, and the fact that political rationality 
invests in the care of individuals. Section 7.2 traced the role of community expertise 
in PREVENT and tried to frame the marginalisation of their approaches within the 
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first dimension of confessional technology- namely the incitement to discourse. This 
section should be read in conjunction with section 7.3, which focused on the Quilliam 
Foundation as an embodiment of ‘elite’ approaches in PREVENT. Fieldwork data 
showed that Quilliam was very successful in undermining the community experts and 
despite the fact it was not itself directly providing de-radicalisation interventions, it 
nevertheless enjoyed the support of government. The Quilliam Foundation was 
favoured because they were ‘confessional’ Muslims. Once knowledge on 
radicalisation and measures designed to counter it had been collated and 
documented, de-radicalisation become the government’s way of centralising counter-
terrorism initiatives. 
The final two sections focused on de-radicalisation interventions. Section 7.4 
discusses the role of mentoring as a form of modern pastoral power in de-
radicalisation interventions. Crucial to the mentor-mentee relationships were the 
techniques of counselling and psychotherapy. It suggested that subjectification 
occurs through the verbalisation of thoughts and the dialectic argumentation 
between the mentor and mentee. Section 7.5 went through some of the difficulties 
researchers face trying to understand de-radicalisation in the UK. This stems from 
the absence of data with respect to the success of the Channel programme, how the 
success of de-radicalisation could ever be established, and inability to access the 
profile of individuals who have undergone interventions. Despite the aforementioned 
challenges, fieldwork data nevertheless showed that the process of de-radicalisation 
was preoccupied with the transformation of subjectivity of the radicalised subject. In 
particular this change of subjectivity had little to do with the abandonment of 
violence, but rather the adoption of politically approved Muslim identities in 
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accordance with wider social and governmental norms. This supports the view that 
the process of de-radicalisation is mediated through pastoral care.  
Confessional technology enables us to explain the conundrum regarding 
PREVENT’s emphasis on a number of distinctive features in de-radicalisation: the 
focus on the individual rather ‘extremist’ groups, the conflation of prevention and 
rehabilitation in terms of policy, and the proposition that behavioural change happens 
through the revision of a person’s worldview. These factors are manifested in 
Channel’s concern for ‘vulnerable’ individuals who have not committed a crime but 
who harbour ‘extremist’ views. This pastoral logic evident in Channel presents a 
removes the attention of policymakers several stages away from terrorism. De-
radicalisation in this light becomes less about terrorism and more about the 
affirmation and suppression of certain identities. This is exemplified by the existence 
of Channel risk indicators, which correspond to the political and religious view and 
behaviours of Muslims, as well as the promotion of British values in public 
institutions. 
The underlying objective of Channel is designed to tackle problematic Muslim 
identity, which is linked with the themes highlighted in chapter 1 of this thesis; 
namely that Muslim identity in Britain is believed to be impregnated with theological 
and political excess, which potentially risks being converted into violence in the 
future. Policymakers have chosen to cull Muslim surfeit by shaping the subjectivity of 
Muslim youngsters through the vehicle of pastoral power, embodied in de-
radicalisation and enabled by Channel. It is thus through confessional technology 
that we can make sense of the fact that Muslim identities- not terrorism- has been 
problematised and actualised in the UK counter-terrorism policy.     
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CHAPTER 8 
Conclusion  
 
We do not destroy the heretic because he resists us: so long as he resists us we 
never destroy him. We convert him, we capture his inner mind; we reshape him. We 
burn all evil and all illusion out of him; we bring him over to our side, not in 
appearance, but genuinely, heart and soul. We make him one of ourselves before 
we kill him. It is intolerable to us that an erroneous thought should exist anywhere in 
the world, however secret and powerless it may be. 
                                                                                            (Orwell 1987 [1949], 267) 
 
....But a long process of pulverising, dissolving and rooting awaits any physical 
things that have been recognised as dirt. In the end, all identity is gone. The origin of 
the various bits and pieces is lost and they have entered into the mass of common 
rubbish. It is unpleasant to poke about in the refuse to try to recover anything, for this 
revives identity. So long as identity is absent, rubbish is not dangerous.....where 
there is no differentiation there is no defilement.  
                                                                                              (Douglas 1992, 197-198) 
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8.1 A Summary of the Thesis  
 
Chapter 1 set the scene for the study of de-radicalisation and summarised 
schematically the three themes considered to be integral for understanding the 
‘problem’ occupying policymakers in Britain: the re-calibration of security post 7/7 
towards a pre-emptive risk regime; the death of political multiculturalism and the 
problematisation of Muslim identity; and the re-positioning of Islam within the 
paradigm of European secularisation and modernisation. A by-product of such 
discursive and non-discursive developments was the problematisation of Muslim 
identity and religion, which was conceptualised in the register of ‘radicalisation’. By 
securitising identity and religion, Muslim subjectivity became seen as being in need 
of reform. Hence the fact that de-radicalisation became touted as one of the 
solutions to the ‘Muslim Question’.  
Moreover, the prevailing recourse of policymakers and public discourse to explaining 
complex political, social, and economic phenomenon in terms of ‘culture’ was 
addressed. The culturalisation of politics revealed the co-constitutive role of identity 
and security, in which both domains are dependent on the other, and which the 
construction of the British Self is achieved through the culturalisation of Islam.  The 
move towards de-radicalisation is therefore a by-product and extension of the 
politicisation of culture. These themes not only encapsulated the major issues that 
constituted the theoretical and discursive background of de-radicalisation, but more 
importantly outlines the historical context which paved the conditions that allowed 
de-radicalisation to emerge as an idea and practice in the UK.  
Despite the growing importance of de-radicalisation in counter-terrorism, there was 
surprisingly very little on it in the literature. Chapter 2 revealed that the definition and 
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conception of de-radicalisation is ambiguous. Ontologically the literature was 
inconclusive on whether it described the move away from violence, integration of 
prison inmates into the mainstream, the adoption of liberal values, preventing crime, 
or the adoption of progressive interpretation of Islam by militants.  Also, no 
agreement exists on the factors that lead individuals away from violence and that 
there exist various programmes with different approaches and strategies. There 
appears to be little or no evidence from the literature regarding how you get 
someone to deradicalise, let alone what de-radicalisation itself is. There was no 
empirical basis for the policy development of de-radicalisation programmes. We 
continue to know very little about the specifics of de-radicalisation in the UK. 
Chapter 3 analysed and evaluated qualitative fieldwork data collated from 27 
practitioners working in the field of PREVENT. The data showed the need to 
abandon attempts to establish a fixed definition of de-radicalisation given that there 
were 28 ways to describe de-radicalisation. When it came to defining de-
radicalisation, the majority of interviewees associated it with ‘cognitive change’ as 
well as getting people away from violence. In this respect, it reflected the 
preponderance of thinking in conceptions of de-radicalisation. One explanation we 
investigated for the high laxity towards terminological ambiguity was the notion of 
‘language games’ and ‘family resemblance’. The concept of ‘language games’ 
allowed us to situate the plethora understandings of de-radicalisation within the 
context of games that people play in language; that it was not the word which was 
important per se, but the context in which the word was used. 
In addition, the data also revealed that de-radicalisation for interviewees 
encompassed four different interpretations, corresponding to four different policy 
agendas: conceptually, this meant getting people away from violence, counter-
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ideology, integration, and youth empowerment. In policy terms this related to 
counter-terrorism, counter-subversion, community cohesion, and crime prevention 
respectively. In contrast to its conception in the literature, the fieldwork data also 
indicated that interviewees associated de-radicalisation with other themes: like 
expertise and knowledge in formulating de-radicalisation, its focus on the youth, its 
connection to the idea of radicalisation, and the fact that it was linked with wider 
political objectives. Although the fieldwork data provided us with a more nuanced 
and complex understanding of de-radicalisation, it did not resolve the problems 
presented by PREVENT and the wider literature. 
Consequently, in chapter 4 it was proposed that the solution to understanding de-
radicalisation in the UK context lay in conceptualising it as a ‘technology of the self’. 
To recapitulate, the technology of the self is defined as that: 
 ....which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a 
certain number of operations on their bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and the 
way of being, so as to transform themselves… 
                                                                                                   (Foucault 1988a, 18)  
 
The technology of the self comprises of four areas: ontology, ascetics, deontology, 
and telos. Using this fourfold breakdown, de-radicalisation is about working on the 
worldview of Muslims, conceived as ‘ideology’ (ontology), through disciplinary and 
confessional technology (normalisation, surveillance, being examined and judged, 
and intervention programmes), which corresponds to ascetics, in which Muslims 
understand themselves to be radicalised and extreme citizens (de-ontology), in order 
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to redeem themselves and become good citizens and adopt a new identity (telos).   It 
was argued that the same process within governmental relations can be delineated 
into three broad areas: discursive (ontology), disciplinary (ascetics), and 
confessional (deontology) technology.  The formation of the self is accomplished 
through the interplay of these three technologies. Foucault’s concept of the 
technology of the self is therefore modified for my purposes of enumerating de-
radicalisation in the UK. Whilst such technologies describe governmentality in its 
initial conception more accurately than the technology of the self, this chapter 
nevertheless argued that it effectively captures the way that governmentality guides 
every citizen at the individual level. The theory of governmentality includes a positive 
conception of power (besides a negative one), as well as a totalising one, in which 
government operates through myriad strategies, techniques, relations, and spheres 
to order and guide the welfare and discipline of the collective population and 
individuals simultaneously.  
 
The regulatory ideal that underlies the logic of governmentality in terms of the 
‘paradigm’, ‘central spheres’, and ‘normalisation’ was also addressed. The regulatory 
ideal shapes what is normally referred to as ‘structure’: networks and systems of 
power, knowledge, culture, institutions, experts, and governmental activities that 
control human behaviour in terms of norms rather than through the law. The 
regulatory ideal in the UK is defined by both ‘the political’ and neo-liberal practice of 
government, two features of the nation-state commonly associated with sovereignty 
and cultural/social domain respectively. Self transformation according to a norm is a 
process that also affects the non-radicalised subject, like the everyday citizen, who is 
also guided to work on themselves.   
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Moreover, it was argued that the Schmittian ‘political’ must be seen as the 
precondition of the nation-state. In order for the political and national community to 
exist, politics has to be exclusionary and antagonistic. Schmitt shows that every acts 
of consensus is based on exclusion, since the nation presupposes the collective 
agency of the ‘we’; it reinforces the fact that identities are constructed through 
difference and hence the irreconcilable exclusion of Muslims from the British nation. 
It is the ‘political’ that allows practices like citizenship and identity to acquire 
significance and therefore provides the normative blueprint for everyone bounded by 
the sovereignty, law, and power of the nation-state.   
 
The second ideal was neo-liberalism as a practice of government. In the UK, 
government operates according to the logic of neo-liberal values, in which there is an 
alignment between the functions of government, the management of society, the 
normative values promoted to citizens, and a market based logic. Specifically, neo-
liberalism seeks a de-politicised subject and market-consumer based values, as well 
as self-regulating and responsible citizenship.  It is in this sense that ‘radicalisation’ 
represents an aberration of the neo-liberal ideal or what constitutes normality. If, in 
other words, radicalisation is about too much religion, politicisation, and a problem of 
identity, normality is defined as de-politicisation, liberal values, and particular forms 
of conduct. This is why British identity and values are valorised as an antidote to the 
radicalisation malaise. The technology of self depends on the criterion of normal and 
deviant, of good and bad, and hence the significance of discursive production in the 
technology of the self.  
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Chapter 5 examined the emergence of radicalisation as a discourse post 2004. This 
was achieved through the problematisation of Muslims in Britain and the 
conceptualisation of radicalisation as a ‘process’, invoking the use of ‘models’ and 
the question of causation associated with the methods of the natural sciences. The 
construction of radicalisation, with the help of ‘experts’ and the social science, built a 
narrative about radicalisation that has a number of inbuilt assumptions: that it affects 
individuals with identity problems who download the ‘Salafi script’, then who go from 
being normal citizens to being terrorists. Thus identity and religion were the 
cornerstones of what was considered a new security threat. The diagnosis in the 
discourse on radicalisation situated the problem of radicalisation with ‘ideology’, 
which comprises of theological and political doctrines, the adherence to which 
causally drives Muslims to violence. Counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation 
initiatives are therefore supposed to tackle the ‘ideology’, something notably 
expected of all Muslims and not just radicalised subjects singled out for intervention 
programmes.  
As highlighted in chapter 1, critiques of radicalisation have suggested that rather 
than reflect the process in the real world, radicalisation should be viewed within the 
social construction of risk. Doing so puts the future orientated logic of radicalisation, 
one which is concerned with the potentiality and possibility of threats, into relief. In 
this respect radicalisation is more about risk management than about fighting 
terrorism. This explained the tolerance by policymakers of the substantial gap 
between research and policy, between perception and reality, and between counter-
terrorism policies that focus on countering radicalisation versus those that counter 
terrorism.  In summation, we can identify three governmental reasons for the 
incitement to discourse post 2004: (1) it created systems of knowledge for 
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deployment in governing structures; (2) it created regulatory frameworks for the 
‘normal’ mainstream and by default deviance from normality; and (3) it justified social 
engineering and individual-level corrective interventions. 
In the sixth chapter, the UK’s PREVENT strategy was analysed through the lens of 
disciplinary technology. The problematisation of Muslim identity was embedded in 
PREVENT. For example, the first two sections showed what PREVENT did in terms 
of remaking Muslim communities. As Salafis and Islamists were categorised as 
‘extremists’, they became marginalised from counter-radicalisation efforts and the 
conventional leadership were generally demoted from their position as ‘gatekeepers’. 
Data showed that alternative communities were promoted instead, especially those 
deemed ‘moderate’. Viewed in this way, PREVENT must therefore be seen as a 
normative project. It seeks to produce new forms of subjectivity and suppress others.  
Meanwhile, the pre-emptive logic of risk is exemplified in the second and third 
objectives of PREVENT, which seek to protect ‘vulnerable individuals’ from 
radicalisation and to help social and public institutions identity ‘extremism’. Notably, 
‘extremism’ enjoys no legal definition but acts as the benchmark by which individuals 
are assessed and placed on a de-radicalisation programme. No crimes were 
perpetrated by radicalised subjects but instead through their expressions and 
outward behaviour displayed the potentiality and possibility for becoming violent. The 
data analysis also indicated that ‘vulnerability’ and ‘extremism’ were associated with 
Muslim difference and excess (defined as too much religion and politics), which are 
to be found and ‘channelled’ into processes of normalisation to curtail Muslim surfeit. 
Hence Muslim subjectivity is being managed by government and remade along more 
congenial lines. 
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Thereafter, chapter 7 addressed ‘subjectification’ or how individuals become subjects 
of a particular ‘regime of truth’. The first two sections conveyed the way that 
community and elite experts, many of whom were Muslims, confessed or 
disseminated their knowledge, which was subsequently used by government and 
experts to improve their knowledge on radicalisation and in order to hone the 
PREVENT strategy. This was evident with the emergence of the category ‘non-
violent extremism’ in PREVENT II, which effectively discredited community expertise. 
Elite experts, like Quilliam, were favoured in the end over community experts 
because, to paraphrase an interviewee, ‘they looked like us’ and are ‘into 
secularism’. In other words, they embodied a government sanctioned Islam.  
The second dimension of the confession was about the transformation of individual 
subjectivity. The young age of radicalised subjects, their disconnection from wider 
terrorist networks, the focus of interventions on individuals rather than groups, and 
the way individuals are viewed as ‘vulnerable’, together reinforced the pastoral logic 
of de-radicalisation. It is a pastoral logic contingent on the pre-emptive logic of risk, 
instead of the logic of rehabilitation commonly associated with de-radicalisation in 
prisons. The confessional is embodied in de-radicalisation interventions through the 
mentoring of radicalised subjects, the use of technique associated with 
psychotherapy, such as counselling, and religious theological dialogue in order to 
de-legitimise the ideological underpinning of radicalised subjectivities. The ultimate 
goal of de-radicalisation in the UK is not necessarily violence, for many of the 
subjects were never violent to begin with, but a type of ideological and religious 
revisionism, which contextualises world politics, foreign policy, and theology in a way 
that is endorsed by political authority. By this we mean that Muslim identity is 
transformed to something more amenable to British social and political spaces. This 
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was encapsulated in the notion prominent in the data of ‘returning to the 
mainstream’, also articulated in terms of ‘redemption’.   
Finally, de-radicalisation is the logical endpoint of the problematisation of identity. In 
terms of intervention programmes and the wider sense in which it impacts everyone 
in society, de-radicalisation seeks to inscribe a form of Muslim subjectivity 
compatible with the nation state and neo-liberalism: modern, secular, liberal, 
consumerist, self-regulating, individualistic, and apolitical. Only once Muslims have 
been de-radicalised can they be included into the national majority. Situated within 
neo-liberal governmentality, de-radicalisation is therefore less about the mitigation of 
violence and more about the making of a particular subjectivity and conduct. An 
important by-product of de-radicalisation is the formation of the identity of the 
collective British nation. De-radicalisation is therefore not only about the remaking of 
subjectivity of the problematic radical ‘Other’, but perhaps more importantly, about 
the remaking of the British Self in relation to the uncertainly about British political 
identity amidst the wider pressures posed by globalisation and fragmentation of the 
nation.    
 
8.2 Contribution to Knowledge 
 
This thesis has contributed to original knowledge in the field by (a) gathering data on 
de-radicalisation- the first of its kind in the UK context (b) offering an alternative 
ontological framework to understand de-radicalisation in the UK; and (c) a theoretical 
contribution to the governmentality of radicalisation policies, in which the self-other 
functionality is explored (usually considered and studied at the global and 
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international level) through the micro-politics of identity and the ‘micro-physics’ of 
power in the neo-liberal era. This three-fold claim will be expanded further and 
defended in this section. 
The first contribution to the knowledge on de-radicalisation is empirical. At the start 
of this investigation, there was not a single study of de-radicalisation in the UK in the 
literature (see chapter 2).  As result, my research tried to address the lacuna in the 
literature by collecting data on de-radicalisation in the UK context. As argued in the 
last section, the fieldwork data revealed a number of important aspects with respect 
to the conceptualisation of de-radicalisation.  It therefore represents the first attempt 
in the UK to gather primary data on de-radicalisation and analyse it in a novel and 
original way.   
The second contribution to knowledge is conceptual. My thesis reconciles the 
conceptual confusion characterising de-radicalisation. These problems include: a 
contested definition, the limitations associated with cognitive/behaviour factors in the 
conceptualisation of de-radicalisation, the predominant association of de-
radicalisation solely with the objectives of counter-terrorism; contradictions in the 
policy logic between pre-emptive and preventive orientations, disjuncture between 
the idea and practice of de-radicalisation, and the ostensible paradox of 
premeditated interventions targeting youngsters categorised as ‘vulnerable’.  
Specifically, conceptual discussions in the literature were primarily around the 
relationship between cognitive and behavioural variables. These conceptions provide 
insight into de-radicalisation ontologically, but they do not advance a clear 
conceptual framework, which is exemplified by the problematic implications of the 
cognitive-behavioural dichotomy in conceptions of de-radicalisation and notions 
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regarding the adoption of values. To elaborate further, reductionist discussions about 
‘cognitive’ and ‘behavioural’ variables can be attributed to the positivist epistemology 
dominating the conceptualisation of de-radicalisation in the literature. 
Epistemologically, both Ashour and Horgan are committed to a positive framework. 
This is also evident in the PREVENT conception of de-radicalisation. This positivism 
means that de-radicalisation conceptually looks for causation in human behaviour 
using scientific premises, which subordinates other factors conducive to analysis, 
shapes the way that policy is implemented, and ultimately obscures the reality of 
political violence.  
Indeed the notion of causation has been at the heart of discursive production on 
radicalisation. After all such research programmes have in large part motivated by 
the questions ‘why’ and ‘how’ British nationals undertake violence against their 
country and ‘why’ and ‘how’ they could abandon violence. The modern scientific 
language discusses human action in terms of ‘root causes’. It seeks to determine 
causes that trigger behaviours, instead of investigating the goods that agent’s pursue 
through their choices and actions. The positivist framework which sees de-
radicalisation in terms of cognitive and behavioural variables presupposes a level of 
determinism. 
For example, the interchangeable use of ‘worldview’, ideology, and cognitive change, 
denotes, despite their different meanings, the notion of a particular paradigm that 
individuals subscribe to that provides both an explanation of the world and a 
prescription of what to do and how to act. The presumption is that the unitary 
worldview of the individual can be dislodged through a dialectic dialogue with 
radicalised individuals. The implicit suggestion is that (1) the worldview could be 
abandoned abruptly; (2) that a new worldview is adopted; and (3) a new behaviour 
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and lifestyle results from (1) and (2). It is these points that are encompassed by the 
term ‘cognitive change’. The causal linear logic dominating analysis of radicalisation, 
and by implication de-radicalisation, goes something like: ‘if the ideas and precepts 
are right, then it follows that the behaviour will be right’. The preoccupation of 
policymakers with the threat of ideology consequently gave the impression that the 
solution to radicalisation resided with alterations with the worldview of the radicalised 
subject, in which tweaking an individual’s belief on certain issues would result in 
behavioural change. 
However, the de-radicalisation process does not happen in such a simplistic manner. 
It also meant that de-radicalisation efforts in the UK have focused on ‘thought-
crimes’ and the expressed opinions and views of youngster as a barometer to gauge 
potentially for radicalism. How does putting a young Muslim, say of fifteen years, 
identified by his school and vetted through Channel, on a de-radicalisation 
programme protect Britain from terrorism? This conception of de-radicalisation 
however restricts our analytical lens solely to the domain of epistemology, when in 
fact the actual concern of policymakers is with a type of political ethics; namely the 
conduct of citizens and the formation of politically sanctioned subjectivities.  
Another inherent problem with the positivist framework dominating the 
conceptualisation of de-radicalisation is that the study of radicalisation and de-
radicalisation, takes place in an objective and neutral way. It presumes that 
policymakers can arrive at universal laws for all times and place. Given that de-
radicalisation is conceived as a policy and solution to radicalisation, any positivist 
study of de-radicalisation is done with the efforts of satisfying policy objectives.  Thus 
the study of radicalisation has not been neutral or objective. I have argued that the 
function of radicalisation is not supposed to describe the phenomenon of the real 
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word exactly but is instead supposed to be performative in order to justify 
interventions. In other words, the positivist framework surrounding de-radicalisation 
is intertwined with a ‘blowing out the fire’ logic, which has undeniably stymied 
attempts to conduct robust research in this area. Popular conceptions of de-
radicalisation however try to produce a concept that is applicable to every place and 
time. It presumes a static temporality that precludes the possibility of changes to the 
idea and practice of de-radicalisation and ignores the wider political, social, historical 
context of de-radicalisation.  Even the literature, which is dominated by think-tanks 
reports, conceded the importance of context and the absence of any applicable laws 
for de-radicalisation. 
Conceptually therefore, the technology of the self manages to capture the main 
dynamics of de-radicalisation without the terminological labyrinth. It allows us to side-
step the problems associated with causation and recalibrate our focus on the ethical 
and political dimensions inherent in de-radicalisation. Another benefit is that it 
describes de-radicalisation solely in the UK context and as a by-product of the 
political, historical, and sociological changes in Britain over the past three decades. 
The technology of the self thus grounds de-radicalisation in a conceptual framework 
that is particular, relevant, and compatible with the context of the UK.  It enables us 
to make sense of the conflicting policy logics found in PREVENT and the fact that it 
operates according to a much wider remit than afforded by counter-terrorism.  
Finally, it explains why and how liberal governmentality intervenes in people’s lives 
through the contradictory functionality of the anticipatory logics of detention and 
pastoral logics of care.  Ultimately, the technology of the self is the most analytically 
fruitful concept to understand de-radicalisation in the UK context.  
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The third contribution to the knowledge of de-radicalisation is theoretical. In some 
respects, my account of de-radicalisation echoes the critical constructivist and post-
structuralist works of David Campbell (1998), Iver Neumann (1998), and Stuart Croft 
(2012) which emphasise the fact that identity and security are co-constitutive.  
However, unlike the authors above, the focus of my thesis has been on the micro-
politics of identity rather than macro and externalised version of identity formation 
between states. In fact the wider conclusion of conceptualising de-radicalisation as 
technology of the self is that it is about ‘who we are’ as much as about disciplining 
the conduct of subjects. The attempt to fix a national political identity and socialise 
subjects in conformity to it is not merely the objective of security. Rather, the 
existence of security is contingent on identity constructions. It is in this sense identity 
and security cannot be ontologically separated, which is controversial given that the 
role that identity plays in security is contested. Notwithstanding the challenging 
questions open to exploration in this field, the technology of the self integrates the 
idea and practice of de-radicalisation into the more elaborate schema of Foucauldian 
governmentality. It is a more comprehensive, coherent, and analytically fecund 
theory than the current PREVENT framework of de-radicalisation.   
 
Remarkably, the literature was devoid of theories on de-radicalisation. The closest to 
a theory on de-radicalisation were Foucauldian interpretations of de-radicalisation by 
Neil Aggarwal and Lindekilde and yet both accounts are not relevant to the UK 
context. The overall lack of theoretical development is surprising given that the de-
radicalisation thesis claims explanatory and prescriptive powers. For example, it 
claims it can explain human behaviour (causal relationship between thought and 
action) and transform behaviour (the experience of change), which manifests in both 
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the renunciation of violence and the socialisation of militants back into mainstream 
society. But the technology of the self provides a theory that not only accommodates 
the claims of de-radicalisation but also offers more with respect to salient debates in 
security studies on issues relating to complexity/parsimony, continuity/change, 
ideas/material, and agency/structure (Jarvis and Holland 2015, 20). The way the 
technology of the self responds to the aforementioned issues is elaborated below. 
Despite the immense complexity of deradicalising someone, government and 
academic accounts are parsimonious: it situates de-radicalisation merely as an 
instrument of counter-terrorism and has primarily focused on the need to tackle 
Islamist ideology. In contrast, the technology of the self introduces more complexity 
to de-radicalisation. It allows us to debunk the prevalent notion that de-radicalisation 
is concerned with merely mitigating the possibility of violence on British soil. 
Although this is undeniably one objective amongst others and indeed a necessary 
and desirable goal for policymakers, employing the concept of the technology of the 
self however situates de-radicalisation as a technique deployed by government in 
order to ensure that the Muslim populations within the nation-state are disciplined, 
that citizens acquire the appropriate conduct, and that individuals adopt and invest in 
modes of subjectivities that are deemed sanitised and certified by political 
authorities. From the standpoint of neo-liberal governmentality acceptable 
subjectivity begins with the notion of the ideal liberal citizen, who is not only 
democratic, non-violent, and tolerant but also active, responsible, and self-regulating. 
The preoccupation of policymakers with the ideas and practices of citizens beyond 
issues relating to violence is reflected in the way that certain forms of identities are 
being suppressed and affirmed. This risk management logic at the heart de-
radicalisation and PREVENT strategies has to be contextualised within wider 
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narratives, in which Islam is being constructed as an essentially fundamentalist 
religion and Muslims as a threat to the security and identity of the nation state. The 
technology of the self is an individuating power that represents one pole of 
governmentality, whereas the other pole is concerned with the collective population. 
Hence the reason governmentality is conceptualised as the government of ‘all and 
each’. Conceptualising de-radicalisation as a technology of the self therefore enables 
us to view it as an instrument of government that seeks to deal with the multifarious 
challenges embodied in ‘the Muslim Question’ and construction of the majority 
identity, and not merely as a strategy to fight terrorism. 
An additional layer of theoretical complexity conferred by using the technology of the 
self is the role of civil society in shaping conduct on behalf of government. After all, 
the PREVENT strategy delegated the responsibility of tackling radicalisation to 
Muslim civil society not to mention the fact that de-radicalisation interventions in the 
UK primarily target non-violent youths in civil society and not in the enclosed 
environment of prisons. The prevailing view in social science literature sees civil 
society as a sphere located between state and market-a buffer zone strong enough 
to keep both state and market in check, thereby preventing each from becoming too 
powerful.  
However, the technology of the self also supports a view of civil society that posits it 
is a sphere which is not just independent and external to the state and government 
but as being an internal, as well as an extension, to the state and political 
institutions. In other words, civil society is something which forms part of modern 
governmental rationalities. To say that civil society belongs to political rationalities 
does not deny its external reality but instead presents another perspective. It is only 
by viewing civil society in this way that we can begin to reconcile the paradox in 
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which the strategy of de-radicalisation has sections of civil society as its target whilst 
simultaneously accomplishing its objective with the help of the very thing it targets. 
Put in another way civil society is tasked with the job of controlling, disciplining, and 
modifying the bad apples at the bottom of its own barrel. It is this self-regulating and 
self-correcting mechanism that connects de-radicalisation, civil society, and 
disciplinary technology. 
Another theoretical benefit gained in employing the technology of the self is the 
distinction between whether de-radicalisation represents continuity or change in 
governmental policy. It sheds lights on the workings of governmentality with respect 
to interventions and programmes that operate in society outside a juridical spaces 
and frameworks. Indeed the non-juridical dimension of de-radicalisation interventions 
remains one of the striking features of UK de-radicalisation. This thesis has hitherto 
demonstrated the way governments seek the modification of behaviour in its 
citizenry outside the juridical realm through wide ranging measures, e.g. discourses, 
strategies, policies, programmes, interventions, and pastoral power. Therefore, 
understanding de-radicalisation through the lens of the technology of the self 
contextualises de-radicalisation in relation to similar interventions in other policy 
domains. 
In this respect de-radicalisation interventions share a similarity with programmes that 
help individuals improve their well-being by overcoming threats to their health, like 
obesity and smoking found in the policy area of Health, or ‘back to work’ initiatives 
found in Welfare and Employment. Whilst undeniably constituting a change in certain 
respects, it represents more continuity, the critical difference is that the nation, and 
by extension the European project, is invested in the cultural universalism through 
the objectification of its antithesis, Islam, and so a lot more is at stake here than back 
413 
 
to work schemes for job seekers. The change of de-radicalisation is therefore 
historical and related to the incorporation of theology and religion in counter-
radicalisation and de-radicalisation efforts. 
Furthermore, the technology of the self presents a symbiotic relationship between 
the role of ideas and material in the de-radicalisation process. The whole enterprise 
of fighting radicalisation and extremism is built on the premise that ideas have 
agency and that ideology is the root cause of our new security challenge. By 
implication therefore counter-ideology gets militants away from violence.  However, 
the literature on de-radicalisation argues against the primacy of counter-ideology in 
interventions. In fact the literature shows ideological factors play little or no role in 
persuading individuals to enter or leave such groups and movements. This highlights 
the disjuncture between the largely ideological focus of current de-radicalisation 
programs and the factors found to motivate individuals’ entry into and exit from 
terrorist organisations. 
Although I have not been concerned with the actual process of de-radicalisation in 
my investigation, the literature on the process of de-radicalisation nevertheless 
forces us to question the influence of ideology as a primary influence in explaining 
the journey towards and away from radicalisation. However, similarly to 
contemporary security thinking regarding the importance of ideas, the technology of 
the self also valorises the role of ideas and discourse in the formation of the self and 
the implementation of policy. However, unlike current thinking on de-radicalisation, 
the technology of the self offers a more holistic account that reconciles discursive 
dimensions with material domains, describing the interplay between radicalisation 
and its concretisation in institutions and programmes. In doing so, the technology of 
the self encompasses the discursive production of ‘radicalisation’ that has 
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distinctively characterised the British experience in relation to fighting terrorism and 
which much of the literature on de-radicalisation has evaded and overlooked.  
However, the importance of discursive technology does not mean that radicalisation 
does not exist in the real world or that there is no such thing as de-radicalisation. Nor 
does it mean that the only thing that exists is meaning, language, and discourse. A 
distinction must be made between the idea that ‘nothing meaningful exists outside 
the discourse’ on the one hand, and that ‘nothing exists outside of discourse’ on the 
other. The second statement is a claim that no material world exists out there and 
that is patently not the case. But to say nothing ‘meaningful’ is different; it is to say 
that you could make sense of the world only within the framework of discourse and 
interpretation. Without the constitutive and instrumental role of discursive production 
therefore in the PREVENT strategy, the meaning of radicalisation as body of 
knowledge could not be exchanged and secured. It is through discourse that the 
interplay between representations of difference, what should be regarded as a threat 
and what is legitimate, the dissemination of that knowledge, in conjunction with 
power, occurs. 
The role of agency is really important. This is another area where the concept of the 
technology of the self moves the debate along, even if only slightly. The positivist 
framework, addressed above, does not afford space for subjects to have any 
agency. It forces the conceptualisation of de-radicalisation to take a deterministic 
view of human behaviour and relegates the influence of structure on subjects, 
reducing the radicalisation process to questions of psychology, identity, and 
ideology. This is obvious in definitions of de-radicalisation as ‘cognitive’ and 
‘behavioural’ and in other definitions that posit de-radicalisation as a process of 
integrating ‘militants into mainstream society’. The suggestion in popular conceptions 
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of de-radicalisation is that ‘mainstream society’ and radicalised subjects are at polar 
ends of the spectrum, completely divorced from one another.  It is reflected in the 
discourse of PREVENT itself, the concept of ‘vulnerability’ being a case in point. 
Therefore, the technology of the self presents a more sophisticated account of the 
debate surrounding agency. It allows the subject to act and make decisions, albeit 
the space for action is limited. The Foucauldian subject was presented in chapter 4 
as internal and not external to structures and as a by-product of society and history 
and not as a disengaged subject floating abstractly in a transcendent way. Foucault’s 
account of the subject as presented in his later works had to be included in order 
secure the agency of the subject, in our context, the Muslim subject, who although is 
subject to scrutiny, objectification, and regimes of domination, has the capacity to act 
in different ways: to reject subjectification and resist in a multitude of ways- as many 
do and many others are trying to negotiate- equally as much as many end up 
accepting and silently embracing regimes of normalisation.  
Whilst this thesis has not included examples of Muslim agency, and perhaps my 
account of de-radicalisation ostensibly appears too silent on Muslim agency, an 
attempt was made nevertheless to maintain the capacity for agency theoretically out 
of the belief that although regimes of domination and processes of normalisation are 
impossible to escape, governmentality can only guide and shape conduct- it cannot 
generally determine it. In any case, my concern has been with the task of ontological 
description rather than normative statements. As a result, the technology of the self 
provides a better account of the relationship between structure and agency.   
In summation, my research has made an original contribution to knowledge by 
gathering empirical data that allowed a more holistic and richer understanding of de-
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radicalisation to emerge; by offering a more accurate conceptual framework to 
understand de-radicalisation in the UK and which resolves both the opacity of the 
PREVENT conception of de-radicalisation and the fissures found in the literature; 
and by contributing to theoretical discussions on the governmentality of radicalisation 
policies, emphasising the micro-physics of power and the micro-politics of identity 
formation in our modern era. This thesis has answered the question posed at the 
beginning of my investigation. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Examples of De-radicalisation Programmes and Source of Information 
Source:  Adapted from Disley et al. 2011, 108-112 
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Table 2: Definitions of De-radicalisation 
 
Author Definitions Features 
UN 
Programmes that are generally directed against 
individuals who have become radical with the aim 
of re-integrating them into society or dissuading 
them from violence. 
 Programmes 
 Individuals 
 Reintegration into Society 
 Dissuade from use of 
violence 
UK Home 
Office 
This support is sometimes described as 
“deradicalisation”, a term which is used to refer to 
cognitive or behavioural change and sometimes 
to both. There are analogies between this work 
and other forms of crime prevention 
 Support for the ‘vulnerable’ 
 Individual process 
 Cognitive Change 
 Behavioural Change 
 Analogies with Crime 
Prevention 
 
Horgan 
Reducing the risk for engagement (and/or re-
engagement) in terrorism and illicit activity 
 Reducing risk 
 Terrorism 
 Illicit activity 
 
Ashour 
A process of relative change within Islamist 
movements, one in which a radical group 
reverses its ideology and de-legitimises the use 
of violence to achieve political goals 
 Islamist Movements 
 Collective Process 
 Ideology 
 Delegitimizing violence 
Demant et 
al.  
The opposite of radicalisation and becoming less 
radical with respect to behaviour and beliefs. 
Belief change entails increase in the confidence 
in the system, a desire to be a part of society, and 
the rejection of non-democratic means 
 Opposite of Radicalisation 
 Becoming less Radical 
 Behaviour 
 Beliefs 
 Belief change= support 
system, society and politics 
Rabasa at 
al. (Rand) 
A process of abandoning an extremist worldview 
and concluding not acceptable to use violence to 
effect social change. Recognition that social, 
political, and economic transformation will occur 
slowly and in a pluralistic environment 
 Abandoning Extremist 
Worldview 
 Rejection of violence 
 Accepting of political, social, 
and economic structure 
 Accepts pluralistic 
environment 
International 
Crisis 
Group (ICG) 
Prison based effort to persuade terrorists and 
their supporters to abandon the use of violence 
 Prison programmes 
 Persuade terrorist 
 Abandon violence 
Quilliam 
Foundation 
(QF) 
Ideology behind extremism is questioned and 
refuted and replaced in favour of a more 
traditional, pluralistic understanding of Islam 
 Ideology 
 Extremism 
 Refutation 
 Acceptance of Liberal Islam 
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Table 5: Definitions of Radicalisation 
 
 
 
 
 
Author Definition Features 
EU 
Commission 
(2005) 
‘Phenomenon of the people embracing opinions, 
views, and ideas which could lead to terrorism’ 
 Terrorism,  
 Extremist beliefs,  
 Individual 
CONTEST, 
UK (2009) 
 
‘Process by which people come to support, and in 
some cases to participate in terrorism’ 
 Directed Process 
 Terrorism 
 Individual 
 Support for terrorism 
NYPD, 
Silber & 
Bhatt (2007) 
‘Local residents or citizens gradually adopt an 
extremist religious/political ideology hostile to the 
West, which legitimises terrorism as a tool to 
affect societal change. This ideology is fed and 
nurtured with a variety of extremist influences. 
Internalizing this extreme belief system as ones’ 
own is radicalisation’ 
 Directed process  
 Hostility to the West  
 Terrorism  
 Extremist beliefs  
 Individual 
 
Danish 
Government 
‘The process by which a person gradually accept 
extremist ideas and methods possibly supports 
organised groups’ 
 Directed Process 
 Acceptance/Support 
 Extremist beliefs 
 Individual 
Moskelenko 
and 
McCauley 
(2008) 
‘Dimension of increasing extremity of beliefs, 
feelings, and behaviours in support of intergroup 
conflict and violence’ 
 Directed Process 
 Extreme belief, feelings, 
and behaviour 
 Violence and Conflict 
 Political Mobilisation 
 Collective 
Jonathan 
Githens-
Mazer (2010) 
‘Collectively defined, individually felt moral 
obligation to participate in direct action’ 
 Moral Obligation 
 Collective and Individual 
 Direct Action 
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